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In  this  thesis,  I  propose  to  explore  Plato's  moral  and  political  thought  in  the  Republic, 
and  comparing  it  with  similar  ideas  in  Confucian  thought,  and  in  modern  liberal 
thought. 
In  Part  I,  1  deal  with  Plato's  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job'  in  the  just  state  (ch. 
1),  and  with  the  Confucian  approach  to  achieving  an  orderly  society  (ch.  2).  In 
Chapter  3  the  idea  that  both  the  Platonic  just  state  and  Confucian  orderly  society  are 
communitarian  by  nature  will  be  discussed.  It  is  noticeable  that  although  both  Plato's 
and  Confucius'  accounts  of  the  just  state  have  the  colour  of  communitarianism,  yet 
their  accounts  are  in  one  way  or  another  different  from  the  modem  communitarian's 
account  of  the  just  state.  In  addition,  there  are  also  important  differences  between 
Plato  and  Confucius.  Take  the  relation  between  personal  good  and  the  common  good 
as  an  example.  Both  Plato  and  Confucius  hold  that  in  the  ideal  state  one's  own  good 
is  identical  with  the  good  of  the  state  as  a  whole.  But  communitarians  hold  that  the 
common  good  is  prior  to  personal  good.  That  is,  for  the  communitarians,  there  is  a 
distinction  between  personal  good  and  the  common  good  (Section  3). 
In  Part  II,  1  shall  consider  a  problem  which  arises  from  the  discussion  of  Plato's 
notion  of  the  tripartite  soul  that  there  is  a  sub-division  in  each  part  of  the  soul,  which 
leads  to  infinite  regress.  I  argue  in  Chapter  4  that  this  problem  can  be  avoided.  So 
long  as  there  is  no  `  degree  of  rationality'  among  the  three  parts.  That  is,  only  reason 
is  capable  of  calculating,  and  the  other  two  parts  do  not  have  the  capacity  of 
reasoning.  This  account  of  the  tripartite  soul  makes  sense  of  why  Plato  puts  such 
strong  emphasis  on  education.  For  through  education,  spirit  and  appetite  are  willing  to 
be  under  the  control  of  reason.  The  unity  of  the  soul  is  not  achieved  by  force  but  by 
education.  Although  in  the  Analects  Confucius  never  discusses  the  notion  of  the 
human  soul,  he  urges  people  to  cultivate  their  character.  A  superior  roan  is  morally 
superior  to  the  public.  The  superior  man,  in  Confucius'  view,  cannot  be  understood 
only  in  terms  of  his  character.  His  possession  of  good  character  has  to  be  understood 
within  social  context.  This  difference  between  Plato  and  Confucius  leads  them  to different  ways  of  understanding  the  individual  (Chapter  6). 
In  Part  III,  I  shall  argue  that  the  orderly  state  depends  upon  each  person  doing 
one  job,  but  that  to  maintain  the  order  in  the  state  depends  upon  education.  In  Chapter 
7I  discuss  how  by  education  the  harmonious  soul  and  state  can  be  achieved.  In 
Section  31  argue  that  order  and  harmony  can  be  achieved  in  both  the  state  and  the 
soul,  but  it  does  not  mean  that  there  is  an  exact  parallel  between  the  state  and  the  soul. 
For  Plato  proposes  different  kinds  of  education  or  training  in  the  state  and  the  soul. 
Moreover  Plato  does  not  see  appetite  in  the  soul  as  exactly  correspondent  to  the  third 
class  in  the  state.  Confucius,  like  Plato,  emphasizes  the  importance  of  education,  i.  e. 
self-cultivation.  Self-cultivation  is  the  process  of  the  realization  of  human-heartedness. 
However  the  realization  of  human-heartedness  can  only  be  achieved  in  social  context. 
Thus  the  notion  of  `  inner  sage  '  and  of  '  outer  king  '  can  never  be  properly 
understood  separately.  The  notion  of  `  authority-as-model  '  is  central  to  Confucian 
moral  and  political  thought.  I  oppose  Weber's  account  of  Confucius'  sage-king  as 
having  charisma  by  showing  that  there  are  inconsistencies  in  Weber's  argument,  and 
that  the  sage-king  does  not  gain  his  authority  by  having  superior  power  but  by  being 
virtuous  (Chapter  8,  Section  3).  Both  Plato  and  Confucius  emphasize  the  importance 
of  education  in  the  cultivation  of  character,  so  the  problem  whether  or  not  education 
and  training  have  the  same  meanings  for  both  of  them,  and  whether  they  apply  the 
notion  of'  treat  unequals  unequally  '  to  education  in  the  same  way,  will  be  the  issues 
in  Chapter  9. 
In  Part  IV,  several  issues  concerning  social  role  are  discussed.  First  of  all, 
whether  morality  can  be  properly  understood  merely  in  terms  of  role-  performance? 
(Chapter  10)  Second,  we  in  society  occupy  more  than  one  roles,  so  how  do  we  decide 
what  to  do  when  our  roles  are  in  conflict  with  one  another  (Chapter  11).  Third,  in  the 
liberal  thought  we  have  our  roles  by  choice.  That  is,  most  of  roles  we  have,  except, 
perhaps,  for  those  we  have  by  birth,  are  contractual  roles.  We  enter  into  a  role  by 
signing  the  contract  (Chapter  12).  In-fact,  we  have  come  across  these  questions  in 
previous  chapters.  However,  the  purpose  of  re-introducing  them  here  is  to  consider 
whether  Plato  and  Confucius  would  be  troubled  by  these  questions,  and  discuss  how 
they  would  give  answers  to  them. 
Finally,  in  Part  V,  two  issues  will  be  discussed.  First,  it  is  commonly  held  that  in 
ii Book  I  of  the  Republic  Plato  shows  his  interlocutors  the  inadequacies  of  giving  an 
account  of  justice  in  terms  of  the  agent's  external  behaviour,  and  then  from  Book  II  to 
Book  IV  Plato  sets  up  an  agent-centred  morality,  and  claims  that  just  man  is  one  who 
has  a  balanced  soul.  I  argue  that  Plato  right  from  the  outset  of  the  Republic  is 
interested  in  an  agent-centred  view  of  morality.  Secondly  throughout  the  Anulects 
Confucius  seems  to  give  his  readers  an  impression  that  he  is  interested  in  act-centred 
morality.  For  the  Confucian  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  one  has  to  act  in  accordance 
with  rules  of  proper  conduct  makes  his  readers  think  that  Confucius'  primarily 
concern  in  the  Analects  is  how  man  should  behave.  However,  I  would  like  to  argue 
that  Confucian  ethics  is  a  combination  or  union  of  agent-centred  and  act-centred 
theory  in  that  acting  in  accordance  with  rules  of  proper  conduct  requires  an  inner 
dimension,  human-heartedness.  Thus  a  person  can  be  identified  as  a  superior  man 
only  when  he  is  able  to  satisfy  these  two  criteria:  rediscovering  human-heartedness 
from  within,  and  expressing  his  possession  of  human-heartedness  by  acting  in 
accordance  with  rules  of  proper  conduct. 
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The  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  is  central  to  the  political  and  moral  thought  of 
Plato's  Republic.  In  the  just  state  each  citizen  willingly  performs  the  role  for  which  he 
is  by  nature  suited  and  sees  his  own  interests  as  identical  with  those  of  the  state.  Plato, 
unlike  Adam  Smith  who  claims  that  one's  nature  is  formed  by  the  division  of  labour,  ' 
thinks  that  in  the  ideal  state  the  division  of  labour  is  determined  by  the  diversity  of 
individual  nature  (415a-c).  Thus,  for  Plato,  each  person  doing  one  job  for  which  he  is 
naturally  suited  is  essential  for  a  state  being  just.  The  just  man  is,  likewise,  the  one 
whose  soul  is  orderly  and  balanced,  with  each  part  playing  its  own  proper  role.  Plato's 
conception  of  the  highest  good  is  thus  an  ideal  of  unity  and  order. 
There  appears  to  be  a  parallel  to  Plato's  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  in 
Confucian  ethics.  An  orderly  society,  in  the  Confucian  view,  can  be  achieved  only 
when  the  members  of  the  society  play  their  roles.  Confucius  in  the  A  alects  says  that 
"  [Ijet  a  ruler  be  a  ruler,  a  subject  be  a  subject,  a  father  be  a  father,  and  a  son  be  a 
son"  (XII,  11).  In  other  words,  a  good  ruler  is  not  simply  one  who  happens  to  occupy 
the  role  of  ruler.  But  he  is  able  to  translate  duties  and  obligations  prescribed  by  the 
role  into  action.  Confucius'  conception  of  the  highest  good,  the  Way,  consists,  like 
Plato,  in  order. 
Men  are  social  animals.  Morality  can  thus  be  seen  as  a  matter  of  fulfilling  the 
duties  and  obligations  prescribed  by  the  roles  one  occupies  in  society.  As  F.  H. 
Bradley  says,  " 
...  a  man's  life  with  its  moral  duties  is  in  the  main  filled  up  by  its 
station  in  that  system  of  wholes  which  the  state  is,  and  ...  this,  partly  by  its  laws  and 
institutions,  and  still  more  by  its  spirit,  gives  him  the  life  which  he  does  live  and 
ought  to  live.  "`  Morality  in  this  sense  is  concerned  with  one  acting  in  accordance  with 
rules  and  laws  which  define  the  duties  or  obligations  of  the  role  one  occupies.  This  in 
1  R.  S.  Downie,  "  Moral  Problems  In  A  Market  Economy:  A  Reappraisal  cf  Atlant  Smith  ",  1)al  unisie 
Review,  vol.  57,1977,  p.  432. 
2  F.  H.  Bradley,  "  My  station  and  its  Duties  ",  in  his  I:  ihica!  Sludiec  (London,  1876),  p.  157. turn  would  appear  to  mean  that  morality  is  primarily  concerned  with  action  rather 
than  with  character.  It  may  therefore  seem  that  the  morality  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  ' 
must  imply  what  we  would  now  call  an  act-centred,  rather  than  an  agent-centred, 
view  of  morality. 
Plato's  account  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  at  first  sight  seems  to  bear  this  out,  i.  e. 
it  sees  morality  in  terms  of  role-performance  and  thus  implies  an  act-centred 
morality.  '  However,  what  Plato  is  most  concerned  with  in  the  Republic  is  the  inner 
harmony  of  the  state  and  the  soul.  A  just  state  is  not  one  which  has  a  harmoniously 
diplomatic  relationship  with  other  states,  but  one  in  which  each  person  does  one  job 
for  which  he  is  by  nature  suited.  A  just  man,  likewise,  is  not  one  who  merely  does  just 
acts,  but  one  whose  soul  is  in  a  state  of  harmony,  i.  e.  each  element  of  the  soul 
performs  their  functions  properly.  It  is  thus  clear  that  Plato's  conception  of  `  doing 
one's  own  job  '  yields  a  very  different  account  of  morality  from  the  simple  role 
morality  I  have  just  described.  In  his  theory  the  connections  between  action  and 
character  and  between  the  individual  and  the  state  are  complex  and  subtle.  One  aim 
of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  these  complexities. 
On  the  surface,  Confucius'  account  of  the  principle  of  Rectification  of  Names4 
may  likewise  seem  to  imply  a  morality  of  role-performance.  To  be  a  morally  good  son 
is  to  be  filial  to  his  parents.  That  is,  a  good  son  fulfills  the  duties  prescribed  by  the 
role  of  son.  However  Confucius  is  not  simply  saying  that  the  ruler  should  carry  out  the 
tasks  appropriate  to  a  ruler,  that  the  father  should  carry  out  the  tasks  appropriate  to  a 
father  and  so  on,  but  that  the  ruler  should  be  a  ruler,  that  the  father  should  he  a  father 
and  so  on.  5  Moreover  he  does  not  claim  that  those  who  are  able  to  stick  to  their  social 
roles,  and  do  not  stray  from  their  stations  can  be  called  the  superior  men.  For  a 
superior  man  is  the  one  who  possesses  a  well-cultivated  character,  and  is  able  to 
actualize  his  character  in  the  social  context  by  acting  in  conformity  with  ritual  (!  i), 
rule  of  proper  conduct.  Thus,  for  Confucius,  the  connection  between  role  and 
character  is  more  complex  than  one  might  suppose. 
3  For  a  discussion  on  the  relation  between  role  morality  and  act-centred  morality,  see  Part  IV,  Chapter 
12. 
4  See  my  discussion  at  Part  I,  Chapter  2,  Section  3. 
3  See  the  Analects,  II,  T,  111,3;  XVII,  9. 
vu lt  is  worth  noting  that  the  salient  feature  of  the  modern  liberal  account  of 
morality  in  teens  of  social  role  is  the  agent's  freedom  of  choice.  One  only  enters  into 
a  role  when  one  chooses  to.  However  for  both  Plato  and  Confucius  having  a  role  is 
not  a  matter  of  choice.  For  Plato,  one's  social  role  is  determined  by  one's  nature  and 
aptitude.  Thus  in  the  ideal  state,  as  mentioned,  the  division  of  labour  depends  upon 
the  theory  of  human  nature  proposed  by  Plato  in  the  Republic.  Confucius,  unlike  Plato, 
does  not  see  human  nature  as  an  important  factor  for  the  division  of  social  class. 
Confucius,  as  a  feudalist,  holds  that  one's  social  role  is  mainly  determined  by  birth, 
inheritance,  and  consanguinity.  Thus,  although  it  is  possible  to  see  some  similarities 
between  Plato  and  Confucius  and  modern  philosophers  who  have  stressed  the 
importance  of  roles  in  morality,  the  contrasts  are  perhaps  even  more  striking. 
viii Part  I 
Just  State Chapter  1 
Plato's  Just  State 
We  are  told  in  the  Republic  that  in  order  to  find  justice  in  the  individual,  it  would  be 
easier  for  us  first  to  look  for  it  in  the  state.  For"  [j  justice  can  be  a  characteristic  of  an 
individual  or  of  a  community  "  (368e).  This  premiss  is  accepted  by  Adeimantus,  thus 
to  see  justice  in  the  society  or  state  we  have  first  to  know  what  the  nature  of  a  society 
is.  What  is  the  essential  factor  for  a  society  coming  into  being?  From  369b  onwards 
Plato  describes  at  length  the  evolution  of  the  society  from  the  primitive  one  to  the 
ideal  one,  and  leads  his  interlocutors,  after  establishing  his  ideal  state,  to  see  how  the 
ideal  state  is  a  just  one.  In  the  just  state  each  individual  does  one  job  for  which  he  or 
she  is  naturally  suited.  In  this  chapter  I  would  like  to  discuss  three  topics  to  explore 
Plato's  account  of  the  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  ':  first  of  all,  the  rise  of  society; 
secondly,  justice  and  sophrosune,  and  finally,  the  unity  of  the  state. 
1.  The  rise  of  society 
Plato  says  at  369b  that  it  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  individual  is  not  self-sufficient,  that 
society  originates.  The  existence  of  a  society  is  to  fulfill  the  individual's  varied  needs 
he  cannot  supply  himself.  In  a  minimal  society,  for  Plato,  people's  basic  needs,  i.  e. 
food,  shelter,  clothing  and  shoes,  can  be  satisfied.  Thus  a  minimal  society  would 
consist  of  at  least  four  men,  that  is,  a  farmer,  builder,  weaver  and  shoemaker  (369d). 
Each  of  them  is  specialized  in  one  trade  and  will  devote  all  his  time  to  producing 
enough  product  to  fulfill  the  needs  of  all  of  them.  For  instance,  a  shoemaker  will 
spend  all  his  time  making  shoes,  and  exchange  his  product  with  the  weaver,  who 
spends  all  his  time  making  clothes.  This  system  of  barter  forms  a  basic  model  of 
economic  society.  And  the  principle  applied  to  '  one  man  should  do  one  job  '  is 
commonly  called  the  Principle  of  Specialization.  However  it  would  be  wrong  to  think 
here  that  Plato  is  only  interested  in  economic  efficiency,  as  Cross  and  Woozley  point out,  "  [e]very  time  we  are  faced  with  a  strike  of  sufficient  proportions  or  duration,  we 
are  given  a  reminder  of  Plato's  point,  that  the  meeting  of  economic  needs  comes  first, 
and  that  without  that  no  other  needs  can  be  met  at  all.  "'  For,  firstly,  what  Plato  says 
here  is  not  only  that  quantity  and  quality  of  products  would  be  more  easily  produced 
when  each  individual  in  the  society  does  one  job  and  devotes  all  his  or  her  time  to  it, 
but  also  that  each  individual  does  one  job  which  is  suitable  for  his  or  her  aptitude  or 
nature  (phusis).  2  It  is  the  latter  which  interests  Plato,  since  later  in  the  Republic  the 
Principle  of  Specialization  will  turn  out  to  be  the  basis  of  class  division  in  the  ideal 
state.  For  Plato  it  is  by  nature  that  each  individual  has  to  stick  to  one  job  for  which  he 
or  she  is  fitted. 
Secondly,  is  it  not  the  case  in  the  first  city  that  in  order  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
body,  the  needs  of  the  soul  have  to  be  met  first?  For,  in  Plato's  view,  the  farmer  can 
provide  enough  food  for  all  four  of  them  in  the  first  city  only  when  he  or  she  devotes 
all  his  or  her  time  to  producing  food.  And  the  devotion  to  producing  food,  for  the 
farmer,  is  to  fulfill  his  or  her  nature  and  to  perform  his  or  her  function  as  a  farmer 
properly.  Thus,  it  follows,  I  think,  that  the  fulfillment  of  one's  nature  is  prior  to  the 
fulfillment  of  one's  economic  or  bodily  needs.  That  is  to  say,  only  when  each 
individual  in  the  first  city  can  fulfill  their  natures,  i.  e.  performing  their  social 
functions  for  which  they  are  naturally  suited,  can  their  bodily  needs  be  met.  So  it 
follows  from  this  that  what  Wilson  claims,  when  he  discusses  the  formation  of  the 
first  city,  that  "  [what]  the  initial  picture  really  omits  is  the  needs  of  the  soul  "',  would 
1  R.  C.  Cross  and  A.  D.  Woozley,  Plato's  Republic.  A  t'hilosophical  (ommeniary  (London,  1994),  p. 
82. 
2  The  sentence  at  370b  is  translated  by  Lee  as  "  we  have  different  iiaiurul  npinu/es  (cliaphero  i  tent 
phu.  sn,  ).  which  fit  us  for  different  jobs  ",  but  the  term  italicized  is  also  translated  by  scholars  as  we  have 
different  '  natures  '  (Shorey  1994,  Grube  1992,  Waterfield  1994,  and  Jowett  1892).  It  is  also  translated 
by  Cornford  as  '  innate  differences  '  (1945).  However  the  sentence  at  433a  is  translated  by  Lee  as  " 
..., 
that  in  our  state  one  man  was  to  do  one  job,  the  job  he  was  naturally  most  suited  for  ",  and  all  the 
scholars  mentioned  above  use  the  same  term  '  nature  '.  In  both  contexts  the  word  is  phusis  '  nature  '. 
Lee's  introduction  of  the  word  at  370b  is  unnecessary.  At  433a  the  claim  is  that  each  person  should 
perform  one  job  for  which  his  nature  is  most  suited.  fiere  the  words  '  perform  '  epilecleileiir  and  `  most 
suited  '  epiledeiolale  are  related.  So  something  like  the  concept  of  aptitude  may  come  in  here. 
3  J.  R.  S.  Wilson,  "  The  Basis  of  Plato's  Society  ",  i'hilosop/iy  52,1977,  p.  316. 
17 be  suspicious.  For  if  one  person  by  nature  is  able  to  make  shoes,  then  to  be  a 
shoemaker  and  making  shoes  will  be  to  fulfill  his  nature  and  perform  his  function  as  a 
shoemaker  in  the  city.  Therefore  so  long  as  people  in  the  first  city,  i.  e.  farmer,  builder, 
weaver,  and  shoemaker,  can  fulfill  their  natures  and  perform  their  social  functions 
well,  they  fulfill  the  needs  of  their  souls.  I  am  inclined  to  think,  opposing  both  claims 
of  Wilson  and  Cross  and  Woozley,  that  even  in  the  first  city  Plato  is  not  only 
concerned  with  the  needs  of  the  body  but  also  those  of  the  soul. 
Furthermore,  in  Plato's  account  of  the  rise  of  society  there  are  two  points  worth 
noting.  Firstly,  a  society  coming  into  being  because  of  the  fact  that  each  individual  is 
not  self-sufficient  seems  to  suggest  that  the  individual  is  prior  to  society.  Whereas  in 
Aristotle's  Politics  we  are  told  that  "  the  city  is  prior  in  the  order  of  nature  to  the 
family  and  the  individual  "  (1253a18-9).  4  The  reason  for  Aristotle's  assertion  is  that 
"  the  whole  is  necessarily  prior  to  the  part  "  (1253a20-1).  5  For  the  part  cannot  be 
understood  unless  there  is  the  whole  existing  before  it,  and  the  part  can  perform  its 
function  only  when  the  whole  is  existent  before  it.  `  It  follows  from  this  that  an 
individual  can  achieve  his  or  her  fulfillment  and  completion  only  when  he  or  she  is  in 
the  society,  outside  the  society  the  individual  is  "  either  a  poor  sort  of  being,  or  a 
being  higher  than  man  "  (1253a6).  7  It  is  clear  that  for  Aristotle  it  would  be  impossible 
for  an  individual  to  perform  his  or  her  function  properly  if  he  or  she  is  outside  society. 
While  some  might  argue  that  it  would  not  be  the  case  for  Plato.  For  although  society 
results  from  lack  of  self-sufficiency,  Plato  does  not  take  lack  of  self-sufficiency  to 
mean  that  without  society  people  cannot  perform  their  functions  well.  We  may 
imagine  that  a  shoemaker  can  still  perform  his  function  as  a  shoemaker  well  despite 
the  fact  that  he  lives  without  society  and  has  difficulty  in  getting  everyday 
commodities.  What  Plato  says  is  that  without  society  people's  varied  needs  will  not 
be  fulfilled. 
However,  the  suggestion  that  a  shoemaker  can  perform  his  function  properly 
even  though  he  is  outside  society  is  only  superficially  correct.  If  we  refer  to  a  passage 
°  C.  Barker,  Arislolle:  7hc,  Politics  (Oxford,  1995),  p.  11. 
Ibid. 
6Ihicl,  p.  321. 
7  Ibid.  p.  10. 
3 in  the  Republic  where  Plato  tells  us  that  the  definition  of  function  is  that  one's 
function  is  what  one  can  do  or  cloes  best  (352e),  then  we  can  see  why  it  would  be 
impossible  for  a  shoemaker  living  outside  society  to  perform  his  function  well  or  to 
do  his  best.  For  he  would  spend  a  lot  of  time  looking  for  his  subsistence,  and  spend 
little  time  making  shoes.  Thus  in  spite  of  the  difference  between  Aristotle  and  Plato, 
there  is  still  one  thing  they  have  in  common.  That  is,  although  Plato  does  not 
explicitly  say  that  without  society  men  cannot  perform  their  functions  well,  we  still 
can  find  the  clue  to  prove  that  Plato  does  think  implicitly  that  only  in  a  society  men 
can  perform  their  functions  well,  which  will  fulfill  both  each  individual's  bodily 
needs  and  the  needs  of  their  souls.  Therefore  both  for  Plato  and  Aristotle,  society 
exists  for  men  to  have  a  good  life,  that  is,  in  a  society  each  individual  can  fulfill  his 
needs  and  perform  his  functions  well.  Nevertheless,  one  thing  has  to  be  pointed  out 
that  although  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  claim  that  men  can  only  seek  their  completion 
within  society,  yet  Plato,  unlike  Aristotle,  does  not  claim  that  a  man  living  outside 
society  and  not  being  able  to  perform  his  function  well  is  a"  subhuman  "s,  but  is  an 
unhappy  man.  In  other  words,  for  Aristotle  man  is  essentially  social,  while  for  Plato  it 
is  a  contingent  matter  that  we  need  to  live  in  society. 
Secondly,  the  division  of  labour  in  the  minimal  society  is  in  accordance  with 
each  individual's  aptitude  or  nature,  and  each  individual  has  to  do  only  one  job  since 
that  will  enable  them  to  do  their  best.  Plato's  emphasis  on  natural  difference  is  not  to 
tell  us  that  each  individual  according  to  his  or  her  natural  tendency  has  to  do  this  or 
that  job  in  terms  of  social  contract  theory,  as  Ilobbes  would  claim,  but  to  tell  us  that 
the  individual's  natural  tendency  is  a  means  for  cooperation  or  mutual  aid  in  a  society. 
For  the  contractarian  claims  that  one  takes  on  a  social  role  only  when  one  chooses  to 
do  it.  One's  consent  to  fulfill  the  obligations  prescribed  by  the  role  is  important. 
However,  individual  natural  tendency  is  the  basis  for  Plato's  economic  division  of 
labour  which  is  a  model  for  his  political  structure.  For  in  Plato's  view  men  are  by 
nature  suited  for  certain  job,  in  other  words,  men  are  born  with  obligation.  For 
instance,  one's  being  a  shoemaker,  for  Plato,  is  determined  by  one's  nature.  Thus  one 
is  born  to  be  a  shoemaker,  and  can  do  nothing  but  fulfill  the  obligation  prescribed  by 
8  T.  J.  Saunders,  Aristotle:  the  J'olilicc  (London,  1981),  p.  59. 
4 the  role,  making  shoes.  So  Plato  seems  to  assume  that  things  go  better  for  the 
individual  and  the  society  if  each  sticks  to  his  own  job.  People  are  not  self-sufficient 
without  society,  so  within  a  society  people  can  meet  their  needs  by  fulfilling  their 
potentials  or  functions  for  which  they  are  fitted.  That  is  the  reason  why  Plato  has  to 
stress  the  importance  of  specialization  in  job.  For  if  the  shoemaker  wants  to  spend 
some  of  his  time  in  building  houses,  then  the  need  of  people  for  shoes  will  not  be 
fulfilled.  It  follows  that  the  chain  of  cooperation  in  the  society  will  be  broken  by  the 
shoemaker's  not  spending  all  his  time  making  shoes.  As  Annas  points  out, 
[Plato]  thinks  that  someone  who  follows  his  or  her  own  personal  inclinations, 
rather  than  the  inclinations  that  spring  from  the  social  role  for  which  they  are 
best  fitted,  is  always  irresponsible  and  immature,  and  that  the  person  who  is 
unwilling  to  co-operate  as  fully  as  possible  in  producing  the  common  good  is 
always  selfish.  9 
We  can  further  see  that  Plato's  appeal  to  the  idea  that  one  has  to  do  one's  own 
thing  for  which  one  is  naturally  suited,  is  opposed  to  a  liberal  individualist  view,  such 
as  Mill's,  that  I  can  do  whatever  I  want  as  long  as  my  action  does  not  do  harm  to  the 
others.  On  the  contrary,  Plato's  view  assumes  the  value  of  cooperation1°  in  the  sense 
that  it  requires  people  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  rules  prescribed  by  their  social 
roles  whether  they  choose  to  or  not.  Thus  what  Cross  and  Woozley's  claim  that  Plato 
is  not  only  stressing  that  "  the  basic  principle  of  a  community's  life  is  economic,  but 
also  that  the  basic  fact  about  economic  life  is  that  it  is  self-interested  "11,  is  doubtful. 
For,  as  mentioned,  both  bodily  needs  and  the  needs  ofthe  soul  can  be  fulfilled  if  each 
individual  does  his  or  her  own  job.  And  doing  one's  own  job  is  not  only  to  do  good  to 
oneself  but  also  to  the  society  as  a  whole. 
As  the  dialogue  proceeds,  the  division  of  labour  becomes  more  elaborate  in 
accordance  with  the  Principle  of  Specialization.  In  the  minimal  society  smiths  and 
9  J.  Annas,  An  Introduction  to  Plato's  Republic  (Oxford,  1981),  p.  76. 
1°  See,  Wilson.  op.  cit.,  p.  315.  It  is  said  in  the  Republic  that  although  the  members  of  the  society  have 
different  natural  aptitudes  (370a-b),  yet  they  have  to  be  in  cooperation  with  one  another  (371b). 
11 
0/).  Cll. 
5 other  craftsmen  are  needed  to  provide  tools  for  farming  and  building  (370d),  and 
there  is  also  a  need  for  merchants  to  deal  with  the  import  and  export  business.  If  this 
trade  is  overseas  then  the  experts  on  ships  and  seafaring  will  be  needed  (371a).  There 
also  need  to  be  retailers  and  manual  labourers  to  deal  with  goods.  So  far,  the  minimal 
society  has  been  established,  and  it  is  within  the  minimal  society  that  people's 
necessary  appetitive  and  spiritual  needs  can  be  met.  Thus  people  who  live  in  it  will  be 
happy.  But  Glaucon  says  ironically  that  it  is  "a  community  of  pigs  "  (372d).  Glaucon 
is  not  satisfied  with  Plato's  account  of  the  minimal  society  and  wishes  for  a  more 
luxurious  society  in  which  people  can  have  more  than  what  they  can  get  in  the 
minimal  society.  Thus  the  size  of  the  city  has  to  be  enlarged  because  in  the  luxurious 
society  there  will  be  more  population  since  there  will  be  more  occupations  added  in. 
The  enlargement  of  the  territory  of  the  city  will  inevitably  cause  conflict  with  its 
neighbours  (373d-e).  So  in  addition  to  hunters,  fishermen,  artists,  doctors 
...  and  so  on, 
there  is  still  one  occupation  needed  in  the  city,  namely,  the  guardians.  The  guardians 
are  able  to  protect  the  city's  possessions  and  property  from  being  plundered.  They 
will  also  be  able  to  seize  the  new  territory  for  city  needs  to  support  its  large 
population. 
Plato,  at  375a,  employs  an  analogy  to  give  an  account  of  the  qualities  required  in 
the  guardians.  He  says  that  a  guardian,  like  a  well-bred  watch  dog,  "  must  have  keen 
perceptions,  and  speed  in  pursuit  of  his  quarry,  and  also  strength  to  fight  if  need  be 
when  he  catches  it.  "  In  addition  to  these  physical  qualities,  the  guardians  also  need  to 
be  high-spirited  in  character  (375b).  Here  Glaucon  is  worried  that  the  guardians'  high- 
spirit  might  lead  them  to  be  aggressive  to  their  fellow-citizens  as  well  as  to  their 
enemies.  Plato  here  employs  the  analogy  again  to  assure  Glaucon  that  the  problem  he 
is  concerned  with  can  be  resolved.  It  is  just  like  the  well-trained  watch-dog  who  will 
be  gentle  to  the  one  it  knows,  and  will  be  fierce  to  a  stranger  (375d-376a).  Similarly, 
the  guardians  will  be  gentle  to  their  fellow-citizens  and  be  fierce  to  their  enemies,  and 
it  is  by  the  knowledge  they  have  that  they  can  discriminate  between  fellow-citizens 
and  enemies.  Since  philosophy  is  the  love  of  knowledge  (376b-c),  the  guardians 
should  have  the  philosophic  disposition. 
Plato  proceeds  at  length  to  describe  the  education  of  the  guardians  (376c-412a). 
6 Here  I  will  not  discuss  in  detail  Plato's  educational  programme  12,  but  will  skip 
directly  to  the  third  state,  i.  e.  the  ideal  state. 
In  the  luxurious  city,  there  exist  two  classes  of  people,  the  guardians  and  the 
producers  and  artists  ...  and  so  on.  However,  the  guardian  class  is  subdivided  into  the 
Guardians  and  the  Auxiliaries  by  selection  or  elimination  through  education.  Thus  the 
state  in  its  final  form  has  three  classes,  that  is,  the  Guardians,  the  Auxiliaries  and  the 
farmers  and  artisans,  etc..  The  Guardians,  says  Plato,  who  possess  "  the  greatest  skill 
in  watching  over  the  community  "  should  be  the  rulers  (412c).  The  function  of  the 
Auxiliaries  is  to  enforce  the  Guardians'  decision  (414b).  Both  the  Guardians  and  the 
Auxiliaries  live  simple  lives,  that  is,  they  do  not  possess  private  property  and  do  not 
have  family  life.  For,  in  Plato's  view,  the  service  of  the  Guardians  and  the  Auxiliaries 
to  the  state  will  be  impeded  by  possessing  private  property  and  family.  They  will  be 
housed  and  eat  common  meals  provided  by  the  lower  class  people.  So,  with  the  basic 
structure  of  the  third  state  is  ideally  established,  from  427d  onwards  Plato  proceeds  to 
look  for  justice  in  the  state. 
Plato's  first  city  rises  because  of  the  individual's  lack  of  self-sufficiency,  I  argue, 
in  this  section,  firstly  that  the  rise  of  the  society  is  not  only  to  meet  the  individual's 
bodily  needs  but  also  the  needs  of  the  individual  soul.  Only  when  the  Principle  of 
Specification  is  in  practice,  can  the  individual's  bodily  needs  be  fulfilled.  The  claim, 
secondly,  that  individual  is  not  self-sufficient  seems  to  suggest  that  society  comes  into 
existence  for  the  benefit  of  individual,  to  which  Aristotle  is  opposed.  For,  in 
Aristotle's  view,  society  is  by  nature  prior  to  individual.  Men  are  born  into  society, 
not  vice  versa.  In  spite  of  the  difference  between  them,  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  would 
agree  that  men  within  society  would  be  better  oft.  Men  living  in  the  society  will  be 
able  to  reach  their  own  completion.  Finally,  Plato's  view  that  we  are  fitted  by  nature 
for  certain  positions  or  roles  differentiates  his  position  both  from  the  contractarians 
and  liberals  who  see  us  as  being  able  to  choose  roles  and  from  those  who  see  tradition 
on  family  background  as  establishing  our  roles. 
12  For  a  discussion  on  the  education  of  the  soul,  see  Part  III,  Chapter  7,  Section  2. 
7 2.  Justice  and  sophrosune 
It  is  said  in  the  Republic  that  one  can  find  the  cardinal  virtues,  i.  e.  wisdom,  courage, 
soplirosune,  and  justice  in  both  the  ideal  state  and  the  balanced  soul  (427e,  440c-d).  It 
would  be  easy  for  readers  of  the  Republic  to  appreciate  that  the  state  is  wise  because 
one  class  of  its  citizens,  namely,  the  Guardians,  are  wise;  similarly,  the  state  is  brave 
because  a  second  class  of  its  citizens,  namely,  the  Auxiliaries,  are  brave.  The  same 
principle,  according  to  Plato,  can  be  applied  to  the  individual  (441c-d).  When  an 
individual  is  called  both  wise  and  brave  it  is  because  his  reason  is  in  control  in  his 
soul,  and  the  spirited  part  of  his  soul  is  in  alliance  with  the  reason,  which  enables  him 
to  know  what  sort  of  things  he  ought  or  ought  not  to  fear  (442e).  However,  there  are 
no  exact  locations  for  sophrosune  and  justice  in  the  state  and  the  individual.  For  there 
are  no  specific  elements  which  correspond  to  these  two  virtues  in  the  way  that  the 
Guardians  and  the  reason  correspond  to  wisdom,  and  the  Auxiliaries  and  the  spirit 
correspond  to  bravery.  In  this  section  I  shall  firstly  explore  the  role  of  sophrosunc  in 
the  Republic,  in  the  course  of  discussion  I  will  refer  to  relevant  passages  in  the 
Gorgias  and  the  Laws;  and  secondly  I  shall  proceed  to  discuss  the  issue  of  the  relation 
between  justice  and  sophrosune  to  show  that  justice  and  sophrosune,  for  Plato,  are  not 
synonymous. 
It  is  said  at  the  Republic  427e  that  the  four  cardinal  virtues  are  wisdom,  courage, 
sophrosune,  and  justice.  Sophrosune,  like  the  other  virtues,  is  "  one  of  the 
cornerstones  of  the  Greeks'  cultural  and  moral  heritage.  "13  The  etymological  meaning 
of  sophrosune  is  '  soundness  of  mind  '  (sain  d'esprit).  14  However,  according  to  De 
Vries,  the  notion  of  sophrosune  can  be  treated  in  two  ways:  firstly,  in  an  intellectual 
sense,  the  meaning  of  sophrosune  may  be  `  reasonableness  '  (epieikeia),  reasonable 
judgement,  or  reasonable  reflection,  etc..  Secondly,  in  a  moral  sense,  the  meaning  of 
D.  Watt,  Charmides,  in  Plato:  Early  Socratic  Dialogures  (London,  1987),  (ed.  )  T.  J.  Saunders,  p.  165. 
See  also  G.  J.  De  Vries,  "  Sophrosune  en  Grec  Classique  ",  Afnemo.  %w  e.  vol.  11,1943.  De  Vries  says  at 
the  outset  of  the  article  that  "  Pour  tout  lecteur  de  cette  litterature  il  est  evident  que  la  qualite  indiquee 
par  ces  mots  (sophroaruºe,  sophron)  dolt  avoir  occupe  dans  la  vie  spirituelle  des  Grecs  une  place 
particuliere.  "  p.  81. 
14  De  Vries,  Ihid.  p.  84. 
8 sophrosune  can  be  '  modesty  '  (aides),  '  self-control  '  (cgkraleia),  discipline 
(eutaksia),  or  `  propriety  '  (kosmioles),  etc..  '  Although  the  intellectual  sense  is  often 
attached  to  the  moral  sense,  or  vice  versa,  yet  the  divergence  makes  the  meaning  of 
sophrosune  vague.  In  what  follows  I  shall  go  through  the  Republic  to  see  how  Plato 
makes  use  of  sophrosune. 
(1)  Sophrosune  as  self-control  and  moderation.  The  notion  of  sophrosune  is 
first  brought  out  by  Cephalus  in  the  Republic,  329d,  when  he  is  asked  by  Socrates 
whether  old  age  is  a  kind  of  burden.  Cephalus  replies  that  if  men  are  sensible  and 
good-tempered  6  then  old  age  is  easy  enough  to  bear.  Cephalus  thinks  that 
overcoming  desires  is  important.  However  Cephalus  as  a  money  lover  does  not  have 
any  philosophical  insight  into  the  importance  of  sophrosune,  and  Plato  at  this  stage 
does  not  give  his  readers  any  information  more  than  a  hint  that  to  be  good-tempered  is 
one  of  the  factors  which  will  enable  people  to  have  a  tranquil  life.  While  as  the 
dialogue  proceeds  the  importance  of  sophrosune  increases.  Towards  the  end  of  Book 
II,  Plato  starts  to  set  up  the  first  stage  of  education  for  the  young  guardians.  Plato 
proposes  that  the  first  stage  of  education  be  divided  into  two  parts:  literary  17  and 
physical  education.  Regarding  literary  education,  Plato,  firstly,  thinks  that  the  subjects 
of  stories,  poetry,  and  narratives  should  be  supervised.  Only  those  suitable  for 
moulding  the  young  guardians'  minds  and  characters  can  be  used  (377b-c).  Most 
existing  poetry,  narration,  and  music  are  unsuitable  for  the  training  of  the  guardians' 
minds,  since  they  are  not  useful  in  encouraging  the  guardians  to  be  self-controlled. 
Plato  says  that  inappropriate  prose  or  verse  cannot  be  used  in  the  education  "  [flor 
they  are  hardly  suitable  to  encourage  the  young  to  self-control  (sophrosunen)"  (390a). 
Secondly,  when  Plato  talks  of  the  form  of  narrative  he  says, 
The  decent  man,  when  he  comes  in  the  course  of  a  narrative  to  a  speech  or 
action  by  a  man  of  good  character  will  be  willing  to  impersonate  him  and 
feel  no  shame  at  this  kind  of  representation.  (396c) 
15  De  Vries,  Ibid.  pp.  82-3. 
16  Although  Cephalus  at  329d  does  not  use  the  word  `  sophrosune  ',  he  clearly  has  this  concept  in  mind. 
17  D.  Lee,  , 
Plato:  Me  Republic  (London,  1987),  p.  129. 
9 What  Plato  proposes  here  is  that  poetry  which  involves  imitation  of  unsuitable 
characters  should  be  restricted.  Only  the  imitation  of  good  man  can  be  used  in  the 
training  of  character.  One  thing  worth  noting  is  that  Plato  in  this  passage  seems  to 
assert  that  to  imitate  the  good  man  can  be  useful  in  the  guardians'  moral  cultivation. 
This  is,  I  think,  parallel  to  the  Confucian  idea  that  superior  men  have  to  be  the  objects 
of  emulation  for  the  ordinary  people.  However  later  on  in  the  Republic  it  is  clear  that 
the  difference  between  Plato  and  Confucius  rests  upon  the  fact,  firstly,  that  for  Plato 
human  beings  are  by  nature  different  from  one  another,  so  it  is  impossible  for  people 
of  lower  class  to  become  Guardians  or  Auxiliaries.  For  each  has  to  do  one  job  for 
which  he  or  she  is  naturally  suited.  Whereas,  in  the  Confucian  view,  superior 
manhood  is  accessible  to  everyone  so  long  as  they  are  willing  to  make  their  efforts  in 
self-cultivation,  in  that  by  nature  men  close  to  each  other  (the  Analects,  XVII,  2). 
Secondly,  although  Plato  thinks  that  imitating  a  good  man  is  good  to  the  guardians' 
moral  cultivation,  imitating  a  character  while  reciting  a  poem  is  different  from  trying 
to  model  oneself  on  a  real  person.  It  is  notable  how  little  Plato  says  about  emulation. 
His  treatment  of  poetry  emphasizes  the  need  to  get  rid  of  harmful  elements  rather  than 
encouraging  good  ones. 
In  addition  to  poetry  and  narrative,  Plato  thinks  that  music  should  be  restricted  to 
some  extent.  Modes  and  rhythms,  in  Plato's  view,  have  to  be  suitable  to  cultivate  the 
guardian's  character.  Plato  says, 
I'm  no  expert  on  modes,  but  leave  me  one  that  will  represent  appropriately 
the  voice  and  accent  of  a  brave  man  on  military  service  or  any  dangerous 
undertaking,  .... 
And  I  want  another  mode  to  represent  him  in  the  voluntary 
non-violent  occupations  of  peace-time:  for  instance,  persuading  someone  to 
grant  a  request,  praying  to  God  or  instructing  or  admonishing  his  neighbour, 
or  again  submitting  himself  to  the  requests  or  instruction  or  persuasion  of 
others  and  acting  as  he  decides,  and  in  all  showing  no  conceit,  but 
moderation  (sophron)  and  common  sense  and  willingness  to  accept  the 
outcome.  Give  me  these  two  modes,  one  stern,  one  pleasant,  which  will  best 
represent  sound  courage  and  moderation  (sophron)  in  good  fortune  or  in  bad. 
(399b-c) 
10 And, 
After  mode  we  should  presumably  deal  next  with  rhythm.  We  shan't  want 
very  elaborate  or  varied  combinations,  but  merely  need  to  find  which 
rhythms  suit  a  life  of  courage  and  discipline  (kosniios).  (399e) 
It  is  apparent  from  these  passages  that  to  educate  the  guardians  to  be  moclcrukc  and 
self-disciplined  is  the  aim  of  literary  education.  There  is  the  other  half  left  untouched 
in  Platonic  educational  system,  that  is,  physical  education. 
Plato  holds  that  physical  education,  like  the  education  of  character,  has  to  be 
simple.  Plato  says, 
Elaborate  music  produces  indiscipline,  and  elaborate  food  produces  disease. 
But  simplicity  in  music  produces  discipline  (sophrusune)  of  character,  and 
simplicity  in  physical  education  health  of  body.  (404e) 
It  can  be  seen  that  Plato  claims  that  physical  education,  like  literary  education,  is 
really  concerned  with  the  soul  (41  le-412a).  The  guardians  will  maintain  self- 
discipline  as  long  as  the  simple  form  of  education  Plato  proposes  is in  practice.  And 
these  self-disciplined  guardians  will  have  no  need  of  `  judicial  treatment  '  because 
they  have  practiced  the  kind  of  `  music  '  which  creates  sophrosunc  (41  Oa). 
After  setting  up  the  systems  of  literary  and  physical  education  Plato  proceeds  to 
look  for  justice  in  the  state  and  the  individual.  At  430e  Plato  says  that  Vophrosune  is  a 
kind  of  order,  a  control  of  certain  desires  and  appetites.  It  is  the  first  time  in  the 
Republic  that  Plato  gives  a  clear  picture  of  what  sophrosune  is.  however,  the  idea  that 
sophrosune  is  a  kind  of  order  is  not  a  new  invention  for  the  same  idea  is  also 
expressed  in  the  Gorgiax,  where  Socrates  says, 
[W]hat  is  the  quality  which  order  and  proportion  create  in  the  soul?  ....  and 
the  means  which  produce  order  and  proportion  in  the  soul  are  called 
`  regulation  '  and  `  law  ';  these  are  what  make  men  law-abiding  and  orderly, and  so  we  have  righteousness  and  moderation  (sophrosune).  (504c-d)' 
Moreover,  the  idea  that  sophrosune  is  a  kind  of  control  of  certain  desires  and 
appetites  is  mentioned  not  only  in  the  Republic,  but  also  in  both  the  Gorgias  and  the 
Laws.  Plato  says  in  the  Republic  that  to  be  self-disciplined  is  to  '  be  master  of 
oneself  ',  which  means  that  in  one's  soul  the  better  element  is  in  control  of  the  worse 
element.  We  are  told  in  the  Gorgias  that  " 
...;  we  can  win  happiness  only  by  bending 
all  our  efforts  and  those  of  the  state  to  the  realization  of  uprightness  and  self- 
discipline  (sophron),  not  by  allowing  our  appetites  to  go  unchecked,  ... 
"  (507c-d).  '9 
In  the  Laws  the  self-disciplined'  man  is  `  conqueror  of  '  his  appetites  or  desires  (626d- 
627b).  `0  It  should  be  noted  that  I  do  not  here  mean  that  Plato  has  two  distinct  accounts 
of  self-discipline  in  the  Republic  for  to  have  an  orderly  soul  is  to  put  one's  desires 
into  reason's  control.  And  the  life  of  the  self-disciplined  man,  as  the  Athenian 
describes  it  in  the  Laws,  will  be  gentle  in  all  respects,  with  mild  pleasures  and  pains, 
light  appetites,  and  desires  without  frenzy  (734a-e).  In  the  Republic,  only  the  genuine 
philosophers  are  sell=disciplined  (sophron)  and  not  grasping  about  money  (485e).  The 
philosophers  are  self-disciplined  because  they  are  capable  of  seeing  mentally  the 
Forms,  and  their  dealing  with  the  divine  order  will  make  them  acquire  the 
characteristics  of  order  and  divinity  (500d). 
(2)  Sophrosune  as  agreement.  In  addition  to  the  fact  that  sophrosune  is  a  kind 
of  order,  Plato  takes  it  to  imply  a  kind  of  agreement  among  the  three  classes.  As  Plato 
says, 
And  so  we  are  quite  justified  in  regarding  self-discipline  as  this  unanimity  in 
which  there  is  a  natural  concordance  between  higher  and  lower  about  which 
of  them  is  to  rule  in  state  and  individual.  (432a) 
[W]e  call  him  self-disciplined  when  all  these  three  elements  are  in  friendly 
and  harmonious  agreement,  when  reason  and  its  subordinates  are  all  agreed 
that  reason  should  rule  and  there  is  no  civil  war  among  them.  (442c-d) 
"W.  Hamilton,  Plato:  Gorgias  (London:  1971),  p.  112. 
19  Ibid.  p.  117. 
20  T.  J.  Saunders,  Plato:  Me  laws  (London:  1975),  pp.  48-9. 
12 Therefore,  a  state  is  called  sophron  when  the  members  of  it  reach  an  agreement  as  to 
who  should  rule  and  who  should  be  ruled.  It  should  be  noticed  that  the  ruled  are  not 
forced  by  the  rulers  to  accept  or  recognize  their  leadership,  since  this  reading  might 
render  Plato's  ideal  state  authoritative.  Rather  the  ruled  are  brought  up  (442a-b)  or 
directed  (519b-d)  to  believe  that  to  be  ruled  by  those  wise  men  is  not  only  good  to 
themselves  but  also  to  the  state  as  a  whole.  That  is,  the  reason  why  only  a  small 
number  of  people  should  be  the  rulers  is  that  they  are  lovers  of  knowledge  and  know 
what  is  best  for  each  individual  of  the  state  and  the  state  as  a  whole.  Plato  gives  a 
similar  account  of  sophrosune  in  the  soul.  In  a  harmonious  soul  the  unnecessary 
desires  are  left  unattended,  and  only  the  necessary  ones  can  be  fulfilled  (588e-590a). 
Thus  the  reason  will  never  be  enslaved  by  those  frenzy  desires. 
Let  us  move  on  to  Book  VIII  and  IX  where  Plato  is  dealing  with  imperfect 
societies  and  individuals.  As  North  fairly  points  out,  the  fundamental  cause  of 
corruption  in  the  state  and  in  the  individual  is  `  the  absence  of  sophrosvne.  '2'  The  rise 
of  timarchy  is  the  result  of  the  loss  of  harmony  among  the  ruling  class  (545d).  The 
salient  feature  of  timocracy  is  ambition  and  competitive  spirit  (548c),  and  it  also 
shares  the  characteristic  of  money-loving  with  oligarchy.  The  main  characteristic  of 
oligarchy  is  the  love  of  money,  so  unity  disappears  and  the  state  is  divided  into  the 
poor  and  the  rich  (550c-d).  The  sharp  division  between  the  poor  and  the  rich  gives 
rise  to  democracy  when  the  rich  are  overthrown  by  the  poor,  which  is  incompatible 
with  sophrosune.  Tyranny  is  the  product  of  corruption  of  democracy  when  the 
obsession  with  liberty  leads  to  anarchy  and  finally  to  the  rise  of  a  despot  (564a,  566a). 
The  corruptions  in  the  soul  happen  in  a  similar  way  to  the  corruptions  of  the 
ideal  state.  That  is,  the  balance  in  the  soul  breaks  down  because  the  harmony  among 
the  three  elements  disappears.  The  timarchic  man  is  in  love  with  honour  (550b),  but 
"  has  lost  his  best  safeguard  ",  reason  (549b).  The  oligarchical  man  is  keen  on  money- 
making,  and  enslaves  reason  and  spirit  in  his  soul  (553b-c).  The  democratic  man  has 
both  necessary  and  unnecessary  desires,  and  finally  the  tyrannical  man  is  full  of 
lawless  and  violent  desires  (571b).  It  is  clear  that  the  corruption  both  of  the  state  and 
of  the  soul  comes  about  not  only  because  the  elements  do  not  stick  to  the  jobs  for 
21  H  North,  Sophros  ne  (Ithaca,  1966),  p.  175. 
13 which  they  are  suited,  but  also  because  the  agreement  among  them  as  to  who  should 
rule  is  broken.  For  if  we  take  the  chronicle  of  the  corruption  seriously  a  breakdown  of 
harmony  within  the  ruling  class  leads  to  a  wide  breakdown  of  harmony  in  the  state. 
This  has  a  domino  effect  on  the  corruption  of  the  state.  Thus  we  can  see  the  force  of 
sophrosune  in  keeping  a  stable  and  unified  state  and  soul. 
So  far  I  have  roughly  run  through  the  passages  relevant  to  sophrosune  in  the 
Republic,  sophrosune  is  taken  by  Plato  to  be  self-control,  moderation,  and  agreement. 
It  is  undoubted  that  sophrosune  is  taken  by  Plato  as  the  cornerstone  of  the  unity  of  the 
state  and  that  of  the  soul.  One  question  might  be  asked  here:  If  sophrosune  alone  can 
guarantee  the  unity  both  of  the  state  and  the  soul,  then  why  Plato  has  to  introduce 
justice?  In  what  follows  I  shall  proceed  to  discuss  the  relation  between  sophroswne 
and  dikaiosune  to  find  the  answer  to  the  question. 
In  the  pre-Platonic  period  the  usages  and  meanings  of  sophrosune  and  justice  are 
not  intermingled.  22  The  former,  according  to  Larson,  has  three  facets:  sound 
judgement  (wisdom),  restraint  of  passion,  and  the  opposite  of  overweening  arrogance 
and  outrage.  And  the  latter  has  two  senses:  one  is  to  mean  lawfulness,  legality  and 
justice  in  connection  with  judging  in  government;  the  other  is  to  mean  faithfulness 
and  reliability.  23  Plato's  usage  of  sophrosune  seems  not  too  far  from  the  usage  of 
sophrosune  in  the  pre-Platonic  period,  but  Plato's  usage  of  justice  is  quite  different 
from  the  pre-Platonic  usage  of  justice.  For  justice  in  the  city,  according  to  Plato, 
means  that  everyone  does  his  or  her  own  job  (433a).  This  account  covers  more  than 
just  the  legalistic  field,  for  Plato  extends  it  to  psychological  field,  and  argues  that  the 
individual  is  just  when  each  part  of  the  soul  does  it's  own  job. 
However,  in  an  early  dialogue,  the  C'harinides,  sophrosune  is  defined  by 
Charmides  as  "  doing  one's  own  job  "  (161b).  24  Although  Charmides'  definition  is 
rejected  by  Socrates  who  later  on  in  the  same  dialogue  defines  sophrosune  as  the 
knowledge  of  good  and  bad,  nevertheless,  in  ordinary  usage,  `  doing  one's  own  job  ' 
21  C.  W.  R.  Larson,  "  The  Platonic  Synonyms,  Dikaiosune  and  Sophrosune  ",  America,,  Journal  of 
Philology,  vol.  LXXII,  1951,  p.  400. 
21  ibid.  pp.  398-399. 
24  Watt,  op.  cit.  p.  187. 
14 is  an  aspect  of  sophrosunc.  25  Therefore  it  might  not  be  unreasonable  to  assert  that 
Plato's  usage  of  justice  in  the  Republic  does  bear  some  attributes  of  sophrosune.  As 
North  points  out, 
[the  fact  that]  Plato  now  defines  justice  as  doing  one's  own  work  and  applies 
this  definition'  to  the  virtue  of  the  soul  and  of  the  State,  each  in  its  ideal 
condition, shows  that  he  is  widening  the  hitherto  narrow  and  legalistic  scope 
ofdikaiosyne  by  endowing  it  with  some  of  the  attributes  of  sophrosyne.  26 
Now  that  Plato  has  endowed  justice  with  some  attributes  of  sophrosune,  it  would  be 
better  if  we  can  see  how  these  two  virtues,  or  one  as  some  scholars  would  suggest,  27 
work  together.  In  the  Meno,  it  is  said  that  if  human  beings,  both  men  and  women,  are 
going  to  be  good,  they  need  both  qualities,  justice  and  temperance  (73b).  Whereas  it 
might  be  asked  why  both,  for  it  is  shown  in  the  Republic  that  sophrosune  alone  seems 
able  to  guarantee  the  harmony  and  the  unity  both  in  the  state  and  the  soul.  The  answer 
to  this  question,  I  think,  can  be  found  in  the  Laws,  where  the  Athenian  says  that  due  to 
the  fact  that  courage  is  in  need  of  sophrosune  as  a  companion,  "  in  the  absence  of 
self-  control,  justice  will  never  spring  up  "  (696c).  28  Although  sophrosune  and  justice 
are  defined  in  different  terms,  one  as  order  and  self-discipline,  the  other  as  doing 
one's  own  job,  the  close  relationship  between  the  two  is  obvious.  For  "  in  both  terms 
there  are  these  two  factors,  agreement  and  doing.  "`9  Sophrosune  by  definition  means 
agreement  (symphonia),  arrangement  (taxis),  order  (kosmos),  and  compromise 
(.  ýJ-stasis),  3°  but  also  implies  the  idea  doing  one's  own.  Justice  by  definition  means 
doing  one's  own  but  also  implies  that  doing  one's  own  is  not  to  be  meddlesome  in 
that  harmony  would  be  spoiled  by  one's  being  meddlesome  (the  Republic,  444b).  It  is 
worth  noting  that  the  relation  between  justice,  dikaiosunc,  and  sophrosune  is  different 
23  North,  op.  cit.  p.  156,  no.  11. 
16  up,  cit.  p.  173,  no.  49. 
27  Larson,  op.  cit. 
28  Saunders,  op.  cit.  p.  147. 
29  Larson,  Ibid.  p.  406. 
30  North,  op.  cit.  p.  152. 
L5 in  the  Republic  and  the  Laws.  Justice  is  more  emphasized  in  the  Republic,  because 
only  if  each  part  does  its  own  job  could  the  agreement  be  reached.  However,  in  the 
Laws  sophrosune  is  more  emphasized  because  Plato  in  the  dialogue  is  mainly 
concerned  with  the  harmony  between  passion  and  reason.  31 
This  relation  between  sophrosune  and  justice  reminds  us  of  the  relation  between 
human-heartedness  and  ritual  in  Confucian  ethics.  For,  in  the  Confucian  view,  to  be  a 
superior  man  is  not  only  a  matter  of  acting  in  accordance  with  rules  of  proper  conduct, 
ritual,  but  also  of  possessing  human-heartedness  (the  Analects,  III,  3).  It  seems  to  me 
that  both  human-heartedness  (to  love  people)  and  sophrosune  point  to  the  existence  of 
an  '  other  ',  that  is,  the  notion  of  sophrosune,  as  harmonious  agreement,  presupposes 
that  there  are  certain  interactions  among  different  classes  in  the  society  and  different 
elements  in  the  soul.  Although  both  justice  and  ritual  imply  a  kind  of  interaction 
among  different  elements,  justice  means  not  being  meddlesome,  and  ritual  acting  in 
accordance  with  rules  of  proper  conduct,  yet  without  sophrosune  and  human- 
heartedness  as  foundations,  both  justice  and  ritual  might  be  practiced  in  the  wrong 
way.  For  example,  in  Confucian  humane  society  a  person  without  possessing  human- 
heartedness  might  express  his  love  to  others  in  a  mechanical  way,  that  is,  when  he 
deals  with  people  he  acts  in  accordance  with  ritual  but  without  any  feeling  for  them. 
And  in  Plato's  just  society  one's  doing  his  own  might  turn  one  into  an  anti-social  man 
because  what  one  will  do  in  the  just  state  is  to  do  his  own  job  and  never  work  in 
cooperation  with  others.  In  other  words,  a  just  state  can  never  be  called  unified  and 
stable  unless  both  doing  one's  own  job  and  sophrosune  go  hand  in  hand  with  each 
other.  For  the  latter  presupposes  a  kind  of  agreement  among  people  which  will  enable 
people  to  work  cooperatively.  It  is  notable  that  ritual  is  very  like  the  older  Greek  idea 
of  sophrosune  as  '  knowing  your  place  ',  '  doing  your  own  job  ',  '  quietness  ',  etc.. 
But  Plato  treats  it  as  something  internal.  For  in  Confucian  ethics  there  is  no  division 
in  the  soul,  and  when  he  talks  of  ritual  Confucius  puts  emphasis  on  how  to  conduct 
oneself  properly  in  a  given  situation. 
The  analysis  above  shows  that  both  Plato  and  Confucius  think  that  the  unity  of 
state  cannot  be  achieved  only  by  practising  the  idea  that  each  sticks  to  his  or  her  own 
31  R.  F.  Stalley,  An  Jn1roductinn  !o  !  '/alo'.  e  laws  (Indianapolis,  1983),  pp.  54-6. 
16 job.  For  the  unity  of  society  is  different  from  that  of  machine,  that  is,  the  unity  of 
society  cannot  be  understood  in  a  mechanical  sense.  It  is  only  when  sophrosune  is 
brought  into  play  that  unity  can  be  achieved.  It  would  be  easier  to  understand  my 
argument  here  if  we  take  a  company  as  an  analogy  to  the  state.  It  is  common  sense 
that  each  member  of  a  company  should  stick  to  their  departmental  jobs  if  the 
company  is  to  be  run  properly.  However,  if  each  one  in  the  company  does  stick  to 
their  own  jobs  but  lacks  the  sense  of  sharing  feelings  and  the  concept  of  common 
good,  it  will  be  hard  to  imagine  how  they  can  be  in  cooperation  with  one  another.  In 
other  words,  for  a  company  to  be  run  well  it  is  not  enough  that  each  one  should 
merely  do  his  own  job.  It  is  only  when  each  department  can  reach  an  agreement  as  to 
how  to  cooperate  with  one  another  in  order  to  reach  a  common  goal  that  this  company 
can  be  said  to  be  well-run. 
Therefore,  there  is  no  surprise  that  sophrosune  and  justice  appear  at  the  same 
time  in  several  passages  in  the  Republic.  For  example,  the  philosophers  are  the  only 
ones  who  can  see  the  Forms,  so 
[l]f  the  philosopher  is  compelled  to  try  to  introduce  the  standards  which  he 
has  seen  there,  and  weave  them  not  into  himself  only,  but  into  the  habits  of 
men  both  in  the  private  and  public  lives,  will  he  lack  the  skill  to  produce 
self-discipline  and  justice  and  all  other  ordinary  virtues. 
Certainly  not.  (500d) 
A  few  lines  below,  Plato  says  that  the  philosophical  artist  will  look  frequently  in  both 
directions,  that  is,  at  justice  and  beauty  and  self-discipline  and  the  like  in  their  true 
nature  (501b)  and  at  the  copies  he  makes  of  them  in  society.  It  is  undoubted  that  Plato 
regards  both  justice  and  sophrosune  as  equally  important.  However  Plato,  as  an 
intellectualist,  would  say  that  without  wisdom,  that  is  without  seeing  the  Forms,  the 
philosophers  will  not  be  able  to  know  what  sophrosune  and  justice  are  in  their  true 
senses.  Consequently,  we  can  see  that  for  Plato  virtues  are  interlocked  with  one 
another. 
Finally,  the  question:  Whether  sophrosune  and  justice  are  synonyms  will  be 
briefly  considered.  Throughout  my  discussion  one  might  have  an  impression  that 
17 sophrosune,  for  Plato,  seems  to  mean  more  than  just  self-control,  it  also  means  order, 
harmony,  agreement,  and  doing  one's  own  job,  and  self-knowledge.  It  seems 
reasonable  to  say  that  sophrosune  expresses  "  the  all-embracing  order  and  the 
morality  of  restraint  and  limitation.  ,  32  In  spite  of  some  scholars'  assertion  that 
sophrosune  and  justice  are  synonyms,  i  would  be  inclined  to  think  that  the  relation 
between  sophrosune  and  justice  is  more  than  just  being  synonymous.  For,  as 
mentioned  earlier  on  in  this  section,  an  ideally  unified  state  demands  something  more 
than  doing  one's  own,  in  that  only  each  member  of  the  state  does  their  own  works 
without  the  aid  of  sophrosune,  there  will  never  be  a  harmony  or  agreement  in  the  state. 
Without  sophrosune  there  will  never  be  interactions  among  the  members  of  the  state. 
Moreover,  although  justice,  doing  one's  own  job,  can  be  the  first  step  towards 
harmony,  yet  it  would  be  hard  to  imagine  how  justice  alone  can  obtain  a  long  term 
stability  in  the  state,  if  each  member  of  it  does  his  or  her  own  job  but  does  not  reach 
an  agreement  as  to  who  should  rule.  Thus,  the  interdependence  between  sophrosune 
and  justice  is  crucial,  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other  if  the  state  is  to  be  unified. 
The  purpose  of  running  through  the  Republic  to  explore  the  role  of  sophrosune  is 
to  show  that  the  meaning  of  sophrosune  can  be  manifested  in  many  different  ways, 
such  as  self-control,  order,  moderation,  harmony,  and  agreement.  I  in  this  section  pick 
up  `  agreement  '  (432a)  as  an  important  aspect  of  sophrosune  because  a  unified  state 
cannot  be  achieved  only  by  appealing  to  the  idea,  doing  one's  own.  A  unified  state,  in 
Plato's  view,  is  a  state  with  inner  harmony,  which  can  be  achieved  when  the  members 
of  it  agree  about  who  should  be  ruled  and  who  should  rule.  Hence  people  share 
feelings  and  work  towards  the  same  goal  -  maintain  the  stability  of  the  state. 
Furthermore,  the  aim  of  the  idea  doing  one's  own  is  to  put  each  individual  in  their 
proper  places  in  the  state,  and  the  aim  of  sophrosune  is  to  create  inner  harmony  based 
upon  some  sort  of  agreement.  Therefore,  these  two  terms,  justice  and  sophrosune,  can 
by  no  means  be  synonymous. 
3.  The  unity  of  society 
32  North,  op.  Cit.  P.  15O. 
18 Plato  has  completed  his  task  in  searching  for  the  justice  in  the  state,  and  throughout 
his  account  of  the  justice  in  the  state  we  can  see  that  a  just  state  is  a  unity.  That  is  to 
say,  it  is  by  justice  and  sophrosune  that  a  state  can  be  unified.  I  shall  proceed  to 
examine  now  what  unity  means  in  Plato's  view. 
For  Plato  a  good  or  just  city  is  a  unified  city,  while  Aristotle  says  in  the  Politics 
that  "a  city  which  goes  on  becoming  more  and  more  of  a  unity,  will  eventually  cease 
to  be  a  city  at  all  "  (1261a18).  33  For  a  city,  in  Aristotle's  view,  is  a  sort  of  plurality, 
not  a  one.  A  unified  city,  for  Aristotle,  can  be  achieved  when  the  diversity  of  people 
who  compose  the  city  are  tied  up  together  with  friendship  and  reciprocity.  Aristotle 
says, 
A  real  unity  must  be  made  up  of  elements  which  differ  in  kind.  It  follows 
that  the  stability  of  every  city  depends  on  each  of  its  elements  rendering  to 
the  others  an  amount  equivalent  to  what  it  receives  from  them.  (126la34-8)34 
However  Plato's  appeal  to  unity  of  the  city  is  not  to  propose  a  kind  of  super- 
individual,  as  Aristotle  thinks,  which  is  over  and  above  each  individual  who 
composes  it.  Some  modern  commentators,  -15  who  follow  Aristotle,  claim  that  Plato's 
account  of  unity  of  the  state  does  lead  to  a  view  of  organic  state.  That  is,  in  an  organic 
state  each  individual  who  composes  it  is  only  a  part  of  the  state  and  without  genuine 
life  of  his  own.  A  unified  state  for  Plato  is  a  state  whose  inner  state  is  harmonious. 
That  is,  in  Plato's  ideal  state  each  one  does  his  or  her  own  job  for  which  he  or  she  is 
naturally  suited.  The  three  classes  are  in  harmony,  they  agree  about  who  should  rule 
and  who  should  be  ruled.  The  three  classes  would  identify  their  own  interests  with  the 
common  good  of  the  state  as  a  whole,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  a  state  is  an 
organism  which  has  its  own  interest  over  and  above  the  different  kinds  of  people's 
own  interests.  The  state  is  "  the  context  in  which  different  kinds  of  people  can  attain 
33  Barker,  op.  cil.  p.  39. 
34  Ibid.  p.  40. 
3sR.  Demos,  "  Paradoxes  in  Plato's  Doctrine  of  The  Ideal  State  ",  Classical  Quarterly,  vol.  VII,  1957. 
P.  167.  And  Cross  and  Woozley,  op.  cit.  p.  76. 
19 the  excellence  appropriate  to  them.  946  It  is  noticeable  that  for  Plato  the  notion  of 
`  doing  one's  own  job  '  is  essential  to  the  unity  of  the  state.  For  without  each  member 
of  the  state  doing  their  own  jobs  there  is  no  order  in  the  state.  It  would  be  impossible 
for  people  to  reach  an  agreement  as  to  who  should  rule  and  to  be  in  harmony  with  one 
another  in  a  disorderly  state. 
Moreover,  although  it  is  forbidden  for  the  lower  classes  to  take  on  the  job  of  the 
higher  class,  it  might  not  be  impossible  that  Plato  would  allow  the  lower  class  people 
to  have  private  property  and  exchange  their  jobs  with  the  others  in  the  class,  which 
also  shows  that  the  individual  to  some  extent,  though  not  fully,  have  their  autonomy. 
Therefore,  Aristotle  might  misunderstand  what  Plato  means  by  unity.  Unity  for  Plato 
is  an  inner  harmony  of  the  state  which  is  composed  of  different  kinds  of  people.  What 
Aristotle  thinks  of  Platonic  unity  is  that  there  is  only  one  kind  of  people  in  the  unified 
state. 
In  addition  to  the  fact  that  a  unified  state  has  inner  harmony,  the  citizens  in  the 
state  have  the  same  feelings  towards  each  other,  in  Plato's  view,  which  can  also  be  a 
basis  for  a  unified  state.  At  415a-d  where  Plato  tells  us  a  tale  to  show  that  all  citizens 
in  the  state  are  brothers.  However  this  does  not  suggest  that  Plato  is  emphasizing  the 
value  of  family;  on  the  contrary,  we  can  see  in  the  Republic  V  where  Plato  proposes 
to  abolish  the  family  in  the  upper  classes  for  both  the  eugenic  reasons  (459c)  and 
promoting  unity.  What  Plato  means  by  the  claim  that  all  citizens  are  brothers  is  that 
he  thinks  that  family  members  are  bound  together  by  mutual  love,  and  it  is  mutual 
love  or  friendship  which  is  important,  not  the  family.  Therefore,  one  loves  someone 
because  he  sees  his  own  good  being  bound  up  with  the  one  he  loves.  Plato  says  that 
"  the  deepest  affection  is  based  on  identity  of  interest,  when  we  feel  that  our  own 
good  and  ill  fortune  is  completely  bound  up  with  that  of  something  else  "  (412d).  It 
follows  that  the  mutual  friendship  or  love  can  only  take  place  when  all  citizens  in  the 
state  identify  their  interests  with  one  another,  and  as  long  as  the  common  interest  can 
be  recognized  by  each  one  of  the  members  of  the  state,  the  state  will  be  a  unity. 
Consequently,  it  is  clear  why  Plato  proposes  to  abolish  the  family  and  private  property, 
for  they  hinder  people  from  recognizing  what  the  common  good  is,  and  why  he 
36  Annas,  op.  cit.  p.  179. 
20 regards  the  mutual  friendship  as  a  means  to  preserve  the  unity  and  stability  of  the 
state.  37 
Aristotle  agrees  with  Plato's  view  that  friendship  is  crucial  for  the  state,  as  he 
mentions  that  "  [f]riendship,  we  believe,  is  the  chief  good  of  cities,  because  it  is  the 
best  safeguard  against  the  danger  of  factional  disputes  "  (1262a50-2).  38  Where 
Aristotle  disagrees  with  Plato  is  that  abolishing  the  family  and  private  property  will 
not  improve  mutual  love  among  the  citizens. 
, 
For  without  genuine  familial  relations  as 
a  basis  it  would  be  difficult  to  see  how  each  one  of  the  citizens  can  appreciate  the  real 
meaning  of  father  and  son,  or  mother  and  daughter.  And  without  private  property  for 
Aristotle  there  will  be  no  friendship,  since  "  friendship  consists  in  part  in  the  free 
bestowal  of  one's  goods  upon  another.  ,  39 
It  is  clear  from  all  this  that  the  Principle  of  Specialization  in  the  Republic  II  and 
doing  one's  own  job  in  Republic  11  and  IV,  are  very  factors  which  help  a  state  to 
remain  unified.  Of  course,  as  I  argued  above,  without  the  aid  of  sophrosune  the  unity 
of  society  cannot  be  achieved  by  the  idea  doing  one's  own  job.  The  idea  of  the 
division  of  labour  being  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  unity  of  the  state  is  echoed  by  E. 
Durkheim.  When  Durkheim  discusses  the  benefit  of  the  division  of  labour  in  the  state, 
he  says, 
Men  obey  the  same  law.  In  the  same  city,  different  occupations  can  co-exist 
without  being  obliged  mutually  to  destroy  one  another,  for  they  pursue 
different  objectives.  The  soldier  seeks  military  glory,  the  priest  moral 
authority,  the  statesman  power,  the  businessman  riches,  and  the  scholar 
scientific  renown.  Each  of  them  can  attain  his  end  without  preventing  the 
others  from  attaining  theirs.  4° 
37  It  is  noticeable  that  Plato  in  the  Laws  does  not  propose  to  abolish  the  family,  but  thinks  that  the  state  is 
the  union  of  families  (680a-e).  See  Stalley,  ol).  cit.  pp.  103-4,  and  G.  R.  Morrow.  1161o  's  Crekur  Cite 
(Princeton,  1993),  pp.  112-31. 
38  Barker,  op.  cit.  p.  44. 
39  R.  F.  Stalley,  "  Aristotle's  Criticism  of  Plato's  Republic  ",  A  Cornpaiiio,  t  to  Aristotle's  Politics 
(Oxford,  1991),  p.  196. 
40  A.  Giddens,  Emile  Uurkheim:  Selected  Writings  (Cambridge,  1995),  p.  154. 
21 What  Durkheim  means  here  is  that  the  division  of  labour  can  prevent  internal  conflict 
between  citizens  from  happening  in  the  state  because  every  citizen  can  obtain  his  or 
her  own  goal  through  the  division  of  labour.  Although  Durkheim's  language  of 
describing  the  benefit  of  the  division  of  labour  is full  of  liberal-democratic  meanings, 
which  are  not  a  salient  feature  in  Plato's  politics,  yet  the  function  of  the  division  of 
labour  both  for  Plato  and  Durkheim  is  the  same.  It  is  employed  to  maintain  the 
solidarity  of  the  state.  Thus,  in  Plato's  ideal  state  each  class  does  their  own  jobs.  The 
Guardians  rule,  the  Auxiliaries  do  military  service  and  police,  and  the  farmer  and 
artisans,  etc.,  produce.  All  members  of  the  ideal  state  stick  to  their  own  jobs  and 
without  trespassing  on  the  others'  (443d).  It  is  by  this  division  that  all  members  of  the 
state  can  have  their  proper  places  and  perform  their  respective  functions  well. 
Although  Plato's  account  of  the  unity  of  the  state  depends  heavily  on  the  idea 
that  the  different  classes  have  different  functions,  he  does  not  have  the  kind  of  organic 
view  of  the  state  which  implies  that  individual  citizens  stand  to  the  state  as  the  parts 
of  a  body  stand  to  the  whole  body.  It  is  essential  to  his  view  that  the  citizens  are  held 
together  by  justice,  sophrosune,  friendship,  and  mutual  love.  If  any  of  these  is  lacking 
the  unity  of  the  state  will  be  threatened. 
To  put  this  chapter  briefly.  The  reason  for  a  society  coining  into  being,  says  Plato, 
is  the  individual's  lack  of  self-sufficiency.  In  order  to  fulfill  their  bodily  needs,  the 
individuals  gather  together,  and  each  one  has  to  do  one  job  for  which  he  or  she  is  by 
nature  suited.  As  the  society  expands  the  importance  of  the  notion  of  `  doing  one's 
own  job  '  increases.  The  notion  is  essential  to  maintaining  the  order  of  the  society. 
However,  for  Plato,  the  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  cannot  be  understood  in  a 
sense  of  mechanism,  nor  of  organism.  For,  in  Plato's  view,  although  the  social  order 
can  be  achieved  by  appeal  to  '  doing  one's  own  job  ',  a  unified  society  requires  the 
citizens  to  reach  an  agreement  (sophrosunc)  as  to  who  should  rule,  have  a  shared 
conception  of  the  good,  and  have  mutual  love  towards  one  other.  In  both  mechanical 
and  organic  unity  there  is  no  need  for  the  parts  to  have  mutual  feeling  and  the  shared 
conception  of  the  good.  In  other  words,  Plato,  on  the  one  hand,  puts  emphasis  on  the 
importance  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  to  the  order  of  the  society;  on  the  other  hand, 
he  thinks  that  in  addition  to  doing  one's  own  job,  a  unified  society  requires  the 
harmonious  human  relation,  and  the  shared  conception  of  the  good  which  are  absent 
22 in  both  mechanic  and  organic  unity. 
23 Chaptcr  2 
Confucius'  Humane  Society 
We  are  told  in  the  Analecis  (XVIII,  6)  that  it  is  impossible  for  man  to  associate  with 
birds  and  beasts,  as  though  they  were  the  same  class  as  human  race;  if  man  does  not 
associate  with  mankind,  with  whom  man  should  associate?  Although  in  this  passage 
Confucius  does  not  overtly  mention  society,  it  is  undoubted  that  in  Confucius'  view 
men  are  not  isolated  from  one  another,  that  is,  men  have  to  live  with  and  to  depend 
upon  each  other.  Society  will  be  the  best  place  in  which  people  can  interrelate  with 
one  another  and  have  mutual  aid,  and  it  is  in  society,  for  Confucius,  that  man  can 
achieve  human-heartedness  (jen).  In  this  chapter  I  would  like  to  discuss  Confucius' 
humane  society  by  exploring  three  topics:  first  of  all,  the  role  of  propriety  or  ritual  (Ii) 
in  society;  secondly,  the  Golden  Rule  as  the  principle  of  dealing  with  human  relations; 
thirdly,  the  unity  of  society. 
1.  The  role  of  propriety  in  society 
The  word  human-heartedness  (jc'n)  is  the  cardinal  concept  and  constantly  appears  in 
the  Analecis.  In  etymology,  human-heartedness  consists  of  two  parts,  that  is,  man  + 
two.  It  is  often  taken  to  mean  that  in  Confucius'  view  man  is  social  animal,  and  jen  is 
primarily  regarded  as  a  concept  of  human  relation.  There  is  however  a  deeper 
meaning  of  human-heartedness  underneath  the  surface.  As  Wei-ming  Tu  points  out, 
human-heartedness  is  "  basically  linked  with  the  self-reviving,  self-perfecting,  and 
self-fulfilling  process  of  an  individual.  "'  In  other  words,  the  first  step  for  a  man  to  be 
a  genuine  man  or  a  superior  man  is  for  him  to  undergo  a  process  of  self-cultivation.  '  lt 
1  Wei-ming  Tu,  "  The  Creative  Tension  Between  ten  and  Li  ",  Philosophy  1  iN  aºu!  {f'est,  vol.  XVIII  (1), 
1968,  p.  34. 
2  It  should  be  noted  that  for  Confucius,  self-cultivation  requires  proper  education. is  noticeable  that  the  self,  in  Confucius'  view,  is  not  something  individual  but 
identical  with  the  human  nature  that  all  people  share.  Human  nature  for  Confucius  is 
the  same  to  everyone  and  bestowed  from  Heaven.  To  undergo  the  process  of  self- 
cultivation  is  to  find  inwardly  one's  true  self,  and  to  dig  out  the  covert  human- 
heartedness  in  oneself.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  human-heartedness  is  linked  with  self- 
cultivation.  Confucius  says:  Is  humaneness  really  so  far  away?  If  we  ourselves  wanted 
humaneness,  then  humaneness  would  arrive  "  (VII,  30).  Human-heartedness  is  not 
something  outside  ourselves,  it  is  something  in  ourselves.  As  long  as  we  will  it,  it  will 
appear.  Mencius  says  that  human-heartedness  "  is  man's  mind  "  and  "  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  man  "  (VI,  a,  11;  VII,  b,  16).  3  These  passages  indicate 
the  point  that  human-heartedness  cannot  be  merely  regarded  as  a  kind  of  social 
relation,  it  should  also  be  regarded  as  an  innate  spiritual  entity  inside  every  human 
being.  However  I  am  not  inclined  to  contend  here  that  the  etymological  meaning  of 
human-heartedness  is  not  important  in  that  if  one  only  possesses  human-heartedness 
without  expressing  it  in  one's  behaviour,  then  it  would  be  difficult  for  others  to 
recognize  the  fact  that  one  is  well  self-cultivated.  The  embodiment  of  human- 
heartedness  has  to  be  in  society  in  that  the  highest  development  of  human-heartedness 
entails  a  harmonious  social  relation. 
The  inner  demand  of  human-heartedness  is  to  undergo  the  process  of  self- 
cultivation,  and  the  paramount  point  of  self-cultivation  is  to  enable  man  to  find  out 
his  inner  self,  i.  e.  to  actualize  the  potential  of  his  being.  4  in  spite  of  the  inner  self- 
realisation,  man  has  also  to  undergo  the  process  of  learning  to  be  a  superior  man,  and 
this  process  of  learning  cannot  be  isolated  from  the  society  in  which  one  lives.  For  in 
Confucius'  view  a  genuine  or  a  superior  man  cannot  he  regarded  only  as  someone 
who  is  able  to  find  out  his  `  ontological  sufficiency  'S,  that  is,  someone  who  is  able  to 
find  out  his  possessing  human-heartedness  which  gives  meaning  to  his  existence. 
What  is  more  important  for  a  genuine  man  is  that  he  is  able  to  harmonize  his 
relationships  with  others  within  a  society.  Therefore  detachment  from  one's  society 
3  J.  Legge,  The  F  ow-  Books  (Hong  Kong,  1966),  p.  268,  and  p.  334. 
4  Wei-ming  Tu,  "  Li  as  a  Process  of  Humanization  ",  Philosophy  East  and  [Vest,  vol.  XXII  (2),  1972,  p. 
189. 
5  Ibid. 
25 will  be  a  detriment  to  one's  achieving  genuine  manhood.  Wei"ming  Tu  says, 
Indeed,  a  Confucian  tries  to  be  social  for  the  sake  of  self-realization.  His 
personal  authenticity  is  inseparable  from  his  sociality.  If  he  fails  to  relate 
himself  to  others  in  a  meaningful  way,  he  does  violence  not  only  to  his  social 
relations  but  also  to  his  authentic  self.  Unless  he  cultivates  himself  in  the 
context  of  human-relatedness,  no  matter  how  high  a  spiritual  level  he  is  able 
to  attain,  from  the  Confucian  point  of  view,  his  claim  to  self-realization  is 
inauthentic.  6 
Thus,  the  dichotomy  of  self-cultivation  and  human  relations  is  not  for  Confucius  a 
game  of  '  either-or  '  but  a  game  of  '  both  '.  If  either  of  them  is  lacking  man's 
authenticity  would  be  in  jeopardy.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  man's  authenticity  is 
expressed  both  in  his  self-cultivation  and  in  harmonious  human  relations  means  that 
there  is  no  self-regarding  behaviour  in  Confucian  ethics.  Whatever  one  does  is 
something  to  do  with  someone  else  or  with  some  group  of  people.  The  contrast  with 
the  ethics  of,  for  example,  J.  S.  Mill,  is  striking  here.  Mill  claims  that  one's  other- 
regarding  actions  should  be  regulated  and  supervised  by  government,  but  the 
government  has  no  business  in  interfering  one's  self-regarding  actions.  7  Thus  in  the 
realm  of  self-regarding  morality,  we  can  do  whatever  we  want  as  long  as  our  actions 
do  not  do  harm  to  others.  The  Great  Learning  however  tells  us  that  "  the  superior  man 
must  be  watchful  over  himself  when  he  is  alone  "x,  since  even  when  a  superior  man  is 
alone  he  is  still  thinking  that  he  has  to  act  in  accordance  with  human-heartedness.  It  is 
an  effort  of  taking  precautions  against  wrong  doings,  and  even  when  one  is  alone  one 
is  still  watched  by  Heaven  and  Earth.  9 
In  the  Analectr  we  can  see  the  embodiment  of  human-heartedness  mainly  lies  in 
the  five  relationships  or  what  are  sometimes  called  '  the  five  constancies  '  10.  That  is, 
6Ibid.  p.  196. 
7  J.  S.  Mill,  On  Liberty,  ch.  4  (London,  1992),  (ed.  )  H.  B.  Acton,  pp.  143-62. 
8  Legge,  op.  cit.  p.  9. 
9  For  a  discussion  on  private  and  public  morality,  sec  Part  IV,  Chapter  11.  Section  3. 
10  Wei-ming  Tu,  centrality  and  Commoi  alily:  An  E's-sat.  an  Confucian  Religiousness  (New  York,  1989), 
26 1)  ruler  and  minister,  2)  father  and  son,  3)  husband  and  wife,  4)  sibling  and  sibling,  5) 
friend  and  friend.  For  example: 
Filial  piety  and  fraternal  duty  -  surely  they  are  the  roots  of  humaneness.  (1, 
2) 
If  he  appreciates  men  of  quality,  if  he  makes  light  of  sexual  attraction,  if  in 
serving  his  father  and  mother  he  is  capable  of  using  his  strength  to  the 
utmost,  if  in  serving  his  lord  he  is  capable  of  offering  up  his  life,  if  in  his 
dealings  with  friends  he  is  trustworthy  in  what  he  says,  I  would  certainly  call 
him  learned 
.... 
(1,7) 
Rulers  in  employing  ministers  do  so  in  accordance  with  ritual,  and  ministers 
in  serving  rulers  do  so  in  accordance  with  loyalty.  (III,  19) 
From  these  passages  we  can  see  the  human-heartedness  is  embodied  in  the  five 
relationships,  and  it  is  in  dealing  with  these  particular  cases  that  the  notion  of 
propriety  or  ritual  (li)  makes  its  appearance.  What  is  li?  The  word  li  has  a  socio- 
religious  meaning.  Etymologically  li  means  a  sacrificial  act.  The  word  li  (iýi;  2)  consists 
of  two  parts:  (':  T;  )  spiritual  body,  (gý)  liquor  container.  These  are  necessary  elements 
for  conducting  a  religious  sacrifice  in  ancient  China. 
Li,  apart  from  its  etymological  meaning,  means  respect  and  reverence.  "  To  treat 
people  in  accordance  with  li  means  to  respect  and  reverence  them.  Thus,  li  does  not 
imply  an  isolated  individual  but  an  other.  Li  is  the  basis  of  one's  dealing  with  his 
social  relations.  Mencius  says, 
According  to  the  way  of  man,  if  they  are  well  fed,  warmly  clothed,  and 
comfortably  lodged  but  without  education,  they  will  become  almost  like 
animals.  The  Sage  (emperor  Shun)  worried  about  it  and  he  appointed  Itsich 
to  be  minister  of  education  and  teach  people  human  relations,  that  between 
father  and  son,  there  should  be  affection;  between  ruler  and  minister,  there 
p.  5S. 
11  The  Mencius,  in  Legge,  op.  cit.  pp.  258-9. 
27 should  be  righteousness;  between  husband  and  wife,  there  should  be 
attention  to  their  separate  functions;  between  old  and  young,  there  should  be 
a  proper  order;  and  between  friends,  there  should  be  faithfulness.....  (3A, 
4)  12 
The  five  moral  principles  of  human  interaction,  namely,  affection,  righteousness, 
separate  functions,  proper  order,  and  faithfulness  are  predicated  on  propriety.  Without 
propriety  as  a  basis  people's  practice  of  the  five  moral  principles  might  either  go  too 
far  or  not  go  far  enough.  Confucius  says, 
If  one  is  courteous  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  dissipates  one's  energies; 
if  one  is  cautious  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  timid;  if  one  is 
bold  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  reckless;  if  one  is  forthright 
but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  rude.  (VIII,  2) 
Thus  we  can  see  the  force  of  propriety  in  one's  dealing  with  his  social  relations. 
Without  propriety  the  harmony  of  human  interrelation  and  orderly  society  will 
diminish.  Furthermore,  propriety  (Ii)  can  bring  about,  in  Wei-ming  Tu's  word,  a 
fiduciary  society.  13  In  a  society  governed  by  ritual  or  propriety,  our  behaviour 
regulated  by  ritual  is  more  predictable.  Ritual,  as  a  guidance  of  proper  conduct, 
enables  us  to  know  or  predict  how  people  would  behave  in  a  given  situation.  Thus 
when  we  deal  with  people  we  do  not  have  to  worry  what  people  would  react  when  we 
say  so-and-so.  For  every  human  relation  is  defined  by  ritual,  there  is  no  room  for 
panic  and  suspicion.  Ritual  creates  an  atmosphere  in  which  people  can  rely  on  one 
another. 
To  put  this  section  briefly,  it  is  clear  from  the  etymological  meaning  of  human- 
heartedness  that  men  are  born  into  society.  For  Confucius'  humane  society  coming 
into  existence  members  of  the  society  have  to  engage  themselves  in  a  process  of  self- 
cultivation  and  a  process  of  learning  to  harmonize  their  social  relations  with  others.  It 
is  the  latter  gives  rise  to  the  role  of  ritual  or  propriety  in  the  society.  Li,  on  the  one 
12  Wing-tsit  Chan,  A  Source  Book  in  Chinese  Philosophy  (Princeton,  1973),  pp.  69.70. 
13  Wei-ming  Tu,  op.  cit.  ch.  3.  pp.  39-66. 
28 hand,  is  the  standard  of  moral  conduct,  it  has  the  function  of  moderation  or  regulation; 
on  the  other  hand,  Ii  is  the  rule  which  is  needed  to  establish  the  social  order,  that  is  jt 
is  the  rule  with  which  each  individual  in  society  has  to  comply. 
4 
2.  The  Golden  Rule  as  the  principle  of 
dealing  with  human  relations 
The  `  five  relations  '  form  the  general  structure  of  Chinese  society.  It  should  be  noted 
that  in  the  '  five  relations  '  the  first  three  together  are  called  '  Three  Bonds  ',  that  is, 
father  and  son,  ruler  and  minister,  and  husband  and  wife.  It  is  commonly  held  that  the 
`three  bonds  '  implies  a  kind  of  authoritarianism  or  paternalism,  since  the  stronger, 
such  as  father,  ruler,  and  husband,  can  employ  their  authority  over  the  weaker,  such  as 
son,  minister,  and  wife.  It  is  undoubted  that  Confucian  society  is  a  hierarchical  and 
feudal  one,  that  is  because,  although  Confucius  asserts  that  by  nature  men  are  close  to 
each  other,  yet  he  does  not  advance  a  step  towards  abolishing  the  class  division  in 
ancient  Chinese  society.  14  For  Confucius  did  not  intend  to  build  a  new  society  from 
without,  which  is  totally  alien  to  the  existing  one,  but  intended  to  reform  the  society 
on  its  original  basis.  It  would  be  hard  to  deny  that  Chinese  society  is  a  paternal  society, 
however  it  does  not  mean  that  the  weaker  people  or  those  in  the  lower  position  should 
follow  blindly  the  order  of  the  stronger  or  higher  position  people  without  any  question. 
Nor  does  it  mean  that  the  authority  of  the  higher  position  cannot  be  questioned.  For 
that  will  stray  away  from  the  principle  of  propriety. 
In  the  Confucian  ethical  system,  human  love  is  not  one-way  but  mutual.  Human 
interaction  is  reciprocal  -  not  giving  without  receiving  or  vice  versa.  The  principle 
of  reciprocity  is  the  result  of  development  of  human-heartedness  in  that  "  the  humane 
man,  wishing  himself  to  be  established,  sees  that  others  are  established,  and  wishing 
himself  to  be  successful,  sees  that  others  are  successful  "  (VI,  30).  One  treats  oneself 
14  In  Chou  dynasty  (1027-256  BC)  the  socio-political  system  is  patriarchal,  and  social  division  is  roughly 
as  follows:  the  Son  of  Heaven,  duke  of  prince,  minister,  scholar,  the  common  people,  artisan  and 
producer,  and  slave. 
29 in  the  same  way  as  one  treats  others,  one  is  always  considerate  and  puts  oneself  in 
someone  else's  position  when  one  is  dealing  with  him.  Thus  Zigong  says  in  the 
Analects, 
If  I  do  not  want  others  to  inflict  something  on  me,  I  also  want  to  avoid 
inflicting  it  on  others.  (V,  12) 
Confucius  says, 
Do  not  inflict  on  others  what  you  yourself  would  not  wish  done  to  you.  (XV, 
24) 
Reciprocity  is  the  principle  which  one  can  practice  in  one's  whole  life  and  can  be  the 
basis  for  treating  others.  If  men  can  get  along  with  one  another  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  reciprocity,  then  the  mutual  relationship  between  man  and  man  will  be  in 
peace  and  not  in  conflict.  Thus  the  value  of  reciprocity  is  obvious,  it  enables  man  to 
think  not  only  from  his  own  standpoint  but  also  from  the  others'  standpoints  as  well. 
Social  conflicts  would  be  diminished  if  each  individual  can  practice  reciprocity.  It 
might  be  asked  why  I  have  to  introduce  the  Golden  Rule,  and  does  it  do  any  help  to 
resolve  the  problem  of  a  paternal  society,  we  encountered  above?  I  think  it  can. 
Although  an  ideal  Confucian  society  is  paternal  in  character,  yet  it  is  not  an 
absolute  paternal  one.  What  I  mean  is  that  although  the  weaker  have  to  show  their 
respect  to  the  stronger,  they  do  not  do  so  blindly.  For  a  minister  has  to  serve  his  ruler 
in  accordance  with  the  Way,  if  it  is  impossible  to  do  so  then  he  should  resign  (XI,  22). 
Likewise,  for  example,  if  a  husband  does  not  pay  attention  to  his  proper  function  in 
the  family,  that  is,  say,  he  has  the  duty  to  support  the  family  by  working  hard,  then  it 
would  be  proper  for  his  wife  to  divorce  her  husband.  Although  it  would  be  impossible 
to  renounce  the  relation  between  father  and  son,  since  it  is  derived  from  biological 
factor,  nevertheless  "  [i]n  serving  father  and  mother,  one  remonstrates  gently  "  (IV118). 
Remonstration,  resignation,  and  divorce  indicate  that  the  relations  between  man 
and  man  are  not  unidirectional  but  two-way  or  mutual.  In  Confucian  society,  unlike 
absolute  paternalism,  there  is  room  for  the  lower  position  people  to  bring  their  ideas 
30 into  play  when  the  higher  position  people's  words  and  deeds  or  deportment  are  in 
excess  of  the  standard  of  propriety.  Therefore  when  Confucius  says  that  "  do  not  look 
at  what  is  contrary  to  ritual,  do  not  listen  to  what  is  contrary  to  ritual,  do  not  speak 
what  is  contrary  to  ritual,  and  make  no  movement  which  is  contrary  to  ritual  "  (XII,  1), 
the  harmonious  society  is  not  based  on  absolute  authority,  but  on  the  principle  of 
propriety  and  reciprocity.  That  is,  people  in  Confucian  society  are  aware  that  what  I 
do  not  want  others  do  to  me  I  should  not  do  to  others.  It  is  not  only  an  expression  of 
altruism  but  also  an  expression  of  self-cultivation,  because  through  self  reflection  we 
will  ask  ourselves  the  question:  If  I  were  my  wife,  how  would  I  like  to  be  treated?  The 
answer  to  it  is  helpful  to  build  up  harmonious  relationships  with  people,  and  is 
essential  to  self-cultivation.  's 
In  Confucian  society  men  are  born  into  social  roles",  and  playing  one's  role 
properly  and  having  a  harmonious  social  relationship  require  one  to  put  the  other's 
situation  or  feeling  into  account  before  one  acts.  As  Confucius  says  in  the  Doctrine  of 
the  Mean, 
In  the  way  of  the  superior  man  there  are  four  things,  to  not  one  of  which 
have  I  as  yet  attained.  To  serve  my  father,  as  I  would  require  my  son  to  serve 
me:  to  this  I  have  not  attained;  to  serve  my  prince,  as  I  would  require  my 
minister  to  serve  me:  to  this  I  have  not  attained;  to  serve  my  elder  brother,  as 
I  would  require  my  younger  brother  to  serve  me:  to  this  I  have  not  attained; 
to  set  the  example  in  behaving  to  a  friend,  as  I  would  require  him  to  behave 
15  Wei-ming  Tu,  op.  cit.  p.  104. 
16  fiere  I  disagree  with  professor  Tu's  assertion  that  "  [ijt  is  difficult  to  assume  the  role  of  the  father  or 
the  son  or  any  of  the  other  roles  in  basic  dyadic  human  relationships.  As  we  grow  and  mature  into  a 
community,  each  role  we  assume  requires  the  tender  care  that  characterizes  one  of  the  central  concerns 
of  Confucian  ethics.  Yet  Confucian  terminology  does  not  describe  the  assumption  of  a  social  role.  It 
seems  unreal  and  somewhat  distasteful  to  describe  fatherhood,  motherhood,  or  friendship  as  roles  we 
play  on  a  social  stage.  Rather,  we  realize  ourselves  as  fill-grown  human  beings  through  our  actual 
experiences  as  fathers,  mothers,  friends,  sons,  daughters,  brothers  or  sisters  ".  Ibid  p.  105.  For  it  seems 
to  me  that  professor  Tu's  assertion  cannot  give  a  full  account  of  Confucius'  principle  of  the  rectification 
of  names.  One's  obligations  or  duties  are  prescribed  by  the  roles  one  occupies. 
31 to  me:  to  this  I  have  not  attained.  (XIII)'7 
This  passage  shows  that  Confucius'  emphasis  on  reciprocity  calls  our  attention  to  the 
fact  that  we  always  have  to  be  aware  of  the  thinking  or  feeling  of  the  other.  If  we  fail 
to  do  so,  we  fail  in  our  self-cultivation.  Confucius  urges  us  to  reconsider  seriously  our 
moral  activities  and  says, 
Earnest  in  practising  the  ordinary  virtues,  and  careful  in  speaking  about  them, 
if,  in  his  practice,  he  has  anything  defective,  the  superior  man  dares  not  but 
exert  himself;  and  if,  in  his  words,  he  has  any  excess,  he  dares  not  allow 
himself  such  license.  Thus  his  words  have  respect  to  his  actions,  and  his 
actions  have  respect  to  his  words;  is  it  not  just  an  entire  sincerity  which 
marks  the  superior  man?  (X1II)18 
For  the  superior  man  "  is  shamed  that  his  words  have  outstripped  his  deeds  "  (VIV, 
27).  The  root  of  the  harmonious  society  does  not  merely  depend  upon  a  cluster  of 
rules  which  prescribe  rights  and  duties  of  those  relations,  but  each  individual  makes 
an  effort  to  engage  not  only  in  self-cultivation  but  also  to  have  harmonious  relations 
with  the  others.  For,  as  mentioned  above,  a  superior  man  would  not  be  recognized  if 
he  is  detached  from  society,  and  the  actualization  of  human"heartedness  cannot  be 
achieved  outside  society.  "  [I]t  is  through  the  achievement  of  excellence  in 
interpersonal  relations  that  one  is  transformed  from  the  biological  level  of  human  qua 
beast  to  the  high  levels  of  personhood  in  which  the  human  qua  social  being  is  himself 
the  determining  factor  in  bringing  about  a  harmonious  social  order.  '  9 
To  put  this  section  simply,  ritual  or  propriety  requires  us  to  act  in  conformity 
with  rules  that  means  a  kind  of  conformism;  on  the  other  hand,  it  does  not  mean  that 
we  have  to  act  acquiescently  in  accordance  with  the  order  of  the  stronger  if  the 
stronger  are  wrong  in  giving  orders.  For  the  notion  of  reciprocity  enables  us  to  have 
17  Legge,  op.  cit.  p.  10. 
18  The  Doctrine  of  the  Mean,  Ibid. 
ºy  R.  P.  Peerenboom,  "  Confucian  Justice:  Achieving  a  Humane  Society  ",  !  ￿tert  alima/  1'hilosophicul 
Quarler/1'.  vol.  XXX,  1990,  p.  23. 
32 our  say  when  the  higher  or  stronger  are  giving  a  wrong  order  or  acting  in  an  immoral 
way.  Therefore  Confucius'  humane  society  will  be  able  to  avoid  the  label  of  absolute 
paternalism. 
3.  The  unity  of  society 
The  starting  point  of  Confucian  society  is  self-cultivation  since  for  a  society  to  be 
humane  requires  the  members  of  the  society  to  make  it  humane,  and  they  can  do  this 
only  by  making  an  effort  to  recover  human-heartedness  in  themselves.  Simultaneously, 
they  have  to  behave  virtuously  in  accordance  with  ritual  or  propriety  for  the  virtuous 
behaviour  is  the  embodiment  of  human-heartedness.  The  person  who  can  unfailingly 
stick  to  human-heartedness  is  a  superior  man.  Confucius'  appeal  to  the  superior  man 
has  political  relevance  because  in  Confucius'  time  the  socio-political  system  was 
patriarchal,  and  the  class  of  ministers  of  feudal  lords  became  hereditary  and  they 
gradually  gained  political  power  over  their  feudal  lords.  Thus  the  state  was  under  their 
control.  The  result  of  this  is  that  the  appointment  of  the  minister  was  not  dependent 
upon  his  ability  and  virtue  but  upon  his  family  status,  so  the  state  tended  to  lapse  into 
chaos  because  it  was  run  by  incompetent  people.  Confucius'  appeal  to  the  superior 
man  is  an  attempt  to  rescue  the  state  from  this  danger. 
Confucius'  political  views  are  based  on  '  the  rule  of  virtue  ',  he  does  not  think 
that  law  is  the  best  remedy  for  curing  a  disorderly  society,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
Legalist  claim.  Confucius  says  that  "  [alt  hearing  legal  proceedings  I  am  no  different 
from  anybody  else,  but  what  is  surely  necessary  is  to  bring  it  about  that  there  is  no 
litigation  "  (XII,  13).  In  the  Confucian  view  an  orderly  society  can  be  achieved  not  by 
severe  law  but  by  setting  up  exemplars  for  people  to  emulate.  The  emulation  plays  an 
important  part  in  Confucius'  political  thought,  since  the  objects  of  emulation  are  the 
superior  men  whom  Confucius  endows  with  the  influence20  that  enables  them  to 
transform  people.  As  Confucius  says, 
20  For  a  view  on  whether  Confucian  superior  man  possesses'  magical  power',  sec  my  discussion  in  Part 
III,  Chapter  8,  Section  3. 
33 If  you  promote  the  straight  and  set  them  above  the  crooked,  then  the  people 
will  be  obedient.  If  you  promote  the  crooked  and  set  them  above  the  straight, 
then  the  people  will  not  be  obedient.  (II,  19) 
The  nature  of  the  gentleman  is  as  the  wind,  and  the  nature  of  the  small  man 
is  as  the  grass.  When  the  wind  blows  over  the  grass  it  always  bends.  (XII,  19) 
If  one's  character  is  rectified,  then  things  will  get  done  without  orders  being 
issued;  but  if  one's  character  is  not  rectified,  then  although  orders  are  issued 
they  are  not  followed.  (XIII,  6) 
Confucius'  assertion  that  an  orderly  or  unified  society  can  be  achieved  only  through 
the  rule  of  virtue,  and  the  emulation  of  exemplars  is  explicitly  expressed  in  the 
Analecis,  he  says  that  "  [ijf  you  lead  them  by  means  of  government  and  keep  order 
among  them  by  means  of  punishments,  the  people  are  without  conscience  in  evading 
them.  If  you  lead  them  by  means  of  virtue  and  keep  order  among  them  by  means  of 
ritual,  they  have  a  conscience  and  moreover  will  submit  "  (II,  3).  It  should  be  noticed 
that  here  Confucius  does  not  propose  anarchism  or  the  notion  of  inaction  as  the 
Taoists  claim,  what  Confucius  claims  is  that  the  person  who  possesses  political  power 
or  holds  the  office  should  be  virtuous  because  it  is  not  his  possessing  political  power 
but  his  possessing  virtue  that  makes  people  obedient.  Thus  the  unity  of  society  in 
Confucius'  view  can  be  achieved  by  the  emulation  of  the  superior  man. 
The  unity  and  stability  of  society  can  also  be  achieved  by  the  Rectification  of 
Names.  This  is  shown  in  a  conversation  in  the  Analects  between  Confucius  and  his 
disciple,  Zilu: 
Zilu  said:  '  If  the  Lord  of  Wei  were  waiting  for  you  to  run  the  government, 
what  would  you  give  priority  to?  '  The  Master  says:  '  What  is  necessary  is  to 
rectify  names,  is it  not?  '  Zilu  said:  '  If  this  were  to  take  place,  it  would  surely 
be  an  aberration  of  yours.  Why  should  they  be  rectified?  '  The  Master  said: 
`  How  uncivilized  you  are.  With  regard  to  what  he  does  not  understand  the 
gentleman  is  surely  somewhat  reluctant  to  offer  an  opinion.  If  names  are  not 
rectified,  then  words  are  not  appropriate.  If  words  are  not  appropriate,  then 
deeds  are  not  accomplished.  If  deeds  are  not  accomplished,  then  the  rites  and 
34 music  do  not  flourish.  If  the  rites  and  music  do  not  flourish,  then 
punishments  do  not  hit  the  mark.  If  punishments  do  not  hit  the  mark,  then 
the  people  have  nowhere  to  put  hand  or  foot.  So,  when  a  gentleman  names 
something,  the  name  can  definitely  be  used  in  speech;  and  when  he  says 
something,  it  can  definitely  be  put  into  practice.  In  his  utterances  the 
gentleman  is  definitely  not  casual  about  anything.  (XIII,  3) 
Confucius'  argument  of  the  connection  between  the  rectification  of  names  and  people 
being  able  to  find  a  place  to  put  hand  or  foot  is  interesting.  It  would  be  easier  for  us  to 
see  the  connection  if  we  have  the  aid  of  logical  principle.  `t 
-A->  --B  If  names  are  not  rectified,  then  words  are  not  appropriate. 
-B--*  -C  If  words  are  not  appropriate,  then  deeds  are  not  accomplished. 
-C--+  -D  If  deeds  are  not  accomplished,  then  the  rites  and  music  do  not 
flourish. 
-D->  -E  If  the  rites  and  music  do  not  flourish,  then  punishments  do  not 
hit  the  mark. 
-E  --*  -F  If  punishments  do  not  hit  the  mark,  then  the  people  have  nowhere 
to  put  hand  or  foot. 
This  shows  the  fact  that  the  rectification  of  names  is  a  reason  for  people  being  able  to 
find  a  place  to  put  hand  or  foot,  but  it  does  not  tell  us  that  the  former  is  the 
prerequisite  for  the  latter.  For  there  might  be  other  reasons  which  enable  people  to 
find  a  place  to  put  hand  or  foot.  However  if  we  use  the  principle  of  denying  the 
consequent  (A  -*  B, 
. ".  -B  -*  -A;  -13-+  -A,  .  ".  A  -+  B  ),  then  it  would  be  clear  why 
the  rectification  of  names  is  the  prerequisite  for  the  orderly  society. 
F-+E 
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So  the  rectification  of  names  is  a  necessary  condition  of  people  having  somewhere  to 
put  hand  and  foot.  That  is,  only  when  people  in  the  society  know  their  stations  and  are 
able  to  fulfill  duties  and  obligations  prescribed  by  those  stations,  can  the  stability  of 
society  be  preserved. 
Confucius  insists  on  the  fact  that  the  rectification  of  names  is  closely  linked  to 
the  order  of  the  society,  because  he  sees  that  one's  deeds  and  words  should  be  in 
accordance  with  each  other.  This  is  why  Confucius  says  that  when  "a  gentleman 
names  something,  the  name  can  definitely  be  used  in  speech;  and  when  he  says 
something,  it  can  definitely  be  put  into  practice.  In  his  utterances  the  gentleman  is 
definitely  not  casual  about  anything.  "  And  "  the  gentleman  is  ashamed  that  his  words 
have  outstripped  his  deeds  "  (XIV,  27). 
But,  what  does  the  rectification  of  names  mean?  The  rectification  of  names 
means  that  the  name  has  to  match  the  reality.  It  is  explicitly  expressed  at  XII,  II 
where  Confucius  says  that  "  [l]et  a  ruler  be  a  ruler,  a  subject  be  a  subject,  a  father  be  a 
father,  and  a  son  be  a  son.  "  The  first  words  of  the  four  pairs  are  nouns  in  Chinese,  i.  e. 
ruler,  subject,  father,  and  son,  which  illustrate  the  status  or  roles  of  the  individual,  and 
the  second  words  of  the  four  pairs  are  verbs,  i.  e.  ruler,  subject,  father,  and  son,  which 
are  to  indicate  the  moral  obligations  required  by  the  roles.  The  moral  requirements  of 
the  roles  are  duties  and  obligations.  Thus  to  understand  the  noun,  that  is,  to 
understand  one's  social  role  and  status  is  to  rectify  the  name,  and  to  fulfill  the  moral 
obligation,  the  verb,  is  to  practice.  The  rectification  of  names  is  used  by  Confucius  as 
the  process  from  understanding  to  practicing,  that  is,  to  understand  one's  station  and 
to  fulfill  the  obligation  prescribed  by  the  station  one  occupies.  Therefore,  by  the 
rectification  of  names  the  order  of  society  can  be  achieved.  22 
22  Although  the  rectification  of  names  may  sound  strange  to  us  there  are  certain  parallels  in  Plato's 
thought.  In  Republic  I  Thrasymachus  insists  that  the  genuine  ruler  does  not  make  mistakes.  The  thought 
here  seems  to  be  that  only  those  who  behave  as  rulers  are  entitled  to  be  called  rulers.  Similarly  in  the 
Republic  IV  Socrates  insists  that  we  must  not  make  the  Guardians  happy  in  such  a  way  that  they  will  no 
36 For  Confucius,  as  mentioned,  the  family  bears  an  analogy  with  society. 
Confucius  emphasizes  filial  piety  because  he  thinks  that  there  is  a  similarity  between 
filial  piety  and  government.  Confucius  says, 
Only  be  dutiful  towards  your  parents  and  friendly  towards  your  brothers,  and 
you  will  be  contributing  to  the  existence  of  government.  These  virtues  surely 
constitute  taking  part  in  government,  so  why  should  only  that  particular 
activity  be  regarded  as  taking  part  in  government?  (11,21) 
To  engage  in  political  affairs  in  Confucius'  view  one  does  not  necessarily  have  to 
hold  an  office  in  that  what  one  does  in  the  family  is  exactly  the  same  as  what  one 
does  in  the  society.  In  other  words,  the  family  is  society  writ  small.  If  in  the  family 
one  can  be  filial  towards  one's  parents,  then  in  the  state  one  can  be  loyal  towards 
one's  ruler;  if  one  can  be  friendly  towards  one's  siblings,  then  one  can  be  friendly 
towards  one's  fellow  countrymen.  Here  we  can  see  the  social  function  of  filial  piety. 
For  it  would  be  impossible  to  break  off  the  tie  between  father  and  son  under  any  given 
circumstance,  and  when  the  social  order  is  concerned  the  filial  piety  will  be  strongly 
emphasized.  A  filial  son  will  mind  his  behaviour  and  pay  attention  to  his  family 
affairs,  and  also  he  will  be  responsible  for  his  duties  and  obligations.  Many  Chinese 
believe  that  the  dutiful  and  filial  son  must  be  the  loyal  minister.  Therefore  the 
stability  of  the  political  system  will  be  preserved  in  the  same  way  as  the  stability  of 
the  family  is  preserved. 
The  emphasis  on  the  family  does  not  mean,  as  mentioned,  that  the  filial  son  and 
the  loyal  minister  have  to  be  obedient,  in  an  authoritarian  sense,  without  any 
condition.  While  some  might  argue  that  the  emphasis  on  the  family  obliterates  the 
individual.  This  charge  might  be  right  at  the  first  sight,  but  one  moment's  reflection 
we  could  find  out  that  it  seems  not  to  be  the  case  for  Confucius.  For  the  purpose  of 
the  Confucian  emphasis  on  the  family  is  to  actualize  each  individual's  human- 
heartedness.  In  Confucian  ethics  the  origin  of  human-heartedness  lies  in  the  family, 
and  the  way  to  cultivate  or  develop  it  requires  one  to  put  filial  piety  in  practice.  It  is 
longer  be  Guardians. 
37 the  reason  why  Confucius  says  that  "  Filial  piety  and  fraternal  duty  -  surely  they  are 
the  roots  of  humaneness  "  (I,  2).  It  is  by  practicing  filial  piety  that  the  individual  can 
actualize  his  human-heartedness,  and  orderly  society  can  be  obtained.  Thus  the 
emphasis  on  filial  piety  does  not  obliterate  the  individual  but  helps  the  individual  to 
achieve  self-realization.  However  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  confer  the  Confucian 
individual  with  the  individuality  in  the  liberal  sense.  For  the  liberals  claim  that 
although  human  beings  share  common  set  of  capacities,  they  can  be  developed  in 
quite  a  different  ways.  Consequently,  each  one's  identity  or  individuality  will  be 
different  from  others'.  Whereas  in  Confucius'  society  each  one  has  to  undergo  a 
process  of  self-cultivation,  looking  for  human-heartedness.  The  rediscovery  of 
human-heartedness  is,  on  the  one  hand,  to  find  out  one's  true  self  and  obtain  self- 
realization;  on  the  other  hand,  it  seems  to  create  a  group  of  people  with  the  same 
individuality,  that  is,  all  of  them  are  called  humane  men.  If  the  diversity  is  the  trait  of 
liberal  society  then  identicality  will  be  the  trait  of  Confucius'  society. 
The  process  or  step  of  obtaining  an  orderly  and  humane  society  is  clearly  marked 
in  the  Great  Learning:  self  cultivation,  the  regulation  of  the  family,  the  orderly  state, 
and  the  peaceful  world.  The  attainment  of  the  orderly  society  is  not  to  be 
accomplished  in  a  move,  but  to  be  accomplished  in  an  orderly  way  and  step  by  step. 
Then  what  would  be  the  picture  of  Confucian  humane  society,  we  are  told  in  Li  Chi 
(the  Book  of  Ritual)  that 
When  the  great  Tao  (Way)  prevails,  all  the  people  of  the  world  will  work  in 
the  light  of  public  spirit  (Kung).  The  men  of  talents,  virtues,  and  ability  %vill 
be  selected,  and  faithfulness  will  be  the  constant  practice  and  harmony  the 
constant  objective  of  self  cultivation.  Consequently,  mankind  will  not  only 
have  their  parents  and  care  for  their  children.  All  the  elderly  will  be  provided 
for  and  all  the  young  will  be  employed  in  work.  Commiseration  will  be 
expressed  toward  the  widows  and  the  widowers,  the  orphans  and  the  children, 
the  disabled  and  the  sick  in  such  wise  that  all  are  properly  cared  for.  Men 
have  their  work  and  women  their  homes 
.... 
In  this  way,  selfish  scheming 
will  be  repressed  and  find  no  room  for  expansion,  and  thievery  and  disorder 
will  not  appear.  Therefore,  the  gates  of  the  houses  are  never  closed.  This 
38 state  is  called  the  Grand  Unity  and  Harmony.  23 
Confucian  humane  society  is  the  highest  development  of  human-heartedness,  it 
cannot  be  achieved  unless  man  is  willing  to  engage  himself  in  self-cultivation.  For 
"  [m]an  can  enlarge  the  Way,  but  it  is  not  true  that  the  Way  enlarges  man  "  (XV,  29), 
that  is,  a  humane  society  is  only  an  empty  place24  for  it  to  come  into  being  will 
depend  upon  the  members  of  it  make  efforts  to  make  it  humane,  that  is,  to  make  it 
meaningful.  This  will  require  people  to  engage  in  self-cultivation  and  acting  in 
accordance  with  ritual  or  propriety.  For  Confucius,  it  is  not  society  which  makes 
people  humane  but  the  society  derives  its  name  as  humane  where  each  individual  in 
the  society  is  humane.  Therefore  what  kind  of  society  one  wants  to  live  in  will  depend 
upon  what  kind  of  person  one  wants  to  be. 
To  sum  up  then,  the  unity  of  Confucius'  humane  society  can  be  maintained 
mainly  by  the  following  three  ways:  firstly,  by  emphasizing  the  rule  of  virtue 
Confucius  appeals  to  the  notion  of  the  superior  man  as  the  object  of  emulation  for  the 
public.  Secondly,  by  proposing  the  principle  of  the  rectification  of  names  Confucius 
claims  that  one  has  to  live  up  to  the  role  one  occupies  by  fulfilling  duties  and 
obligations  prescribed  by  the  role.  Finally,  Confucius  sees  politics  as  an  extension  of 
morality.  What  one  does  at  home  will  be  no  different  from  what  one  does  in  politics. 
Therefore  a  filial  son,  in  the  Confucian  view,  will  never  fail  to  be  a  loyal  minister. 
Finally,  to  put  this  chapter  in  a  nutshell.  The  term  '  human-heartedness  '  (jell) 
implies  that  men  are  born  into  society.  Thus  to  have  a  harmonious  social  relation  with 
others,  for  Confucius,  is  essential  to  both  individual  self-cultivation  and  the  social 
order.  The  function  of  ritual  serves  to  be  a  guideline  for  one's  conduct,  and  the 
principle  of  reciprocity  enables  one  to  take  the  other  person's  standing  point  into 
account  when  one  is  dealing  with  him.  The  principle  shows  that  Confucian  society 
cannot  be  an  absolute  paternalistic  one.  A  unified  society  can  be  achieved  when  it  is 
ruled  by  a  virtuous  man  whose  behaviour  is  exemplary;  and  when  each  member  or  the 
23  A.  S.  Cua,  "  Confucian  Vision  and  Human  Community  ",  Journal  of  Chinese  J'hilosohhv,  vol  11, 
1984,  p.  236. 
24  J.  Legge,  Confucius:  Confucian  Analects,  they  Great  Learning  and  the  Ucxtrine  of  the  Mean  (New 
York,  1971),  note  28,  p.  302. 
39 society  plays  his  or  her  role  or  roles  properly,  i.  e.  the  rectification  of  names.  Moreover, 
for  Confucius,  the  smallest  unity  of  a  society  is  the  family,  so  a  unified  society  is 
achieved  when  each  family  is  in  a  state  of  harmony. 
40 Chapter  3 
Communitarianism  or  Individualism 
Plato's  discussion  of  the  just  state  can  be  roughly  divided  into  three  stages.  The  first 
stage  is  the  rise  of  society.  Due  to  the  fact  that  men  have  varied  needs  and  cannot 
fulfill  their  needs  by  themselves,  society  originates.  Then  in  society  each  individual 
has  to  do  one  job  for  which  his  or  her  aptitude  is  most  suitable.  For  in  this  way  each 
will  work  most  efficiently  and  consequently  both  the  varied  needs  of  the  city  and,  as  I 
have  argued  in  chapter  1,  those  of  the  soul  will  be  net.  At  the  third  stage  Plato 
employs  both  the  principle  of  specification,  which  is  the  key  issue  at  the  stage  two, 
and  the  allegorical  human  nature  theory,  the  myth  at  415a-c,  to  set  up  his  ideal  state. 
Plato  claims  that  justice  can  be  found  in  the  state  only  when  people  of  each  class  do 
their  own  jobs  and  do  not  trespass  on  the  business  of  the  other  classes.  However,  the 
picture  of  Confucian  humane  society  coming  into  being  is  quite  difTerent  from  that  of 
Platonic  just  society.  For,  in  the  Confucian  view,  men  are  born  into  society,  that  is, 
society  is  prior  to  the  individual.  Furthermore  men  derive  their  social  roles  not  from 
their  nature  but  from  inheritance  and  the  extension  or  a  personal  social  web. 
Confucius  thinks  that  the  stability  of  society  can  be  achieved  only  when  each 
individual  plays  his  or  her  social  role  properly,  i.  e.  the  rectification  of  names,  and 
engages  in  self-cultivation  to  develop  his  or  her  human-heartedness.  In  this  chapter  I 
would  like  to  discuss  three  topics  to  show  that  although  both  Plato  and  Confucius  are 
not  individualists,  yet  it  would  be  wrong  to  see  them  as  communitarians  in  the  same 
way  as  modern  communitarians.  Firstly,  the  priority:  society  or  individual;  secondly,  a 
brief  discussion  of  individualism,  and  Finally,  Plato  and  Confucius  as 
communitarians. 
1.  The  priority:  society  or  individual 
In  order  to  find  justice  in  the  individual,  says  Socrates,  it  would  be  easier  for  us  first to  "  find  justice  on  a  larger  scale  in  the  larger  entity  "  (368e),  that  is,  to  find  justice  in 
polis  or  society.  For  justice  is  a  character  which  can  be  found  both  in  an  individual 
and  in  a  society.  This  suggestion  is  endorsed  by  Adeimantus.  Socrates  goes  on  to  say 
that  we  are  able  to  see  how  justice  and  injustice  originates  in  a  society,  only  when  we 
look  at  it  coming  into  being  (369a).  Thus  Socrates  starts  to  give  an  account  of  how  a 
society  comes  into  existence.  At  369b-c  Socrates  says  that  due  to  the  fact  that  no 
individual  is  self-sufficient,  and  each  has  many  needs,  society  comes  into  being.  It 
would  be  better  for  individuals  to  get  together  in  society  in  which  each  individual  can 
fulfill  his  or  her  own  needs  by  receiving  from  the  others  and  also  contributes 
something  to  satisfy  the  others'  needs.  Such  mutual  exchange  of  taking  and  giving  is 
made  possible  because  "  each  believes  that  this  is  better  for  himself  "  (369c).  I 
Why  is  the  mutual  interchange  of  giving  and  taking  good  for  the  individual?  Two 
reasons  might  be  implicitly  suggested  by  Plato2:  first,  "  it  increases  production  and 
thus  satisfies  the  material  needs  of  all  individuals  better.  "  For  in  a  society  each 
individual  will  do  his  own  business  better,  if  he  is  to  exercise  one  skill  and  to  devote 
most  of  his  time  to  his  business.  Thus  the  farmer  will  devote  most  of  his  time  to 
producing  food,  which  can  fulfill  the  needs  of  all  individuals.  Second,  "  it  increases 
the  inherent  satisfaction  every  man  finds  in  his  own  work.  "  For  each  individual  has 
different  aptitudes,  which  fit  him  or  her  for  a  different  job  (370b).  So  a  shoemaker  is 
one  who  is  by  nature  suitable  for  making  shoes,  and  will  be  happier  in  doing  his  job 
than  doing  something  else.  The  term  italicized  is  to  indicate  that  Versenyi's  use  of 
. cat,  sfiiction  is  suspicious  for  the  term  satisfaction  seems  to  mean  that  people's  desires 
can  be  satisfied.  What  Plato  says  however  is  that  in  the  first  city  each  one  does  his  or 
her  work  for  which  he  or  she  is  by  nature  suited.  The  division  of  labour  fulfills  the 
needs  of  the  soul  as  well  as  of  the  body.  To  perform  one's  function  is  to  live  well  and 
to  live  well  is  to  he  happy.  It  is,  however,  misleading  to  talk,  as  Vcrsenyi  does,  of 
satisfaction  here.  Moreover,  it  follows  from  the  above  that  the  stability  of  the  society 
can  be  achieved  for  if  the  individual's  bodily  and  mental  needs  can  be  met  then  there 
will  be  no  scrambling  and  striving  against  one  another.  Therefore,  the  idea  that  each 
does  his  own  job  for  which  he  is  naturally  suited,  is  not  only  good  for  the  individual 
1GM.  A.  Grube,  Plato:  Republic  (Indianapolis,  1992),  p.  44. 
2  L.  G  Versenyi,  "  Plato  and  His  Liberal  Opponent  ",  Philosophy,  vol.  XLVI.  1971,  p.  224. 
42 but  also  for  society. 
Plato's  assertion  that  society  comes  into  being,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the 
individual  is  not  self-sufficient  seems  to  suggest  that  the  individual  is  prior  to  society. 
However,  it  is  noticeable  that  the  myth  of  human  nature  at  415  a-c  seems  to  suggest  a 
different  view,  society  is  prior  to  the  individual.  For,  in  the  myth  each  individual  is 
born  into  the  society  and  their  social  status  is  determined  by  their  nature.  And  from 
this  passage  onwards  Plato  seems  to  take  it  for  granted  that  people  are  made  for  a  role. 
Thus  it  might  not  be  unreasonable  to  hold  that  Plato  changes  his  view  on  the  problem: 
whether  society  is  prior  to  the  individual,  or  vice  versa,  as  he  moves  from  the  first  to 
the  ideal  society. 
In  spite  of  the  different  views  ascribed  to  Plato,  the  language  used  at  369b  does 
indicate  that  the  society  comes  into  being  for  the  benefit  of  men.  A  few  pages  before 
this  passage  a  similar  idea  is  brought  out  by  Glaucon  when  he  gives  an  account  of  the 
origin  of  justice  (358e-359c).  Glaucon  says, 
What  they  say  is  that  it  is  according  to  nature  a  good  thing  to  inflict  wrong  or 
injury,  and  a  bad  thing  to  suffer  it,  but  that  the  disadvantages  of  suffering  it 
exceed  the  advantages  of  inflicting  it;  after  a  taste  of  both,  therefore,  men 
decide  that,  as  they  can't  evade  the  one  and  achieve  the  other,  it  will  pay  to 
make  a  compact  with  each  other  by  which  they  forgo  both.  They  accordingly 
proceed  to  make  laws  and  mutual  agreements,  and  what  the  law  lays  down 
they  call  lawful  and  right.  This  is  the  origin  and  nature  of  justice.  (358e-359a) 
Glaucon's  account  of  the  origin  of  justice  is  full  of  the  contractarian  sense.  In  this  it 
resembles,  for  example,  Hobbes  who  holds  that  society  originates  because  people  in 
the  society  can  live  without  being  in  "a  state  of  war,  a  state  of  constant  fear  and 
danger  of  a  violent  death  ".  3  Human  nature  is  essentially  competitive,  and  in  the  state 
of  nature  two  people  who  want  the  same  kind  of  thing  will  desire  to  have  the  same 
thing.  So  the  war  between  them  begins.  In  order  to  avoid  the  cruelty  of  war  the 
contractarians  hold  that  people  have  to  consent  to  the  protection  of  the  government. 
3  J.  Wolff,  An  hilrochiction  w  Political  Philosophy  (Oxford,  1996),  p.  9, 
43 Therefore  justice  can  be  achieved  only  when  people  sign  the  contract  with  the 
government,  and  both  for  Glaucon  and  Hobbes  the  just  men  are  those  who  perform 
their  contracts  made.  4 
The  contractarian  view,  that  men  live  in  a  state  of  nature  before  society 
originates,  suggests  that  the  individual  is  prior  to  society.  At  the  first  sight,  it  seems  to 
be  parallel  to  what  Plato  says  at  369b.  However,  a  moment's  reflection,  the  difference 
between  the  contractarian  view  and  Plato's  one  is  obvious.  Plato  does  not  regard  the 
theory  of  contract  as  essential  to  the  orderly  and  just  society,  for,  unlike  the 
contractarians,  Plato  appeals  to  human  nature  to  pave  the  way  for  achieving  the  just 
society.  In  the  contractarian  view,  the  division  of  labour  and  the  basis  of  social 
arrangement  relies  upon  contract.  People  can  freely  choose  what  they  want  to  do,  so 
long  as  the  contract  between  the  employee  and  the  employer  is  signed.  In  other  words, 
people's  obligations  must  result  from  their  free  choice.  Whereas  for  Plato,  the  basis  of 
social  arrangement  is  human  nature,  one  man  does  one  job  for  which  he  is  naturally 
suited.  In  the  Platonic  society,  people  do  not  have  the  chance  to  choose  what  they 
want  to  do,  and  their  social  positions  are  decided  by  their  different  aptitudes.  That  is 
to  say,  for  Plato,  people  are  born  with  obligations.  Therefore,  although  both  Plato  and 
Glaucon  and  the  contractarians  agree  that  the  individual  is  prior  to  society,  yet  the 
way  of  maintaining  social  order  adopted  by  them  is  different. 
Confucius,  on  the  one  hand,  unlike  Plato  and  the  contractarians,  holds  that  men 
are  born  into  society,  or  more  precisely,  into  a  family.  In  other  words,  society  is  prior 
to  the  individual.  Society,  in  the  Confucian  view,  is  the  place  in  which  one  can 
achieve  one's  genuine  manhood.  s  Separation  from  society  would  do  harm  to  one's 
self-realization.  For  human"heartedness  can  be  achieved  only  through  constant  self- 
cultivation  and  having  a  harmonious  relationship  with  others  in  society.  If  either  of 
them  is  lacking,  then  the  claim  of  possessing  human-heartedness  would  he  in  vain. 
Without  the  former  the  person  who  has  a  harmonious  relationship  with  others  might 
be  a  hypocrite,  and  without  the  latter  the  well  self-cultivated  person  might  not  be 
4  R.  E.  Allen,  "  The  Speech  of  Glaucon:  On  Contract  and  the  Common  Good  ",  Justice, 
Liu,  a11c/A1.  'i/;  c  d 
in  I'lato  cried  Aristotle,  (cd.  )  P.  Spiro  (Alberta,  1987),  pp.  51-62. 
s  J.  Macmurray's  claim  that"  I  exist  as  an  individual  only  in  a  personal  relation  to  other  individuals 
seems  to  echo  the  Confucian  idea.  See  J.  Macmurray,  l'ersrnis  i'r  Relations  (London,  1995),  ch.  1,  p.  28. 
44 recognized  by  the  public  as  a  superior  man.  Thus  one  should  cultivate  oneself  in  the 
context  of  social  relations  and  these  two  conditions  supplement  each  other. 
On  the  other  hand,  Confucius,  like  Plato,  is  not  a  contractarian,  although  for  a 
different  reason.  Confucius  does  not  regard  the  theory  of  contract  as  the  cornerstone 
of  the  stability  of  society  either.  For,  as  a  feudalist,  Confucius  holds  that  people's 
social  roles  are  derived  either  by  inheritance  or  consanguinity.  It  follows  from  this 
that  the  notion  of  family  is  essential  to  a  stable  society.  People's  roles  in  the  family 
are  not  contractarian  by  nature;  they  derive  their  familial  roles  by  biological  factors. 
The  familial  roles  cannot  be  defined  in  terms  of  contract  for  they  are 
unrenounceable.  6  If  we  take  this  account  together  with  Confucius'  claim  that  politics 
is  the  extension  of  morality  then  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  Confucius  will  regard 
the  theory  of  contract  as  meaningless  to  the  stability  of  society.  For  society  is  the 
family  writ  large  what  happens  in  the  family  will  be  the  same  as  what  happens  in  the 
society.  An  orderly  family  will  assure  an  orderly  society. 
In  addition,  Confucius,  unlike  Plato  and  Aristotle,  who  regard  society  as  the 
place  in  which  man  can  perform  his  function  (ergoix)  properly  without  distractions, 
does  not  see  the  notion  of  function  as  important.  Function,  for  Plato,  is  something  by 
which  one  can  do  best  (352e,  353a),  so  the  function  of  a  shoemaker  is  to  make  shoes 
well.  Plato's  notion  of  function,  as  mentioned,  is  closely  connected  with  his  assertion 
that  people  have  different  natures  or  aptitudes  which  fit  them  for  different  jobs.  A 
person's  natural  aptitude  fits  him  for  being  a  shoemaker,  which  means  that  he  is  able 
to  perform  the  function  of  the  shoemaker  well  since  he  is  by  nature  suitable  for 
making  shoes  and  capable  of  making  shoes  well.  It  is  noticeable  that  Plato's 
definition  of  function  is  distinct  from  the  ordinary  one  according  to  which  our 
function  is  a  job  assigned  to  us.  So  effectively  Plato  defines  function  in  terms  of 
natural  aptitude.  Whereas  the  linkage  between  function  and  nature  seems  difficult  to 
find  in  Confucius'  thought.  For  Confucius  says  in  the  Analecis  that  "  [b]y  nature  men 
are  nearly  alike;  by  practice,  they  get  to  be  wide  apart  "  (XVII,  2).  '  1f  we  were  to 
apply  Plato's  notion  of  function  to  this  passage  then  it  would  be  difficult  to  see  how 
6  For  a  discussion  on  contractual  and  non-contractual  roles,  see  Part  IV,  Chapter  13.  Section  1. 
J.  Legge,  Confucius:  Confucian  A,  ralects,  tiw 
Greal  Learning  and  the  Doctrine  of  The  Afeatt  (New 
York,  1971),  p.  318. 
45 different  persons  could  have  their  own  particular  functions  since  by  nature  people  are 
close  to  one  another.  For  Confucius,  as  mentioned,  one's  self-realization  can  be 
achieved  only  by  engaging  in  constant  self-cultivation  in  the  context  of  human- 
relatedness,  not  merely  by  performing  one's  particular  function  well. 
Moreover,  Confucius  tells  us  at  11,12  in  the  Analects  that  "  [a]  gentleman  does 
not  behave  as  an  implement.  "  The  happy  life  of  the  gentleman  or  the  superior  man 
does  not  merely  depend  upon  whether  he,  like  a  machine,  can  perform  his  function 
properly,  but  also  upon  how  far  he  can  develop  his  moral  qualities.  Confucius,  unlike 
Plato,  does  not  regard  function  as  equivalent  to  human  nature,  but  as  something 
equivalent  to  duty  or  obligation  prescribed  by  social  role.  Thus  to  perform  one's 
function  is  to  fulfill  one's  duty  to  which  one's  social  role  gives  rise.  To  merely  vest 
the  superior  man  with  a  function  will  make  him  like  a  machine  which  can  only 
perform  the  function  assigned,  but  for  Confucius  the  superior  man  is  ad  amnia 
paratu.  s.  8  For  the  nature  of  the  superior  man  is  not  only  defined  in  terms  of  function, 
viz.  the  fulfillment  of  his  duty  or  obligation,  but  also  of  the  development  of  his  moral 
quality,  human-heartedness,  which  enables  the  superior  man  to  have  the  sense  of 
responsibility  in  his  fulfillment  of  duty  and  obligation. 
To  summarize  this  section.  Although  Plato  and  Confucius  have  different  views 
on  whether  society  is  prior  to  individual,  or  vice  versa,  yet  what  they  agree  on,  I  think, 
is  that  society  is  the  place  in  which  individuals  can  seek  their  own  fulfillment.  That  is, 
they  regard  society  as  a  need.  Moreover,  both  Confucius  and  Plato  do  not  see  the 
theory  of  contract  as  essential  to  the  stability  of  the  society.  For  the  former  holds  that 
the  social  arrangement  is  by  and  large  based  upon  the  feudal  system,  inheritance,  and 
consanguinity;  and  the  latter  that  it  is  mainly  based  upon  human  nature  and  the  theory 
of  function.  It  is  emphatic  that  Plato's  appeal  to  natural  aptitude  or  function  to  be  the 
basis  for  division  of  labour  in  the  society  is  alien  to  Confucius  who  thinks  that  by 
human  nature  everyone  is  the  same. 
2.  A  brief  discussion  of  individualism 
'  Legge,  Aid.  note  12,  p.  150. 
46 Both  Plato  and  Confucius  emphasize  the  importance  of  society  as  required  for 
people's  self  fulfillment,  which  leads  us  to  see  how,  as  scholars  often  claim,  both 
Plato  and  Confucius'  ideal  societies  are  communitarian  in  nature.  To  understand  this 
point  it  will  be  useful  to  first  bring  out  some  features  of  individualism. 
Socrates'  description  of  the  origin  of  society,  at  first  sight,  seems  similar  to  D. 
Gauthier's  description  of  society.  9  In  Gauthier's  view,  the  basis  of  a  society  is 
cooperation  for  mutual  advantage.  However,  this  similarity  is  only  superficial,  in  that 
if  we  go  into  the  detail  of  what  Gauthier  says,  then  we  will  find  Socrates  and  Gauthier 
offer  very  different  pictures.  Although  Gauthier  asserts  that  a  society  is  based  on 
cooperation  for  mutual  advantage,  yet  he  does  not  assert,  like  Socrates,  that  each 
individual  has  to  stick  to  one  job  for  which  he  is  naturally  suited.  On  the  contrary, 
Gauthier  asserts  that  the  liberal  individual  is  capable  of  choosing  freely,  although  she 
is  living  in  a  society,  "  [s]he  is  not  bound  by  fixed  social  roles,  either  in  her  activities 
or  in  her  feelings.  "10  The  capacity  of  choice  is  the  most  important  feature  in  liberal 
thought,  for  instance,  the  thinkers  Taylor  calls  atomists  hold  the  view  that  to  be  an 
individual  is  to  he  free  to  choose  one's  own  mode  of  life.  11  The  capacity  of  choice 
cannot  be  bound  up  with  obligations  or  duties.  For  the  affirmation  of  obligation  or 
duty  implies  that  the  individual's  freedom  of  choice  would  be  to  some  extent 
restricted.  In  other  words,  the  capacity  for  choice  is  prior  to  all  obligations  and  duties 
in  the  sense  that  they  result  from  our  choice.  When  we  talk  of  social  roles,  we  are 
talking  about  a  kind  of  duty  or  obligation.  Different  social  roles  have  different 
obligations  which  have  to  be  fulfilled  by  the  person  who  plays  those  roles.  Thus  in 
Plato's  ideal  state,  for  example,  one  is  a  natural  born  shoemaker.  One  has  no  choice 
but  fulfills  the  duty  prescribed  by  the  role,  that  is,  to  make  shoes.  It  means  that  the 
freedom  of  choice  of  the  individual  will  be  restricted.  Similarly,  for  Confucius,  men 
are  horn  into  roles  so  the  freedom  of  choice  is  somewhat  limited. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  Plato  and  Confucius,  and  the  individualists  have  different 
views  on  the  questions:  Who  am  I?  and  What  are  my  interests?  For  Plato,  both 
9  D.  Gauthier,  "  The  Liberal  Individual  ",  C.  ommuttilariw,  ism  wid  111,  liº-ichualism,  (cd.  )  Shlomo  Avineri 
and  Avncr  dc-Shalit  (Oxford,  1995),  pp.  151-164. 
Ibid.  p.  155. 
C.  Taylor,  "  Atomism  ",  Ibid.  p.  34. 
47 questions  have  to  be  decided  by  one's  nature.  To  be  a  shoemaker,  for  example,  means 
that  one  is  naturally  suitable  for  and  interested  in  making  shoes.  Whereas,  for 
Confucius,  both  questions  are  determined  largely  by  one's  family,  that  is,  if  one's 
father  is  a  shoemaker  then  one  will  be  a  shoemaker  by  inheritance,  In  the  individualist 
view  both  questions  are  neither  determined  by  human  nature  nor  by  inheritance,  but 
by  freedom  of  choice.  Each  individual  has  his  or  her  personal  interest  and  is  able  to 
pursue  what  he  or  she  wants  to  do.  Thus  one  can  choose  who  one  is  and  pursue  what 
interests  one. 
The  individualist  asserts  that  there  is  no  so-called  final  end  or  common  good, 
each  individual  has  his  or  her  own  independent  conception  of  good.  lt  follows  that  the 
denial  of  the  final  end  suggests  that  "  what  makes  the  just  society  just  is  not  the  telos 
or  purpose  or  end  at  which  it  aims.  "12  What  makes  the  just  society  just  is  that 
according  to  its  constitution  and  law,  the  just  society  provides  a  framework  within 
which  each  individual  can  pursue  his  or  her  own  good,  and  the  freedom  of  pursuing 
one's  own  good  is  equally  open  to  others.  Thus,  the  individual's  right  to  pursue  his  or 
her  personal  good  is  prior  to  the  common  good.  It  is  noticeable  that  the  individualist 
claim  that  each  has  a  conception  of  the  good  and  that  there  is  no  common  good  are  at 
odds  both  with  Plato  and  Confucius.  Plato  holds  that  there  is  right  conception  of  the 
good,  which  can  only  be  obtained  by  those  who  are  well  educated,  i.  e.  the 
philosophers.  So  the  philosophers  have  to  be  in  office  to  make  sure  that  each 
individual  stands  in  their  proper  station  in  that  each  does  one  job,  not  only  for  the 
benefit  of  the  individual  but  also  for  that  of  the  state.  In  other  words,  the  good  of  the 
individual  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  state. 
Confucius'  emphasis  on  the  family  illustrates  that  the  individual's  personal  good 
coincides  with  the  good  of  the  family  as  a  whole.  For  Confucius  says  in  the  first 
chapter  of  the  Hsiao  Ching  (the  Book  of  Filial  !  'iety), 
Seeing  that  our  body,  with  hair  and  skin,  is  derived  from  our  parents,  we 
should  not  allow  it  to  be  injured  in  any  way.  This  is  the  beginning  of  filiality. 
We  develop  our  own  personality  and  practice  the  Way  so  as  to  perpetuate  our 
12  M.  Sandel,  "  The  Procedural  Republic  and  The  Unencumbered  Self  ",  op.  cit.  P.  13. 
48 name  for  future  generations,  and  to  give  glory  to  our  parents.  3 
It  is  clear  that  in  Confucius'  view,  one's  well  being  will  be  coincident  with  that  of  the 
family  as  a  whole.  This  is  true  no  matter  what  one  does  one  has  to  take  one's  family 
into  account.  Unlike  the  individualist  view,  Confucius  does  not  see  the  common  good 
as  an  obstacle  preventing  the  individual  from  practicing  the  freedom  of  choice.  For  if 
the  individual's  own  conception  of  the  good  is  coincident  with  the  common  good  then 
what  is  good  for  the  family  is  also  good  for  the  individual. 
Furthermore,  as  M.  Sandei  points  out,  when  he  describes  the  picture  of  the 
unencumbered  self,  understanding  an  individual  as  prior  to  and  independent  of 
purposes  and  ends  means  that  there  is  always  a  distinction  between  the  values  I  /gave 
and  the  person  I  am.  14  To  understand  what  a  person  is,  is  not  to  understand  his  aims, 
ambitions,  and  interests,  but  to  understand  the  person  '  him  '  behind  those  aims, 
ambitions,  and  interests.  To  understand  what  a  person  as  a  shoemaker  is,  is  always  to 
imply  that  there  is  a'  person  '  behind  the  attribute,  i.  e.  shoemaker.  Thus  the  person 
`  him  '  will  be  prior  to  the  attribute  he  has.  Again,  this  assertion  rules  out  the 
possibility  that  the  individual  can  be  completely  defined  or  identified  by  virtue  of 
referring  to  their  social  roles  or  commitments.  For  the  distinction  between  what  I  am 
and  the  values  I  have  puts  '  the  unencumbered  self  '  beyond  the  experience  the  self 
has. 
This  distinction  is  originally  emphasized  in  a  different  way  by  J.  Rawls,  who 
says  that  a  just  society  is  one  whose  basic  principles  could  be  agreed  by  people  in  the 
original  position,  for  "  the  effects  of  specific  contingencies  "1S  will  "  put  men  at  odds 
and  tempt  them  to  exploit  social  and  natural  circumstances  to  their  own  advantage.  "16 
That  is  to  say,  to  avoid  this  exploitation,  each  individual  has  to  be  situated  behind  a 
64  veil  of  ignorance  ".  Rawls  says, 
[T]he  reason  why  the  original  position  must  abstract  from  and  not  be 
13  L.  M.  Makra,  The  !!  sinn  Ching  (New  York,  1961),  p.  3. 
14  Sandet,  op.  cit.  p.  I8. 
13  Rawls,  J.,  A  Theory  of  Justice  (Oxford,  1973),  p.  136. 
16  Ibid. 
49 affected  by  the  contingencies  of  the  social  world  is  that  the  conditions  for  a 
fair  agreement  on  the  principles  of  political  justice  between  free  and  equal 
persons  must  eliminate  the  bargaining  advantages  which  inevitably  arise 
within  background  institutions  of  any  society  as  the  result  of  cumulative 
social,  historical  and  natural  tendencies.  " 
Therefore,  we  can  see  that  people  in  the  original  position,  for  Rawls,  are  able  to 
choose  rationally  principles  of  justice  which  define  the  basic  structure  or  framework 
of  society,  without  knowing  their  past  and  natural  tendencies.  For  the  dependence 
upon  those  factors,  the  individual  will  not  be  able  to  choose  principles  of  justice 
rationally,  but  also  the  equal  distribution  can  not  be  put  into  effect.  Furthermore, 
Rawls'  assertion  of  the  veil  of  ignorance  depicts  the  idea  that  the  identity  of  each 
individual  cannot  be  dependent  upon  his  social  status,  natural  tendencies,  and  the 
general  good.  For  one's  own  self  is  not  defined  by  one's  social  roles,  nor  by  one's 
natural  capacities.  One's  own  self  is  defined  by  one's  capacity  of  practice  the  freedom 
of  choice.  It  is  obvious  that  Rawls'  claim  is  not  accepted  by  both  Plato  and  Confucius 
under  different  considerations.  The  former  holds  that  the  just  society  can  come  into 
existence  only  when  each  individual  does  one  job  for  which  they  are  naturally  suited. 
The  basis  of  the  just  society  is  human  nature.  The  latter  claims  that  the  humane 
society  can  come  into  being  only  when  each  practices  the  filial  piety  in  the  family. 
The  practicing  filial  piety  suggests  that  one's  social  positions  are  decided  by  one's 
social,  historical,  and  cultural  background.  "' 
To  summarize  this  section  briefly.  I  have  picked  up  sonne  features  of 
individualism,  which  I  think  are  in  contrast  with  both  Plato  and  Confucius.  These 
features  are:  1)  in  liberal  society  each  individual  is  able  to  exercise  their  freedom  of 
choice,  and  2)  values  their  personal  goals.  3)  Only  in  the  original  position  can  the 
individual  chooses  rationally  a  suitable  principle  or  principles  of  justice  which  define 
the  basic  structure  of  the  society. 
1'  J.  Rawls,  "  Justice  As  Fairness:  Political  not  Metaphysical  ",  op).  cit.  p.  200. 
18  Sonne  commentators  claim  that  Rawls'  theory  of  the  original  position  does  not  necessarily  entail  that 
individuals  are  prior  to  society.  See  Liberals  and  Coni  nuniinrians  (Oxford.  1994),  ed.  S.  Muthall  and  A. 
Swift,  p.  96. 
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Once  we  return  to  the  Republic  and  the  Analects  we  will  find  the  picture  of  the  just 
society  is  different  from  what  has  been  described.  For  both  Plato  and  Confucius  the 
just  society  is  not  individualistic  in  nature.  The  Platonic  notion  of  a  just  society  is  that 
1)  everyone  does  his  or  her  own  job;  2)  he  emphasizes  the  different  nature  of  each 
citizen,  which  is  the  basis  for  the  division  of  labour,  and  3)  the  common  good  is  the 
good  at  which  each  citizen  aims.  In  what  follows  I  shall  mainly  discuss  these  three 
aspects  in  turn,  and  in  the  course  of  the  discussion  Confucius'  ideas  will  be  referred 
to. 
First,  Plato's  ideal  just  society  would  be  achieved  if  and  only  if  each  citizen  of 
the  just  society  played  his  or  her  social  role  properly.  That  is,  in  an  ideal  state  "  one 
man  was  to  do  one  job,  the  job  he  was  naturally  most  suited  for  "  (433a).  The  notion 
of  social  role  presupposes  the  fact  that  there  are  duties  and  obligations  corresponding 
to  social  roles.  Thus  the  farmer's  duty  is  to  produce  food,  the  shoemaker's  duty  is  to 
make  shoes,  and  the  doctor  is  to  heal  the  sick.  Different  people  can  be  identified  by 
their  different  professions  for  which  they  are  naturally  fitted.  The  same  idea  is 
expressed  in  Confucius'  Analecis,  where  Confucius  is  asked  by  Duke  Jing  of  Qi  about 
government,  Confucius  replies:  "  [l]et  a  ruler  be  a  ruler,  a  subject  be  a  subject,  a 
father  be  a  father,  and  a  son  be  a  son.  ... 
"  (XII,  11).  Each  individual  who  occupies  a 
social  role  has  to  play  that  role  well,  so  that  an  orderly  society  can  be  achieved.  What 
has  to  be  noticed  here  is  that,  though  both  Plato  and  Confucius  assert  that  an  orderly 
society  can  be  achieved  only  when  each  individual  in  the  society  plays  his  or  her  role 
well,  yet,  as  mentioned,  the  way  in  which  each  individual  obtains  his  or  her  own 
social  role  to  Plato  and  Confucius  is  different.  For  Plato,  people  obtain  their  social 
roles  by  their  nature,  but  for  Confucius  people  obtain  their  social  roles  partly  by 
inheritance  and  partly  by  the  extension  of  their  personal  social  web.  Confucius  thinks 
that  the  smallest  unit  of  society  is  the  family,  so  within  the  family  people  can  have 
their  basic  social  roles,  such  as  father  and  son,  husband  and  wife,  and  brother  and 
sister.  Moreover,  people  can  also  obtain  their  social  roles,  thus  by  inheritance,  for 
example,  a  carpenter's  son  may  be  a  carpenter  in  the  future  by  inheriting  his  father's 
business,  irrespective  of  whether  he  is  naturally  suited  for  being  a  carpenter. 
51 In  spite  of  the  difference  between  Plato  and  Confucius,  the  assertions  of  both 
Plato  and  Confucius  are  not  compatible  with  individualists'  assertion  that  the 
individual,  as  a  free  agent,  cannot  be  bound  by  social  roles.  The  only  way,  for 
Confucius,  to  achieve  the  orderly  society  is  that  everyone  engages  in  self-cultivation 
and  performs  his  or  her  social  role  in  accordance  with  ritual.  Otherwise,  it  would  be 
like  what  Duke  Jing  of  Qi  says  that  "  if  a  ruler  be  not  a  ruler,  a  subject  be  not  a 
subject,  a  father  be  not  a  father,  and  a  son  be  not  a  son,  even  if  there  is  grain,  shall  l 
manage  to  eat  it?  "  (XII,  1l).  That  is  to  say,  living  in  a  disorderly  society  people's 
lives  and  everything  else  of  value  would  be  in  danger.  Similarly,  for  Plato,  the  basis 
for  the  just  state  is  that  everyone  should  do  his  or  her  own  job.  That  is  the  reason  why 
when  Plato  plans  his  ideal  state  he  emphasizes  that  three  classes  of  people  have  to 
keep  in  their  positions  and  cannot  trespass  on  the  other  classes.  It  would  do  great 
harm,  says  Plato, 
[IJf  someone  who  belongs  by  nature  to  the  class  of  artisans  and 
businessmen  is  puffed  up  by  wealth  or  popular  support  or  ...,  and  tries  to 
enter  our  military  class;  or  if  one  of  our  military  Auxiliaries  tries  to  get  into 
the  class  of  administering  Guardians  for  which  he  is  unfit,  ..., 
I  think  you'll 
agree  that  this  sort  of  mutual  interchange  and  interference  spells  destruction 
to  our  state.  (434a-b) 
The  non-interchangeability  among  the  three  classes  is  based  not  only  on  the  fact  that 
each  citizen  should  do  his  or  her  o%%m  job,  but  also  on  the  fact  that  it  is  by  nature  that  a 
particular  person  has  to  be  placed  in  this  or  that  job  and  class.  This  leads  to  the 
second  aspect  of  Plato's  just  state. 
Second,  at  415a-c  Plato  tells  us  a  tale  about  that  the  people's  nature  in  different 
classes  are  composed  of  different  metals.  The  Rulers'  nature  are  composed  of  gold. 
the  Auxiliaries  are  composed  of  silver,  and  the  farmers  and  artisans  ...  etc.  are 
composed  of  iron  and  bronze.  If  a  child  with  gold  in  its  nature  is  born  within  the 
lower  class,  then  it  should  be  promoted  to  its  appropriate  class.  Similarly,  if  a  child  is 
born  with  silver  or  iron  in  its  nature  within  the  top  class,  then  it  should  be  degraded  to 
its  appropriate  class.  In  Plato's  view,  a  person's  social  class  in  the  just  state  is 
52 determined  by  his  or  her  nature.  A  similar  idea  has  been  shown  at  370b,  "  we  have 
different  natural  aptitudes,  which  fit  us  for  different  jobs.  "  Plato's  appeal  to  each 
individual's  nature  to  give  an  account  of  how  a  just  state  can  be  sustained  is  quite 
different  from  individualists'  appeal  to  individual's  rights,  and  also  different  from 
Confucius'  appeal  to  the  family. 
It  is  clear  that  Plato's  appeal  would  be  incompatible  with  Rawls'  '  veil  of 
ignorance  ',  in  that  under  this  assumption  the  procedure  of  choosing  the  principles  of 
justice  cannot  be  just  if  people  are  not  in  the  original  position  without  knowing  their 
natural  tendencies  and  social  background.  And  people  in  the  original  position  are  able 
to  choose  rationally  the  principles  of  justice  defining  the  structure  of  the  society.  If  we 
apply  this  assumption  to  Plato's  just  state  then  the  different  metals  which  represent 
different  social  classes  will  have  to  be  unknown  to  each  individual  citizen,  they  will 
have  their  own  rights  to  choose  the  principles  which  define  the  framework  of  the  ideal 
state.  Whereas  this  absolutely  cannot  be  the  case  for  Plato.  Firstly,  it  would  be  a 
disaster,  in  Plato's  view,  if  people  in  the  ideal  state  can  choose  what  kind  of  society  in 
which  they  would  like  to  live.  For,  except  the  philosophers,  people  of  the  other  two 
classes  do  not  possess  the  right  conception  of  the  good.  Therefore  their  decisions  on 
what  kind  of  society  in  which  they  want  to  live  may  not  be  the  right  decisions  for 
them. 
Secondly,  the  individual's  behaviour  and  moral  point  of  view,  for  Plato,  have  to 
be  understood  through  his  or  her  nature  by  which  his  or  her  social  context  is  decided. 
For  Confucius  they  have  to  be  understood  in  individual's  social,  historical  and 
cultural  context  irrespective  of  human  nature.  Moreover,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
one,  in  Plato's  just  state,  to  choose  his  own  way  of  life.  What  kind  of  life  one  leads 
will  be  decided  by  what  kind  of  nature  one  was  born  with.  In  the  Republic  VIII,  the 
description  of  four  types  of  imperfect  societies  suggests  that  different  types  of 
societies  are  the  results  of  different  types  of  individual  characteristics.  To  know  a 
democratic  man,  for  example,  we  have  to  refer  to  his  nature  of  characteristic. 
Therefore,  for  Plato,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  understand  a  person's  behaviour 
without  considering  his  or  her  nature.  For,  in  Plato's  view,  how  a  person  behaves  in 
the  society  is  determined  by  his  or  her  nature. 
It  is  noticeable  that  Plato's  emphasis  on  human  nature  is  not  only  in  contrast 
53 with  the  Confucian  view  but  also  with  the  communitarianism.  For  throughout  the 
Republic  the  individual  identity  is  mainly  decided  by  their  nature  irrespective  of  their 
social  and  historical  background.  We  are  told  in  the  7imacus  that  the  visible  world, 
the  universe,  is  a  copy  of  the  real  world  (30a-d).  Thus  the  arrangement  of  the  social 
order  in  the  ideal  state  in  the  Republic  might  be  a  replica  of  the  universe  made  by  the 
Creator.  Due  to  the  fact  that  the  universe  in  the  7imaeux  is  governed  by  Reason  so  the 
ideal  state  has  to  be  governed  by  the  philosophers  whose  reason  is  in  control  in  the 
soul.  It  is  clear  that  Plato's  ideal  state,  unlike  Confucius'  humane  society  and  the 
communitarian  society,  is  not  based  upon  historical  or  cultural  factors,  but  upon 
reason.  Therefore,  in  this  sense,  it  might  be  wrong  to  classify  Plato  as  a 
communitarian. 
I  would  like  now  move  to  the  third  aspect  of  Plato's  just  state,  that  is,  the 
common  good  is  the  good  at  which  each  citizen  should  aim.  Karl  Popper  says  in  7%e 
Open  Society  and  Its  Enemies'9  that  Plato  prepares  his  collectivist  doctrine  by  quoting 
the  proverb  "  all  things  in  common  between  friends  "  (424a,  449c).  Plato  claims  that 
there  are  two  things,  wealth  and  poverty,  which  can  ruin  the  stability  of  the  society 
(421d,  422a).  For  the  former  will  make  potter  a  worse  potter  by  becoming  idle  and 
full  of  desires.  The  latter  will  prevent  the  potter  from  getting  tools  and  other 
necessities  for  his  trade,  so  the  quality  of  his  work  will  deteriorate  (421  d"e).  So  Plato 
here  asserts  that  for  a  state  to  be  unified  and  stable  wealth  has  to  be  well  distributed  to 
each  member  of  the  state,  the  unbalance  between  the  rich  and  the  poor  will  do 
damage  to  the  state.  In  addition  to  wealth  and  poverty,  Plato  thinks  that  the  size  of  the 
just  state  has  to  be  compatible  with  its  unity  (423b,  460a).  2°  Therefore,  it  can  be  seen 
that  even  the  expansion  of  the  state  has  to  be  compatible  with  the  maintenance  of  the 
19  K.  R.  Popper,  71w  Ojwii  Socieiy  and  llc  f:  uemies  (London,  1991),  p.  104. 
20  A  similar  idea,  i  think,  is  illustrated  in  the  Laws  where  the  Athenian  says  that  "  [e]veryone  who 
legislates  should  have  sufficient  appreciation  of  arithmetic  to  know  what  number  will  be  most  used  in 
every  state,  ... 
"  (737e-738a).  T.  J.  Saunders,  Plato:  77w  bars  (London,  1970).  It  is  apparent  that  the 
Athenian  here  is  concerned  with  the  size  of  the  population,  nevertheless"  [h]e  (Plato)  must  believe  that 
around  five  thousand  households  will  produce  a  state  small  enough  to  have  a  real  sense  of  unity  and  to 
permit  decisions  to  be  made  and  officers  to  be  appointed  on  the  basis  of  a  real  personal  kno"ledge  and  at 
same  time  large  enough  to  bestow  the  full  benefits  of  civilized  life.  "  it.  F.  Stalley,  An  Inrrodsiction  lo 
Platos  Laws  (Indianapolis,  1983),  p.  100. 
54 unity  of  the  state. 
Furthermore  in  order  to  keep  the  unity  of  the  state  Plato  proposes  that  the  family 
has  to  be  abolished  in  the  upper  classes  (457d),  and  marriage  and  procreation  have  to 
be  regulated  (458d-e).  They  will  have  no  private  home  or  property,  and  cat  common 
meal  provided  by  the  other  citizens  (416d-e,  458c).  Plato  thinks  that  the  whole 
arrangement  of  the  state  has  to  aim  at  the  good  of  the  state  as  a  whole  so  people  have 
to  share  everything  they  can  to  maintain  the  unity  of  the  state. 
A  just  society  consists  of  rulers  and  common  people,  the  rulers  regard  the  land  as 
their  mother,  and  regard  their  fellow-citizens  as  brothers  and  sisters  (415d-e,  463c). 
Thus,  their  mother's  interests  will  be  the  rulers'  interests,  and  the  interest  of  the 
individual  fellow-citizens  will  be  the  rulers'  interests.  All  members  of  the  just  society 
are  devoted  to  a  common  interest,  that  is,  they  identify  their  own  goods  as  the  good  of 
the  society  as  a  whole.  Furthermore,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  philosophers  arc  capable 
of  seeing  the  good  itself,  no  one  loves  the  society  more  than  they  do.  For 
...  the  deepest  affection  is  based  on  identity  of  interest,  when  we  feel  that 
our  own  good  and  ill  fortune  is  completely  bound  up  with  that  of  something 
else.....  So  we  must  choose  from  among  our  guardians  those  who  appear  to 
us  on  observation  to  be  most  likely  to  devote  their  lives  to  doing  what  they 
judge  to  be  in  the  interest  of  the  community,  and  who  are  never  prepared  to 
act  against  it.  (412d) 
However,  the  identity  of  individual  interest  or  good  with  common  good  cannot  be 
accepted  by  individualists,  in  that  they  deny  that  there  is  the  conception  of  the 
common  good,  for  the  individualists  see  the  society  as  nothing  but  a  social  structure 
within  which  people  can  exercise  their  free  choice  and  choose  their  own  conceptions 
of  good.  The  individualist  might  claim  that  Plato'.  s  using  human  nature  as  the  basis 
for  achieving  social  stability  is  to  obliterate  the  individual's  freedom  of  choosing  what 
is  in  his  or  her  interest.  Thus  the  conception  of  the  common  good  implies  a  kind  of 
restriction  of  freedom  of  choice,  and  the  only  route  to,  in  the  individualist  view, 
achieve  a  just  society  is  to  secure  each  person's  right  to  pursue  his  or  her  own  good  or 
interest.  Therefore,  the  conception  of  the  individual  person's  good  cannot  be 
55 identified  with  that  of  the  common  good. 
Plato's  appeal  to  the  common  good  causes  him  to  be  criticized  by  scholars  as 
proposing  totalitarianism.  However,  I  would  be  inclined  to  think  that  Plato  is  unfairly 
criticized.  For  although  the  example  at  420b-421a  shows  superficially  that  Plato  holds 
the  organic  view  in  the  account  of  the  relation  between  the  whole  and  the  part.  In 
other  words,  the  part  cannot  live  without  the  whole,  so  what  is  good  for  the  whole  is 
good  for  the  part.  While  it  is  wrong  to  ascribe  the  organic  view  to  Plato  because  Plato, 
unlike  Aristotle,  does  not  regard  a  man  living  without  society  as  a  sub-human.  What 
Plato  tells  us  in  this  example  is  that  the  good  of  the  individual  coincides  with  the  good 
of  the  state  as  a  whole,  and  he  does  not  propose  that  the  individual's  interests  have  to 
be  suppressed,  the  individuals  work  towards  a  common  goal  because  they  identify 
their  own  interests  with  the  interests  of  the  state  by  the  mutual  agreement  (432a, 
442c-e) 
. 
The  message  from  the  passage  referred  shows  that  the  good  of  the  part 
coincides  with  that  of  the  whole.  The  happiness  of  the  whole  is  based  upon  that  each 
part  of  it  gets  its  proper  portion  under  the  mutual  agreement. 
Plato's  claim  that  the  good  of  the  individual  is  coincident  with  that  of  the  state  is 
similar  to  Confucius'  claim  of  the  coincidence  between  the  good  of  the  individual  and 
that  of  the  family  which  is  the  society  writ  small.  However,  the  communitarians' 
emphasis  on  one's  identity  resting  upon  one's  social,  cultural,  and  historical  context, 
and  on  the  common  good  might  suggest  that  the  good  of  the  individual  has  to 
subordinate  to  that  of  the  state.  Therefore,  Plato  and  Confucius,  in  this  sense,  is 
different  from  the  communitarians.  For  both  Plato  and  Confucius  do  not  see  that  the 
subordination  of  the  individual  good  is  necessary  for  the  individual  person  to  make 
his  or  her  commitment  to  the  common  good.  What  causes  one  to  make  commitment 
to  pursue  the  common  good,  for  both  Plato  and  Confucius,  is  not  because  the 
individual  good  is  inferior  to  the  common  good  but  because  they  are  coincident  with 
each  other.  To  pursue  the  common  good  is  at  the  same  time  to  pursue  the  individual 
good,  and  vice  versa.  Therefore,  in  terms  of  common  good,  it  would  be  odd  to  say  that 
Plato  and  Confucius  embrace  the  communitarian  idea  of  the  common  good. 
Although  Plato  and  Confucius  are  not  individualists,  yet  it  does  not  mean  that 
their  views  are  exactly  the  same  as  the  communitarians'.  For  both  Plato  and 
Confucius  are  in  one  way  or  the  other  different  from  the  communitarians.  Two  more 
56 cases  can  be  presented:  first,  Plato  thinks  that  for  the  state  to  be  unified  the 
philosophers  should  rule.  For  the  philosophers'  long-term  education  suggests  that 
Plato  regards  government  as  a  science  and  science  should  be  left  to  experts.  21  The 
analogy  of  ships  and  the  crew  at  488a-e  is  a  good  example  to  illustrate  Plato's  idea. 
Plato  says  that  a  navigator  is  good  only  when  he  possesses  knowledge  of  navigation; 
similarly  the  philosophers  will  be  good  rulers  because  they  have  insight  into  the  good 
itself;  their  knowledge  enables  them  to  concentrate  on  the  reality  rather  than  on  the 
resemblances  which  share  in  it.  Therefore,  the  possession  of  absolute  knowledge  of 
good  gives  the  philosophers  the  right  to  rule.  The  analogy  also  suggests  the  fact  that 
"  it  is  as  absurd  to  govern  by  popular  vote  as  it  would  be  to  conduct  medicine  or 
navigation  by  popular  vote.  "22 
Popper  thinks  that  Plato's  Republic  is  anti-democratic,  his  assertion  might  be 
true,  but  what  is  more  important  is  that  Plato  at  488a-e  points  out  a  blind  spot  of 
democracy.  That  is,  "  democracy  denies  the  possibility  of  science  in  government  ".  23 
In  modern  democratic  society,  through  election  everyone  who  possesses  the 
qualification  for  standing  for  election,  is  capable  of  being  elected  to  be  in  office.  It 
does  not  matter  whether  the  candidate  possesses  relevant  knowledge  or  not.  Therefore, 
we  can  see  that  in  America  an  actor  can  be  the  president,  and  in  Poland  a  shipbuilder. 
However,  if  Plato  were  alive  today,  these  men  would  he  regarded  by  Plato  as  lower 
class  people.  They  do  not  possess  proper  knowledge  of  how  to  rule,  and  their  being  in 
power,  in  Plato's  view,  would  be  the  kind  of  absurdity  which  happens  in  democratic 
societies. 
Confucius,  second,  is  not  a  supporter  of  democracy  either  but  a  supporter  of  a 
feudal  system.  However,  unlike  Plato,  who  thinks  that  the  person  in  power  should 
possess  knowledge,  Confucius  thinks  that  a  state  should  be  ruled  by  a  virtuous  man. 
Instead  of  appealing  to  '  rule  by  knowledge  ',  Confucius  is  more  interested  in  `  rule 
by  virtue  '.  The  ruler,  for  Confucius,  is  the  object  of  emulation  to  the  public,  and  the 
public  would  be  affected  by  the  ruler's  virtuous  behaviour.  That  is  why  Confucius 
21  R.  Robinson,  "  Dr.  Popper's  Defence  of  Democracy  ",  Essaus  in  Greek  P/iilosophy  (Oxford,  1969).  p. 
82. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
57 says  at  XII,  19  in  the  Analects  that  "  the  nature  of  the  gentleman  is  as  the  wind,  and 
the  nature  of  the  small  man  is  as  the  grass.  When  the  wind  blows  over  the  grass  it 
always  bends.  "  The  reason  why  Plato  and  Confucius  have  different  views  on  the 
characteristics  that  the  ruler  should  possess  in  order  to  rule  efficiently  is,  it  seems  to 
me,  that  Plato's  moral  and  political  philosophy  are  based  upon  his  epistemology,  that 
is,  on  the  belief  that  only  the  philosophers  are  capable  of  seeing  the  Form  of  the  Good 
which  enables  them  to  make  a  proper  judgement  on  the  issues  of  everyday  life.  While 
Confucian  moral  and  political  thought  are  based  upon  the  golden  past,  that  is,  upon 
tradition  and  custom  practiced  by  his  predecessors  for  a  long  time.  What  I  am  arguing 
here  is  not  that  virtue  for  Plato  is  not  important  and  knowledge  for  Confucius  is  not 
important,  in  effect,  both  knowledge  and  virtue,  for  Plato  and  Confucius,  are 
important  elements  for  being  an  ideal  ruler.  What  makes  the  difference  is  their 
different  views  on  whether  virtue  is  knowledge. 
To  sum  up.  In  constructing  his  just  state  Plato  emphasizes  the  importance  of 
social  roles,  the  nature  of  each  citizen,  and  the  common  good.  In  a  just  society 
individual  citizens  should  do  their  own  jobs,  and  their  social  roles  and  classes  are 
determined  by  their  aptitudes  and  natures,  namely,  gold,  silver,  and  iron  and  bronze. 
What  is  more  important  is  that  they  all  share  a  common  interest,  i.  e.  they  identify 
their  own  interests  with  those  of  society.  If  society  benefits  then  they  benefit.  In  a 
society  a  certain  level  of  mutual  relationship  should  be  granted,  and  the  society,  as  a 
framework  with  common  interests,  aims,  and  values,  within  which  each  individual 
regards  the  common  goods  as  his  or  her  own,  is  a  good  in  itself.  It  is  by  such  mutual 
relationship  that  each  individual  is  morally  good.  24  Confucian  society,  though  there 
are  differences  between  Plato's  account  of  just  society  and  Confucius'  account  of 
humane  society,  is  built  upon  tradition  and  social  customs,  i.  e.  the  rules  of  proper 
conduct,  and  upon  the  idea  that  the  duties  of  social  roles  have  to  be  fulfilled  by  the 
persons  who  occupy  them.  Moreover,  society  is  like  a  family  writ  large,  the  affection 
towards  one's  family  members  is  the  same  as  that  towards  one's  fellow  countrymen. 
Thus  the  good  or  stability  of  the  society  would  be  maintained  by  people's  playing 
their  social  roles  properly  and  having  the  mutual  affection  towards  and  the 
24  Shlomo  Avineri  and  Avner  de-Shalit,  "  Introduction  ",  oj'.  cii.  pp.  6-7. 
58 harmonious  relationship  with  others. 
In  conclusion.  In  contrast  to  Plato  and  Confucius,  individualism  is  the  politics  of 
rights  and  emphasizes  the  freedom  of  choice  on  a  basis  of  equality.  The  identity  of 
each  person  cannot  be  his  or  her  natural  tendencies,  social  class,  religion  etc.,  in  that 
The  conception  of  citizens  as  free  and  equal  persons,  need  not  involve,  so  I 
believe,  questions  of  philosophical  psychology  or  a  metaphysical  doctrine 
of  the  nature  of  the  self.  No  political  view  that  depends  on  these  deep  and 
unresolved  matters  can  serve  as  a  public  conception  of  justice  in  a 
constitutional  democratic  state.  25 
What  Rawls  rejects  here  can  all  be  seen  in  modern  communitarianism,  which  asserts 
that  human  behaviour  can  only  be  understood  in  their  social,  historical,  and  cultural 
context.  The  image  of  the  individual  is  not  an  '  unencumbered  self  '  but  with 
`  constitutive  ends  ',  which  constitute  who  the  individual  is.  Thus,  if  we  want  to  know 
a  person,  then  his  aims  and  interests  should  be  put  under  consideration.  However,  the 
differences  between  individualism  and  Plato  and  Confucius  do  not  necessarily  lead  us 
to  assert  that  both  Plato  and  Confucius  are  communitarians  in  the  same  way  as  the 
modern  communitarians.  The  difference  between  Plato  and  the  communitarians  lies 
upon  the  fact  that  the  former  does  not  take  one's  social  context  as  the  basis  for 
deciding  one's  social  status,  but  one's  nature.  Although  Confucius,  in  this  sense,  is 
similar  to  the  modern  communitarianism,  yet  Confucius'  assertion,  shared  with  Plato, 
that  the  good  of  the  individual  is  coincident  with  the  good  of  the  state  is  different 
from  the  communitarian  assertion  that  the  individual  good  has  to  subordinate  to  the 
good  of  the  state.  And  the  claim  of  the  coincidence  between  the  individual  good  and 
the  common  good  can  save  both  Plato  and  Confucius  from  being  criticized  as 
proposing  totalitarianism  for  there  is  no  subordination  and  suppressing.  26 
a  op.  cit.  p.  194-5. 
26  For  a  comprehensive  table  to  this  chapter.  see  appendix. 
59 Part  II 
Just  Man Chapter  4 
Plato's  Notion  of  Just  Individual 
It  is  well-known  that  in  the  Republic  Plato  proposes  that  the  human  soul  has  three 
parts,  i.  e.  reason,  spirit,  and  appetite.  By  using  this  theory  of  the  tripartite  soul  Plato 
gives  an  account  of  how  man  can  be  virtuous.  A  virtuous  man  is  one  in  whom  the 
three  parts  of  his  soul  play  their  proper  roles  and  are  in  harmony  with  one  another.  It 
is  clear  that  the  notion  of  `doing  one's  own  job  '  is  not  only  essential  to  the  just  state 
but  also  to  the  just  man.  For,  in  Plato's  view,  the  just  man  cannot  be  identified 
without  the  orderly  and  harmonious  soul.  Thus  human  virtue  will  be  dependent  upon 
how  these  three  psychological  elements  interact  with  one  another. 
I  propose  in  this  chapter  to  investigate  the  idea  of  virtue  as  an  order  or  harmony 
in  the  soul  and  state  in  which  every  part  does  its  own  work.  Clearly  to  understand 
what  is  meant  by  order  and  harmony  we  need  to  know  what  the  elements  are  and  how 
they  are  related  to  each  other.  Plato  deals  with  these  points  in  great  detail  in  the 
middle  books  of  the  Republic.  So  the  main  purpose  of  this  chapter  will  be  to  examine 
this  account  and  to  investigate  whether  there  are  any  significant  parallels  between 
Plato's  account  and  Confucian  ethics.  Thus,  I  have  divided  this  chapter  into  three 
parts  related  to  Plato's  notion  of  order  or  harmony  in  the  soul  and  state:  firstly,  the 
tripartite  soul,  in  this  section  I  will  confine  my  discussion  mainly  to  the  different 
characteristics  of  the  three  parts  of  the  soul;  secondly,  the  unity  of  the  soul,  how  the 
three  parts  interacting  with  one  another  will  be  considered.  Finally,  the  analogy 
between  individual  and  state.  Plato  says  that  in  a  just  state  we  can  find  four  virtues,  i.  e. 
wisdom,  courage,  sophrosune,  and  justice.  It  follows  that  if  the  individual  is  the  state 
writ  small  then  these  four  virtues  can  also  be  seen  in  the  just  individual. 
1.  The  tripartite  soul 
In  order  to  show  that  we  perform  each  of  the  three  functions  with  different  parts  of 
our  soul,  Socrates  puts  forwards  a  principle  that  "  one  and  the  same  thing  cannot  act or  be  affected  in  opposite  ways  at  the  same  time  in  the  same  part  of  it  and  in  relation 
to  the  same  object  "  (436b).  This  principle  is  called  by  scholars  the  Principle  of 
Opposites  or  Principle  of  Conflict.  '  According  to  this  principle,  it  is  impossible  for  a 
thing  to  be  at  rest  and  in  motion  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  part  of  it  (436c). 
Plato  at  436c-e  deals  with  two  likely  objections  to  the  principle  to  remove  ambiguities 
in  using  it.  One  is  that  it  is  wrong  to  say  that  a  man,  who  is  standing  still  and  moving 
his  hands,  is  at  rest  and  in  motion  simultaneously.  Rather  we  should  say  that  a  part  of 
him  is  standing  still  and  another  part  of  him  is  moving  (436c-d).  The  other  one  is  that 
we  should  say  that  a  spinning  top  whose  circumference  is  in  motion,  but  whose  axis  is 
at  rest  (436d-e)  is  moving  in  one  respect  but  not  in  another.  Plato  now  thinks  that  the 
principle  is  valid  so  from  437b  onwards  he  proceeds  to  demonstrate,  by  using  the 
principle,  that  there  are  three  different  parts  in  the  soul. 
(1)  reason 
Plato  says  that  assent  and  dissent,  impulse  and  aversion  to  something  are  opposite 
actions  or  states  (437b).  So  hunger,  thirst,  and  the  appetitive  desires  can  be  classed  as 
impulses  to  desire  food  and  drink.  However,  men  sometimes  are  unwilling  to  drink  or 
eat  even  if  they  are  thirsty  or  hungry  (439b-c).  Therefore,  according  to  the  Principle  of 
Opposites,  there  is  an  element,  different  from  the  one  driving  men  to  crave  for  drink 
or  food,  preventing  men  from  craving  for  it.  The  element  preventing  men  from  giving 
way  to  unhealthy  cravings  is  reason  (439c-d). 
In  addition  to  the  function  of  `  prevention  ',  reason  is  characterized  by  Plato  in 
several  different  ways.  At  439d  reason  is  said  to  be  the  reflective  or  calculative 
element.  Reason  is  also  described  as  being  able  to  make  decisions  and  judgements 
(440b).  In  Book  VIII  in  the  oligarchic  soul  reason  is  forbidden  to  "  make  any 
calculation  or  inquiry  "  except  about  money  making  (553d).  Reason,  at  580d,  is  the 
part  with  which  we  learn.  Therefore  it  seems  reasonable  for  us  to  conclude  that  reason, 
in  Plato's  view,  is  a  power  by  which  we  reason,  learn,  and  make  judgement  and 
decision.  However  it  would  be  misconstruing  Plato  to  suppose  that  he  sees  reason 
J.  Annas,  An  Introduction  to  Plato's  Republic  (Oxford,  1981),  p.  137.  R.  Robinson,  "  Plato's 
Separation  of  Reason  From  Desire  ",  Phronesis,  vol.  XVI,  197  1,  p.  39. 
61 only  as  the  capacity  of  calculation.  For,  as  commentators  point  out,  2  Plato  does  not 
only  regard  reason  as  a  power  by  which  we  ]cam  and  make  judgement  but  also  as 
motivation.  Plato  says, 
Now,  it  is  clear  to  everyone  that  the  part  with  which  we  learn  is  always 
wholly  straining  to  know  where  the  truth  lies  and  that,  of  the  three  parts,  it 
cares  least  for  money  and  reputation. 
By  far  the  least. 
Then  wouldn't  it  be  appropriate  for  us  to  call  it  learning-loving  and 
philosophical.  (581b)3 
The  characteristic  of  reason  is  not  only  the  capacity  of  calculation  but  the  desire  to 
learn.  Thus  reason  is  the  motivation  which  leads  us  to  learn  and  discover  the  truth, 
and  causes  us  to  participate  in  philosophical  contemplation.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Plato 
does  not  distinguish  the  difference  between  capacity  to  know  and  the  desire  to  know, 
and  the  difference  between  the  theoretical  and  practical  wisdom.  For,  in  Plato's  view, 
they  are  two  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  thing.  '  Therefore,  a  philosopher  is  one 
whose  reason  is  predominant  in  the  soul.  Reason  is  the  ruling  clement  in  the  soul  for 
it  is  able  to  "  reflect  about  good  and  evil  "  (441b"c),  and  has  "  the  wisdom  and 
foresight  to  act  for  the  whole  "  (441  e).  Furthermore,  reason  motivates  the  philosopher 
to  love  the  truth,  and  to  love  the  truth,  for  Plato,  is  to  love  the  good.  Thus  due  to  the 
fact  that  Plato  does  not  distinguish  the  difference  between  the  theoretical  and 
practical  wisdom,  to  love  the  good  is  not  only  to  engage  in  contemplating  the  good 
but  also  able  to  seek  to  create  the  goodness  and  order  both  in  the  corporeal  world  and 
the  soul. 
(2)  appetite 
Plato  says  at  436a-b  that  appetite  is  the  element  with  which  the  soul  "  desires  the 
2  C.  I.  Kahn,  "  Plato's  Theory  of  Desire  ",  77nß  Review  of  Me/apl;  )-ics,  vol.  XLI,  1987,  p.  81;  and  R.  P. 
Stalley,  "  Virtue  and  the  Tripartite  Soul  ",  1997,  unpublished  paper. 
3  G.  M.  A.  Grube,  Plato:  Jzeprihlic  (Indianapolis,  1992),  p.  251. 
4  Kahn,  Ibid.  p.  82. 
62 pleasures  of  eating  and  sex  and  the  like  ",  and  at  439d  that  the  appctitivc  part  is  "  the 
element  with  which  it  feels  hunger  and  thirst,  and  the  agitations  of  sex  and  other 
desires,  the  element  of  irrational  appetite  --  an  clement  closely  connected  with 
satisfaction  and  pleasure.  "  In  Book  IX  Plato  demonstrates  how  the  life  of  the 
philosopher  is  happier  than  that  of  the  unjust  men,  he  recalls  the  theory  of  the 
tripartite  soul  and  says, 
As  for  the  third,  we  had  no  one  special  name  for  it,  since  it's  multiform,  so 
we  named  it  after  the  biggest  and  strongest  thing  in  it.  Hence  we  called  it  the 
appetitive  part,  because  of  the  intensity  of  its  appetites  for  food,  drink,  sex, 
and  all  the  things  associated  with  them,  but  we  also  called  it  the  money- 
loving  part,  because  such  appetite  are  most  easily  satisfied  by  means  of 
money.  (580d-  581a)5 
It  seems  obvious  that  Plato's  language  here  indicates  that  the  appetitive  part  is 
irrational.  However  some  commentators  hold  that  the  appetitive  part  has  rationality  to 
a  minimal  extent.  Moline,  for  example,  asserts  that  Plato  assigns  a  minimal  level  of 
calculative  capacity  to  the  appetitive  part.  6  Kahn  holds  that  "  this  passage  [437d-439aJ 
has  sometimes  been  thought  to  imply  that  the  appetite  (epithy-mia)  in  question  is  a 
`  blind  craving,  '  with  no  cognitive  grasp  of  its  object;  but,  of  course,  thirst  must 
recognize  its  object  as  drinkable  and  hence  as  desirable.  So  a  minimum  of  cognition 
is  implied  even  for  the  most  elemental  appetite.  "7  Lesses  comments  that  it  is  crucial 
to  see  that  all  three  parts  of  the  soul  have  the  capacity  of  forming  beliefs,  in  other 
words,  the  appetitive  part  has  the  cognitive  capacity.  8  In  what  follows  I  shall  argue 
that  Plato  does  not  see  the  appetitive  part  as  having  the  capacity  of  forming  belief. 
Plato  shows  the  appetitive  part  being  irrational  by  virtue  of  discussing  our 
ý  Grube,  op.  cit. 
61.  Moline,  "  Plato  on  the  Complexity  of  the  Psyche  ".  Archiv  Fur  Geschichte  I)er  1'1hilosohhie,  vol.  60, 
1978,  p.  11. 
7  op.  cit.  p.  85. 
"  G.  Lesses,  "  Weakness,  Reason,  and  the  Divided  Soul  in  Plato's  Republic  ",  history  of  philosnphyQuarterltiv, 
vol.  4,1987,  p.  149. 
63 craving  for  drink  (437d439a).  When  one  is  thirsty,  there  will  be  a  desire  for  drink  in 
one's  mind.  However,  it  would  be  wrong  to  say  that  one  desires  a  hot  or  cold  drink, 
when  he  is  thirsty.  For"  for  a  particular  kind  of  drink  there  will  be  a  particular  kind  of 
thirst  "  (439a).  Plato  says,  at  437e,  that  simple  thirst  is  the  desire  for  its  natural  object, 
drink,  without  qualification.  From  438b  to  439a,  Plato  proposes  an  argument  to  show 
that  appetites  are  desires  without  qualification,  that  is,  when  one  person  is  thirsty  he 
desires  a  simple  drink,  not  a  hot  or  cold  drink.  Plato's  argument  is  summarized  as 
follows: 
1)  When  two  terms  are  correlative  it  seems  that  either  both  must  be  qualified  or 
both  unqualified.  (438b) 
2)  What  is  larger  must  be  larger  than  something  smaller,  and  similarly,  what  is 
heavier  must  be  heavier  than  something  lighter.  It  will  be  the  same  for  the 
various  branches  of  knowledge.  For  knowledge  of  health  is  medical 
knowledge,  but  knowledge  unqualified  is  knowledge  simply  of  something 
learned.  (438b-c) 
So,  3)  among  correlative  terms  if  the  first  is  unqualified  so  is  the  second;  if  the  first 
is  qualified  so  again  is  the  second.  (438d) 
Since,  4)  desire  in  itself  is  without  qualification.  (439a) 
And,  5)  thirst  is  related  to  drink,  and  thirst  is  a  sort  of  desire.  (439b) 
So,  6)  thirst  is  the  desire  neither  for  cold  or  hot  drinks,  nor  for  good  or  bad  drinks, 
but  for  drink  simple. 
Thirst  in  itself  is  the  desire  for  drink  without  any  qualification.  It  will  not  cease 
to  be  a  desire  even  though  there  are  no  hot  and  cold  drinks.  For  what  thirst  desires  is 
drink,  not  hot  or  cold  drink.  The  epithets,  '  hot  '  and  '  cold  ',  are  not  essential  for 
thirst  to  be  the  desire  for  drink.  Therefore,  Plato  in  the  Republic  claims  that  thirst  and 
hunger  as  unqualified  desires  are  not  to  crave  for  good  drink  or  delicious  food,  but 
drink  and  food  pure  and  simple.  It  is  clear  that  Plato  is  not  interested  in  the  objects  for 
which  the  desires  crave  but  in  the  nature  or  essence  of  the  desires. 
Moreover,  Plato's  insistence  on  the  fact  that  the  desire  for  drink  is  neither  for 
64 good  nor  for  bad  drink  (439a)  sccros  to  suggcsts  that  dcsirc  is  "  good"indiflcrcnt  ".  1' 
And  it  is  by  this  good-indifference  that  Plato  is  able  to  bring  out  the  difference 
between  reason  and  desire.  Parry  fairly  points  out, 
Desires  are  not  said  to  be  desires  for  what  is  pleasant  as  opposed  to  what  is 
good  --  the  definition  of  good-independent.  Indeed,  the  simple  desire  for 
drink  is  no  more  for  pleasant  drink  than  it  is  for  good  drink.  Plato's  point  is 
that  desire,  in  itself,  is  not  calculative;  it  is,  let  us  say,  good-indifferent.  It  is 
the  job  of  reason  to  calculate)° 
Thus  it  would  be  misleading  to  render  the  appetitive  part  as  `  foolish  '  or 
`  unreasonable  '.  11  For  the  passage  at  439d  cannot  be  fitted  in  with  this  interpretation. 
The  comparison  between  reason  and  appetite  at  439d  is  the  comparison  between  the 
rational  and  irrational,  but  not  between  the  clever  and  the  foolish.  12  It  is  impossible, 
as  mentioned  above,  for  the  appetitive  part,  let  us  say,  thirst  to  desire  a  good  or 
pleasant  drink.  For  it  is  unable  to  have  any  conception  of  the  good.  It  is  reason  alone 
that  can  possess  cognitive  capacity.  However,  Annas  asserts  that  the  appetitive  part 
has  the  ability  to  figure  out  the  means  to  achieve  the  end  it  wants.;  This 
interpretation  seems  to  be  supported  by  580e  where  the  appetitive  part  is  said  to  be 
the  money-loving  part.  That  is  to  say,  the  appetitive  part  is  able  to  use  money  as  a 
means  to  acquire  what  it  wants.  While  the  claim  that  the  appetitive  part  desires  money 
for  buying  things  it  wants  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  this  is  the  result  of  rational 
calculation.  For  it  could  result  from  association14  or  what  I  would  call  habituation 
without  thinking.  That  is,  money  in  one's  experience  has  been  associated  with  the 
satisfaction  of  desires,  buying  things  one  wants,  as,  for  example,  is  the  case  with  a 
shopaholic,  whenever  one  wants  something  one  is  habituated  to  buy  it  without  any 
R.  Parry,  Plato's  Croft  of  Justice  (New  York,  1996),  p.  94. 
w  Ibid. 
"  Moline,  op.  cit.  p.  11,  and  Lesses,  op.  cit. 
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65 further  thought.  In  this  case  there  is  no  need  to  assign  the  appetitive  part  the  capacity 
of  reasoning  for  in  the  situation  of  habituation  reason  is  under  the  control  of  the 
appetite  and  serves  to  work  out  the  means  of  satisfying  the  appetite's  order. 
Moline  claims15  that  the  passage  at  571c  which  indicates  that  the  appetitive  part 
is  able  to  unleash  its  beliefs  while  the  rational  part  falls  asleep,  shows  that  the 
appetitive  part  can  form  belief  or  opinion.  And  the  passage  in  Book  X,  602c-603b, 
seems  to  indicate  that  the  appetitive  part  can  form  its  own  opinion  contrary  to 
reason's  measurement.  However,  according  to  Stalley,  the  interpretation  of  this 
passage  depends  upon  how  we  understand  the  term  clo  a:  ern.  16  Stalley  says, 
This  [doxa:  ein]  is  generally  translated  as  '  have  a  belief  '  or  '  have  an 
opinion  '  but  Socrates'  argument  will  go  through  only  if  a  mere  appearance, 
to  which  we  do  not  give  full  assent,  counts  as  an  opinion.  The  person  who 
sees  the  apparently  bent  stick  while  recognising  that  this  is  an  illusion  does 
not  literally  have  the  opinion  that  the  stick  is  bent,  because  he  or  she  does 
not  assent  to  the  appearance.  One  could  not  even  claim  that  appetite  assents 
to  appearances  of  this  kind.  If  I  see  something  which  looks  very  much  like  a 
cream  cake  but  realise  that  it  is  in  fact  only  a  realistic  dummy,  l  do  not  feel  a 
desire  for  the  dummy  cake.  We  thus  have  to  take  cloxn  as  `  appearance  ' 
rather  than  `  opinion  '.  But  to  concede  that  the  appetitive  element  in  the  soul 
may  have  ddoxa  in  this  sense  is  not  to  allow  it  any  substantial  share  in 
rationality. 
Thus  it  is  not  necessary  to  designate  the  appetitive  part  as  being  able  to  form  opinion, 
and  the  problem  of  that  within  the  appetitive  part  there  are  sub-divisions  will  not 
arise. 
(3)  spirit 
Glaucon  holds,  at  439e,  that  spirit  might  be  the  same  as  appetite.  Whereas  Plato 
appeals  to  the  example  of  Leontius  whose  appetitive  part  wants  to  see  the  corpses, 
's  a1).  cit.  P.  11. 
16  Ibid.  pp.  10-11. 
66 while  his  spirited  part  condemns  his  appctitivc  part  for  being  immoral,  to  show  that 
spirit  and  desire  arc  different.  In  Lcontius'  case  the  spirit  seems  to  take  the  side  of 
reason  to  prevent  the  appetite  from  doing  immorally.  I  iowever,  does  this  mean  that 
spirit  is  also  different  from  reason?  Plato,  at  44  lb-c,  refers  to  children  and  animals  to 
give  an  explanation  why  spirit  and  reason  are  different.  Plato's  argument  is  that 
children  and  animals  lack  reason  but  have  spirit.  Thus  reason  and  spirit  are  distinct 
from  one  another.  In  our  soul,  like  the  ideal  state,  there  are  three  elements,  reason, 
spirit,  and  appetite.  In  the  ideal  state  the  Auxiliaries  arc  always  to  be  supportive  to  the 
Guardians,  so  in  the  soul  spirit  is  "  reason's  natural  auxiliary  ". 
Although  spirit,  in  Leontius'  case,  is  identified  as  the  part  with  which  we  are 
angry,  it  has  wider  role  to  play  in  the  soul.  At  375a-c  the  guardians  are  said  to  be 
spirited  and  gentle,  that  is,  they  have  to  be  courageous  and  wise.  The  spirited  part  is 
by  nature  the  helper  of  the  rational  part  (441a,  441e).  This  claim  enables  us  to  see 
why  in  the  first  stage  of  education  Plato  concentrates  on  the  education  of  the  spirited 
part  for  the  cooperation  between  the  spirited  and  the  rational  part  will  secure  the  order 
and  harmony  of  the  soul.  The  spirited  part,  unlike  the  irrational  appetitive  part,  has 
certain  passive  rational  capacity.  "  To  have  passive  rational  capacity  is  not  to  mean  to 
have  the  capacity  of  reasoning,  but  the  capacity  of  listening  to  and  accepting  the 
instruction  of  reason  without  any  reflection.  Thus  spirit  is  able  to  absorb  the  moral 
principles  presented  to  it  in  the  education  programme  laid  down  by  Plato,  and  also 
able  to  stick  to  the  Guardians'  command. 
In  addition  to  having  the  passive  capacity  of  reasoning,  the  spirited  part  is  said  at 
581a  to  be  the  element  that  "  is  entirely  devoted  to  the  achievement  of  success  and 
reputation  ",  and  that  "  its  motives  arc  ambition  and  love  of  honour.  "  The  spirited 
man  enjoys  the  pleasure  of  honour.  It  is  clear  that  the  spirited  element  makes  us  seek 
self  esteem  by  competing  with  others.  Participating  in  a  tournament,  when  we  win  we 
feel  proud  and  happy,  but  when  we  lose  we  feel  shame  and  upset.  Therefore  Plato 
does  not  see  the  spirited  part  merely  as  anger,  but  as  involving  the  emotions  with 
which  we  feel  shame,  proud,  and  honoured.  Although  it  has  no  capacity  of  forming  its 
own  judgement,  yet  its  sticking  steadfastly  to  the  rational  part  secures  the  stability  of 
º7  C.  Gill,  "  Plato  and  the  Education  of  Character  ",  Archiº'  Fur  Gesc/richte  Der  /'hi/(»ophIe,  vol.  67, 
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67 the  soul. 
To  put  this  section  briefly,  Plato's  psychology  is  not  only  concerned  with 
showing  that  there  are  three  parts  in  human  soul.  What  he  aims  to  do  in  the  theory  of 
the  tripartite  soul  is  to  give  an  account  of  how  an  orderly  soul  can  be  achieved.  For,  in 
Plato's  view,  to  have  an  orderly  soul  is  essential  for  a  person  to  be  virtuous  and  just. 
In  the  discussion  I  disagree  with  the  claim  that  there  is  a'  degree  of  rationality  ' 
among  the  three  parts.  I  argue  that  reason  is  not  only  able  to  exercise  the  capacity  of 
calculation,  but  also  a  kind  of  motivation  which  motivates  us  to  learn  and  seek  the 
truth.  Unlike  the  reason,  the  appetitive  part  is  completely  irrational.  I  have  rendered 
the  spirited  part  as  having  the  passive  capacity  of  calculation,  but  it  is  no  better  than 
the  appetitve  part  because  like  appetite  it  is  unable  to  form  its  own  judgement.  But  it 
is  able  to  recognize,  after  receiving  proper  education,  what  reason  is  approved  of  or 
disapproved  of.  The  advantage  of  this  interpretation  is  that  it  does  not  lead  to  the 
infinite  regress  as  the  homoculus  theory  does.  That  is,  we  do  not  have  to  face  the 
problem  of  the  sub-divided  soul,  which  troubles  many  commentators. 
2.  The  unity  of  soul 
According  to  439e,  there  was  a  conflict  between  Leontius'  spirit  and  desire,  when  he 
noticed  some  corpses  lying  on  the  ground.  '  . crus"ia_ein  '  or  ' 
. ciusi.  c  '  are  the  most 
common  expressions  used  by  Plato  to  describe  the  interaction  among  the  three  parts 
of  the  soul  (440b,  442d,  and  444b).  Socrates  in  Book  I  claims  that  in  a  group  of  men 
the  function  of  justice  will  produce  harmony  and  friendly  feeling,  and  the  function  of 
injustice  will  produce  the  opposite  (35ld-e).  And  he  goes  on  saying  that  similarly 
injustice  will  produce  the  same  effect  in  the  individual,  that  is,  "  [i]t  renders  him 
incapable  of  action  because  of  internal  conflict  and  division  of  purpose  "  (352a). 
Socrates  talks  of  the  appetitive  element  as  trying  to  force  a  person  to  do  something  his 
reason  does  not  approve  of  (440a"b).  An  unjust  man  is  one  the  three  parts  of  whose 
soul  are  in  a  state  of  civil  war  (444b).  In  Book  VIII  where  Socrates  gives  an  account 
of  the  corrupted  states  and  characters  the  language  of  civil  war  plays  a  dominant  role 
(545d-547b,  554d,  556e,  and  560a). 
68 The  internal  conflict  in  the  soul  can  be  described,  according  to  t3obonich,  "  on 
two  different  models,  i.  e.  the  '  Command  Model  '  and  the  '  Force  Model  '.  On  the 
Force  Model  the  conflict  between,  let  us  say,  reason  and  appetite  is  described  as  that 
of  two  forces  pulling  in  opposite  directions.  It  is  just  like  two  group  of  people  playing 
tug-of-war;  the  stronger  side  will  win  the  game.  However,  this  interpretation  gives 
rise  to  some  problems.  Firstly,  as  IIobonich  himself  points  out,  19  if  human  action  is 
determined  by  the  strength  of  a  desire  then  what  would  be  the  content  of  the  strength. 
For  without  knowing  the  content  of  the  strength  it  would  be  impossible  to  give  a 
satisfactory  explanation  of  why  a  person  acts  in  this  way  but  not  otherwise.  Secondly, 
the  passages  at  440b  and  441a  seem  to  suggest  that  reason  without  the  aid  of  spirit  is 
unable  to  combat  appetite.  Although  the  joint  forces  of  reason  and  spirit  can  make 
sense  of  the  Force  Model,  one  could  still  question,  as  Stalley  asserts,  20  whether  the 
model  can  fit  in  adequately  with  what  Plato  says. 
The  second  model  Bobonich  proposes  is  the  '  Command  Model  '.  This  model, 
according  to  ßobonich,  relies  on  the  idea  that  the  three  parts  can  communicate  with 
one  another.  "  A  similar  idea  was  brought  out  by  Moline  twenty  years  ago.  Moline 
claims  that  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  are  like  the  three  classes  in  the  just  state,  they 
are  persuadable  agents.  So  "  [t]he  business  of  the  wisdom-loving  part  is  to  guide  the 
other  parts  by  persuasion,  to  transplant  into  alien  parts  its  own  opinions,  or,  more 
accurately,  opinions  corresponding  in  content  to  its  knowledge.  "22  This  interpretation 
is  certainly  more  attractive  than  the  Force  Model  in  that  Plato  puts  strong  emphasis  on 
the  harmony  of  the  soul.  The  three  parts  of  the  soul  can  be  harmonious  with  one 
another.  However  if  the  discussion  in  the  first  section  is  correct  then  it  would  be 
difficult  for  us  to  see  how  reason  can  be  in  charge  of  the  soul  by  persuasion.  For  the 
appetitive  element  is  said  to  be  irrational  and  has  no  capacity  of  calculation. 
Moreover,  if  each  part  of  the  soul  has  the  capacity  of  reasoning  then  within  appetite 
18  C.  E3obonich,  "  Akrasia  and  Agency  in  Plato's  Lmvs  and  tlep:  rblic  ",  Archiv  1--ur  Geschichte  Der 
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69 there  are  sub-parts,  i.  e.  reason,  spirit,  and  appetite.  For  the  term  '  persuasion  '  implies 
that  conversation  or  dialogue  takes  place  among  the  three  parts  of  the  soul.  Therefore 
to  persuade  the  appctitivc  part  is  to  make  it  to  do  something  by  reasoning  or  arguing. 
It  follows  that  the  appetitive  part  has  the  ability  to  calculate  whether  it  is  or  is  not 
beneficial  to  follow  reason's  command.  So  there  will  be  an  inner  conversation  within 
the  appetitive  part,  and  the  conversation  among  the  sub-parts  will  lead  to  infinite 
regress.  It  follows  from  the  regress  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  give  a  sufficient 
account  of  what  a  single  individual  is,  in  other  words,  individual  identity  is  at  stake. 
For  the  individual  character  is  shredded  into  pieces. 
In  addition  to  these  two  models,  I  suggest,  following  Stalley,  a  third  model,  the 
'  Educational  Model  '.  The  passage  at  442c  is  taken  by  ßobonich  as  to  mean  that  the 
agreement  on  who  should  rule  is  the  result  of  the  internal  communication.  However 
the  term  '  agreement  '  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  lower  part  has  the  capacity 
of  forming  their  own  opinions.  For,  as  mentioned,  the  term  doxu  may  be  taken  to 
mean  appearance  and  the  translation  of  the  term  Bora  ein  as  `  share  the  same 
opinion  '  is  an  over-translation.  23  So  Socrates'  saying,  "  when  reason  and  its 
subordinates  are  all  agreed  that  reason  should  rule  and  there  is  no  civil  war  among 
them  "  (442c-d),  does  not  mean  that  appetite  sees  that  following  the  rule  of  reason 
will  make  it  better  off.  It  rather  means  that  the  appctitive  element  is  well  rruined  so 
they  will  only  desire  what  reason  approves  of.  The  Educational  Model  is  explicitly 
appealed  if  we  refer  to  554b-c  where  Socrates  says, 
I  suppose  that  his  [the  oligarchic  man]  lack  of  education  will  breed  desires  in 
him,  like  the  pauper  and  criminal  drones,  which  his  general  carefulness  will 
keep  under  restraint. 
This  passage,  it  seems  to  me,  indicates  that  if  the  oligarchic  man  were  properly 
educated  then  his  '  unnecessary  '  desires  would  be  restrained  or  starved,  and  only 
those  '  necessary  '  ones  can  grow  and  be  active. 
Finally  the  Beast  image  at  589b  shows  that  the  appetitive  element  needs  to  be 
23  Stalley,  op.  cit.  p.  21. 
70 trained,  since  neither  the  Force  Model  nor  the  Command  Model  fits  in  with  this 
passage.  The  former,  as  mentioned,  is  incompatible  with  Plato's  notion  of  harmony 
within  the  soul,  and  of  the  latter  we  cannot  find  any  trace  of  persuasion  in  the  context. 
The  method  of  training  the  many-headed  beast,  says  Socrates,  is  to  look  after  it  like 
the  farmer  looks  after  crops.  Nursing  and  cultivating  its  tamer  parts  and  restraining  or 
preventing  the  wilder  ones  growing.  Therefore,  it  can  be  seen  that  Plato  sees 
education  as  the  cornerstone  for  achieving  the  inner  harmony  of  the  individual  soul. 
Without  the  proper  education  programme  for  the  three  parts  of  soul  the  inner  conflict 
will  never  be  eliminated.  24 
The  question  whether  Confucius  himself  will  accept  or  claim  that  human  soul 
has  parts  is  problematic,  for  he  never  says  anything  about  it,  but  in  the  Book  of 
Mencius  some  passages  convey  an  idea  of  how  to  restrain  the  appetitve  element 
similar  to  that  mentioned  in  the  Republic.  Mencius  says  in  the  Nook  ofMcnciur,  25 
The  disciple  Kung-tu  said,  '  All  are  equally  men,  but  some  are  great  men, 
and  some  are  little  men;  -  how  is  this?  '  Mencius  replied,  '  Those  who 
follow  that  part  of  themselves  which  is  great  are  great  men;  those  who 
follow  that  part  which  is  little  are  little  men.  ' 
Kung-tu  pursued,  '  All  are  equally  men,  but  some  follow  that  part  of 
themselves  which  is  great,  and  some  follow  that  part  which  is  little;  --  how 
is  this?  '  Mencius  answered,  `  The  senses  of  hearing  and  seeing  do  not  think, 
and  are  obscured  by  external  things.  When  one  thing  comes  into  contact  with 
another,  as  a  matter  of  course  it  leads  it  away.  To  the  mind  belongs  the  office 
of  thinking,  By  thinking,  it  gets  the  right  view  of  things,  by  neglecting  to 
think,  it  fails  to  do  this.  (VI,  i,  15) 
it  is  clear  from  this  passage  that  Mencius  seems  to  propose  a  theory  of  division  of 
mind  and  body.  For  the  great  part  of  men,  in  Mencius'  view,  is  mind  or  soul;  and  the 
little  part  of  men  is  senses  which  belong  to  body.  Therefore  those  who  follow  their 
souls  will  be  great  men  and  those  who  follow  their  senses  will  be  little  men.  For  the 
2'  The  issue  of  how  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  are  educated  will  be  considered  in  Part  Ill,  Chapter  7. 
25  J.  Legge,  The  Works  ojAfencius  (New  York,  1970),  pp.  417-8. 
71 five  senses,  in  Mencius'  view,  are  easily  attracted  to  external  objects  without  thinking. 
Whenever,  for  example,  we  see  beautiful  clothes  we  want  to  have  them  without 
further  thinking  whether  they  are  suitable  for  us.  Thus  senses  will  arouse  desires.  The 
same  kind  of  mind  and  body  division  can  also  be  seen  in  the  I'hactio,  where  Socrates 
talks  of  how  the  soul  is  corrupted  by  agreeing  with  the  body  (83d).  Moreover, 
Mencius  also  points  out  that  the  body  is irrational  because  it  is  incapable  of  thinking, 
but  the  soul  is  rational  because  by  thinking  the  soul  can  get  '  the  right  view  of  things  '. 
Plato,  I  think,  will  agree  with  Mencius  on  this  matter,  for  Plato  too  does  not  think  that 
the  appetitive  element  can  have  the  capacity  of  reasoning,  although  Mencius,  unlike 
Plato,  does  not  see  human  soul  as  having  parts. 
Thus  it  is  possible  for  the  body  and  the  soul  to  be  in  conflict  with  each  other. 
How  can  a  person  prevent  the  body  from  getting  the  upper  hand  of  the  soul?  Mencius 
says  that  "  [l]et  a  man  first  stand  fast  in  the  supremacy  of  the  nobler  part  of  his 
constitution,  and  the  inferior  part  will  not  be  able  to  take  it  from  him  "  (VI,  i,  15).  2&' 
Mencius  later  in  the  Book  tells  us  how  the  soul  can  win  over  the  body,  he  says, 
To  nourish  the  mind  there  is  nothing  better  than  to  make  the  desires  few. 
Here  is  a  man  whose  desires  are  few:  -  in  some  things  he  may  not  be  able 
to  keep  his  heart,  but  they  will  be  few.  Here  is  a  man  whose  desires  are  many: 
-  in  some  things  he  may  be  able  to  keep  his  heart,  but  they  will  be  few.  27 
(VII,  ii,  35) 
To  make  the  desires  few  does  not  mean  that  the  soul  tells  the  body  no  to  do  this  or 
that,  nor  that  the  force  of  the  soul  is  stronger  than  that  of  the  body.  But  by  education  a 
person's  bodily  desires  can  be  made  few.  For,  in  the  Confucian  viewv,  only  by 
education  and  self-cultivation  one  person  can  recover  his  true  self,  human- 
heartedness. 
To  sum  up  this  section,  although  Plato  treats  justice  and  the  other  virtues  as 
matters  of  the  soul's  internal  constitution,  he  does  not  think  that  a  man  could  be  just 
outside  society.  We  need  education  which  is  only  available  in  society  in  order  to 
26  op.  cit.  p.  418. 
27  Ibid.  p.  497. 
72 achieve  inner  justice.  In  this  respect  there  may  be  less  difference  than  one  would 
suppose  between  Plato  and  the  Confucians.  Although  the  latter  have  little  to  say  about 
inner  mental  states,  they  would  stress  the  importance  of  virtuous  character  and  see 
this  as  possible  only  within  society. 
3.  The  virtues  in  state  and  individual 
After  the  discussion  of  the  tripartite  soul,  Socrates,  at  441d,  draws  a  conclusion  that 
"  the  individual  man  is  just  in  the  same  way  that  the  state  is  just  ",  since  " 
...  the 
individual  is  brave  with  the  same  part  and  in  the  same  way  as  the  state,  and  ...  there  is 
the  same  correspondence  in  all  the  other  constituents  of  excellence.  "  Plato's  method 
of  looking  for  justice  in  the  state  and  the  individual  is  weird,  but  the  problem  whether 
his  method  is  legitimate  I  will  leave  aside  for  the  moment.  I  shall  try  next  to  discuss 
how  Plato  can  find  out  the  four  virtues,  namely  wisdom,  courage,  sophrosune,  and 
justice,  in  the  state  as  well  the  individual. 
(1)  wisdom 
At  428b,  Socrates  says  that  it  is  obvious  that  the  state  we  have  described  may  fairly  be 
called  wise,  since  it  has  good  judgement.  The  ideal  state  has  wisdom  and  good 
judgement  not  because  of  the  knowledge  of  farmers  and  artisans,  but  because 
everyone  does  his  or  her  job  under  the  supervision  of  the  Guardians.  It  is  worth  noting 
that  without  having  everyone  doing  his  or  her  job  the  order  of  the  state  cannot  be 
established.  Subsequently,  without  the  order  it  would  be  impossible  to  say  that  the 
wise  Guardians  are  in  control  of  the  state.  Thus  only  when  each  one  does  his  own  job 
under  the  guidance  of  the  Guardians'  knowledge  can  the  state  be  called  wise. 
I  lowever  one  thing  could  be  argued:  Why  cannot  the  other  two  classes,  the  Auxiliaries, 
and  farmers  and  artisans  etc.,  be  in  charge  of  the  state?  The  answer  to  it  seems  to  be 
found  at  428c,  where  Glaucon  says  that  carpenter's  knowledge  can  only  make  him 
good  at  carpentry.  That  is,  the  function  of  the  carpenter,  for  Plato,  is  only  to  do 
carpentry  well  not  for  anything  else.  For  everything  which  has  a  function  has  its  own 
excellence  (353b),  so  the  carpenter  has  his  own  excellence  which  will  he  different 
73 from  the  Guardians'.  On  the  contrary,  the  Guardians'  knowledge  enables  them  to 
know  what  is  good  for  the  state  as  a  whole.  To  put  political  power  in  the  hand  of  the 
wise  few  seems  to  suggest  that  Plato  is  asserting  an  anti-democratic  thesis  that  only 
the  few  who  possess  wisdom  and  knowledge  can  be  good  governors  and  make  a  state 
well-governed.  Although  Plato  does  commit  himself  to  this  anti-democratic  thesis, 
what  Plato  is  more  concerned  with  are,  firstly,  everyone  has  to  do  one  job  for  which 
he  or  she  is  naturally  suited;  and  secondly,  the  state  has  to  be  ruled  by  the  wise  ruler, 
because  the  philosopher  whose  soul  is  in  a  state  of  harmony,  i.  e.  reason  is  properly  in 
control,  understands  what  is  good.  Thus  the  philosophers  have  to  take  part  in  politics 
in  turn  to  rule  the  state.  Furthermore,  Plato  regards  government  as  science  so  it  should 
be  left  to  experts.  The  analogy  at  488a-e  explicitly  illustrates  the  idea  that  only  the 
philosophically  trained  Guardians  can  be  good  rulers  for  they  have  the  capacity  to 
appreciate  the  good  itself,  and  subsequently  are  able  to  make  a  judgement  about  what 
is  good  for  the  state  as  a  whole. 
When  Plato  compares  his  just  man  with  just  state,  Plato  asserts  that  reason  ought 
to  rule  in  the  soul,  since  it  is  the  only  part  "  having  the  wisdom  and  foresight  to  act  for 
the  whole  "  (441e),  whereas  the  other  two  parts,  spirit  and  desire,  have  their  eyes  only 
on  their  own  interests.  Moreover,  we  are  told,  at  442c,  that  we  call  an  individual  wise 
in  virtue  of  his  reason  which  is  "  in  control  and  issues  the  orders,  knowing  as  it  does 
what  is  best  for  each  of  the  three  elements  and  for  the  whole  made  up  of  them.  "  It  is 
clear  from  this  passage  that  a  wise  individual  is  one  in  whom  each  of  the  three  parts 
of  the  soul  does  one  job  for  which  it  is  naturally  suited  under  the  control  of  reason. 
Without  each  part  doing  its  own  the  soul  will  be  in  a  state  of  chaos.  Thus  it  will  be 
impossible  for  reason  to  rule.  29 
(2)  courage 
The  state's  bravery  is  evidently  shown  in  the  bravery  of  the  Auxiliaries.  Although  the 
other  classes  may  be  brave,  it  is  not  their  bravery  which  constitutes  "  the  ordinary 
citizen's  courage  "  (430c).  However  the  Auxiliaries'  bravery  cannot  be  said  to  be  true 
bravery,  but  cili:  ens  bravery,  since  their  souls  are  not  guided  by  reason,  The 
28  For  a  comparison  between  Plato's  notion  of  wisdom  and  Confucius'  notion  of  wisdom,  see  Part  111, 
Chapter  5,  Section  3. 
74 Auxiliaries  have  right  beliefs  about  what  sort  of  things  are  and  are  not  to  be  feared, 
whereas  they  lack  ability  to  critically  reflect  on  the  contents  of  their  beliefs.  For  this 
kind  of  ability  can  only  be  found  in  people  who  possess  knowledge,  and  whose  soul  is 
dominated  by  reason.  So  "  [s]trictly  speaking,  only  the  Rulers  can  have  true  courage, 
because  true  courage  must  be  based  on  full  knowledge.  "try 
However,  one  question  can  be  asked:  If  the  Auxiliaries'  bravery  is  only  a 
secondary  bravery  then  how  can  a  state  be  truly  brave  when  its  bravery  depends  upon 
the  Auxiliaries  who  is  not  brave  in  the  full  sense?  The  answer  to  it,  I  think,  is  that,  for 
Plato,  only  the  just  state  can  be  truly  brave  for  the  Auxiliaries  are  brought  up  and 
educated  with  right  kind  of  opinions  which  will  enable  them  to  stick  to  and  execute 
the  orders  of  the  Guardians.  While  the  Auxiliaries'  ability  to  listen  to  the  orders  of  the 
Guardians  means  that  the  state's  bravery  does  not  depend  exclusively  upon  them. 
Since  for  a  state  to  be  just  everyone  of  it  has  to  do  their  own  job,  and  the  Guardians' 
wisdom  will  ensure  that  everyone  is  in  the  right  position  and  does  his  or  her  job. 
Therefore  a  just  state  needs  the  guidance  of  the  Guardians;  similarly,  a  state's  bravery 
is  not  because  the  Auxiliaries  are  brave,  but  because  the  Auxiliaries  and  the  fancier 
and  artisan,  etc.  are  guided  by  the  Guardians  who  make  sure  that  the  two  classes  cling 
steadfastly  to  the  order  of  the  Guardians.  Thus  the  state's  bravery  does  not  merely 
depend  upon  the  Auxiliaries'  bravery  but  upon  everyone  standing  fast  to  their  stations 
and  listening  to  the  instructions  of  the  Guardians. 
At  441a,  Socrates  says  that  spirit  is  "  reason's  natural  auxiliary  ",  and  we  know 
in  Book  III  that  the  Auxiliaries  are  in  charge  of  military,  police  and  executive  duties 
under  the  control  of  the  Guardians.  It  seems  reasonable  to  relate  spirit  to  the 
Auxiliaries.  At  441  e-442a  where  Socrates  tells  us  that  the  spirit  needs  to  receive  a 
combination  of  intellectual  and  physical  training,  in  order  to  obey  and  support  the 
reason.  Thus  we  can  see  that  courage  in  the  individual  is  the  power  of  the  spirit  to 
stick  to  the  dictates  of  reason  with  regard  to  what  is  and  is  not  to  be  feared  in  all 
circumstances.  Therefore  we  call  a  person  brave  because  of  his  spirit  obeying  the 
orders  of  reason  about  what  he  ought  or  ought  not  to  fear,  in  spite  of  pain  and  pleasure 
(442b1  l-c3).  It  is  this  internal  motive  which  enables  us  to  decide  whether  an  agent's 
29  D.  Lee,  Plato:  The  Republic  (London,  1987),  p.  200. 
75 behaviour  is  or  is  not  brave.  As  we  saw  above,  the  claim  that  '  spirit  obeys  the  order 
of  reason  '  does  not  mean  that  spirit  is  able  to  form  the  opinion  that  it  is  good  for  it  to 
obey  the  reason,  but  that  since  it  has  received  proper  education  it  is habituated  to 
listen  to  reason's  command. 
The  notion  of  courage  is  also  mentioned  in  the  Confucian  ethics.  Confucius  says 
in  the  Doctrine  of  the  Mean, 
To  be  fond  of  learning  is  to  be  near  to  knowledge.  To  practice  vigour  is  to  be 
near  magnanimity.  To  possess  the  feeling  of  shame  is  to  be  near  to  energy.  10 
The  term  knowledge  here  is  not  Platonic  knowledge  of  the  Forms  but  knowledge 
which  enables  one  to  understand  the  detailed  course  of  duty  and  obligation  prescribed 
by  social  role.  The  term  energy  or  courage  means  that  a  superior  man  should  have 
sufficient  strength  and  courage  to  maintain  the  task  of  being  a  superior  man.;  '  The 
superior  man's  courage  will  enable  him  to  sustain  the  permanence  of  his  fulfillment 
of  his  duties  and  the  practice  of  human-heartedness.  Therefore, 
[T]he  superior  man  cultivates  a  friendly  harmony,  without  being  weak;  .... 
He  stands  erect  in  the  middle,  without  inclining  to  either  side;  .... 
When  good 
principles  prevail  in  the  government  of  his  country,  he  does  not  change  what 
he  was  in  retirement.....  When  bad  principles  prevail  in  the  country,  he 
maintains  his  course  to  death  without  changing.  32 
Confucius,  like  Plato,  does  not  see  courage  as  a  kind  of  animal  impulse  without 
the  company  of  wisdom,  but  as  a  harmony  between  one's  nature  and  conduct.  That  is, 
for  a  person  to  be  a  superior  man  requires  him  to  have  the  strength  or  courage  to  stick 
to  uncovering  human-heartedness,  and  acting  in  accordance  with  ritual.  For  Confucius 
to  be  courageous  requires  one  to  face  oneself,  self-examination,  to  see  whether  one  is 
30  J.  Legge,  Confucius:  Confucian  Analecls,  hie  Great  Learning,  and  hue  Doctrine  of  the  Mean  (New 
York,  1971),  p.  407. 
31  Wei-ming  Tu,  Centrality  and  Commonality  (New  York,  1989),  p.  33. 
32  Legge,  op.  cit.  p.  390. 
76 loyal  in  one's  designs  for  others,  whether  one  is  trustworthy  in  one's  dealing  with 
friends,  and  whether  one  has  practiced  what  has  been  passed  on  him.  33  Even  though 
the  superior  man  is  alone  he  will  be  watchful  over  his  conduct,  The  courageous  man 
will  not  feel  fear  because  he  has  the  strength  to  keep  himself  on  track  without  going 
astray.  The  fundamental  difference  between  Plato  and  Confucius  in  the  account  of 
courage  is  that  the  former  thinks  that  only  the  philosopher's  courage  is  real  one  for  it 
is  combined  with  wisdom,  the  knowledge  of  the  Forms.  In  other  words,  Plato's 
distinguishing  knowledge  from  belief  leads  him  to  hold  that  real  courage  is  one  with 
the  company  of  knowledge.  In  the  conversation  with  Polemarchus  in  Book  I  Plato 
points  out  Polemarchus'  inadequate  account  of  justice  by  showing  that  without  proper 
understanding  the  term  `justice'  it  would  be  impossible  to  give  a  consistent  account 
of  it.  The  latter,  Confucius,  however  emphasizes  the  importance  of  self-examination, 
a  person  has  to  examine  himself  whether  he  behaves  rightly  according  to  traditional 
wisdom  or  custom.  Thus,  Confucius'  notion  of  courage  is  more  like  the  courage  of  the 
Auxiliaries. 
(3)  sophrosunc 
Socrates  says  at  432a  that  sophrosune  is  a  harmony  between  all  three  classes  in  a  city. 
So  sophrosune  is  regarded  as  the  "  unanimity  in  which  there  is  a  natural  concordance 
between  higher  and  lower  about  which  of  them  is  to  rule  in  state  and  individual.  "  In 
saying  this  Plato  seems  to  appeal  to  two  of  the  many  definitions  of  sophrosune.  First, 
sophrosune  is  a  kind  of  order,  a  control  of  pleasure  and  desire.  People  use  the  phrase 
"  being  master  of  oneself  "  as  indication  of  sophrosune  (430e).  The  expression 
"  master  of  oneself  "  is  intended  to  mean  that  the  naturally  better  part  controls  the 
worse  part.  A  similar  idea  is  illustrated  in  the  Laws,  where  the  Athenian  asserts  that 
"  each  one  of  us  is  either  '  conqueror  of  '  or  `conquered  by  '  himself  "  (627a),  since 
"  each  man  fights  a  private  war  against  himself  "  (626e).  And  this  private  war  can  he 
clearly  seen  in  the  individual's  counterpart,  the  state,  when  the  inferior  are  subdued 
by  the  better  people.  In  this  case  it  may  be  said  to  be  '  conqueror  of  '  itself  Second, 
sophrosune  is  regarded  as  an  agreement  among  the  classes  of  the  state  (442c-d),  and 
33  The  Analecls,  1,4. 
77 this  description  of  sophrosune  involves  two  elements,  as  Annas  points  out.  34 
Firstly,  all  citizens  in  a  state  agree  in  their  opinion  that  the  right  people  are  ruling. 
As  Socrates  says  at  431e1-2,  "  it  will  be  true  that  government  and  subjects  will  agree 
about  who  ought  to  rule.  "  The  basis  for  this  should  be  that  sophrosune  is 
characteristic  of  both  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  (431e5-7).  For  the  agreement  between 
the  rulers  and  the  ruled  results  from  the  fact  that  the  former  know  that  they  are  the 
right  people  to  rule,  and  the  latter  know  that  they  are  not.  Secondly,  there  is  the 
element  of  deference.  35  This  element  Plato  fairly  describes  at  431b-d,  that  is, 
sophrosune  in  a  state  requires  the  rulers  to  impose  control  on  their  own  appetitive 
desires  from  within,  and  the  ruled  to  acquiesce  in  the  imposition  control  on  their 
appetitive  desires  from  without,  36  that  is,  they  accept  the  rule  of  the  Guardians. 
However,  two  problems  arise  from  the  account  of  deference.  The  one  is  that  the 
imposition  on  the  lower  class  people's  appetitive  desires  seems  to  implicitly  suggest 
that  the  deference  of  the  lower  classes  to  the  rulers  requires  some  sacrifice  of  their 
own  interests  or  good.  37  In  other  words,  Plato  seems  to  suggest  an  autocratic  element 
or  totalitarianism38  in  his  political  system.  It  could  be  argued  that  Plato  here  is  talking 
of  an  ideal  state  not  a  real  state,  it  is  only  in  the  ideal  state  that  the  lower  class  people 
have  to  defer  to  the  rulers  who  are  wise  and  possess  knowledge.  Nevertheless, 
something  still  has  to  be  explained:  Do  the  lower  classes  willingly  abandon  what  they 
themselves  would  prefer  because  they  recognize  that  the  decisions  made  by  the  wise 
rulers  are  the  better  ones?  or  although  they  recognize  that  the  Guardians  should  be 
rulers,  do  they  still  feel  sullen  because  their  appetitive  desires  are  thwarted  to  some 
extent?  If  the  second  suggestion  were  the  case,  then  Plato's  account  of  the  agreement 
among  the  three  classes  about  who  should  rule  could  be  challenged.  Since  the 
agreement  involves  the  lower  class  people's  dissatisfaction  with  their  desires  or 
34  op.  cil.  pp.  115-6. 
35  Annas,  Mitt  pp.  116-7,  pp.  172-4. 
36  M.  C.  Nussbaum,  "  Shame,  Separateness,  and  Political  Unity  ",  bs  a  ys  on  Aristotle's  Ethics,  (ed.  ) 
Rorty,  A.  0.  (California,  1980).  p.  408. 
37  N.  P.  White,  A  (.  'ompa  nio  i  to  Mato's  Republic  (Cambridge,  1979),  p.  118. 
38  Popper  says  that  "I  believe  that  Plato's  political  programme,  far  from  being  morally  superior  to 
totalitarianism,  is  fundamentally  identical  with  it.  "  The  Oper  Society  and  Its  Ehemies,  vol.  1  (London, 
1991,  p.  87. 
78 appetites  being  thwarted  to  some  extent  by  the  wise  rulers,  the  stability  of  the  state 
would  be  doubtful.  It  is  superficially  true  that  Plato  seems  to  have  no  answer  to  this. 
For  Plato's  usage  of  the  terms  `  unanimity  '  and  `  agreement  '  indicates  that  people  in 
the  ideal  state  are  not  forccci  to  agree  on  who  should  rule  and  who  should  be  ruled. 
They  accept  the  rule  of  the  Guardians  because  that  is  the  way  they  have  been  brought 
up.  39  Therefore  it  would  be  difficult  to  see  how  in  a  happy  and  just  state  people  will 
revolt  against  their  rulers.  White  might  be  wrong  to  point  out  that  people  in  the  ideal 
state  might  have  to  sacrifice  their  own  interests  to  some  extent.  40  For  people  in  the 
ideal  state  are  trained  to  believe  that  their  own  interest  is  coincident  with  that  of  the 
state. 
The  other  consequence  of  Plato's  account  of  sophrosune  is  that  the  lower  class 
people  are  deprived  of  liberty.  We  are  told  in  Book  III  that  the  life  of  the  three  classes 
are  different  and  that  they  have  different  kinds  of  education  and  upbringing.  Although 
Plato  emphasizes  the  unity  of  the  state,  there  seems  to  be  no  common  culture  among 
the  three  classes.  The  values  endorsed  by  the  state  depends  on  the  values  of  the  rulers, 
not  on  the  other  classes.  Furthermore,  people  in  the  ideal  state  lack  freedom.  At  434a- 
b,  we  are  told  that  it  is  forbidden  for  the  three  classes  to  interchange  their  jobs,  since 
it  will  do  the  greatest  harm  to  the  state.  The  lower  classes  lack  all  autonomy  over  their 
life,  since  they  lack  the  capacity  of  reasoning.  They  are  unable  to  decide  what  to  do  or 
what  goals  are  appropriate  for  them.  Their  life  has  to  be  dependent  on  the  rulers' 
decisions.  They  are  not  free  to  change  their  style  of  life,  for  that  will  go  against  their 
rulers.  Therefore  Plato's  requirement  for  conformity  seems  to  make  the  lower  classes 
slaves  of  the  Guardians  (590c-d),  they  are  lacking  any  self-respect  and  self-worth. 
However,  although  it  would  do  great  harm  to  the  state  if  people  of  the  different 
classes  interchanged  their  jobs,  Plato  never  says  that  it  is  forbidden  for  people  in  the 
same  class  to  interchange  their  jobs.  In  fact,  at  434a,  we  find  that  the  interchange  of 
jobs  between  a  shoemaker  and  a  builder  would  not  do  so  much  harm  as  the 
interchange  of  jobs  between  different  classes  people  might  do,  likewise  in  the  first 
39  Plato,  at  588c-589b,  gives  us  a  clue  of  how  the  appetitive  part  can  be  trained.  However,  I  am  aware  of 
the  point  that  if  Plato  claims  that  the  lower  classes  are  trained  to  obey,  then  he  has  to  say  something 
about  the  education  of  the  third  class,  which  Plato  says  nothing  about. 
40  White,  op.  cit. 
79 minimal  city,  we  saw  in  chapter  1,  there  is  no  prohibition  against  job  interchange,  as 
long  as  each  one  does  his  or  her  job  for  which  he  or  she  is  naturally  suited,  and  with 
all  his  or  her  effort.  So,  we  can  still  find  some  sort  of  individual  autonomy  in  the 
lower  class,  although  when  the  state  is  considered  as  a  whole  the  conformity  still 
makes  an  appearance.  That  is  because  Plato  is  not  interested  in  whether  one  has  equal 
chance  to  pursue  one's  goal,  but  in  whether  by  nature  one  is  suitable  for  this  or  that 
job. 
Sophrosune  in  the  state  is  described  as  a  harmony  among  the  three  classes,  which 
can  be  identified  with  the  harmony  among  the  three  parts  of  soul.  That  is  to  say  that 
the  unanimity  among  the  three  parts  that  reason  should  rule.  However,  as  mentioned, 
to  say  that  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  agree  on  who  should  rule  is  not  to  say  that  the 
lower  parts  of  the  soul,  like  the  lower  classes  in  the  state,  have  reason,  spirit,  and 
appetite  within  themselves.  For  the  issue  whether  Plato  himself  would  take  the 
isomorphism  seriously  is  problematic,  and  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  apply  too  much 
political  language  to  the  three  parts  of  the  soul.  I  would  be  inclined  to  think  that  Plato 
is  aware  that  the  situation  is  different  in  state  and  soul,  and  has  different  treatment  for 
them.  41  Furthermore,  the  two  meanings  adopted  by  Plato  at  430e  can  also  be  applied 
to  the  individual.  A  sophron  person  who  is  `  master  of  '  or  '  conqueror  of  '  himself 
and  whose  certain  desires  are  under  control.  In  his  soul  there  is  an  agreement  among 
the  three  parts  on  who  should  rule.  Thus  sophrosune  can  both  be  seen  in  the 
individual  and  the  state. 
It  is  noticeable  here  that  in  a  reason-ruled  and  sophron  soul  each  part  of  it  has 
not  only  to  perform  its  function  well  but  also  can  enjoy  its  own  pleasure  to  its  proper 
extent.  Plato  says, 
Then  if  the  mind  as  a  whole  will  follow  the  lead  of  its  philosophical  element, 
without  internal  division,  each  element  will  be  just  and  in  all  other  respects 
perform  its  own  function,  and  in  addition  will  enjoy  its  own  particular 
pleasures,  which  are  the  best  and  truest  available  to  it.  (586e-587a) 
41  For  further  discussion  on  this  issue  see,  Part  111,  Chapter  7,  Section  3. 
80 It  is  clear  that  the  harmony  among  the  three  parts  does  not  suggest  the  idea  of 
asceticism.  That  is,  appetite  has  to  be  suppressed  or  forbidden  to  enjoy  any  pleasure. 
On  the  contrary,  the  notion  of  sophrosune  provides  a  basis  for  reason,  spirit,  and 
appetite  to  work  together  as  a  team  striving  towards  a  common  goal  and  at  the  same 
time  each  of  them  can  enjoy  their  own  pleasure  to  the  truest  extent. 
A  similar  idea  is  found  in  the  Analects,  where  Confucius  says, 
Riches  and  honours  --  these  are  what  men  desire,  but  if  this  is  not  achieved 
in  accordance  with  the  appropriate  principles,  one  does  not  cling  to  them. 
(IV,  5) 
Confucius  holds  here  that  not  all  appetitive  desires  have  to  be  restrained  but  those  are 
exceeding  and  not  in  accordance  with  ritual.  For  the  decay  of  social  order  is  the  result 
of  people's  not  being  able  to  practice  moderation,  but  having  too  much  unnecessary 
desires.  Confucius  says  that  "  [s]upreme  indeed  is  the  Mean  as  a  virtue,  but  for  a  long 
time  it  has  been  rare  among  the  people  (VI,  29).  Both  Plato  and  Confucius  do  not 
propose  to  suppress  all  the  appetitive  desires  but  only  those  unnecessary  ones.  For 
one's  having  excessive  desires  not  only  does  damage  to  one's  personal  life  but  also  to 
the  stability  of  the  state. 
(4)  justice 
The  introduction  of  justice  is  different  from  those  of  the  other  three  virtues.  Socrates 
tells  us  that  in  fact  justice  has  already  been  introduced  in  the  course  of  discussing  the 
other  virtues.  Then  what  is  justice?  Justice  in  a  state  consists  in  the  fact  that  each 
citizen  has  to  do  one  job  and  sticks  to  what  is  appropriate  for  him  (433a,  435b,  443c). 
lt  should  be  noticed  that  Plato's  notion  of  justice  is  not  to  designate  each  member  of 
the  state  for  one  type  of  job,  and  '  doing  one's  own  job  '  and  '  keeping  what  is 
appropriate  for  him  '  do  not  suggest  that  one  cannot  exchange  jobs  with  others  within 
the  same  class,  as  mentioned  above.  What  is  important  here  is  that  "a  city  cannot  be 
just  unless  it  recognizes  and  institutionalizes  basic  natural  differences  between 
81 people.  "42  In  other  words,  each  class  must  stick  to  its  own  job.  Since  it  is  our  nature 
which  determines  which  class  we  belong  to. 
In  the  state,  wisdom  and  courage  are  identified  respectively  with  the  Guardians 
and  the  Auxiliaries.  And  sophrosune  is  regarded  as  an  agreement  among  the  three 
classes.  Justice  may  seem  to  have  no  object  to  which  it  corresponds,  and  in  the  state 
there  seems  to  be  no  role  for  justice.  But  without  justice  a  state  cannot  become 
orderly  in  the  first  place,  since  justice  is  a  virtue  of  the  state,  which  makes  the  state 
orderly.  It  requires  every  member  of  the  state  to  recognize  his  or  her  own  role  as 
contributing  the  common  good  to  the  state  as  a  whole.  For  a  state  to  be  just  requires 
citizens  to  realize  their  roles  in  the  state,  do  their  own  jobs,  and  stick  to  what  is 
appropriate  for  them.  The  definition  of  justice  in  the  state  is  called  by  Vlastos  "  social 
justice  -it.  43  It  means  that  in  a  just  state  each  citizen  performs  his  or  her  function  well. 
This  is  not  only  emphasized  in  Book  IV,  but  originally  in  Book  tl,  where  Socrates 
says  that  each  citizen  has  a  different  natural  aptitude,  which  fits  him  or  her  for 
different  job,  and  each  citizen  should  do  better  to  exercise  his  or  her  skill  or  function 
(370b).  Thus  the  state  will  be  a  unity,  and  each  class  can  share  the  general  good  they 
produce. 
A  just  individual  is  the  one  in  whom  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  do  their  own  jobs. 
Like  the  just  state,  an  individual  is  just,  not  because  of  his  relation  with  others,  but 
because  each  part  of  his  soul  does  its  own  job.  This  definition  of  individual  justice  is 
called  "  psychological  justice  ".  Or  we  can  say  that  justice  in  the  individual  is 
"  psychic  harmony  "  or,  in  Kenny's  word,  "  mental  health  ".  ￿  It  means  that  an 
individual  is  just,  if  his  reason  is  ruling,  spirit  is  backing  up  reason's  adequate 
decision,  and  appetite  is  under  the  control  of  the  other  two.  It  should  be  noticed  that 
to  say  that  reason  is  ruling  is  not  only  to  say  that  an  individual  can  plan  his  life 
rationally.  For  we  shall  see  in  Book  VIII  and  IX,  the  unjust  men,  namely  the 
timocratic  man,  the  oligarchy  man,  whose  reason  is  not  in  control,  are  nevertheless 
capable  of  planning  their  life  as  a  whole.  So  to  say  that  a  man  is  just  we  must  say 
42  Annas,  op.  cit.  p.  118. 
4'  G.  Vlastos,  Platonic  Studies  (Princeton,  1981),  p.  123. 
44  A.  Kenny,  The  Anatomy  of  The  Soul,  ch.  I  (Oxford.  1973). 
82 something  more  than  rational  planning,  he  must  have  a"  well-rounded  personality.  "45 
For  a  reason-ruled  soul,  it  is  not  just  a  matter  of  the  desire  of  money  making  profits. 
Reason  enables  an  individual  to  make  a  critical  and  informed  decision,  rather  than 
letting  the  strongest  desire  win  the  day.  46 
It  is  noticeable  that  Plato  thinks  that  a  just  man  is  not  one  who  is  merely  able  to 
observe  the  laws  and  act  rightly,  but  has  to  have  inner  harmony,  i.  e.  reason  is  in 
control  with  the  help  of  spirit  over  appetite.  For  Confucius  a  humane  man  is  one  who 
engages  in  self-cultivation  as  well  having  a  harmonious  relation  with  others.  That  is, 
for  Confucius,  the  superior  man  has  to  possess  both  qualities,  human-heartedness  and 
harmonious  social  relationships  at  the  same  time.  However,  Plato  in  the  Republic, 
unlike  Confucius,  puts  strong  emphasis  on  the  individual's  inner  harmony  for  in 
Plato's  view  one's  psychological  harmony  is  the  basis  for  behaving  morally  and 
rightly.  Without  possessing  the  harmonious  soul,  i.  e.  reason  is  in  control,  it  would  be 
impossible  for  one  to  be  a  just  man.  Confucius  thinks  that  for  a  person  to  be  virtuous 
both  his  internal  harmony  and  external  behaviour  have  to  complement  to  each  other. 
For  Confucius,  unlike  Plato  who  says  that  the  real  concern  of  justice  is  with  a 
person's  inner  self  (443c-d),  sees  a  person's  having  harmonious  relationships  with 
others  as  being  essential  to  his  seeking  human-heartedness. 
To  put  this  section  simply,  both  Plato  and  Confucius  have  an  ideal  of  a  state 
guarded  by  wisdom  and  embodied  in  the  persons  of  wise  rulers.  This  wisdom,  as  it 
were,  `  flows  down  '  and  penetrates  every  part  of  the  state.  In  Plato  what  brings  about 
this  conformity  to  wisdom  is  primarily  the  educational  process.  This  ensures  that 
although  members  of  the  lower  classes  may  have  limited  rational  powers  they 
nevertheless  cling  to  the  opinions  taught  by  the  rulers  and  model  themselves 
accordingly.  Confucius'  ideal  differs  from  this  in  two  respects:  firstly,  in  a  Confucian 
society  the  driving  force  is  rather  the  citizens'  decision  to  emulate  the  ruler.  Secondly, 
due  to  the  fact  that  Confucius  does  not  draw  Plato's  distinction  between  rational 
knowledge  and  belief,  even  members  of  the  lower  classes  may  have  a  share  in 
%visdom.  They  display  this  in  discharging  well  the  duties  of  their  roles  and  in  directing 
their  own  families. 
43  parry,  op.  cit.  p.  99. 
46  Annas,  op.  cii.  p.  135. 
83 To  summarize  this  chapter  briefly.  The  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  is 
essential  to  the  order  of  the  soul  and  the  society.  For  without  each  part  of  the  soul 
doing  its  own  job  there  will  never  be  order  in  the  soul.  In  a  disorderly  soul  the  three 
parts  are  in  conflict  with  one  another.  Thus  to  establish  order  in  the  soul  each  part  has 
to  do  one  job  for  which  it  is  naturally  suited,  and  they  have  to  reach  an  agreement 
(sophrosune)  as  to  who  should  rule.  The  notion  of  sophrosune  does  not  imply  that 
there  is  a  degree  of  rationality  or  an  internal  conversation  among  the  three  parts  of  the 
soul.  It  rather  means  that  receiving  proper  training  or  education  spirit  and  appetite  are 
habituated  to  listen  to  reason's  direction.  Thus  the  Command  Model  and  the  Force 
model  cannot  properly  explain  how  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  interact  with  one 
another  and  achieve  harmony.  The  connection  between  the  virtues  in  state  and  soul 
shows  that  the  fulfillment  of  the  inner  harmony  of  the  state  requires  each  citizen  to 
receive  training  or  education.  For,  like  the  soul,  by  education  the  lower  classes  are 
habituated  to  he  under  the  control  or  direction  of  the  philosopher-king. 
84 Chapter  5 
Confucius'  Notion  of  the  Superior  Man 
Confucius  says  in  the  Analects  that  "  [a]  sage  it  is  not  mine  to  see;  could  I  see  a  man 
of  real  talent  and  virtue,  that  would  satisfy  me  "  (VII,  25).  t  The  '  man  of  talent  and 
virtue'  in  Chinese  means  Chun-t:  u,  which  is  often  translated  by  scholars  into  English 
as  '  the  superior  man  '  or  '  gentleman  '.  The  sage  is  in  Confucius'  mind  an  ideal, 
which  is  difficult  to  find  in  real  world.  This  is  the  reason  why  Confucius  modestly 
says  that  "  [a]s  for  being  a  sage  or  a  humane  man,  I  would  surely  not  presume  to  be 
such  "  (VII,  34).  However,  it  would  be  relatively  easier,  for  Confucius,  to  find  a 
superior  man  or  gentleman  in  the  real  world.  This  can  be  seen  from  the  frequent  usage 
of  the  word  Chun-t:  u  in  the  Analects.  In  this  chapter  I  would  like  to  explore  the 
Confucian  notion  of  the  superior  man  by  discussing  three  topics:  firstly,  the  meaning 
of  the  superior  man  in  the  Analects;  secondly,  the  comparison  between  the  superior 
man  and  inferior  man,  and  finally  the  requisites  for  being  a  superior  man. 
1.  The  meaning  of  the  superior  man  in  the  Analects 
The  notion  of  the  superior  man  can  be  found  in  four  features  in  the  Analects: 
Confucius  himself,  the  civil  servant,  the  virtuous  man,  and  the  virtuous  civil  servant.  ` 
I  shall  discuss  them  in  turn.  Firstly,  Confucius  does  not  regard  himself  as  a  sage, 
whereas  it  may  not  be  implausible  that  he  regards  himself  as  a  superior  man,  as  can  be 
seen  in  the  Analecis.  For  example, 
The  Master  wished  to  dwell  among  the  nine  wild  tribes  of  the  East.  Someone 
1  J.  Legge,  The  Four  Books  (t  long  Kong,  1966),  p.  52. 
2  Yih  fing  Lin,  "  Confucian  Notion  of  Chun-tzu  ",  The  Erploralion  (?  f  Co  fucian  7lrought,  Lin,  Yih-ling, 
(Taipei,  1987),  pp.  69-70. said:  `  They  are  uncivilized,  so  what  will  you  do  about  that?  '  The  Master 
said:  `  If  a  gentlernan  dwelt  among  them,  what  lack  of  civility  would  they 
show?.  (IX,  14) 
It  is  obvious  according  to  this  passage  that  Confucius  sees  himself  as  a  superior  man, 
and  as  a  model  for  the  emulation  of  the  uncivilized.  Moreover,  to  be  a  superior  man 
cannot  be  "  ashamed  of  bad  clothes  and  bad  food  "  (IV,  9).  For  a  superior  man  "  does 
not,  even  for  the  space  of  a  single  meal,  act  contrary  to  virtue.  In  moments  of  haste, 
he  cleaves  to  it.  In  seasons  of  danger,  he  cleaves  to  it  "  (IV,  5).  3  Thus  wherever  the 
superior  man  goes  he  is  always  virtuous. 
Secondly,  the  word  Chun-t:  u  is  often  in  the  Analects  taken  to  mean  those  who 
are  in  office.  For  example,  Confucius'  disciple,  Tzu-yu,  in  a  conversation  with 
Confucius,  says, 
When  the  superior  man  has  studied  the  Way,  he  loves  men.  When  the 
inferior  man  has  studied  the  Way,  he  is  easy  to  employ.  (XVII,  4)4 
The  difference  between  the  superior  man  and  inferior  man  here  rests  on  the  fact  that 
they  occupy  different  social  status.  In  J.  Legge's  translation  of  the  Analecis,  he 
translates  the  superior  man  as  "  the  man  of  high  station  ",  and  the  inferior  man  as 
"  the  man  of  low  station  ".  S  lt  seems  to  me  that  Legge's  translation  exactly  reveals  the 
meaning  of  the  superior  man  in  this  passage. 
Thirdly,  the  word  Chun-t.  u  can  also  mean  those  who  possess  virtue.  For  example, 
Confucius  says, 
The  superior  man  does  not  seek  fullllment  of  his  appetite  nor  comfort  in  his 
lodging.  He  is  diligent  in  his  duties  and  careful  in  his  speech.  He  associates 
with  men  of  moral  principles  and  thereby  realizes  himself.  Such  a  person 
3  J.  Legge,  /bid.  p.  23. 
4  Wing-tsit  Chan,  A  Source  ß(x)k  in  Chinese  Philosophy  (Princeton,  1973),  p.  46. 
s  op.  cit.  p.  153. 
86 may  be  said  to  love  learning.  (I,  14)6 
The  superior  man  thinks  of  virtue;  the  inferior  man  thinks  of  possessions.  (IV, 
11)ý 
It  can  be  seen  that  a  superior  man  only  pays  attention  to  virtue,  and  only  associates 
himself  with  virtuous  men.  Bodily  pleasure  is  out  of  his  concern,  in  that  the  superior 
man  "  plans  for  the  Way  and  does  not  plan  for  food  ",  and  "  is  concerned  about  the 
Way  and  is  not  concerned  about  poverty  "  (XV,  32). 
Finally,  the  fourth  meaning  of  the  word  Chun-t:  u  is  the  virtuous  man  who  is  in 
office.  For  example, 
The  Master  said  that  there  were  four  of  the  ways  of  the  gentleman  present  in 
Zichan:  in  his  conduct  of  himself  he  was  courteous,  in  his  service  of  his 
superiors  he  showed  veneration,  in  his  provision  for  the  needs  of  the  people 
he  was  generous,  and  in  his  employment  of  the  people  he  was  righteous.  (V, 
16) 
Zichan  was  a  great  politician  in  Zheng,  also,  according  to  Confucius,  Zichan  was  a 
politician  who  possesses  virtue.  It  is  worth  noting  here  that  the  third  and  fourth 
meaning  of  the  superior  man  seem  to  overlap  one  another.  For  in  Confucius'  view  to 
he  a  good  or  virtuous  ruler  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  being  capable  of  administering, 
but  a  matter  of  being  a  virtuous  ruler  who  is  able  to  be  a  model  people  can  follow. 
Confucius  says  that  "  [a]  ruler  who  governs  his  state  by  virtue  is  like  the  north  polar 
star,  which  remains  in  its  place  while  the  other  stars  revolve  around  it  "  (11,1).  8 
Confucius,  unlike  legalists  who  prefer  law  and  force,  thinks  that  having  a  virtuous 
ruler,  as  a  model  of  emulation,  is  important  for  achieving  an  orderly  society.  Since, 
for  Confucius, 
[T]he  important  task  of  government  was  to  transform  the  people  through 
6  Wing-tsit,  Chan,  Ibid.  p.  21. 
7Ibid.  p.  27. 
g  Ibid..  p.  22. 
87 education,  and  since  this  involved  the  study  and  imitation  of  models,  it 
followed  that  Confucius  thought  of  the  person  in  political  power,  not 
primarily  as  a  man  who  could  cope  skillfully  with  administrative  problems, 
but  as  one  who  would  act  as  an  example  to  the  people  because  of  his  moral 
qualities.  9 
Thus  we  can  understand  why  Confucius  says  that  "  [t]he  character  of  a  ruler  is 
like  wind  and  that  of  the  people  is  like  grass.  In  whatever  direction  the  wind  blows, 
the  grass  always  bends  "  (XII,  19).  10  In  a  nutshell,  government,  for  Confucius,  is  to 
transform  people  through  education  by  exemplars  or  precepts.  It  is  worth  noting  that 
ideally  speaking,  a  virtuous  man  by  nature  is  fitted  for  office.  Confucius  however 
does  not  think  that  every  virtuous  man  has  to  take  part  in  politics.  For  Confucius  says, 
The  Book  (!  f  Documents  mentions  filial  piety,  doesn't  it?  "  Only  be  dutiful 
towards  your  parents  and  friendly  towards  your  brothers,  and  you  will  be 
contributing  to  the  existence  of  government.  "  These  virtues  surely  constitute 
taking  part  in  government,  so  why  should  only  that  particular  activity  be 
regarded  as  taking  part  in  government?  ([l,  21) 
The  order  of  society,  for  Confucius,  is  mainly  dependent  upon  the  order  of  the  family. 
Thus  as  long  as  one  is  filial  to  one's  parents  and  fraternal  to  one's  siblings,  one  takes 
part  in  politics.  The  notion  that  politics  is  the  extension  of  morality  allows  Confucius 
to  claim  that  a  superior  man  is  not  necessarily  in  office,  since  what  he  does  in  the 
family  would  be  similar  to  what  he  does  in  the  office. 
Furthermore,  although  the  word  Chun-i  u  has  four  meanings  as  we  saw,  yet  in 
Confucius'  mind  to  be  a  superior  man,  no  matter  which  social  status  one  occupies,  is 
to  be  a  virtuous  man.  That  is  to  say,  the  primal  concern  of  a  superior  man  should  be 
that  he  is  one  who  possesses  virtue.  This  concern  has  been  revealed  throughout  the 
Analects  (for  example,  XIV,  42).  And  in  the  (;  reut  Learning,  which  is  a  small  book 
about  Confucian  educational,  political,  and  moral  programme,  we  can  also  see  the 
9  R.  Dawson,  Co  fuciuus  (Oxford,  1981),  p.  54. 
10  Chan,  op.  cit.  p.  40. 
88 emphasis  on  the  fact  that  a  superior  man  should  be  concerned  primarily  with  his  own 
virtue.  What  follows  is  the  text  of  the  Great  Learning,  and  we  can  see  the  great 
importance  of  appeal  to  human  virtue  in  Confucian  philosophy. 
The  Way  of  learning  to  be  great  (or  adult  education)  consists  in  manifesting 
the  clear  character,  loving  the  people,  and  abiding  in  the  highest  good. 
Only  after  knowing  what  to  abide  in  can  one  be  calm.  Only  after  having  been 
calm  can  one  be  tranquil.  Only  after  having  achieved  tranquillity  can  one 
have  peaceful  repose.  Only  after  having  peaceful  repose  can  one  begin  to 
deliberate.  Only  after  deliberation  can  the  end  be  attained.  Things  have  their 
roots  and  branches.  Affairs  have  their  beginnings  and  their  ends.  To  know 
what  is  first  and  what  is  last  will  lead  one  near  the  Way. 
The  ancients  who  wished  to  manifest  their  clear  character  to  the  world  would 
first  bring  order  to  their  states.  Those  who  wished  to  bring  order  to  their 
states  would  first  regulate  their  families.  Those  who  wished  to  regulate  their 
families  would  first  cultivate  their  personal  lives.  Those  who  wished  to 
cultivate  their  personal  lives  would  first  rectify  their  minds.  Those  who 
wished  to  rectify  their  minds  would  first  make  their  wills  sincere.  Those  who 
wished  to  make  their  wills  sincere  would  first  extend  their  knowledge.  The 
extension  of  knowledge  consists  in  the  investigation  of  things.  When  things 
are  investigated,  knowledge  is  extended;  when  knowledge  is  extended,  the 
will  becomes  sincere;  when  the  will  is  sincere,  the  mind  is  rectified;  when 
the  mind  is  rectified,  the  personal  life  is  cultivated;  when  the  personal  life  is 
cultivated,  the  family  will  be  regulated;  when  the  family  is  regulated,  the 
state  will  be  in  order;  and  when  the  state  is  in  order,  there  will  be  peace 
throughout  the  world.  From  the  Son  of  Heaven  down  to  the  common  people, 
all  must  regard  cultivation  of  the  personal  life  as  the  root  or  foundation. 
There  is  never  a  case  when  the  root  is in  disorder  and  yet  the  branches  are  in 
order.  There  has  never  been  a  case  when  what  is  treated  with  great 
importance  becomes  a  matter  of  slight  importance  or  what  is  treated  with 
89 slight  importance  becomes  a  matter  of  great  importance.  11 
We  see,  from  the  sentence  '  from  the  Son  of  Heaven  down  to  the  common 
people,  all  must  regard  cultivation  of  the  personal  life  as  the  root  or  foundation  ',  that 
the  foundation  or  root  of  an  orderly  state  is  human  virtue,  and  an  orderly  state  can  be 
achieved  only  when  every  member  of  it  makes  their  own  effort  to  manifest  their 
virtues.  That  is,  people  have  to  cultivate  their  personal  character,  since  the  superior 
man  is  concerned  with  virtue.  This  passage  seems  to  suggest  aI  bottom  up  '  view  of 
virtue  in  the  state.  That  is,  although,  in  Confucius'  view,  the  virtuous  ruler  occupies 
an  important  role  for  achieving  an  orderly  society,  what  is  more  important  is  that 
every  member  of  the  state  has  to  make  an  effort  to  engage  in  self-cultivation,  for  by 
nature  men  are  close  to  each  other  (XVII,  2).  To  be  virtuous  is  not  a  privilege  for  the 
few.  However,  Plato,  unlike  Confucius,  in  the  Republic  proposes  a`  top  down  '  view 
of  virtue.  In  the  ideal  state  only  the  philosophers  can  be  said  to  be  truly  virtuous,  for 
Plato's  theory  of  human  nature  (415a-d)  does  not  allow  the  lower  classes  have  the 
opportunity  to  be  truly  virtuous.  The  maintenance  of  the  social  order  is  mainly  in  the 
hands  of  the  philosopher-kings. 
The  word  Chun-t:  u  (;  fl  =J)  in  Chinese  consists  of  two  characters,  i.  e.  Chun 
means  ruler,  and  7:  u  means  son.  Thus  (`hun-i:  u  originally  means  the  son  of  ruler.  The 
word  ('hun-t.:  u  was  often  taken  to  mean  a  kind  of  social  class,  aristocracy,  before 
Confucius'  time.  "  However  at  Confucius'  time  the  rules  of  social  conduct  were 
corrupted,  the  division  of  the  social  class  was  ruined,  and  the  hereditary  system  no 
longer  existed.  Therefore  the  education  which  used  to  be  a  privilege  of  aristocratic 
class  was  available  to  everyone,  and  Confucius  was  the  first  person  who  popularized 
the  aristocratic  education.  From  the  historical  evidence  we  can  know  the  reason  for 
Confucius'  shifting  from  the  original  meaning  of  the  superior  man,  the  aristocratic 
class,  to  the  virtuous  person.  For  the  popularization  of  education  breaking  up  the 
social  classes  can  fulfill  Confucius'  ideal  that  everyone  can  be  a  superior  man  through 
proper  education.  Moreover,  although  Confucius  does  not  think  that  the  superior  man 
is  necessarily  in  office,  nevertheless  he  would  agree  with  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  that 
I  Chan,  op.  cit.  p.  86, 
12  Dawson,  op.  cit.  p.  54. 
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2.  The  comparison  between  the  superior  man 
and  the  inferior  man 
The  superior  man  is  an  achievable  ideal  for  Confucius  in  the  real  world,  and  he  often 
in  the  Analects  compares  the  superior  man  with  the  inferior  man,  or  as  R.  Dawson's 
translation,  "  the  small  man.  What  is  the  difference  between  the  superior  man  and  the 
inferior  man?  This  question  can  be  treated  in  two  ways:  "  firstly,  the  difference 
between  the  superior  man  and  the  inferior  man  rests  on  the  fact  that  the  former  is  the 
ruler  and  the  latter  is  the  ruled.  Due  to  the  fact  that  they  are  in  different  stations,  they 
are  concerned  with  different  things.  As  Confucius  says, 
The  gentleman  cherishes  virtue,  but  the  small  man  cherishes  the  soil;  the 
gentleman  cherishes  the  rigours  of  the  law,  but  the  small  man  cherishes 
leniency.  (IV,  11) 
[W]hen  a  gentleman  studies  the  Way,  he  loves  his  fellow-men;  and  when  a 
small  man  studies  the  Way,  he  is  easy  to  command.  (XVII,  3) 
[I]f  a  gentleman  has  courage  but  lacks  a  sense  of  right  and  wrong,  he  will 
cause  political  chaos;  and  if  a  small  man  has  courage  but  lacks  a  sense  of 
right  and  wrong,  he  will  commit  burglary.  (XVII,  21) 
The  superior  man  who  is  in  office  is  concerned  with  virtue  and  the  firmness  of  law, 
and  knows  what  is  right  and  wrong.  On  the  contrary,  the  inferior  man  is  concerned 
with  his  personal  interests.  The  superior  man  will  put  his  eyes  on  the  public  interest, 
and  act  according  to  law,  whereas  the  inferior  man  will  only  pay  attention  to  his 
personal  interest  without  thinking  of  law. 
Furthermore,  the  difference  between  the  superior  man  and  inferior  man  cited 
R.  Dawson,  Coi  fucius:  71re  Atialecls  (Oxford,  1993). 
14  Lin,  op.  cil.  pp.  81-89. 
91 above  does  not  mean  that  everyone  who  is  in  office  will  automatically  become  a 
superior  man,  since  there  is  a  distinction  between  the  virtuous  civil  servant  and  the 
vicious  one.  Confucius  says, 
The  gentleman  is  easy  to  serve  but  difficult  to  please.  If  in  trying  to  please 
him  one  does  not  accord  with  the  Way,  he  is  not  pleased.  But  when  it  comes 
to  his  employing  others,  he  takes  account  of  their  capacity.  The  small  man  is 
difficult  to  serve  but  easy  to  please.  Although  one  does  not  accord  with  the 
Way  when  trying  to  please  him,  he  is  pleased.  But  when  it  comes  to  his 
employing  others,  he  seeks  perfection  in  them.  (XIII,  25) 
The  gentleman  cannot  be  appreciated  in  minor  matters,  but  can  be  accepted 
in  major  matters.  The  small  man  cannot  be  accepted  in  major  matters,  but 
can  be  appreciated  in  minor  matters.  (XV,  34) 
Here  both  the  gentleman  and  the  small  man  are  in  office,  but  what  makes  them 
different  is  whether  they  can  cleave  to  the  Way.  As  Zixia,  Confucius'  disciple,  says, 
"  [e]ven  lesser  arts  are  bound  to  have  something  noteworthy  in  them,  but  if  they  are 
taken  too  far,  there  is  a  fear  that  one  could  get  stuck  in  the  mud,  and  that  is  why  the 
gentleman  does  not  practice  "  (XIX,  4).  The  lesser  arts  here  means  fanning,  medicine, 
and  divination,  etc..  These  arts  might  be  valuable  in  their  own  fields,  whereas  those 
who  practice  them  might  not  have  a  broader  view  over  the  state  as  a  whole.  And  their 
practicing  those  arts  might  be  only  for  their  own  interests.  The  superior  man  however 
is  working  for  the  Way  and  seeking  the  Way,  which,  for  Confucius,  is  the  highest  goal 
of  human  being. 
The  other  way  of  describing  the  difference  between  the  superior  man  and  the 
inferior  man  is  that  the  former  possesses  virtue,  but  the  latter  does  not.  Confucius 
says, 
The  gentleman  is  familiar  with  what  is  right,  just  as  the  small  man  is  familiar 
with  profit.  (IV,  16) 
A  gentleman,  in  his  plans,  thinks  of  the  Way;  he  does  not  think  how  he  is 
going  to  make  a  living.  Even  farming  sometimes  entails  times  of  shortage; 
92 and  even  learning  may  incidentally  lead  to  high  pay.  But  a  gentleman's 
anxieties  concern  the  progress  of  the  Way;  he  has  no  anxiety  concerning 
poverty.  (XV,  3  1)ßs 
The  gentleman  always  acts  in  accordance  with  the  Way,  so  he  knows  what  is  right  and 
wrong,  and  also  knows  how  to  act  properly  in  all  circumstances.  On  the  contrary,  the 
inferior  man  cannot  tell  right  from  wrong,  as  long  as  he  sees  profit  he  will  go  for  it. 
Whether  it  is  legitimate  is  out  of  his  concern.  It  is  worth  noting  here,  as  Lin  Yih-jing 
points  out,  Confucius'  emphasis  on  propriety  is  not  to  preclude  people  from  gaining 
profit,  but  to  point  out,  people  have  to  gain  their  profit  legitimately.  '6  Confucius  says, 
Riches  and  honours  --  these  are  what  men  desire,  but  if  this  is  not  achieved 
in  accordance  with  the  appropriate  principles,  one  does  not  cling  to  them. 
Poverty  and  obscurity  -  these  are  what  men  hate,  but  if  this  is  not  achieved 
in  accordance  with  the  appropriate  principles,  one  does  not  avoid  them.  (IV, 
5) 
Therefore  the  consideration  of  the  appropriate  principle,  i.  e.  the  Way,  is  nothing  to  do 
with  profit,  since  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  Way  is,  in  the  Confucian  view,  much 
more  valuable  than  gaining  profit.  Furthermore,  the  difference  between  the  superior 
man  and  the  inferior  man  will  be  clear  when  they  are  in  a  state  of  being  poor.  For 
Confucius  says  that  "  [t]he  gentleman  remains  firm  in  the  face  of  suffering,  but  if  the 
small  man  suffers,  he  is  carried  away  on  a  flood  of  excess  "  (XV,  2). 
A  passage  in  The  Doctrine  of  the  A1ean  can  be  referred  to,  to  give  an  account  of 
the  situation  we  have  here. 
The  superior  man  does  what  is  proper  to  the  station  in  which  he  is;  he  does 
not  desire  to  go  beyond  this.  In  a  position  of  wealth  and  honour,  he  does 
what  is  proper  to  a  position  of  wealth  and  honour.  In  a  poor  and  low  position, 
he  does  what  is  proper  to  a  poor  and  low  position.  Situated  among  barbarous 
15  A.  Waley,  Confucius:  The  A»nlecls  (Ware,  1996),  p.  106. 
16 
op.  cii,  p.  83. 
93 tribes,  he  does  what  is  proper  to  a  situation  among  barbarous  tribes.  In  a 
position  of  sorrow  and  difficulty,  he  does  what  is  proper  to  a  position  of 
sorrow  and  difficulty.  The  superior  man  can  find  himself  in  no  situation  in 
which  he  is  not  himself.  (Chapter  l4)' 
The  superior  man  is  always  being  himself  because  he  does  what  is  proper  to  his  role, 
and  can  stick  to  the  Way  without  abandoning  it  `  even  for  the  lapse  of  a  single  meal  '. 
Thus  the  superior  man  always  knows  what  to  do,  and  how  to  do,  and  will  not  be 
affected  by  others.  As  Confucius  says, 
The  gentleman  is  calm  and  peaceful;  the  small  man  is  always  emotional. 
(VII,  37) 
The  gentleman  is  dignified  but  not  arrogant.  The  small  man  is  arrogant  but 
not  dignified.  (XIII,  26) 
What  the  gentleman  seeks  in  himself  the  small  man  seeks  in  others.  (XV,  21) 
The  difference  between  the  superior  man  and  the  inferior  man,  in  my  opinion, 
can  also  be  seen  in  their  dealing  %%ith  people.  Confucius  says, 
The  superior  man  is  broadminded  but  not  partisan;  the  inferior  man  is 
partisan  but  not  broadminded.  (11,14)' 
In  my  view,  neither  Chan's  translation  of  the  word  Jo  as  '  being  broadminded  '  nor 
Dawvson's  translating  the  word  as  `  universal  sympathy  '  can  be  properly  fitted  in  with 
this  passage.  For  both  words  Jo  and  Bi  (partisan)  in  Chinese  mean  '  being  close  to  or 
intimate  with  people  ',  and  Confucius'  use  of  them  here  implies  the  comparison 
between  good  and  bad.  Therefore  the  phrase  '  the  superior  man  is  Jo  but  not  13i  ' 
should  be  translated  as  that  the  superior  man  is  close  to  people  but  not  partisan.  The 
superior  men's  being  close  to  people  is  based  upon  the  righteousness,  "  they  are 
sociable  but  do  not  form  parties  "  (XV,  22).  The  basis  for  this  translation  can  be 
º'  Legge,  op.  cit.  p.  11. 
ºg  Chan,  op.  cit.  p.  24. 
94 found  at  IV,  16,  where  Confucius  says  that  "  [t]he  gentleman  is  familiar  with  what  is 
right,  just  as  the  small  man  is  familiar  with  profit.  "  Thus  the  inferior  men's  forming 
parties  is  to  seek  their  own  interests  without  considering  what  is  right  or  wrong. 
The  difference  between  the  superior  man  and  the  inferior  man  in  their  ways  of 
dealing  with  people  can  also  be  seen  at  XIII,  23,  where  Confucius  says, 
The  superior  man  is  affable,  but  not  adulatory;  the  mean  man  is  adulatory, 
but  not  affable.  9 
The  affability  (Ho)  means  that  the  superior  man's  getting  along  with  people  is  in 
accordance  with  morality  and  justice;  on  the  contrary,  the  word  adulation  (Tung) 
means  that  the  inferior  man's  getting  along  with  people  is  based  upon  gains  and  losses. 
Thus  the  superior  man  can  get  along  with  people  harmoniously,  and  will  not  take 
advantage  of  others. 
Furthermore,  Confucius  says, 
The  gentleman  brings  to  completion  the  fine  qualities  in  others  and  does  not 
bring  to  completion  the  bad  qualities  in  others.  The  small  man  does  the 
opposite  of  this.  (XII,  16) 
Gentlemen  do  not  promote  someone  because  of  what  he  says,  and  do  not 
reject  what  is  said  because  of  who  said  it.  (XV,  23) 
We  can  see  from  the  above  that  the  superior  man's  dealing  with  people  is  based  upon 
the  principle  of  impartiality  and  unselfishness.  He  gets  along  with  people 
harmoniously  without  conflict  of  interests.  He  is  close  to  people  and  willing  to  help 
them,  but  does  not  wallow  in  the  mire  with  the  evil  people.  What  he  is  always 
concerned  with  is  right  and  wrong,  reasonableness  and  unreasonableness.  All  these 
characteristics  of  the  superior  man  cannot  be  found  in  the  inferior  man. 
19  Lcgge,  cep.  cit.  p,  114, 
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So  far,  the  differences  between  the  superior  man  and  the  inferior  man  have  been 
brought  out,  I  shall  proceed  to  discuss  the  requisites  of  being  a  superior  man.  A.  S. 
Cua  says,  at  the  outset  of  his  article  "  Competence,  Concern,  and  The  Role  of 
Paradigmatic  Individuals  (Chun-T_-u)  in  Moral  Education  ", 
From  the  perspective  of  Confucian  ethics,  learning  to  become  an  exemplary, 
autonomous  moral  agent,  a  chun-I:  u,  is  a  constant  and  unceasing  process  of 
self-Cultivation  (hsiu-shcn).  This  process  involves  an  acquisition  and  critical 
interpretation  of  an  established  cultural  tradition,  seen  as  an  embodiment  of 
a  concern  for  human  well-being  (jcn),  as  well  as  familiarity  with  rules  of 
proper  conduct  (Ii),  with  due  regard  to  reasoned  judgment  concerning  their 
relevance  to  particular  circumstances  (yi).  This  process  also  involves  a  daily 
examination  of  the  ethical  import  of  one's  words  and  deeds.....  20 
The  first  requisite  of  being  a  superior  man  is  human-heartedness  (je)y),  which  is 
clearly  expressed  in  two  passages  in  the  Analects,  where  Confucius  says, 
The  gentleman  never  shuns  humaneness  even  for  the  time  it  takes  to  finish  a 
meal.  If  his  progress  is  hasty,  it  is  bound  to  arise  from  this;  and  if  his 
progress  is  unsteady,  it  is  bound  to  arise  from  this.  (IV,  5) 
The  determined  public  servant  and  the  humane  man  never  seek  to  preserve 
life  in  such  a  way  as  to  injure  humaneness,  but  they  will  sometimes  even 
sacrifice  their  lives  in  order  to  achieve  humaneness.  (XV,  9) 
lt  can  be  seen  that  to  be  a  superior  man  is  to  cleave  to  jean,  A  superior  man  who  only 
possesses  the  name  of  the  superior  man  without  the  reality  of  jen  is  not  a  superior 
man  in  the  real  sense  of  the  term.  That  is,  a  true  superior  man  never  departs  from 
20  A.  S.  Cua,  "  Competence,  Concern,  and  The  Role  of  Paradigmatic  individuals  (Chun-Tzu)  in  Moral 
education  ",  Philosophy  /.  a.  +7  and  West,  vol.  42,1992,  p.  49. 
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Jen  is  what  makes  us  truly  human,  to  abandon  it  is  to  give  up  a  fully  human 
life.  Jet:  is  worth  sacrificing  one's  life  for;  it  is  the  basis  of  all  human  value 
and  worth.  It  isjen,  ultimately,  that  makes  life  worth  living.  21 
Thus  we  know  why  the  superior  man  will  cleave  tojen,  and  never  abandon  it. 
The  second  requisite  for  being  a  superior  man  is  ritual  (Ii).  To  be  a  superior  man 
is  to  act  in  accordance  with  rules  of  proper  conduct  (li).  Confucius  says, 
One  is  roused  by  the  Songs,  established  by  ritual,  and  perfected  by  music. 
(VIII,  8) 
If  you  do  not  study  the  rites,  you  will  have  no  way  of  taking  your  stand.  (XVI, 
13) 
If  one  does  no  understand  the  rites,  one  has  no  means  of  taking  one's  stand. 
(XX,  3) 
Confucius  is  in  praise  of  li,  because  as  long  as  one  is  in  the  society  one  has  to  learn 
the  rules  of  social  life.  A  person  who  deserves  the  name  of  superior  man  should 
conduct  himself  and  get  along  with  people  in  the  society  in  accordance  with  li.  The 
understanding  of  the  rules  of  proper  conduct  enables  the  superior  man  to  take  his 
stand  firmly.  But  what  is  the  content  of  Confucian  li?  As  J.  M.  Koller  points  out, 
Confucian  li  has  three  meanings.  "  lt  means  religion,  it  means  a  customary  code  of 
social  behaviour,  and  it  also  means  that  1i  conforms  to  the  norms  of  human- 
heartedness.  Li,  firstly,  is  religious  when  it  is  concerned  with  rites  for  religious 
ceremony.  That  is  the  reason  why  when  Confucius  entered  the  grand  temple,  he  asked 
about  every  single  thing  (11!,  15).  For  the  religious  ceremony  should  be  held  in 
accordance  with  11,  to  hold  a  religious  ceremony  ritually  one  should  understand  every 
detail  of  the  ceremony. 
Secondly,  1i  is  the  customary  code  of  social  conduct.  Li  in  this  sense  takes  the 
2  11  M.  Koller,  Oriental  Phi/osop/iles  (Basingstoke,  1985),  p.  266. 
22  Ibid  pp.  267-268. 
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the  written  law  that  tells  people  what  they  should  not  do.  Li,  unlike  written  law,  does 
not  entail  punishment.  Its  function  is  to  guide  and  regulate  people's  behaviour.  The 
nature  of  li  for  Confucius  is  unchangeable,  whereas  the  form  of  li  can  be  altered 
according  to  different  circumstances.  From  Confucius'  praise  of  Lin  Fang  for  his 
concern  of  the  root  of  ritual  (III,  4),  we  know  that  the  nature  of  li  is  unchangeable,  but 
institutions  and  implements  can  be  changed  in  different  circumstances.  Thus 
Confucius  tells  us  that  li  means  something  more  than  jades  and  silk  (XVII,  9). 
Confucius'  superior  man  is  living  in  a  real  world,  that  is,  he  has  to  live  with  others, 
and  cannot  isolate  himself  from  others.  Thus  in  order  to  get  along  with  people 
harmoniously,  a  reasonable  social  order  is  required  to  keep  this  interpersonal  harmony 
going.  And  this  reasonable  social  order  is  li.  This  interpersonal  harmony  leads  to  the 
third  meaning  of  li. 
In  the  Analects  we  can  see  that  Confucius'  talking  of  !i  emphasizes  order  and 
moral  education.  '`  For  example, 
Duke  Jing  of  Qi  asked  Master  Kong  about  government.  Master  Kong  replied: 
`  Let  a  ruler  be  a  ruler,  a  subject  a  subject,  a  father  a  father.  (XII,  11) 
Yan  Hui  asked  about  humaneness.  The  Master  said:  '  To  subdue  oneself  and 
return  to  ritual  is  to  practise  humaneness.  If  someone  subdued  himself  and 
returned  to  ritual  for  a  single  day,  then  all  under  Heaven  would  ascribe 
humaneness  to  him.  For  the  practice  of  humaneness  does  surely  proceed 
from  the  man  himself,  or  does  it  proceed  from  others?  Yan  Hui  said  :'I  beg 
to  ask  for  the  details  of  this.  '  The  Master  said:  '  Do  not  look  at  what  is 
contrary  to  ritual,  do  not  listen  to  what  is  contrary  to  ritual,  do  not  speak 
what  is  contrary  to  ritual,  and  make  no  movement  which  is  contrary  to 
ritual.  '  Yan  Hui  said:  '  Although  I  am  not  clever,  I  beg  to  put  this  advice  into 
practice.  '  (XII,  1) 
The  first  passage  indicates  Confucius'  emphasis  on  order.  Everyone  should  play  his  or 
23  Chucn"hae  Tzeng,  "  The  Relations  Among  Li,  Yi  and  Jen  in  The  Confucian  Analects  ",  Pu  Jet, 
Philosophical  Studies,  vol.  V  (Taipei,  1975),  p.  55. 
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to  return  to  an  orderly  state,  and  the  content  of  mastering  oneself  is  displayed  in  one's 
everyday  conduct,  i.  e.  looking,  listening,  speaking,  and  moving.  If  someone  can 
master  himself  and  return  to  order,  then  he  can  achieve  the  realm  of  human- 
heartedness.  The  importance  of  !t  is  also  stated  at  VIII,  2,  where  Confucius  says, 
If  one  is  courteous  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  dissipates  one's  energies; 
if  one  is  cautious  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  timid;  if  one  is 
bold  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  reckless;  if  one  is  forthright 
but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  rude. 
For  a  superior  man,  who  possesses  the  virtue  of  human-heartedness,  will  take  his  time 
in  self-cultivation  in  order  to  be  courteous,  cautious,  bold,  and  forthright.  However, 
without  the  regulation  of  li  these  virtues  would  become  dissipated,  timid,  reckless  and 
rude.  24  If  human-heartedness,  possessed  by  all  human  being,  implies  that  men  by 
nature  have  affection  for  one  another.  Ritual  then  provides  guideline  for  the 
expression  of  one's  affection  for  others.  Thus  we  can  see  why  li  is  a  requisite  for 
being  a  superior  man  in  that  moral  conduct  requires  li  to  be  its  foundation. 
The  third  requisite  for  being  a  superior  man  is  yi.  The  word  yi  is  usually 
translated  into  English  as  '  righteousness  ',  which  is  also  stressed  by  Confucius  in  the 
Anulear.  Confucius  says, 
Righteousness  the  gentleman  regards  as  the  essential  stuff  and  the  rites  are 
his  means  of  putting  it  into  effect.  If  modesty  is  the  quality  with  which  he 
reveals  it  and  good  faith  is  his  method  of  bringing  it  to  completion,  he  is 
indeed  a  gentleman.  (XV,  18) 
Yi,  as  mentioned,  is  concerned  with  the  right  conduct  in  the  specific  situation.  A 
superior  man  who  possesses  the  virtue  of  jen  and  yi  has  not  only  the  disposition  to  do 
what  is  right,  but  also  the  ability  to  know  how  to  act  rightly  in  a  specific  situation. 
24  Tzeng,  op.  cil.  p.  56. 
99 Confucius  says  that  "  [ijn  his  attitude  to  the  world  the  gentleman  has  no  antagonisms 
and  no  favourisms.  What  is  right  he  sides  with  "  (IV,  10).  Yi  thus  is  the  basis  for  the 
superior  man's  moral  judgment,  the  superior  man  is  only  concerned  with  what  is  right, 
but  not  with  what  is  profitable  (IV,  16).  As  Koller  points  out,  "  [a]  person  who  acts  for 
the  sake  ofyi,  because  that  action  is  the  right  thing  to  do,  is  not  far  from  jcn.  "25 
In  addition  to  the  ability  to  make  a  judgement  about  what  is  right  thing  to  do  in 
the  special  situation,  yi,  as  Tzeng  Chuen-hae  points  out,  can  be  treated  in  two  ways: 
the  negative  meaning  and  the  positive  meaning.  `G  The  negative  meaning  of  yi  is  to 
mean  that  one  is  never  inflexible  (IX,  4).  The  flexibility  means  that  one  should  not  be 
punctilious,  otherwise  one  would  be  an  inferior  man.  For  when  one  is  always  true  to 
his  word  and  he  always  brings  his  deeds  to  fruition,  he  may  appear  to  be  an  inferior 
man  because  of  his  stubbornness  (XIII,  20).  Yi  is  different  from  being  stubborn,  which 
enables  us  to  do  things  rightly  and  appropriately  according  to  ditTerent  situations.  The 
positive  meaning  of  yi  means  the  virtue  of  the  mean.  The  word  `  mean  '  in  Chinese 
consists  of  two  words,  Chung  and  Yung.  The  former  means  doing  thing  appropriately, 
not  going  too  far  and  not  going  not  far  enough;  the  latter  means  changelessness.  Thus 
yi  in  this  sense  means  that  the  principles  of  morality  are  unchangeable,  but  the 
applications  of  them  have  to  take  the  actual  situations  into  account.  Yi  in  Confucian 
philosophy  is full  of  the  spirit  of  expediency.  Confucius  says,  for  example,  that 
When  the  Way  prevails  in  the  world,  then  be  seen.  When  it  does  not,  then 
hide.  When  the  Way  prevails  in  your  own  state,  to  be  made  poor  and  obscure 
by  it  is  a  disgrace;  but  when  the  Way  does  not  prevail  in  your  own  state,  to 
be  made  rich  and  honourable  by  it  is  a  disgrace.  (Vill,  13) 
Confucius  here  expresses  his  way  of  conducting  himself  in  society,  he  does  not  insist 
that  he  has  to  be  in  office,  and  become  rich;  nor  does  he  insist  that  he  has  to  be  away 
from  being  in  office,  and  become  poor.  What  he  is  saying  is  that  he  will  take  the 
actual  situations  into  account,  and  regard  yi  as  the  basis  of  his  moral  realization. 
Mencius  says,  in  the  Mencius,  that  "  [w]hen  it  was  proper  to  go  into  office,  then  to  go 
25  Koller,  op.  cit.  p.  270. 
26  Tzcng.  op.  cit.  p.  49. 
100 into  it;  when  it  was  proper  to  keep  retired  from  office,  then  to  keep  retired  from  it; 
when  it  was  proper  to  continue  in  it  long,  then  to  continue  in  it  long;  when  it  was 
proper  to  withdraw  from  it  quickly,  then  to  withdraw  quickly:  that  was  the  way  of 
Confucius  "  (II,  i,  2).  27 
In  addition  to  these  three  requirements  for  being  a  superior  man,  wisdom  should 
be  regarded  as  one  of  the  requisites  for  being  the  superior  man.  Confucius  says, 
The  wise  are  not  perplexed,  the  humane  do  not  worry,  and  the  courageous  do 
not  feel  fear.  (IX,  29) 
...: 
The  gentleman  is  neither  worried  nor  afraid.....  If  when  he  looks  within 
he  is  not  diseased,  then  what  does  he  worry  about  and  what  does  he  fear? 
(XII,  4) 
The  ways  of  the  gentleman  are  three  but  I  have  no  ability  in  them:  the 
humane  do  not  worry;  the  wise  are  not  perplexed;  and  the  courageous  do  not 
feel  fear.  (XIV,  28) 
It  is  obvious,  in  Confucius'  mind,  that  a  gentleman  should  possesses  human- 
heartedness,  wisdom,  and  courageousness.  The  wisdom  is  expressed  in  his  constant 
reflecting  on  his  words  and  deeds.  Master  Zeng's  examining  his  character  in  three 
respects  every  day  would  be  a  typical  example  of  the  expression  of  Confucian 
wisdom  (1,4).  It  is  noticeable  that  Confucius,  unlike  Plato  who  requires  the 
philosophers  to  have  theoretical  wisdom,  is  mainly  concerned  with  practical  wisdom 
in  the  Analects.  Moreover,  for  Confucius,  the  superior  man  is  both  humane  and  wise. 
Confucius  says,  "  [t]he  wise  delight  in  water,  but  the  humane  delight  in  mountains. 
For  although  the  wise  arc  active,  the  humane  are  at  rest.  And  although  the  wise  will 
find  joy,  the  humane  will  have  long  life  "  (VI,  23).  No  matter  where  the  superior  man 
is,  and  no  matter  what  he  is  doing  the  life  of  the  superior  man  is  full  of  joy  and 
happiness. 
Finally,  Confucius  says  at  the  end  of  the  Analecis  that  "  [i]f  one  does  not 
understand  fate,  one  has  no  means  of  becoming  a  gentleman  "  (XX,  3).  Confucius 
27  J.  Legge,  Ilse  Works  of  Akneius  (New  York,  1970),  p.  194. 
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There  are  three  things  which  the  gentleman  holds  in  awe:  he  is in  awe  of  the 
decree  of  Heaven,  he  is  in  awe  of  great  man,  and  he  is  in  awe  of  the  words  of 
sages.  The  small  man,  being  unaware  of  the  decree  of  Heaven,  is  not  in  awe 
of  it.  He  is  rude  to  great  men  and  ridicules  the  words  of  sages.  (XVI,  8) 
It  can  be  seen  that  Confucius  here  regards  understanding  fate  and  the  decree  of 
Heaven  as  a  requisite  for  being  a  superior  man.  However  since  Confucius  seldom 
talks  about  fate  (IX,  1),  I  shall  not  talk  it  in  depth.  For  "  the  principle  of  destiny  is 
subtle.  "28  One  thing  however  is  worth  noting  that  Confucius'  talking  of  destiny  is  to 
ascribe  those  things  which  man  is  unable  to  control  and  change.  Confucius'  saying  at 
XIV,  36  reveals  this  situation,  he  says:  "  Is  the  Way  about  to  make  progress?  If  so,  it  is 
due  to  Fate.  Is  the  Way  about  to  be  rejected?  If  so,  it  is  due  to  Fate.  "  Whereas 
Confucius  does  not  mean  that  one  should  acquiesce  in  one's  destiny  and  does  nothing, 
since  humaneness  is  the  burden  the  superior  man  has  taken  on  himself,  and  it  is  heavy 
and  his  way  is  long,  only  after  death  does  his  journey  end  (VIII,  7).  Things  ascribed  to 
destiny  might  be  out  of  one's  control,  but  what  one  can  do  is  to  seize  the  opportunity 
to  practise  human-heartedness.  Therefore  Confucius'  appeal  to  fate  has  its  positive 
meaning,  that  is,  recognition  of  fate  is  not  to  give  up  everything,  but  to  make  one's 
effort  to  do  things.  Although  we  might  fail  in  doing  things,  yet  as  long  as  we  have 
done  our  best  we  still  can  set  our  heart  at  rest.  For  we  do  what  we  are  able  to  do,  let 
the  result  be  decided  by  our  fate.  "  [D]eath  and  life  are  predestined,  and  riches  and 
honours  depend  on  Heaven  "  (XII,  5).  Confucius'  concept  of  fate  has  deeply 
influenced  the  Chinese  outlook  on  life,  and  Chinese  optimism  is  rooted  in 
Confucianism. 
In  conclusion.  Confucius'  superior  man  is  a  product  of  his  time,  since  Confucius 
is  in  a  disorderly  society.  He  hopes  that  the  superior  men  can  be  exemplars  of  society, 
and  through  their  moral  influence  the  disorderly  society  can  be  reformed.  Therefore 
superior  men  have  to  possess  four  virtues,  i.  e.  human-heartedness,  righteousness, 
28  Chan,  up.  cit.  p.  34. 
102 propriety,  and  wisdom,  and  through  constant  self-cultivation  they  can  reach  a  higher 
realm  of  moral  sentiment.  When  they  are  in  office,  people  live  and  work  in  peace  and 
contentment;  when  they  retire  from  office,  they  will  pay  their  attention  to  their  own 
moral  uplift.  Finally,  the  superior  man  should  understand  fate,  since  the  understanding 
of  fate  can  give  the  human  mind  a  spiritual  sustenance. 
103 Chapter  6 
Autonomy  and  Uniqueness 
Plato's  account  of  the  just  man  appeals  to  the  soul's  inner  structure,  which  consists  of 
reason,  spirit,  and  appetite.  A  just  man  is  the  person  whose  reason  is  in  control;  his 
spirit,  reason's  natural  auxiliary  (441a),  is  in  support  of  reason,  and  his  appetite  is 
regulated  by  the  two  elements  or  parts.  Therefore,  the  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own 
job  '  applied  to  the  just  man  will  be  that  each  of  the  three  parts  of  soul  will  not 
interfere  with  one  another,  and  will  perform  its  own  function  in  harmony  with  the 
others'  (443d). 
Confucius'  account  of  the  superior  man,  unlike  Plato,  does  not  appeal  to  the  soul, 
instead  he  emphasizes  that  to  be  a  superior  man  is  to  cleave  to  human-heartedness 
(jen),  to  behave  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  proper  conduct  (/i),  to  be  able  to  know 
how  to  act  in  specific  situation  (yi),  and  to  continue  to  develop  one's  learning  through 
one's  life.  Thus  the  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  applied  to  the  superior  man  will 
be  that  the  superior  man  "  does  not  stray  from  his  station  "  (XIV,  26).  Although  Plato 
and  Confucius'  ways  of  giving  an  account  of  the  just  man  and  the  superior  man  are 
different,  yet  the  goal  they  want  to  reach  is  the  same.  That  is,  the  social  order  would 
be  easily  maintained  when,  for  Plato,  philosophy  and  politics  are  combined.  And  for 
Confucius,  when  the  superior  man  is  in  office,  the  social  order  would  he  easily 
restored.  In  this  chapter  I  shall  discuss  three  topics  to  compare  the  differences  and 
similarities  between  Plato's  and  Confucius'  moral  and  political  thought:  firstly,  the 
different  approaches  adopted  by  Plato  and  Confucius  towards  human  nature;  secondly, 
the  different  ways  of  understanding  the  self  between  Plato  and  Confucius,  and  thirdly, 
the  idea  that  the  just  man  and  superior  man  should  be  rulers? 
1.  The  different  approaches  adopted  by,  Plato 
and  Confucius  towards  human  nature In  Book  IV  of  the  Republic  we  are  told  that  human  soul  consists  of  three  elements,  i.  e. 
reason,  spirit,  and  appetite  (435a-440b).  The  notion  of  the  tripartite  soul  underpins 
Plato's  view  that  there  are  three  main  kinds  of  individual.  The  soul  of  the  first  kind  of 
individual  is dominated  by  reason,  the  soul  of  the  second-kind  is  dominated  by  spirit, 
and  the  soul  of  the  third  kind  is  dominated  by  appetite.  And  this  in  turn  underpins  the 
class  division  in  the  state.  So  far  as  the  application  of  the  term  justice  both  to  the  state 
and  the  individual  goes  (441d-c),  the  three  classes  in  the  ideal  state,  the  Guardians, 
the  Auxiliaries,  and  farmers  and  artisans,  etc.,  correspond  to  the  three  elements  of  the 
soul,  reason,  spirit,  and  appetite.  It  is  clear  that  for  Plato  one's  place  in  the  ideal  state 
is  decided  by  one's  soul  or  nature  (415a-c). 
In  the  Analects  we  are  told  by  Zigong,  Confucius'  disciple,  that  "  [t]he  Master's 
accomplishments  one  can  get  to  hear  about,  but  what  he  has  to  say  about  human 
nature  and  the  way  of  Heaven  one  cannot  get  to  hear  about  "  (V,  13).  The  tentative 
reason  why  Confucius  rarely  talks  of  human  nature  and  the  way  of  Heaven  might  be 
that  at  Confucius'  time  assumptions  about  human  nature  and  the  way  of  Heaven  were 
distorted  and  somewhat  mysterious.  And  we  know  in  the  Analect  that  "  Confucius 
never  discussed  strange  phenomena,  physical  exploits,  disorder,  or  spiritual  beings  " 
(VII,  20).  I  However  one  passage  does  reveal,  although  vaguely,  Confucius'  view  on 
human  nature,  at  XVII,  2  where  Confucius  says,  "  [b]y  nature  close  to  each  other,  but 
through  practice  far  apart  from  each  other.  "  Because  Confucius  has  little  to  say  about 
human  nature  it  is  not  clear  how  exactly  he  thinks  men  are  all  alike.  Traditionally 
scholars  take  the  view  that  the  Confucian  school  asserts  that  human  nature  is 
originally  good,  and  that  by  nature  we  are  equal.  The  notion  of  `  natural  equality  '  is 
not  only  mentioned  by  Confucius,  though  only  once  in  the  An  lecl.  r,  but  also 
mentioned  by  his  successors,  such  as  Mencius  (c.  372-289  B.  C.  )  and  lisun  Tiu  (c. 
298-238  B.  C.  ).  Mencius  says  in  the  Afenciux  that  "  Yaou  and  Shun  were  just  the  same 
as  other  men  "  (IV,  ii,  32)2,  and  that  "  [a]II  men  may  be  Yaous  and  Shuns  "  (VI,  ii, 
2).  3  Yaou  and  Shun  were  sage-rulers  in  the  past  time,  and  Mencius'  claim  implies  that 
there  is  no  ditTerence  between  ordinary  people's  nature  and  sage-ruler's  nature.  Shun 
Wing-tsit  Chan,  A  Source  Huck  in  Chinese  Philu  opt  (  Princeton,  1973),  p.  32. 
2  J.  Legge,  The  Four  Books  (tiong  Kong,  1966),  p.  200. 
3  Ibid.  p.  278. 
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Although  a  man  may  be  the  descendant  of  kings,  dukes,  or  high  court 
ministers,  if  he  cannot  adhere  to  ritual  principles,  he  should  be  ranked  among 
the  commoners.  Although  a  man  may  be  the  descendant  of  commoners,  if  he 
has  acquired  learning,  is  upright  in  conduct,  and  can  adhere  to  ritual 
principles,  he  should  be  promoted  to  the  post  of  prime  minister  or  high  court 
official.  4 
lt  is  noticeable  that  Shun  Tzu  is  opposed  to  traditional  Confucian  notion  of  human 
nature  being  originally  good,  instead  he  holds  the  view  that  human  nature  is  originally 
bad.  Nevertheless  he  agrees  with  the  Confucian  view  on  the  point  that  men  by  nature 
are  equal.  By  receiving  proper  education,  even  a  commoner  can  be  as  virtuous  as  the 
sage-kings. 
In  Plato's  view  human  nature  or  soul  consists  of  reason,  spirit,  and  appetite. 
Among  them  spirit  and  appetite  are  shared  with  animals.  For  both  men  and  animals 
feel  hunger  and  thirst,  and  both  men  and  animals  feel  indignant  and  angry.  Reason  is 
the  only  part  of  the  human  soul  which  is  unique  to  men  and  not  shared  with  animals. 
Similarly,  in  the  Aristotelian  tradition  there  are  three  kinds  of  soul,  i.  e.  the  vegetative 
soul  is  found  in  plants,  the  sensitive  soul  is  found  in  animals,  but  the  rational  soul  is 
found  only  in  men.  In  spite  of  their  differences  it  can  be  seen  that  both  Plato  and 
Aristotle  regard  reason  as  the  main  trait  of  human  nature.  What  is  Confucian  view  on 
human  nature?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  not  clear  in  the  Analecrs,  whereas  in  the 
A'tenciu.  c  we  are  told  that  "  [a]ll  men  have  a  mind  which  cannot  bear  to  see  the 
sr  fferin,  s  of  others  "  (II,  i,  6).  5  Men's  being  unable  to  see  the  sufferings  of  others 
because  they  have  the  feeling  of  commiseration,  and  the  possession  of  the  feeling  of 
commiseration  is  the  manifestation  of  human-heartedness  (jen).  Thus  human- 
heartedness  may  be  regarded  as  part  of  Confucian  view  on  human  nature.  In  fact, 
Mencius'  notion  of  the  feeling  of  commiseration,  in  my  point  of  view,  is  the  extension 
of  Confucian  assertion  that  human-heartedness  is  to  love  others  (XII,  22).  The 
B.  Watson,  Basic  Writings  of  ltfo  I.  -it,  Hsºuº  T. -H,  cnºcl  Na»  Fei  Tv,  (New  York,  1967),  p.  33. 
5  J.  Legge,  op.  cit.  p.  75. 
106 affection  for  others,  for  Confucius,  is  inborn,  it  is  not  something  which  men  have  to 
obtain  from  outside.  And  the  essence  of  human-heartedness  is  what  Confucius  calls 
`  reciprocity  '(IV,  15),  which  means  that  do  not  do  to  others  what  you  would  not  like 
others  to  do  to  you  (XII,  2;  XV,  24).  In  other  words,  if  you  do  not  want  yourself  to 
suffer,  then  do  not  make  others  suffer  either.  It  is  noticeable  that  there  is  a  sharp 
contrast  between  Plato  and  Confucius  on  human  nature.  The  former  regards  human 
nature  as  the  basis  for  the  division  of  labour.  But  the  latter  does  not  mention  the 
notion  of  human  nature,  instead  Confucius  puts  lots  of  emphasis  on  humanity,  i.  e. 
human-heartedness  is  to  love  people.  However  Mencius  claims  that  goodness  is  the 
essence  of  human  nature  (III,  I,  1)6,  and  being  unable  to  see  others'  suffering  and 
having  affection  for  others  are  the  manifestations  of  the  goodness  of  human  nature. 
Furthermore  the  affection  for  others  is  expressed  in  the  superior  man's  feeling 
towards  others,  Confucius  says, 
[T]he  humane  man,  wishing  himself  to  be  established,  sees  that  others  are 
established,  and  wishing  himself  to  be  successful,  sees  that  others  are 
successful.  To  be  able  to  take  one's  own  familiar  feelings  as  a  guide  may 
definitely  be  called  the  method  of  humaneness.  (VI,  30) 
It  can  be  seen  that  "  the  criterion  of  human-heartedness  ",  as  Ru  Xin  mentioned  7,  "  is 
to  be  found  in  oneself,  in  one's  nature,  "  and  the  practice  of  human-heartedness  is  not 
forced  by  external  institutions  or  law,  the  practice  of  it  should  be  spontaneous.  What 
is  worth  noting  here  is  that  Confucius,  unlike  Plato  who  appeals  to  the  inner  psychic 
harmony  to  give  an  account  of  the  just  man,  holds  that  a  just  man  is  the  combination 
of  engaging  in  continuous  self-cultivation,  self-development,  and  having  harmonious 
social  relationships  with  others.  The  goal  of  continuous  self-development  can  be 
achieved  provided  that 
[T]he  development  of  the  individual  is  in  conformity  with  social  and  ethical 
norms  which  are  universally  recognized  and  accepted  in  society.  In  other 
6  J.  Legge,  op.  cit.  p.  234. 
7  Xin  Ru,  "  The  Unity  of  Man  in  Ancient  Chinese  Philosophy  ",  Uiogeines,  1987,  p.  7. 
107 words,  the  harmony  of  human  relationships  is  a  necessary  presupposition  of 
the  moral  growth  of  the  individuals.  And  in  order  to  maintain  the  balance 
and  harmony  of  the  individual  on  the  one  side  and  society  on  the  other,  self- 
restraint  is  always  required.  " 
The  idea  of  self-restraint  or  self-mastery  is  mentioned  both  in  the  Republic  and 
the  Analects.  However  the  account  of  it  in  the  Republic  is  quite  different  from  that  of 
it  in  the  Analecls.  In  the  Republic  self-mastery  is  taken  to  mean  that 
...  that  there  is  a  better  and  a  worse  element  in  the  personality  of  each 
individual,  and  that  when  the  naturally  better  element  controls  the  worse 
then  the  man  is  said  to  be  "  master  of  himself",  as  a  term  of  praise.  (431a) 
In  other  words,  one  person's  soul  or  nature  being  good  or  bad  depends  upon  whether 
the  three  parts  of  his  soul  are  in  harmony,  that  is,  "  reason  and  its  subordinates  are  all 
agreed  that  reason  should  rule  "  (442c-d).  If  reason  does  not  rule,  then  one's  soul  will 
be  in  a  state  of  disorder,  and  the  one  who  possesses  a  disorderly  soul  would  be  an 
unjust  man.  Plato's  appeal  to  natural  difference,  again,  in  contrast  to  Confucius, 
entails  the  fact  that  only  the  Guardians'  nature  can  be  said  to  be  genuinely  good.  The 
other  two  classes  people's  natures  which  cannot  satisfy  the  condition  that  reason  is  in 
control  cannot  be  said  to  be  truly  good. 
Confucius  says  that  "  [t]o  subdue  oneself  and  return  to  ritual  is  to  practise 
humaneness  "  (XII,  1).  The  meaning  of  the  subduing  oneself  here  is  that  through  self- 
cultivation  one  can  overcome  selfishness  in  the  self.  According  to  Legge,  9  this 
`  selfishness  in  the  self'  can  be  treated  in  three  ways:  first,  it  can  be  taken  to  mean  a 
person's  natural  constitution  and  disposition  of  mind;  second,  the  desires  of  the  ears, 
the  eyes,  the  mouth,  the  nose,  that  is,  the  dominant  influences  of  the  senses;  third,  you 
and  I,  the  lust  of  superiority.  And  Legge  thinks  that  to  overcome  one's  selfishness,  in 
the  Confucian  view,  is  to  overcome  the  excessive  desires  of  the  senses.  This 
suggestion  is  supported,  I  think,  by  the  Confucian  saying  that  "  [d]o  not  look  at  what 
R  Ru,  op.  cit.  p.  8. 
J.  Legge,  Me  Life  and  Teachings  ofConfucius  (London,  1895),  p.  191. 
108 is  contrary  to  ritual,  do  not  listen  to  what  is  contrary  to  ritual,  do  not  speak  what  is 
contrary  to  ritual,  and  make  no  movement  which  is  contrary  to  ritual  "  (XI[,  1)  which 
makes  explicit  reference  to  the  senses.  Plato,  unlike  Confucius,  does  not  have  a  notion 
of  selfishness10,  but  Plato  thinks  that  one's  excessive  bodily  desires  should  not  be  left 
unchecked.  Plato's  notion  of  self-mastery  is  a  process  of  overcoming  internal  conflict, 
at  the  end  of  the  conflict  the  better  part  of  one's  soul  will  win  over  the  worse  part,  if 
one  is  called  self-mastering.  That  is,  to  overcome  one's  excessive  bodily  desires  the 
appetitive  element  of  the  soul  should  be  under  the  control  of  reason.  The  picture  of 
Confucius'  account  of  human  nature  is  quite  different,  as  Fingarette  points  out, 
There  is, 
...,  no  inner  machinery  or  equilibrium  of  psychic  forces,  no  inner 
theatre  in  which  an  inner  drama  takes  place,  no  inner  community  with  rule 
and  ruled.  11 
Therefore,  self-mastery,  for  Confucius,  is  not  a  matter  of  one's  inner  conflict  one  part 
will  be  in  control  of  the  other,  but  a  matter  of  overcoming  the  influences  of  one's 
senses,  and  return  to"the  ordinations  of  man's  moral  and  intelligent  nature  in  the  line 
of  what  is  proper.  "  12  This  will  be  the  manifestation  of  human-heartedness. 
Confucius,  in  contrast  to  Plato,  does  not  divide  man  into  two  parts,  soul  and 
body,  and  does  not  think  that  there  is  a  subdivision  in  man's  soul.  '3  Confucius  regards 
man  as  a  whole  without  part.  When  Confucius  therefore  talks  of  self-mastery  and  self- 
cultivation,  he  is  not  referring  to  any  part  of  man's  soul  or  body,  but  to  man  as  a 
whole,  and  this  difference  leads  to  different  approaches  to  the  understanding  of  the 
self. 
Before  I  proceed  to  discuss  the  second  topic  of  this  chapter,  one  point  should  be 
10  However,  Plato'  saying  in  the  Laws  that  we  have  to  avoid  excessive  self-love  (pheugein  to  spho  dra 
yhilein  auºloºº)  (732b),  indicates  that  selfishness  is  a  serious  vice  in  our  soul  (732a).  For  right  actions  will 
always  serve  our  interests,  but  selfishness  often  leads  us  to  mistake  what  our  best  interests  are. 
1  H.  Fingarette,  "  The  Problem  of  the  Self  in  the  Aººa/ects  ",  Philosophy  East  ant/  West,  vol.  29,1979,  p. 
133. 
12  Legge,  op.  cit.  p.  162. 
13  However,  Mencius  thinks  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  mind  and  body,  see  Part  II,  Chapter  4, 
Section  2,  and  Part  V,  Chapter  15,  Section  1. 
109 made.  Virtue  for  Plato  is  a  kind  of  `  intellectual  virtue  ',  that  is,  to  know  what  virtue  is 
will  motivate  one  to  act  virtuously.  Thus  Plato  emphasizes  the  superiority  of  reason, 
and  the  second  stage  of  education  serves  to  lead  the  philosophers  to  know  the  Good. 
A  different  picture  however  can  be  seen  in  Confucian  philosophy.  Virtue  for 
Confucius  is  `  moral  virtue  '  or  `  virtue  of  the  will  ',  it  emphasizes  the  importance  of 
self-consciousness  and  self-examination.  And  the  ideal  personality  can  only  be 
obtained  through  constant  self-cultivation,  and  through  the  interactions  with  people.  It 
is  said  in  the  Great  Learning  that  self-cultivation  is dependent  upon  the  rectification 
of  the  mind,  since 
[W]hen  one  is  affected  by  wrath  to  any  extent,  his  mind  will  not  be  correct. 
When  one  is  affected  by  fear  to  any  extent,  his  mind  will  not  be  correct. 
When  he  is  affected  by  fondness  to  any  extent,  his  mind  will  not  be  correct. 
When  he  is  affected  by  worries  and  anxieties,  his  mind  will  not  be  correct. 
When  the  mind  is  not  present,  we  look  but  do  not  see,  listen  but  do  not  hear, 
and  eat  but  do  not  know  the  taste  of  the  food.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  saying 
that  the  cultivation  of  the  personal  life  depends  on  the  rectification  of  the 
mind.  (Chapter  7)14 
What  this  passage  means  is  that  our  wrong-doings  result  from  the  fact  that  we 
are  unable  to  set  our  mind  straight.  Without  having  the  mind  rectified  it  would  he 
impossible  for  us  to  concentrate  on  studying  the  Book  of  Poetry,  the  Book  of  Hislorv, 
the  Rook  of  Rites,  and  the  Book  of  Music  (VII,  18;  VIII,  8).  Moreover  a  superior  man 
is  one  who  not  only  engages  in  self  cultivation  but  has  harmonious  relations  with 
others.  As  D.  J.  Munro  says  that  "  [t]he  difference  between  the  early  Platonists  and 
Confucians  can  be  stated  as  follows:  the  Platonists  were  more  concerned  with 
knowing  in  order  to  understand,  while  the  Confucians  were  more  concerned  with 
knowing  in  order  to  behave  properly  toward  other  men  "15,  and  that  "  [nor  the 
Confucians,  the  foundations  of  all  human  virtues  are  the  !  i,  the  rites  or  rules  of 
14  Chan,  op.  cit.  p.  90. 
15  D.  J.  Munro,  The  Concept  of  Man  in  Early  China  (California,  1969).  p.  54. 
110 propriety  ",  and  "  [for  Plato,  '  wisdom  '  was  the  source  of  all  the  specific  virtue.  "16 
This  difference  also  has  its  application  in  politics.  Confucius  appeals  to  the 
superior  man  in  the  hope  that  the  model  of  the  superior  man  can  be  an  object  of 
emulation  to  common  people,  and  can  have  influence  on  the  people.  Confucius  says 
that  "  [t]he  nature  of  the  gentleman  is  as  the  wind,  and  the  nature  of  the  small  man  is 
as  the  grass.  When  the  wind  blows  over  the  grass  it  always  bends  "  (XII,  19).  On  the 
contrary,  a  person  being  in  office  for  Plato  has  always  to  be  the  one  who  possesses 
knowledge  and  is  a  lover  of  wisdom.  Therefore  to  be  in  office  is  always  secondary  to 
having  knowledge,  in  other  words,  to  be  in  office  is  the  by-product  of  possessing 
knowledge.  The  idea  that  the  people  should  emulate  their  leaders  is  foreign  to  Plato, 
since,  unlike  Confucius,  Plato  denies  the  fact  that  the  lower  class  people  have  the 
same  nature  as  the  Guardians'. 
2.  The  different  ways  of  understanding  the  self 
between  Plato  and  Confucius 
It  can  been  seen  that  the  just  man,  in  Plato's  view,  can  be  identified  by  his  inner 
psychic  structure.  And  Plato  puts  this  point  strongly  at  443c  where  he  says  that 
"  [j]ustice, 
..., 
is  a  principle  of  this  kind;  its  real  concern  is  not  with  external  actions, 
but  with  a  man's  inward  self,  his  true  concern  and  interest.  "  Plato's  account  of  the 
just  man  implies  that  human  beings  have  the  capacity  for  rational  decision  and  choice, 
provided  that  the  right  part  of  their  soul,  reason,  is  in  charge.  It  also  implies  that  a 
man  can  be  understood  without  referring  to  others.  Man's  soul  seems  to  have  its  own 
autonomy,  that  is,  it  is  self-governing  and  able  to  manage  or  resolve  the  possible 
conflict  within  it.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  language  used  above,  the  capacity  for 
rational  choice,  does  not  suggest  that  Plato  regards  the  notion  of  autonomy  as  the 
moral  agent's  freely  choosing  a  moral  policy.  As  Kant  would  say,  "  the  principle  of 
autonomy  is  `Never  to  choose  except  in  such  a  way  that  in  the  same  volition  the 
16  op.  cit.  P.  58. 
111 maxims  of  your  choice  are  also  present  as  universal  law'.  "17  For  Plato  personal 
autonomy  does  not  rest  upon  one's  ability  to  choose  but  upon  one's  own  apprehension 
of  the  Good.  A  just  man,  who  has  a  balanced  soul  and  is  capable  of  understanding  the 
Form  of  the  Good,  is  an  autonomous  individual.  The  just  man's  understanding  the 
Good  therefore  will  enable  him  to  be  self-governed  and  to  manage  his  own  affairs, 
and  make  a  decision  on  the  basis  of  rationality. 
It  follows  that  in  Plato's  view  what  constitutes  a  person's  self  cannot  be  regarded 
as  merely  corporeal.  The  criterion  of  bodily  identity  is,  for  brevity,  that  if  we  ask 
whether  person  A  before  us  is  John  whom  we  met  yesterday,  it  will  be  a  sufficient 
condition  of  an  affirmative  answer  to  know  that  A's  body  is  John's  body.  "  It  is 
obvious  that  this  bodily  criterion,  for  Plato,  cannot  be  exclusive,  but  only  conclusive, 
for  personal  identity.  Socrates  in  the  Phaedo  says,  when  he  is  asked  by  Crito  how  to 
bury  him, 
`However  you  wish,  '  said  he;  `provided  you  catch  me,  that  is,  and  I  don't  get 
away  from  you.  '  And  with  this  he  laughed  quietly,  looked  towards  us  and 
said:  `Friends,  I  can't  persuade  Crito  that  I  am  Socrates  here,  the  one  who  is 
now  conversing  and  arranging  each  of  the  things  being  discussed;  but  he 
imagines  I'm  that  dead  body  he'll  see  in  a  little  while,  so  he  goes  and  asks 
how  he's  to  bury  me!  .... 
'  (115c"d)`9 
Socrates'  sharp  distinction  between  the  soul  and  the  body  is  obvious  in  this  passage. 
And  one's  '  true  self  '  is  one's  soul,  which  in  its  good  condition  constitutes  one's 
well-being.  20 
Confucius,  as  mentioned,  talks  of  the  human  soul  or  nature  rarely.  He  is  more 
interested  in  the  interactions  between  person  and  person.  To  be  a  superior  man  is  not, 
17  I.  Kant,  77ie  Moral  Law:  Groundwork  of  the  1Lletaphysic  (?  f  Morals,  ch.  11,  (trans.  )  If.  J.  Paton, 
(London,  1995),  p.  101. 
18  T.  Penelhum,  "  Personal  Identity  ",  77,  e  Encvc/opt'dia  of  Philosophy,  vol.  5,  (ed.  )  P.  Edwards  (London, 
1967)  ,  p.  101. 
19  D.  Gallop,  Plato:  Phacdo  (Oxford,  1993). 
20  Ibid.  p.  xvi. 
112 in  Confucian  view,  to  be  an  autonomous  individual  whom  can  be  understood  or 
analyzed  without  referring  to  others,  but  is  to  have  a  harmonious  relationship  with 
others.  This  can  be  seen  in  the  Anulects  where  Confucius  constantly  talks  of  families, 
friends,  rulers,  and  subordinates.  Confucius  says, 
Filial  piety  and  fraternal  duty  -  surely  they  are  the  roots  of  humaneness.  (1, 
2) 
Young  men  should  be  filial  when  at  home  and  respectful  to  elders  when 
away  from  home.  They  should  be  earnest  and  trustworthy.  Although  they 
should  love  the  multitude  far  and  wide,  they  should  be  intimate  only  with  the 
humane.  (1,6) 
[I]f  in  serving  his  father  and  mother  he  is  capable  of  using  his  strength  to  the 
utmost,  if  in  serving  his  lord  he  is  capable  of  offering  up  his  life,  if  in  his 
dealings  with  friends  he  is  trustworthy  in  what  he  says,  I  would  certainly  call 
him  learned.  (1,7) 
These  passages  reveal  how  one  can  achieve  good  quality  in  one's  relationships  with 
others,  and  the  reason  for  the  absence  of  human  soul  here  would  be  that 
"  Confucianism  disdains  the  sense  of  individual  pride  and  hubris  prominent  in  Greek 
thought  from  Homer  onward.  There  is  even  less  room  in  the  Confucian  way  for  the 
intensely  personal,  overtly  self-preoccupying,  autonomous  emphasis  in  many  other 
strands  of  western  thought.  "Z' 
3.  The  just  man  should  be  ruler 
Plato's  emphasis  on  the  natural  difference  between  men  and  on  the  individual  soul 
precludes  the  lower  class  from  being  able  to  he  promoted  to  the  upper  class.  The 
philosopher-kings  are  not  models  of  emulation  for  people,  they  are  regulators  of 
people's  life.  They  are  special  in  that  they  are  the  only  people  who  are  able  to  see,  in 
21  R.  Ketcham,  I  ndividu  alismn  and  Public  Life:  A  Moral  Dilemma  (0-ford.  1987) 
,  p.  79. 
113 the  sense  of  seeing  in  the  mind,  the  Form  of  the  Good.  By  virtue  of  this  knowledge  of 
the  good  they  can  lay  down  regulations  for  others.  Confucius,  unlike  Plato,  does  not 
regard  the  superior  man  as  one  who  regulates  the  lives  of  others.  Rather  Confucius 
regards  the  superior  man  as  a  model  for  emulation.  The  superior  man  thus  sends  forth 
his  influence  on  people.  For  example, 
When  gentlemen  deal  sincerely  with  their  kinsfolk,  then  the  people  are 
stimulated  towards  humaneness.  (VIII,  2) 
Ji  Kang  Zi  asked  Master  Kong  about  government.  Master  Kong  replied:  `  To 
govern  means  to  correct.  If  you  take  the  lead  by  being  correct,  who  will  dare 
not  to  he  corrected?  '  (XII,  17) 
If  one's  character  is  rectified,  then  things  will  get  done  without  orders  being 
issued.  (XIII,  6) 
Suppose  one  rectifies  one's  own  character,  what  difficulty  does  one  have  in 
participating  in  government.  (XIII,  13) 
Politics  for  Confucius  is  a  matter  of  teaching  others  by  one's  own  example.  The 
responsibility  of  the  superior  men  in  society  is  not  to  intervene  or  regulate  people's 
everyday  life,  but  to  set  an  example  for  them  to  emulate,  and  eventually  everyone  will 
be  a  superior  man.  Thus  the  characteristics  of  the  autonomous  individual  are  not 
important  for  Confucius,  what  is  important  here  is  that  the  superior  man  should  be 
recognized  by  virtue  of  his  relations  and  their  quality.  2`'  It  is  by  having  good  character 
and  having  quality  relationships  with  others  that  a  superior  man  can  be  a  model  for 
emulation,  which  means  that  the  superior  man  has  nothing  qualitatively  in  common 
with  others.  They  are  unique  in  the  sense  of  being  able  to  stick  to  human-heartedness, 
so  they  can  be  identified  as  humane.  Furthermore,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  word 
human-heartedness  in  Chinese  is  composed  of  two  and  men,  the  uniqueness  of  the 
superior  man  will  be  "  irreducibly  social  99.23 
Plato's  just  man  is  mainly  recognized  by  referring  to  his  balanced  mental 
22  R.  T.  Ames,  "  Reflections  on  the  Confucian  Self:  A  response  to  Fingarette  ",  R,,  ks.  Rituals,  and 
Respon.  sibility:  C".  ssc{vs  Dedicated  to  Herbert  !  inrgarette,  (ed.  )  M.  1.  L3ockover  (Illinois,  1991).  p.  108. 
23Ibid..  p.  109. 
114 structure,  his  external  behaviour  constitutes  his  personal  identity  merely  conclusively; 
on  the  contrary,  the  Confucian  superior  man  can  only  be  recognized  in  a  social 
context,  and  there  is  little  room  for  the  Platonic  soul  in  Confucian  thought. 
Nevertheless,  one  thing  on  which  both  Plato  and  Confucius  will  agree  is  that  the  just 
man  ideally  should  be  ruler  or  in  office. 
We  are  told  in  the  Republic, 
The  society  we  have  described  can  never  grow  into  a  reality  or  see  the  light 
of  day,  and  there  will  be  no  end  to  the  troubles  of  states,  or  indeed,  my  dear 
Glaucon,  of  humanity  itself,  till  philosophers  become  kings  in  this  world,  or 
till  those  we  now  call  kings  and  rulers  really  and  truly  become  philosophers. 
(473c-d) 
The  philosophers,  as  mentioned,  are  the  only  persons  who  are  truly  just  in  Plato's 
ideal  state.  The  philosophers  are  the  lovers  of  wisdom,  who  are  able  to  understand  the 
Forms  through  proper  education.  Their  understanding  of  the  Forms  enables  them  to 
have  a  broader  view  over  society  and  state  as  a  whole.  Thus  the  philosophers  can 
make  rational  decisions  on  what  is  good  for  people  and  what  is  good  for  society  as  a 
whole.  It  is  obvious  that  the  presupposition  of  being  a  ruler,  in  Plato's  view,  is 
knowledge,  and  the  ability  of  seeing  the  Forms  is  the  main  trait  of  the  philosopher- 
kings  (486d). 
Confucius  says  that  "  [a]  gentleman  does  not  behave  as  an  implement  "  (1I,  12). 
An  instrument  has  its  own  particular  use,  such  as  lamp  is  used  for  illumination.  The 
function  of  lamp  is  confined  to  a  particular  field,  illumination.  And  a  lamp  can  only 
be  lit  by  someone,  that  is,  it  is  always  used  by  someone.  While  Confucius  does  not 
think  that  a  superior  man,  like  an  instrument,  is  used  by  others.  The  extended  meaning 
of  this  passage  thus  is  that 
[T]he  gentleman's  training  should  not  be  confined  to  particular  skills  so  that 
he  may  become  the  tool  or  implement  of  others.  lt  must  instead  develop  his 
115 moral  qualities  and  powers  of  leadership.  24 
It  is  said  in  the  last  chapter  that  the  superior  men  can  be  taken  to  mean  virtuous 
civil  servants,  for  example, 
The  gentleman  is  easy  to  serve  but  difficult  to  please.  If  in  trying  to  please 
him  one  does  not  accord  with  the  Way,  he  is  not  pleased.  (XIII,  25) 
[W]hen  a  gentleman  studies  the  Way,  he  loves  his  fellow-men.  (XVII,  3) 
Both  Confucius  and  Plato  agree  that  just  man  ideally  has  to  be  in  office,  but  the 
primal  concern  of  being  a  ruler  for  Plato  and  Confucius  is  different.  The  former 
thinks  that  knowledge  is  the  central  theme  for  being  a  philosopher-king;  the  latter 
thinks  that  self-cultivation  is  the  central  theme  for  being  the  superior  man.  However, 
as  mentioned,  25  Confucius  does  not  see  that  the  superior  man  has  necessarily  to  be  in 
office.  Even  though  both  Plato  and  Confucius  think  that  sage-king  would  be  an  ideal 
for  achieving  orderly  society. 
Throughout  this  chapter,  the  differences  between  Plato  and  Confucius'  approach 
towards  the  just  man  can  be  summarized  as  follows:  first  of  all,  Confucian  natural 
equality  is  different  from  Platonic  natural  difference.  The  result  of  this  difference  is 
that  for  Confucius  everyone,  as  long  as  he  makes  his  effort  to  cultivate  himself,  can 
be  a  superior  man;  on  the  contrary,  for  Plato  it  is  impossible  for  a  person  whose 
nature  is  iron  to  be  a  genuinely  just  man,  since  to  be  a  just  man  is  to  mean  that  one's 
nature  is  gold  not  iron,  and  one  has  a  balanced  soul.  Secondly,  Plato's  appeal  to 
human  soul  to  give  an  account  of  just  man  is  different  from  Confucius'  being 
unwilling  to  talk  about  the  soul.  The  result  of  this  difference  is  that  the  self  of 
Platonic  just  man  can  be  identified  without  referring  to  others,  it  is  itself  an 
autonomous  entity;  the  self  of  Confucian  superior  man  cannot  be  identified  without 
referring  to  others.  The  superior  man  can  be  recognized  only  because  he  is  the  only 
one  of  his  type  among  others.  Finally,  for  Plato,  the  ideal  state  can  be  realized  only  by 
24  R.  Dawson,  Coi  jicisis  (Oxford,  1981),  p.  58;  and  R.  Dawson,  C'ot  jucius:  77w  Analech;  (Oxford, 
1993),  note  2.12,  p.  85. 
23  See,  Part  11,  Chapter  5.  Section  1;  and  Part  III,  Chapter  9,  Section  1. 
116 the  combination  of  philosophy  and  political  power;  and  for  Confucius,  the  superior 
man  does  not  necessarily  take  part  in  politics.  For  the  family  is  the  society  writ  small. 
In  spite  of  this  difference  both  Plato  and  Confucius  would  agree  that  it  would  be  an 
ideal  that  if  the  philosophers  and  the  superior  men  are  in  power. 
117 Part  III 
Philosopher  as  Ruler Chapter  7 
Philosopher-King 
Plato  argues  in  the  Republic  that  the  order  of  the  ideal  state  has  to  be  maintained 
under  the  supervision  of  the  philosopher-kings.  The  ideal  or  just  state  can  come  into 
being  only  when  political  power  is  in  the  hands  of  the  philosophers  (473d-e,  499b, 
540d).  Under  the  control  of  the  philosophers  the  rule  of'  each  doing  one  job  '  will  not 
be  violated  so  that  the  social  order  can  be  preserved.  However  without  a  proper 
educational  system  there  will  be  no  philosophers.  Thus  Plato's  educational  system  in 
the  Republic  serves  not  only  to  turn  the  youths  with  philosophical  potentiality  into 
true  philosophers  but  also  as  the  cornerstone  of  maintaining  the  unity  of  the  state.  For 
without  education  there  will  be  no  philosophers,  and  without  the  philosophers  the 
social  order  will  deteriorate.  Similarly,  on  Plato's  account  of  the  tripartite  soul,  a 
balanced  soul  is  one  whose  reason  is in  control.  Reason  being  in  control  in  the  soul  is 
the  result  of  having  proper  education. 
In  this  chapter  I  propose  to  discuss  three  points:  firstly  I  would  like  to  discuss  the 
origin  of  Plato's  doctrine  of  philosopher-king,  to  show  that  the  doctrine  of 
philosopher-king  is  mentioned  not  only  in  the  Republic  but  also  implicitly  in  the 
Gorgias.  And  to  some  extent  the  doctrine  is  influenced  by  the  Pythagorean  society. 
Secondly,  the  philosophers,  according  to  Plato,  are  those  who  have  a  balanced  soul.  In 
this  part  I  would  like  to  explore  Plato's  theory  of  education  to  see  how  by  receiving 
proper  education  the  three  elements,  i.  e.  reason,  spirit,  and  appetite,  can  he  in 
harmony  with  one  another.  Finally,  the  fact  that  harmony  in  both  the  soul  and  the  state 
is  achieved  by  education  may  suggest  that  there  is  an  exact  parallel  between  the  two. 
This  leads  to  difficulties  which  have  been  noted  by  commentators  such  as  B.  Williams. 
I  shall  argue  that  these  difficulties  can  be  avoided  if  we  see  that  Plato  does  not  take 
the  analogy  between  state  and  soul  literally. 
1.  The  origins  of  philosopher-king The  idea  of  philosopher-king  is  first  explicitly  brought  out  by  Plato  in  the  Republic, 
where  Socrates  is  asked  to  show  how  his  ideal  state  can  be  realized.  Socrates  says  that 
" 
...,  till  philosophers  become  kings  in  this  world,  or  till  those  we  now  call  kings  and 
rulers  really  and  truly  become  philosophers,  and  political  power  and  philosophy  thus 
come  into  the  same  hands, 
... 
"  (473d).  Although  the  idea  of  philosopher-king  is  first 
explicitly  mentioned  in  the  Republic,  yet  it  is  not  a  newly  invented  idea  for  Plato.  The 
idea  can  be  traced  back  to  the  Gorgias  or  even  to  the  Pythagorean  society.  ' 
In  an  early  dialogue,  the  Apology,  Socrates  tells  us  why  he  does  not  engage  in 
public  affairs  but  gives  advice  and  busies  himself  in  people's  personal  affairs. 
Socrates  says, 
The  reason  for  this  is 
...  -  that  I  am  subject  to  a  divine  or  supernatural 
experience,  which  Meletus  saw  fit  to  travesty  in  his  indictment.....  It  is  this 
that  debars  me  from  entering  public  life,  and  a  very  good  thing  too,  in  my 
opinion,  because  you  may  be  quite  sure,  gentlemen,  that  if  I  had  tried  long 
ago  to  engage  in  politics,  I  should  long  ago  have  lost  my  life,  without  doing 
any  good  either  to  you  or  to  myself.  Please  do  not  be  offended  if  I  tell  you 
the  truth.  No  man  on  earth  who  conscientiously  opposes  either  you  or  any 
other  organized  democracy,  and  flatly  prevents  a  great  many  wrongs  and 
illegalities  from  taking  place  in  the  state  to  which  he  belongs,  can  possibly 
escape  with  his  life.  The  true  champion  of  justice,  if  he  intends  to  survive 
even  for  a  short  time,  must  necessarily  confine  himself  to  private  life  and 
leave  politics  alone.  (31c-32a)2 
It  is  clear  from  the  passage  quoted  that  Socrates  is  opposed  to  or  refuses  to  lead  a  life 
in  which  he  has  to  engage  in  political  affairs.  As  J.  S.  Morrison  points  out,  Socrates' 
peculiar  view  on  distancing  himself  from  politics  in  the  Apology  seems  to  be 
endorsed  by  Plato  in  the  Gorgius.  '  When  Socrates  asks  Callicles  to  answer  the 
1  J.  S.  Morrison,  "  The  Origins  of  Plato's  Philosopher-Statesman  ",  The  Classical  Quarterly,  vol.  VIII, 
1958,  pp.  198-218. 
21lamilton  and  Huntington  Cairns,  Plato:  The  Colleck'cl  Dialogues  (Princeton,  1994),  p.  17. 
3  op.  cit.  p.  200. 
119 question  which  life  is  the  best,  the  political  or  the  philosophical  one,  Socrates  says, 
... 
how  a  man  should  live.  Is  he  to  adopt  the  life  to  which  you  invite  me, 
doing  what  you  call  a  man's  work,  speaking  in  the  assembly  and  practising 
oratory  and  engaging  in  politics...,  or  should  he  follow  my  example  and  lead 
the  life  of  a  philosopher;  ... 
7  (500c)4 
Plato's  full  support  of  philosophic  life  is  ridiculed  by  Callicles  at  484c,  wehere 
Callicles  says  that  "  [p]hilosophy,  Socrates,  is  a  pretty  toy,  if  one  indulges  in  it  with 
moderation  at  the  right  time  of  life;  but  if  one  pursues  it  further  than  one  should  it  is 
absolute  ruin.  "  Moreover,  at  485a-c  Callicles  keeps  on  saying  that  "  when  a  man  of 
maturer  years  remains  devoted  to  this  study  (philosophy)  the  thing  becomes  absurd  " 
and  "  when  I  see  an  older  man  still  at  philosophy  and  refusing  to  abandon  it,  that  man 
seems  to  me,  Socrates,  to  need  a  whipping.  "  For 
...  such  a  person,  however  great  his  natural  gifts,  will  never  be  a  real  man; 
shunning  the  busy  life  of  the  heart  of  the  city  and  the  meetings  in  which,  as 
the  poet  says,  `  men  win  renown  ',  he  will  spend  the  rest  of  his  life  in 
obscurity,  whispering  with  three  or  four  lads  in  a  corner  and  never  uttering 
any  sentiment  which  is  large  or  liberal  or  adequate  to  the  occasion.  (485d-e) 
Socrates  here  seems  to  be  accused  by  Callicles  of  encouraging  people  to  lead  a 
kind  of  unmanly  or  secluded  life.  It  would  be  interesting  to  see  how  Socrates  can 
answer  Callicles'  accusation,  and  since  the  Gorgias  might  he  regarded  as  a 
transitional  dialogue  from  Plato's  early  dialogues  to  his  dialogues  of  middle  period,  it 
is  important  to  see  what  Plato  has  in  mind  about  the  notion  of  philosopher-king  at  this 
stage. 
Socrates  says  at  507a-e  in  the  Gorgias  that  "  [t]he  man  who  is  disciplined  will 
behave  with  propriety  towards  God  and  man;  .... 
",  and  the  man  who  is  not  self- 
disciplined  "  will  win  the  love  neither  of  God  nor  of  his  fellow-men;  he  is  incapable 
4  W.  Hamilton,  I'lalo:  Gorgias  (London,  1971).  The  rest  passages  of  the  Gorgias  in  this  chapter  are 
quoted  from  Hamilton's  translation. 
120 of  social  life,  and  without  social  life  there  can  be  no  love.  "  It  seems  to  follow  from 
this  that  the  philosopher  who  is  self-disciplined  and  upright  will  not,  as  in  Callicles' 
description,  lead  an  unmanly  life;  and  the  self-disciplined  and  upright  philosopher 
will  be  welcomed  by  his  fellow  countrymen.  Socrates  goes  on  saying  that  "  the  man 
who  is  to  be  an  orator  in  the  proper  sense  must  be  upright  and  understand  right  and 
wrong  "  (508c).  It  might  not  be  clear  that  Socrates  here  explicitly  introduces  the 
notion  of  philosopher-king,  whereas  the  idea  presented  in  this  passage  "  would  seem 
to  be  the  feeling  that  the  activities  of  the  philosopher  and  the  statesmen  should  not  be 
separate.  "s 
Furthermore,  we  are  told  by  Socrates  in  the  Gorgias  that  geometry  plays  a  great 
part  in  the  orderly  universe.  Socrates  says, 
We  are  told  on  good  authority,  Callicles,  that  heaven  and  earth  and  their 
inhabitants  are  held  together  by  the  bonds  of  society  and  love  and  order  and 
discipline  and  righteousness,  and  that  is  why  the  universe  is  called  an 
ordered  whole  or  cosmos  and  not  a  state  of  disorder  and  license.  You,  I  think, 
for  all  your  cleverness,  have  failed  to  grasp  the  truth;  you  have  not  observed 
how  great  a  part  geometric  equality  plays  in  heaven  and  earth,  .... 
(507e- 
508a) 
As  W.  Hamilton  points  out,  the  authority  referred  to  in  this  passage  is  Pythagorean.  6 
The  influence  of  the  Pythagorean  society  on  Plato  can  be  seen  not  only  from 
Aristotle's  writings,  7  but  also  in  the  central  part  of  the  Republic  where  Plato  lays  out 
the  subjects  -  arithmetic,  plane  and  solid  geometry,  astronomy,  and  harmonics,  and 
finally  dialectic  -  which  are  to  be  used  to  produce  the  philosopher.  In  fact,  except 
the  dialectic  the  rest  of  subjects  can  be  associated  with  the  Pythagorean  paideiu.  8 
Moreover,  the  idea  of  combining  philosophy  and  political  power  in  one  man's  hand 
seems  to  be  embodied  by  Pythagorean  philosopher  and  mathematician,  Archytas,  who 
s  Morrison,  (>/?.  cit.  p.  200. 
6  q'.  cit.,  p.  117. 
7A1t'laphysics  I  (A),  987a29-30. 
8  Ibid.  p.  212. 
121 was  elected  general  seven  times.  9  In  my  brief  account  of  the  origins  of  Platonic 
philosopher-king  we  can  see  that  the  influence  of  Pythagoreans  on  the  Platonic 
education  programme  for  the  future  philosopher-kings  is  undoubted,  and  although  the 
idea  of  philosopher-king  is  not  overtly  expressed  in  the  Gorgias,  yet  we  can  still  find 
the  passages  quoted  as  the  transitional  point  from  the  Apology,  "  the  true  champion  of 
justice,  if  he  intends  to  survive  even  for  a  short  time,  must  necessarily  confine  himself 
to  private  life  and  leave  politics  alone  ",  to  the  Republic,  "  the  transformation  can  be 
effected  by  a  single  change,  but  it's  hardly  a  small  or  easy  one,  though  it  is  possible  " 
(473c).  The  small  but  hard  change  is  Plato's  ideal  that  philosophy  and  political  power 
have  to  be  in  one  and  the  same  hand. 
2.  The  education  of  the  soul 
Before  I  enter  into  the  discussion  of  the  education  of  the  tripartite  soul,  I  would  like  to 
first  discuss  the  point,  whether  in  Plato's  mind  the  term  '  character  '  and  the  term 
`  nature  '  are  different  from  each  other.  R.  S.,  Peters,  says  in  "  Moral  Education  and 
the  Psychology  of  Character  "  that 
Character-traits  are  shown  in  the  sort  of  things  a  man  can  decide  to  be, 
where  it  may  be  a  matter  of  forcing  himself  to  do  something  in  the  face  of 
social  pressures  or  persistent  temptations.  In  this  way  a  man's  character  is 
contrast  with  his  nature.  A  man  just  is  stupid  or  lacking  in  vitality;  he  cannot 
decide  to  be  either  of  these.  But  he  can  decide  to  be  more  or  less  honest  or 
selfish.  His  inclinations  and  desires,  which  are  part  of  his  `nature',  may 
suggest  goals;  but  such  inclinations  and  desires  only  enter  into  what  we  call 
a  man's  `character'  in  so  far  as  he  chooses  to  satisfy  them  in  a  certain 
v  The  l)xforcd  Classical  Dicüaarary,  (ed.  )  S.  Ilornblower  and  A.  Spawforth  (Oxford,  1996),  p.  150.  For  a 
view  on  the  relation  between  Plato  and  Archytas,  and  whether  Plato  is  or  is  not  influenced  by  the 
Pythagoreans  see,  G.  E.  R.  Lloyd,  "  Plato  and  Archytas  in  the  Seventh  Letter  ".  11hronesi.  s,  1990,  pp. 
159-174. 
122 manner,  in  accordance  with  rules  of  efficiency  ...,  or  in  accordance  with 
rules  of  social  appropriateness  .... 
10 
Peters  claims  that  a  desire  for  money,  for  example,  reveals  a  person's  nature,  but 
his  character  is  revealed  in  the  manner  in  which  he  carries  out  the  desire  for  getting 
money.  Therefore  he  might  get  the  money  he  wants  dishonestly,  if  his  way  of 
satisfying  his  desire  is  not  in  accordance  with  laws.  However  it  might  not  be  the  case 
for  Plato.  For  Plato  would  not  distinguish  between  nature  and  character  in  the  way 
that  Peters  does.  He  holds  that  in  the  ideal  state  each  class  needs  both  the  right  natural 
qualities  and  the  right  education.  Right  after  his  discussion  of  the  first  stage  of 
education,  at  415  a-d  he  says  that  those  who  possess  gold  in  their  nature  should  be  the 
Guardians,  those  whose  nature  is  silver  should  be  the  Auxiliaries,  and  those  who 
possess  bronze  and  iron  in  their  nature  should  be  the  farmers  and  artisans,  etc..  That  is, 
how  the  three  classes  behave  will  be  decided  by  their  natures  and  upbringing.  And  in 
Books  VIII  and  IX  the  different  types  of  individuals,  i.  e.  the  timarchic  man,  the 
oligarchic  man,  the  democratic  man,  and  the  tyrannical  man,  are  distinguished 
according  to  what  part  of  the  soul  is  dominant.  But  this  seems  to  be  determined  by 
nature  and  by  upbringing.  Therefore  the  difference  between  one's  nature  and 
character,  for  Plato,  is  blurred.  A  person  who  by  nature  craves  for  luxurious  food  will 
decide  to  get  the  food  at  whatever  expense  in  that  his  reason  is  under  the  control  of 
appetitive  desire.  Surely  character  is  the  product  of  the  combination  of  nature  and 
upbringing,  and  it  is  character  which  determines  behaviour.  Thus,  in  Plato's  writing 
we  can  find  an  ambiguity  about  whether  we  require  some  kind  of  character  from 
nature. 
The  term  character  or  personality  has  two  general  meanings.  First,  a  person  is  the 
combination  of  qualities  which  constitute  some  kind  of  cohesive  unity,  Second,  the 
combination  of  qualities  makes  a  person  different  from  others,  that  is,  he  has  some 
distinct  individuality.  "  Plato's  lack  of  interest  in  the  concept  of  individuality  is 
overtly  expressed  when  Socrates  is  taken  to  task  by  Adeimantus  for  not  making  the 
10  R.  S.  Peters,  "  Moral  Education  and  the  Psychology  of  Character  ",  Philosophy,  1962,  pp.  38-9" 
C.  Gill,  "  Plato  and  the  Education  of  Character  ",  Archir  Fur  Geschichte  Der  I'hi/asuhhie,  vol.  67, 
1985,  pp.  1-2 
123 Guardians  happy  (419a).  As  we  saw  in  chapter  1,  Plato  says,  the  purpose  in  founding 
the  ideal  state  is  not  to  promote  the  particular  happiness  of  one  class,  but  of  the 
community  as  a  whole  (420b,  466a,  519e).  This  would  suggest  that  the  educational 
programme  proposed  in  the  Republic  is  not  to  serve  to  develop  each  person's 
individuality,  but  to  produce  an  integrated  psychic  whole.  That  is,  in  the  soul  the  three 
parts  can  be  in  harmony  with  one  another,  and  likewise,  in  the  state  the  three  classes 
can  work  harmoniously  and  cooperatively  with  one  another.  What  follows  I  shall 
concentrate  on  the  issue:  flow  by  education  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  can  be  in 
harmony  with  one  another? 
(a)  The  education  of  the  spirited  part 
Plato's  educational  system  is  divided  into  two  stages:  the  first  stage  is  literary  and 
physical  education,  and  the  second  stage  is  education  of  the  philosopher  or 
intellectual  education.  The  aim  of  the  first  stage  is  to  train  the  young  guardian's  body 
and  to  educate  his  mind  and  character  (376e).  With  regard  to  literary  education,  an 
important  part  of  this  education  is  played  by  poetry,  narrative,  and  music.  Plato 
contends  that  the  inappropriate  verse  and  prose  should  not  be  used  in  educating  the 
young  guardians.  For  they  are  not  useful  in  encouraging  them  to  be  sophron  (390a). 
Does  the  first  stage  aim  at  educating  the  soul  as  a  whole  or  it  aim  at  a  single  part  of 
the  soul?  The  answer  to  this  question  can  be  found  at  375a-376c,  where  the  guardians 
are  compared  to  watch-dogs.  Plato  says:  "  the  natural  qualities  needed  in  a  well-bred 
watch-dog  have  a  certain  similarity  to  those  which  a  good  young  man  needs  for 
guardian-duty  "  (375a).  What  kind  of  qualities  are  needed  both  in  a  well-bred  watch- 
dog  and  the  guardians?  They  are  high  spirit,  speed,  strength,  and  philosophical 
disposition.  As  Gill  claims,  the  first  stage  of  education  serves  to  educate  the  young 
guardians  whose  dominant  tendency  is  the  Ihuntoeides  element.  12  The  spirited  part  is 
not  only  designated  as  the  element  with  which  we  get  angry  (436a,  439e),  but  as  the 
source  of  being  courageous  (375a),  and  as  ambition  or  the  love  of  honour  (581a).  The 
first  stage  of  education  is  to  educate  the  spirited  part  to  listen  to  and  cling  fast  to  "  the 
orders  of  reason  "  (442c),  and  to  be  the  ally  of  reason  (441a). 
12  Gill,  op.  cii.  p.  9. 
124 However  the  requirement  that  the  young  guardians  possess  a  philosophical 
disposition  does  not  mean  that  at  this  stage  the  young  guardians  are  required  to  be 
analytical  and  critical  to  the  norms  being  presented.  What  they  are  required  to  do  is  to 
"  retain  principles  laid  down  by  the  educator  about  what  should,  and  what  should  not, 
be  feared.  "13  Thus  at  this  stage  the  young  guardians  can  at  best  have  belief,  not 
knowledge,  about  what  is  right  or  wrong.  To  instill  the  right  beliefs  in  the  mind  of  the 
young  guardians  is  to  expose  them  in  the  right  kind  of  music,  poetry,  and  narrative. 
For 
[A]Il  man-made  objects  and  cultural  forms  (including  visible  objects  like 
paintings  and  buildings  as  well  as  the  cultural  forms  whose  effect  was 
already  being  recognized)  are  representative,  in  some  ways,  of  ethical 
qualities,  and  thus  contribute  to  the  formation  of  the  child's  character.  '4 
And  at  this  stage  of  education  the  young  guardians  are  not  required  to  understand  the 
principles  laid  down  by  the  educator.  Whereas  through  the  education  they  become 
habituated  to  behaving  in  accordance  with  those  principles.  Thus  the  philosophical 
disposition  required  at  this  stage  is  no  more  than  a  passive  rational  capacity,  the 
ability  to  appreciate  the  moral  principles  without  any  reflection  presented  in  the  first 
stage  of  education.  15 
(b)Thc  education  of  the  calculating  part 
This  stage,  unlike  the  first  stage  which  is  habituative  in  method,  is  intellectual  in 
nature.  The  second  stage  of  education  is  to  enable  the  future  philosophers  to  see  the 
Forms  and  to  give  a  coherent  account  of  what  they  know.  But  why  does  Plato  have  to 
emphasize  this  stage  of  education?  Plato  thinks  that  without  being  able  to  see  the 
Forms  the  philosophers  are  unable  to  lay  down  rules  in  this  world  about  what  is  right 
and  what  is  wrong.  Plato  says, 
13  op.  Ch. 
14  Gill, Ibid.  p.  10. 
15  Ibid.  p.  13 
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knowledge  of  reality,  and  no  clear  standard  of  perfection  in  their  mind  to 
which  they  can  turn,  as  a  painter  turns  to  his  model,  and  which  they  can 
study  closely  before  they  start  laying  down  rules  in  this  world  about  what  is 
admirable  or  right  or  good  where  such  rules  are  needed,  or  maintaining,  as 
Guardians,  any  that  already  exist.  (484d) 
Thus  it  is  necessary  for  the  philosophers  to  see  the  Forms,  because  seeing  the 
Forms  will  make  them  closer  to  reality  (514c),  and  will  enable  them  to  make  proper 
judgements  about  this-world  affairs.  It  is  clear  that  the  faculty  with  which  the 
philosophers  are  able  to  see  the  Forms  is  reason.  So  this  stage  is  the  education  of 
reason.  To  see  the  Forms  will  actualize  the  potentiality  of  reason,  16  that  is,  it  will  have 
wisdom  and  foresight  to  act  for  the  soul  as  a  whole  (441c).  Similarly,  the 
philosopher's  seeing  the  Forms  will  not  make  them  interested  in  the  special  welfare  of 
any  particular  class  in  the  ideal  state,  but  that  of  the  state  as  a  whole  (519e). 
Two  points  need  to  be  noted.  First,  the  language  used  here  clearly  indicates  that 
for  Plato  theoretical  wisdom  will  entail  practical  wisdom.  As  Kahn  points  out,  Plato 
does  not  make  the  distinction  between  these  two  types  of  wisdom.  '7  For  in  Plato's 
view  reason  is  not  only  a  desire  for  the  knowledge  of  the  Good  but  a  desire  for  the 
good.  That  is,  to  know  the  Form  of  Justice  will  motivate  the  philosophers  to  act  justly. 
However  although  by  not  distinguishing  between  theoretical  wisdom  and  practical 
wisdom  Plato  makes  the  philosophers  perfect  candidates  for  the  government,  one 
question  still  has  to  be  answered.  flow  is  the  philosopher  who  has  theoretical  wisdom 
able  to  know  when,  for  example,  to  raise  the  interest  rate  better  than  an  economic 
expert?  I  suppose  that  Plato  might  think  that  details  of  economic  policy  were  a  matter 
of  rechne  rather  than  philosophical  wisdom.  In  the  Gorgias  Socrates  questions 
Gorgias  about  his  professional  expertise,  rhetoric.  Professional  expertise  or  lcchnc'  is 
said  to  be  transmissible,  that  is,  an  orator  can  teach  others  to  be  able  to  practice  the 
skill  of  rhetoric  (449a-b).  And  a  techne  has  its  specific  product.  Weaving  is  concerned 
with  the  production  of  clothes,  and  music  with  the  creation  of  melodies  (449c). 
16  GiI1,  op.  cit.  p.  17. 
17  C.  Kahn,  "  The  Theory  of  Desire  ",  71ie  Review  of  A1aaphysicc,  vol.  XLI,  1987,  p.  82. 
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philosopher  makes  a  decision  he  will  take  all  situations  into  account.  Thus  the 
philosopher,  unlike  the  economic  expert  who  is  only  specialized  in  economic  issues, 
will  take  the  society  as  a  whole  into  account  when  he  makes  a  judgement  on  raising 
the  interest  rate.  Second,  Plato's  emphasis  on  the  capacity  of  knowing  the  Forms  is 
not  to  lead  the  philosophers  to  criticize  and  reject  the  values  and  the  norms  by  which 
they  organize  their  state,  but  to  uncover  the  meanings  of  moral  terms,  such  as  justice, 
courage,  and  wisdom,  etc..  Gill  asserts  that  this  leaves  Plato's  psychological  theory 
with  an  odd  combination  of  emphasis.  Gill  says, 
He  [Plato]  lays  great  stress  on  the  idea  that  an  individual  should  learn  to 
think  for  himself  (if  his  intellectual  education  is  to  be  complete),  but  he  does 
not  seem  to  expect  these  thoughts  to  lead  to  any  individual  conclusions  about 
the  way  to  organize  his  life.  18 
I  agree  with  the  latter  part  of  Gill's  assertion,  but  the  former  part  could  he 
misleading.  It  is  true  that  those  destined  to  be  philosopher  rulers  must  see  the  truth  for 
themselves  (as  opposed  to  accepting  beliefs  from  others),  but  they  are  not  expected  to 
think  for  themselves  in  the  sense  of  showing  originality.  Equally  they  are  not 
supposed  to  think  for  themselves  in  the  sense  of  paying  special  attention  to  their  own 
private  concerns.  For  after  completing  his  intellectual  education  the  philosopher  has 
to  take  up  the  job  of  government  when  his  turn  comes  (540b).  Although  the 
philosophers  will  be  happier  if  they  live  the  contemplative  life,  yet  it  is  necessary  for 
them  to  rule  the  state.  For  it  would  be  disastrous  that  if  the  state  is  ruled  by  a  worse 
man  (347c).  Thus  the  philosophers  who  have  completed  their  intellectual  education 
will  not  only  think  for  themselves,  but  of  the  state  as  a  whole.  The  philosophers' 
taking  up  the  job  of  government  is  not  only  beneficial  to  themselves  but  also  to  the 
state  as  a  whole.  Due  to  the  fact  that  the  philosophers  identify  their  own  interests  with 
those  of  the  state  as  a  whole,  by  taking  up  the  job  of  government  they  do  not  sacrifice 
their  own  interests.  For  what-is  good  for  the  state  as  a  whole  will  be  good  for  the 
18  Gi1I,  op.  cit.  p.  18 
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the  goods  of  the  state  as  a  whole,  and  in  the  meantime  their  own  goods  arc  fulfilled.. 
(c)  The  education  of  the  appetitive  part 
What  is  the  educational  programme  for  the  appetitive  part?  After  discussing  the  two 
stages  of  education  it  seems  natural  to  ask  this  question.  If  there  is  no  educational 
programme  for  appetite  then  how  Plato  is  able  to  say  that  after  receiving  the 
intellectual  education  the  harmonious  soul  is  achieved.  It  is  said  at  439d  that  the 
appetitive  element  is  irrational,  and  it  might  get  too  large  and  strong  to  mind  its  own 
business  and  try  to  subject  and  control  the  other  elements,  and  so  wreck  the  life  of  all 
of  them  (442a-b).  Thus  the  irrational  appetite  seems  to  be  uneducatable.  However  if 
the  inner  harmony  can  really  be  achieved  then  there  should  be  certain  method  to  train 
or  educate  the  appetitive  part.  The  passage  at  588c-589b  gives  us  the  clue  how  the 
appetitive  part  can  be  trained.  The  tripartite  soul  is  presented  by  the  Beast  image.  The 
man  represents  reason,  the  lion  represents  spirit,  and  the  many-headed  beast 
represents  appetite.  Thus  to  have  a  balanced  soul  is  not  only  for  reason  to  make  an 
ally  of  the  lion,  but  also  to  nurse  and  cultivate  the  beast's  tamer  elements  and  prevent 
the  wilder  ones  growing.  A  balanced  soul  is  one  in  which  the  unnecessary  desires 
have  to  be  starved  away  and  the  necessary  ones  have  to  be  nurtured.  In  other  words, 
the  method  of  educating  the  appetitive  part  is  to  direct  the  attention  to  those  necessary 
desires  whereas  allowing  the  unnecessary  desires  to  wither  away  through  negligence. 
The  idea  that  appetite  is  educated  by  directing  the  attention  to  the  necessary  appetitive 
desires  has  already  been  mentioned  at  485d,  where  Plato  says, 
But  we  know  that  if  a  man's  desires  set  strongly  in  one  direction,  they  are 
correspondingly  less  strong  in  other  directions,  like  a  stream  whose  water 
has  been  diverted  into  another  channel. 
Thus  if  a  person's  desires  set  in  acquisition  of  knowledge,  then  his  desires  for 
physical  pleasures,  such  as  good  food,  sex,  etc.,  will  wither.  Consequently,  the  inner 
conflict  among  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  will  never  happen.  It  is  worth  noting  here 
that  Plato's  emphasis  on  the  withering  away  of  the  unnecessary  desires  shows  that  he 
128 does  not  assert  a  kind  of  asceticism.  For  Plato  allows  some  healthy  and  necessary 
desires  to  be  fulfill  to  some  extent.  And  if  the  soul  as  a  whole  follows  the  rule  of 
reason,  then  each  part  of  it  "  will  enjoy  its  own  particular  pleasures,  which  arc  the 
best  and  truest  available  to  it  "  (586e-587a). 
In  the  soul,  the  appetitive  part  has  to  be  controlled  and  directed  by  reason,  for  it 
is  purely  irrational.  Similarly,  in  the  ideal  state  the  third  class,  the  farmers  and  artisans, 
have  to  listen  to  the  order  or  command  of  the  philosopher-kings.  In  the  ideal  state 
everyone  has  to  do  one  job  for  which  he  or  she  is  suited.  Thus  both  the  Guardians  and 
the  Auxiliaries  have  received  the  proper  education,  which  enables  them  to  carry  out 
their  social  functions  properly.  However  what  is  the  education  for  the  third  class?  Is  it 
possible  for  the  farmers  and  artisans  to  perform  their  functions  without  giving  them 
proper  training?  The  answer  to  this  is  brought  out  by  Socrates  when  he  shows  that  the 
Guardians  are  the  best  citizens  in  the  ideal  state,  Socrates  says, 
Then  in  our  imaginary  state  which  will  produce  the  better  men  -  the 
education  which  we  have  prescribed  for  the  Guardians  or  the  training  our 
shoemakers  get?  (456d) 
It  is  unclear  whether  the  training  for  the  shoemakers  involves  moral  training.  I-Iourani 
claims  that  the  above  passage  is  "  an  example  which  shows  that  the  craftsmen  in 
general  receive  a  technical  education.  "19  However,  it  could  be  argued  that  the 
craftsmen  need  more  than  a  purely  technical  education  if  they  arc  to  perform  their 
functions  well.  The  aim  of  education  for  Plato  is  to  consolidate  the  order  of  the  state, 
and  only  when  all  the  three  classes  have  received  proper  education  which  enables 
them  to  perform  their  distinct  functions,  can  the  happiness  of  the  state  as  a  whole  and 
that  of  the  individual  be  achieved.  As  Plato  says, 
If  it  is,  our  Guardians  and  Auxiliaries  must  be  compelled  to  act  accordingly 
and  be  persuaded,  as  indeed  must  everyone  else,  that  it  is  their  business  to 
perfect  themselves  in  their  own  particular  job;  then  our  state  will  be  built  on 
19  G.  F.  I  iourani,  "  The  Education  of  the  Third  Class  in  Plato's  Republic  ",  The  (.  71msha/  Qnnrler/}Y.  vol. 
XLII[,  1949,  p.  59. 
129 the  right  basis,  and,  as  it  grows,  we  can  leave  each  class  to  enjoy  the  share  of 
happiness  its  nature  permits.  (421c) 
This  passage  may  offer  an  answer,  I  think,  to  B.  Williams'  question.  When  he  talks  of 
the  analogy  of  city  and  soul  in  the  Republic  he  says,  "  [i]nner  peace  is  what  Plato 
must  want,  but  that  in  the  political  case  requires  the  allegiance  of  the  epithymetic 
element,  and  we  are  back  to  the  question  of  how  we  are  to  picture  that  being 
secured.  "20  The  three  classes  will  stick  to  their  stations  for  which  they  arc  naturally 
suited.  And  to  perform  their  functions  well  is  to  fulfill  their  natures,  so  they  will  have 
their  shares  of  happiness  and  the  happiness  of  the  state  as  a  whole  can  also  be 
preserved.  If  the  third  class  arc  trained  to  perform  their  functions  that  will  enable 
them  to  fulfill  their  natural  capacities.  They  will  recognize  that  doing  their  own  jobs 
and  not  being  meddlesome  will  do  both  the  state  and  themselves  good. 
3.  The  analogy  of  state  and  soul 
However,  the  final  sentence  of  the  passage  quoted  above  seems  to  cause  some 
problem.  That  is,  the  sentence  '  we  can  leave  each  class  to  enjoy  the  share  of 
happiness  its  nature  permits  '  seems  to  tell  us  that  the  philosophers  can  enjoy  the 
pleasures  of  contemplating  the  Forms,  the  Auxiliaries  can  enjoy  the  pleasure  of 
competition,  and  the  farmers  and  artisans  can  enjoy  physical  pleasures.  If  we  take  the 
analogy  of  the  state  and  the  individual  seriously,  then  reason  will  enjoy  itself  in  seeing 
the  Forms,  spirit  will  enjoy  itself  in  pursuing  honours,  and  appetite  will  enjoy  itself  in 
satisfying  its  appetitive  desires  to  the  full  extent.  If  it  were  the  case,  then  it  would  be 
hard  to  imagine  how  the  harmonious  soul  and  state  can  be  possibly  achieved. 
Therefore  if  Plato  takes  the  analogy  seriously  he  has  to  answer  this  question:  Ilow  can 
the  inner  harmony  both  in  the  soul  and  in  the  state  be  achieved  if  the  three  elements 
are  lets  to,  following  their  natures,  fulfill  their  desires? 
=n  B.  Williams,  "  The  Analogy  of  City  and  Soul  in  Plato's  Republic  ",  Exegesis  aiuc/Arguinenl,  (cd.  )  Lee, 
Mourelatos,  and  Rorty.  1973,  p.  202. 
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one  man  has  to  do  one  job  for  which  he  is  by  nature  suited.  It  follows  that  if  a 
shoemaker  can  perform  his  function  well,  i.  e.  making  shoes,  then  he  can  have  sclf- 
fulfillment.  Therefore  what  the  sentence  at  421c  says  is  that  as  long  as  one  man  does 
one  job  for  which  he  is  naturally  suited  he  can  fulfill  his  nature.  However  it  would  be 
odd  to  say  that  as  long  as  the  appetitive  part  of  the  soul  does  its  own  job  it  can  fulfill 
its  own  nature.  For  to  fulfill  the  nature  of  the  appetitive  part  will  be  to  allow  appetite 
to  desire  whatever  it  wants  excessively.  I  think  however  that  the  oddity  can  be  solved 
if  we  read  this  passage  together  with  the  passage  586c-587a,  where  Plato  says, 
Then  if  the  mind  as  a  whole  will  follow  the  lead  of  its  philosophical  element, 
without  internal  division,  each  element  will  be  just  and  in  all  other  respects 
perform  its  own  function,  and  in  addition  will  enjoy  its  own  particular 
pleasures,  which  are  the  best  and  truest  available  to  it. 
The  idea  that  the  three  parts  of  the  soul,  wehen  each  of  them  doing  its  own  job,  can 
enjoy  its  own  pleasures  which  are  the  best  and  truest  available  to  it,  shows  that  the 
three  parts  of  the  soul,  even  though  they  do  their  own  jobs,  can  only  enjoy  the 
happiness  which  is  the  truest  available  to  them.  The  reason  for  this,  i  think,  lies  in  the 
fact  that  although  reason  and  spirit  are  functionally  defined  as  their  counterparts,  the 
Guardians  and  the  Auxiliaries,  in  the  state,  yet  it  is  unclear  what  is  the  function  of 
appetite.  For  in  the  state  the  third  class,  the  farmers  and  artisans,  have  their  different 
functions,  whereas  the  function  of  appetite  seems  to  he  the  desires  for  food,  drink, 
and  any  physical  pleasure.  But  it  cannot  be  the  function  of  appetite  to  pursue 
excessive  pleasures.  Plato,  I  think,  is  clearly  aware  of  this  oddity,  and  that  is  the 
reason  why  he  has  to  emphasize  that  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  have  to  enjoy  those  of 
their  own  pleasures  the  truest  and  the  best  for  them  (587a). 
B.  Williams,  in  "  The  Analogy  of  City  and  Soul  in  Plato's  Rel)uhlic  ",  says  that 
there  are  obstacles  to  make  sense  of  Plato's  analogy.  21  However,  as  mentioned  above, 
it  is  arguable  whether  Plato  himself  take  the  analogy  seriously  and  literally.  In  the 
21  a''.  cit.  pp.  196-206. 
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individual  possesses  reason,  spirit,  and  appetite  in  his  or  her  mind.  To  what  class  he 
or  she  belongs  will  be  determined  by  which  part  of  soul  is  dominant  in  the  soul.  It 
does  not  mean  however  that  the  degree  of  rationality  has  to  be  applied  to  the  tripartite 
soul.  For  in  my  account  of  the  education  of  the  tripartite  soul  only  reason  has 
rationality  and  the  capacity  of  calculation,  the  other  two  parts,  spirit  and  appetite,  do 
not  have  any  calculative  ability  at  all.  The  first  stage  of  education  simply  makes  spirit 
listen  to  the  voice  of  reason  without  any  reflection,  and  the  education  of  appetite  is  to 
nurture  the  necessary  desires  and  wither  away  the  unnecessary  ones.  Therefore  on  this 
account  we  do  not  have  to  face  the  problem  of  homunculi,  ' '2  and  to  suggest  that  there 
is  an  internal  communication23  within  the  soul. 
Without  education  the  harmony  of  the  soul  and  the  state  can  never  be  realized.  In 
the  state  although  each  individual's  social  position  is  determined  by  his  or  her  nature, 
yet  to  make  the  individual's  natural  capacity  fully  function  vvill  need  education.  Each 
class  has  its  particular  educational  programme  to  follow,  which  will  enable  people  to 
perform  their  distinct  functions  properly.  Therefore  the  orderly  state  can  be  realized 
when  the  three  classes  mind  their  own  business  and  agree  on  who  should  rule. 
Similarly,  the  harmony  of  the  soul  can  be  achieved  when  each  part  of  it  receives 
education  and  does  its  own  job.  However,  the  three  parts  of  the  soul,  unlike  the  three 
classes  in  the  state,  cannot  have  an  internal  communication  to  decide  who  should  rule. 
The  rule  of  reason  is  the  result  of  proper  education  for  by  education  the  irrational 
appetite  will  be  kept  in  control.  Although  Plato  constantly  appeals  to  the  analogy  of 
state  and  soul,  yet  it  is  not  necessary  to  think  that  Plato  takes  it  seriously  in  every 
respect.  For  if  my  analysis  is  right  then  the  differences  between  Plato's  education 
programme  for  the  appetitive  part  in  the  soul  and  that  for  the  third  class  in  the  state 
will  make  sense. 
22  J.  Annas,  An  InIroxhicliwt  to  I  Iguo'.  v  Republic  (Oxford,  1981),  pp.  142-6. 
2'  J.  Moline,  "  Plato  on  the  Complexity  of  the  Psyche  ",  Archiv,  Fur  Geschichte  Der  t'hiIosn/dlie.  vol.  60, 
1978,  p.  14. 
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Inner  Sage  Outer  King; 
We  are  told  of  the  idea  of  the  inner  sage  and  outer  king  in  the  Shu  Ching  (77ie  Book  of 
Documents)  that 
Examining  into  antiquity,  we  rind  that  the  Emperor  Yao  was  called  Fang- 
hsun.  He  was  reverent,  intelligent,  accomplished,  sincere,  and  mild.  Ne  was 
sincerely  respectful,  and  capable  of  modesty.  His  light  covered  the  four 
extremities  of  the  empire  and  extended  to  Heaven  above  and  the  earth  below. 
He  was  able  to  make  bright  his  great  virtue,  and  bring  affection  to  the  nine 
branches  of  the  family.  When  the  nine  branches  of  the  family  had  become 
harmonious,  he  distinguished  and  honored  the  hundred  clans.  When  the 
hundred  clans  had  become  illustrious,  he  harmonized  the  myriad  states.  The 
numerous  people  were  amply  nourished  and  prosperous  and  became 
harmonious.  1 
Without  doubt  all  the  qualities  embodied  in  Yao  are  required  by  Confucius  for  a  ruler 
to  he  a  Confucian  ruler,  that  is,  a  good  or  virtuous  ruler  who  loves  the  people,  and 
possesses  a  reverent  and  thoughtful  manner,  intelligence,  and  modesty.  Although 
Confucius  humbly  says  at  VII,  34  in  the  Analens  that  "  [als  for  being  a  sage  or  a 
humane  man,  I  would  surely  not  presume  to  be  such  ",  and  "  [a]  sage  I  have  not  been 
able  to  meet  "  (VII,  26),  yet  the  idea  of  the  sage-king  is  deeply  implanted  in 
Confucian  socio-political  thought.  In  this  chapter  I  would  like  to  discuss  three  topics 
in  the  Confucian  notion  of  the  inner  sage  and  outer  king:  firstly,  self-cultivation  is  the 
prerequisite  for  the  inner  sage;  secondly,  outer  king:  the  practice  of  the  inner  sage, 
and  finally,  the  notion  of  authority-as-model. 
1  Wm.  Theodore  De  ßary,  Wing-tsit  Chan,  and  Burton  Watson  (compiled),  Sources  of  Chlucsc  TflZdiýicýu, 
vol.  I  (New  York.  1960),  p.  8. 1.  Self-cultivation  is  the  prerequisite  for  inner  sage 
The  notion  of  the  inner  sage  and  outer  king  is  not  an  idea  peculiar  to  Confucianism,  it 
is  also  expressed  in  Taoism.  2  However,  it  is  without  any  doubt  the  central  idea  in 
Confucian  socio-political  thought.  In  the  text  of  the  Great  Learning3  we  arc  told  that 
The  Way  of  learning  to  be  great  (or  adult  education)  consists  in  manifesting 
the  clear  character,  loving  the  people,  and  abiding  in  the  highest  good. 
Only  after  knowing  what  to  abide  in  can  one  be  calm.  Only  after  having  been 
calm  can  one  be  tranquil.  Only  after  having  achieved  tranquillity  can  one 
have  peaceful  repose.  Only  after  having  peaceful  repose  can  one  begin  to 
deliberate.  Only  after  deliberation  can  the  end  be  attained.  Things  have  their 
roots  and  branches.  Affairs  have  their  beginnings  and  their  ends.  To  know 
what  is  first  and  what  is  last  will  lead  one  near  the  Way. 
The  ancients  who  wished  to  manifest  their  clear  character  to  the  world  first 
bring  order  to  their  states.  Those  who  wished  to  bring  order  to  their  states 
would  first  regulate  their  families.  Those  who  wished  to  regulate  their 
families  would  first  cultivate  their  personal  lives.  Those  who  wished  to 
cultivate  their  personal  lives  would  first  rectify  their  minds.  Those  who 
wished  to  rectify  their  minds  would  first  make  their  wills  sincere.  Those  who 
wished  to  make  their  wills  sincere  would  first  extend  their  knowledge.  The 
extension  of  knowledge  consists  in  the  investigation  of  things.  When  things 
are  investigated  knowledge  is  extended;  when  knowledge  is  extended,  the 
will  becomes  sincere;  when  the  will  is  sincere,  the  mind  is  rectified;  when 
the  mind  is  rectified,  the  personal  life  is  cultivated;  when  the  personal  life  is 
cultivated,  the  family  will  be  regulated;  when  the  family  is  regulated,  the 
state  will  be  in  order;  and  when  the  state  is  in  order,  there  will  be  peace 
throughout  the  world.  From  the  Son  of  Heaven  down  to  the  common  people, 
all  must  regard  cultivation  of  the  personal  life  as  the  root  or  foundation. 
2  Scc  Wing-tsit  Chan's  A  Source  Ikx,  k  hi  Chinese  Ph  ilosophhy  (Princeton.  1973),  p.  208. 
3  1bid.  p.  86-7. 
134 There  is  never  a  case  when  the  root  is  in  disorder  and  yet  the  branches  arc  in 
order.  There  has  never  been  a  case  when  what  is  treated  with  great 
importance  becomes  a  matter  of  slight  importance  or  what  is  treated  with 
slight  importance  becomes  a  matter  of  great  importance. 
The  purpose  of  running  the  text  is  to  illustrate  the  consistency  between  the  three 
requirements  and  the  eight  steps.  4 
The  three  requirements  arc:  manifesting  the  clear  character,  loving  the 
people,  and  abiding  in  the  highest  good. 
The  eight  steps  are:  the  investigation  of  things,  extension  of  knowledge, 
sincerity  of  the  will,  rectification  of  the  mind,  cultivation  of  the  personal  life, 
regulation  of  the  family,  order  of  the  state,  and  peace  through  the  world. 
It  can  be  seen  that  both  the  three  requirements  and  the  eight  steps  are  concerned 
with  the  balance  between  the  individual  on  the  one  side  and  the  society  on  the  other. 
That  is  to  say,  manifesting  a  clear  character,  and  the  first  five  of  the  eight  steps 
concern  the  inner  sageliness;  and  loving  the  people,  abiding  in  the  highest  good,  and 
the  last  three  of  the  eight  steps  concern  outer  kingliness.  5  Moreover,  the  basis  for  an 
orderly  society  to  be  achieved  is  that  "from  the  Son  of  E  leaven  down  to  the  common 
people,  all  must  regard  cultivation  of  the  personal  life  as  the  root  or  foundation.  "  Thus 
the  realization  of  the  sage-king  will  primarily  depend  upon  the  individual's  self- 
cultivation. 
Self-cultivation,  for  Confucius,  focuses  on  the  realization  of  human-heartcdness, 
which  is  basically  linked  with  the  self-fulfilling  process  of  an  individual.  In  other 
words,  in  order  to  achieve  the  ideal  of  inner  sageliness  one  has  to  undergo  a  process 
of  self-cultivation,  To  undergo  the  process  of  self-cultivation  is  for  one  to  uncover  the 
human-heartedness  buried  in  one's  nature.  Therefore,  Confucius  says  that  "  [w]hat  the 
gentleman  seeks  in  himself  the  small  man  seeks  in  others  "  (XV,  21).  Fluman- 
Chan,  op.  cit.  p.  84, 
Shu-hsien  Liu,  "  On  the  Confucian  ideal  of'  Sagcliness  Within  and  Kingliness  Without  ',  I'r(weedri?  gs 
of71w  Iiiier￿aý,  ý￿ar  sfm  siurn  apt  co  jucianisnr  cn  d  Me  Mockrn  !  t`cor/d  (Taipei.  1987),  p.  402. 
135 heartedness  is  not  far  away  from  us  in  that  if  we  ourselves  wanted  human-hcartcdncss, 
then  it  would  arrive  (VII,  30).  Human.  heartcdness  is  not  something  alien  to  us,  but  it 
is  something  we  possess  at  birth.  Mencius  says, 
If  man  does  evil,  it  is  not  the  fault  of  his  natural  endowment,  The  feeling  of 
commiseration  is  found  in  all  men;  the  feeling  of  shame  and  dislike  is  found 
in  all  men;  the  feeling  of  respect  and  reverence  is  found  in  all  men;  and  the 
feeling  of  right  and  wrong  is  found  in  all  men.  The  feeling  of  commiseration 
is  what  we  call  humanity;  the  feeling  of  shame  and  dislike  is  what  we  call 
righteousness;  the  feeling  of  respect  and  reverence  is  what  we  call  propriety 
(/i),  and  the  feeling  of  right  and  wrong  is  what  we  call  wisdom.  Humanity, 
righteousness,  propriety,  and  wisdom  are  not  drilled  into  us  from  outside.  We 
originally  have  them  with  us.  6 
Thus,  self-cultivation  is  to  engage  in  the  process  of  finding  the  four  beginnings  in 
human  nature,  i.  e.  humanity,  righteousness,  propriety  and  wisdom.  lt  would  be  worth 
noting  that  Mencius'  assertion  of  the  four  beginnings  is  a  development  of  the 
Confucian  notion  of  human"heartedness.  For,  in  Confucius'  view,  a  humane  man  will 
naturally  be  a  man  who  is  righteous,  self  restrained,  and  wise.  As  Tu  Wei-ming  says, 
the  four  beginnings  can  be  regarded  as  "a  progressive  articulation  of  the  concept  of 
humanity  (jct:  ) 
. 
"7  Consequently,  "  [i]f  these  four  beginnings  are  allowed  to  reach 
their  complete  development  in  a  man,  he  becomes  a  Sage.  "' 
2.  Outer  king:  the  Practice  of  the  inner  sage 
Rediscovering  hurnan-heartedness  in  oneself  requires  us  to  engage  in  seif-cultivation, 
G  Chan,  op.  cil.  p.  54. 
7  Wei-ming  Tu,  "  The  Fiduciary  Community  ",  (i'i,  trcrlityy  und  C  onmui,,  ility:  An  Fs  ay  On  (.  'oi  juricun 
Religiou.  aress  (Albany,  1989),  p.  57. 
a  Yu-Ian  Puns,  Ah  istor),  of  C/hinc'se  /'hilocophyy,  vol.  I  (Princcton,  1983),  p.  121. 
136 but  the  application  of  human-hcartedncss  to  others  needs  the  practice  of  propriety. 
Human-heartedness  and  propriety  are  not  two  notions  conflicting  with  each  other,  but 
supplementary  to  each  other.  Confucius  says  that  "  [tbo  subdue  oneself  and  return  to 
ritual  is  to  practise  humanness  "  (XII,  1).  That  is,  to  practice  human-heartcdness 
requires  people  to  not  look  at  what  is  contrary  to  propriety,  not  listen  to  what  is 
contrary  to  propriety,  not  speak  what  is  contrary  to  propriety,  and  make  no  movement 
which  is  contrary  to  propriety  (XII,  1).  Thus,  a  humane  man  can  act  in  accordance 
with  the  rule  of  propriety  so  he  is  not  far  from  being  a  sage-king,  in  that 
humanity  (jen)  and  propriety  (!  i)  arc  the  two  pillars  of  Confucius'  thought, 
they  are  inseparable  from  the  practice  of  personal  cultivation  and  the  ideal  of 
sageliness  within  and  kingliness  without.  While  humanity  was  Confucius' 
ultimate  concern  and  propriety  its  outward  manifestation,  Confucius'  ideal 
was  none  other  than  to  realize  the  humanity  within  oneself  (sageliness  within) 
and  extend  this  humanity  to  others  (kingliness  without)  through  the  practice 
of  propriety  which  has  its  origin  in  the  self;  and  a  sage  is  none  other  than  a 
person  who  can  realize  the  humanity  in  himself  and  extend  this  humanity  to 
others.  9 
The  consistency  between  the  notion  of  the  inner  sage  and  that  of  the  outer  king  is 
also  expressed  in  the  Doctrine  of  /lie  Mean,  where  the  Master  says, 
Love  of  learning  is  akin  to  wisdom.  To  practice  with  vigor  is  akin  to 
humanity.  To  know  to  be  shameful  is  akin  to  energy.  He  who  knows  these 
three  things,  knows  how  to  cultivate  his  personal  life.  Knowing  how  to 
cultivate  his  personal  life,  he  knows  how  to  govern  other  men.  And  knowing 
how  to  govern  other  men,  he  knows  how  to  govern  the  empire,  its  states,  and 
the  families.  (Chapter  XX)'° 
If  we  take  for  granted  the  Confucian  idea  that  politics  is  the  extension  of  morality, 
9  Liu,  op.  cit.  p.  403. 
10  Chan,  op.  cit.  p.  105.  Also  sce  the  Anolecis  XIV,  28. 
137 then  it  will  logically  follow  that  social  stability  and  harmony  require  that  the  true  king 
be  a  sage.  For  Confucius  disavows  ruling  by  law  or  punishment,  but  advocates  ruling 
by  virtue.  Confucius  says  in  the  Analects, 
If  you  lead  them  by  means  of  government  and  keep  order  among  them  by 
means  of  punishments,  the  people  are  without  conscience  in  evading  them.  If 
you  lead  them  by  means  of  virtue  and  keep  order  among  them  by  means  of 
ritual,  they  have  a  conscience  and  moreover  will  submit.  ([l,  3) 
How  can  a  ruler  rule  by  virtue?  Or  what  method  can  a  ruler  adopt  to  rule  by 
virtue?  Confucius  in  the  Doctrine  of  Thce  Mean  lays  down  nine  standards,  which  have 
to  be  followed  by  all  the  rulers.  The  standards  are:  1)  cultivating  the  personal  life,  2) 
honoring  the  worthy,  3)  being  affectionate  to  relatives,  4)  being  respectful  toward  the 
great  ministers,  5)  identifying  oneself  with  the  welfare  of  the  whole  body  of  officers, 
6)  treating  the  common  people  as  one's  own  children,  7)  attracting  the  various 
artisans,  8)  showing  tenderness  to  strangers  from  far  countries,  and  9)  extending 
kindly  and  awesome  influence  on  the  feudal  lords  (XX).  " 
The  nine  standards  of  ruling  can  be  discussed  in  the  following  three  headings: 
firstly,  the  ruler  has  to  set  an  example;  secondly,  the  ruler  should  rule  by  virtue  and 
propriety,  and  finally,  the  ruler  should  be  able  to  promote  the  quality  and  talent,  and 
treat  his  ministers  in  accordance  with  propriety.  12 
The  ruler  himself  has  to  engage  in  self-cultivation  because  Confucius  says  in  the 
Analects  that  "  if  one's  character  is  not  rectified,  then  although  orders  arc  issued  they 
are  not  followed  "  (XIII,  6).  Thus  when  Confucius  was  asked  by  Ji  Kang  Zi  about 
government  he  says, 
To  govern  means  to  correct.  If  you  take  the  lead  by  being  correct,  who  will 
dare  not  to  be  corrected?  (XII,  17) 
Confucius  says  again, 
Chan,  op.  cil.  p.  105. 
12  Yih-jing  Lin,  Me  Exploration  of  Confucian  Though!  (Taipei,  1987),  pp.  50-6. 
138 Suppose  one  rectified  one's  own  character,  what  difficulty  does  one  have  in 
participating  in  government.  If  one  cannot  rectify  one's  own  character,  what 
has  one  to  do  with  rectifying  others.  (XIII,  13) 
It  can  be  seen  that  the  idea  of  setting  an  example  for  the  people  to  follow  is  important 
in  Confucius'  thought.  For  rectifying  one's  character  is  to  require  one  to  act  in 
accordance  with  propriety,  and  if  a  ruler  can  rectify  his  character,  and  acts  according 
to  the  rule  of  propriety,  then  "  the  people  will  be  easy  to  command  "  (XIV,  41). 
Secondly,  the  idea  that  the  ruler  should  rule  by  virtue  and  propriety  is  also 
expressed  strongly  in  the  Analects,  where  Confucius  says, 
The  practice  of  government  by  means  of  virtue  may  be  compared  with  the 
pole-star,  which  the  multitudinous  stars  pay  homage  to  while  it  stays  in  its 
place.  (II,  1) 
You  are  running  the  government,  so  what  is  the  point  of  killing?  if  you  desire 
good,  the  people  will  be  good.  The  nature  of  the  gentleman  is  as  the  wind, 
and  the  nature  of  the  small  man  is  as  the  grass.  When  the  wind  blows  over 
the  grass  it  always  bends.  (XII,  19) 
It  is  obvious  that  Confucius  is  opposed  to  ruling  by  means  of  punishment,  and  it 
would  be  even  more  difficult  for  Confucius  to  accept  the  idea  that  killing  can  be  taken 
to  be  a  means  of  ruling.  For,  in  Confucius'  view,  society  is  the  extension  of  the  family. 
What  is  done  in  the  society  will  be  similar  to  what  is  done  in  the  family.  "  If  it  is 
immoral  for  a  father  to  kill  his  son,  then  equally  it  will  be  immoral  for  the  ruler  to  kill 
his  people.  The  ruler  has  to  deal  with  the  people  as  his  own  children,  that  is,  the 
relationship  between  the  two  sides  should  have  love  and  affection  involved.  Therefore, 
"  See  the  ninth  commentary  of  the  Greed  /.  earning,  where  it  is  said  that  "  [w]hat  is  meant  by'  [i]n  order 
rightly  to  govern  the  State.  it  is  necessary  first  to  regulate  the  family,  '  is  this-  --  ft  is  not  possible  for  one 
to  teach  others,  while  he  cannot  teach  his  own  family.  Therefore,  the  ruler,  without  going  beyond  his 
family,  completes  the  lessons  for  the  State  ",  and  that  "  [f]rom  the  loving  example  of  one  family  &  'Whole 
State  becomes  loving,  and  from  its  courtesies  the  whole  State  becomes  courteous,  .... 
"  J.  Legge.  0/).  rit. 
p.  ä7o. 
139 Mencius  says  that  the  one  who  can  unite  a  country  "  has  no  pleasure  in  killing  men  " 
(1,  i,  6)'a 
Moreover,  the  ruler  should  rule  in  accordance  with  propriety.  For  the  order  and 
stability  of  the  society  can  only  be  achieved,  for  Confucius,  when  a  ruler  is  a  ruler,  a 
minister  a  minister,  a  father  a  father,  a  son  a  son  (X11,11).  Propriety  is  the  cornerstone 
of  social  order,  the  decline  of  propriety  indicates  the  decay  of  the  society.  If  the  ruler 
cannot  act  according  to  the  rule  of  propriety  then  it  will  be  the  disaster  for  society;  on 
the  contrary,  if  the  ruler  can  act  or  govern  in  accordance  with  propriety  that  will  bring 
the  well-being  of  society.  Confucius  says, 
If  one  is  courteous  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  dissipates  one's  energies; 
if  one  is  cautious  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  timid;  if  one  is 
bold  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  reckless;  if  one  is  forthright 
but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  rude.  When  gentlemen  deal 
sincerely  with  their  kinfolk,  then  the  people  are  stimulated  towards 
humaneness.  When  old  friends  are  not  neglected,  then  the  people  will  not 
behave  irresponsibly.  (VIII,  2) 
The  true  king  should  not  be  timid,  reckless,  and  rude  towards  the  people,  but  be  kind 
and  affectionate  towards  them.  For  the  social  order  is  not  built  on  a  one-way  basis, 
that  is,  the  ruler  has  absolute  authority  over  the  ruled,  but  on  a  reciprocal  basis.  That 
is,  it  is  only  when  the  ruler  can  exert  himself  to  govern  according  to  the  rule  of 
propriety  that  the  authority  of  the  ruler  can  be  approved  by  the  people  who  will  follow 
the  ruler  and  act  accordingly. 
Finally,  the  ruler  should  treat  the  ministers  in  accordance  with  propriety,  and 
promote  the  quality  and  talent.  It  is  said  in  the  Anolecis, 
Duke  Ai  asked:  '  What  action  does  one  take  so  that  the  people  will  be 
obedient?  '  Master  Kong  replied  saying:  '  If  you  promote  the  straight  and  set 
them  above  the  crooked,  then  the  people  will  be  obedient.  If  you  promote  the 
14  J.  Legge,  71ie  LVorkc  of  AIenciuc  (New  York,  1970),  p.  136. 
140 crooked  and  set  them  above  the  straight,  then  the  people  will  not  be 
obedient.  '  (11,19) 
Duke  Ding  asked  how  rulers  should  employ  ministers,  and  how  ministers 
should  serve  rulers.  Master  Kong  replied:  `  Rulers  in  employing  ministers  do 
so  in  accordance  with  ritual,  and  ministers  in  serving  rulers  do  so  in 
accordance  %vith  loyalty.  '  (III,  19) 
Zhonggong,  being  steward  to  the  Ji  family,  asked  about  government.  The 
Master  said:  '  Give  a  lead  to  your  officials,  pardon  minor  errors,  and  promote 
men  of  quality  and  talent.  '  (XIII,  2) 
Although  a  good  government  requires,  in  Confucius'  view,  a  virtuous  ruler,  yet 
without  the  help  of  good  administrative  ministers  the  governor  will  get  half  the  result 
with  twice  the  effort.  Thus  a  true  king  is  capable  of  promoting  the  men  of  quality  and 
talent  which  will  make  his  ruling  get  twice  the  result  with  half  the  effort.  The  ruler 
has  to  treat  his  ministers  with  kindness  and  respect  so  that  his  order  can  be 
implemented  eflicicntly  by  them  in  return.  Again,  the  relationship  between  ruler  and 
minister  is  not  that  one  issues  command  and  the  other  carries  out  the  command. 
Rather  the  relationship  should  be  a  reciprocal  one,  that  is,  the  ruler  should  employ  the 
ministers  with  respect  and  in  accordance  with  propriety,  and  the  ministers  should  in 
return  serve  the  ruler  in  accordance  with  loyalty. 
It  should  be  noticed  that  through  the  discussion  of  the  nine  standards  of  ruling 
we  can  see  that  the  underlying  idea  of  the  claim  of  the  nine  standards  is  the  idea  of 
reciprocity.  15  The  true  king  does  not  gain  his  authority  over  the  people  by  virtue  of 
military  force,  but  by  being  virtuous.  And  he  always  acts  on  behalf  of  the  people  so 
the  people  arc  willing  to  follow  and  obey  him.  Thus  the  difference  bet  wween  true  king 
and  despot  is  virtue.  As  Mencius  says  that  "  [a]  ruler  who  uses  force  to  make  a 
pretense  at  humanity  is  a  despot.....  A  ruler  who  practices  humanity  with  virtue  is  a 
true  king  "'  (2A:  3).  " 
1s  Tu,  op.  cit.  p.  59, 
16  Chan.  up.  cit.  p.  64. 
141 3.  The  notion  of  authority-.  as-model 
The  terms'  inner  sage  '  and  '  outer  king  '  are  never  used  by  Confucius  in  the  Anutects, 
nevertheless  the  ideas  prevail  implicitly  in  Confucian  socio-political  thought.  The 
idea  of  the  inner  sage  requires  the  rulers  to  dig  out  human-heartedness  in  themselves, 
i.  e.  to  undergo  the  process  of  self  cultivation;  and  the  idea  of  the  outer  king  is  to 
extend  human-heartedness  towards  others.  It  is  obvious,  for  Confucius,  that  the 
extension  human-hcartedness  towards  others  is  not  by  means  of  coercion,  but  by 
means  of  setting  a  model  or  exemplar  people  can  follow  (II,  1;  XII,  17).  Due  to  the 
fact  that  Confucius  never  mentions  the  term  '  model  '  or  '  exemplar  ',  it  would  be 
worthwhile  for  us  to  see  what  it  would  mean  to  Confucius. 
When  we  say  that  someone  is  a  model  or  exemplar,  we  arc  meant  to  say  that  the 
person  as  a  model  will  illustrate  what  others  are  to  do  or  be.  When  we  say,  therefore, 
that  someone  is  a  model  student,  we  do  not  encourage  other  students  to  merely 
imitate  his  behaviour,  but  try  their  best  to  share  his  characteristic.  However,  a  model 
aeroplane,  for  instance,  will  never  be  a  real  one  but  an  imitation.  In  addition  to  these 
two  senses  of  model,  there  is  a  third  one.  For  instance,  students  of  art  school  might 
take  a  sculpture  as  a  model,  and  observe  it  and  practice  their  skill  at  sketching.  The 
term  '  model  '  in  this  sense  is  instrumental,  'l  that  is,  the  sculpture  is  to  be  copied  and 
imitated  by  the  students  who  want  to  improve  their  skill  at  sketching.  The  model, 
sculpture,  has  instrumental  value.  However,  if  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  Analects", 
where  Confucius  says  that  "  [a]  gentleman  does  not  behave  as  an  implement  "  (11,12), 
then  it  should  be  clear  that  Confucius  will  not  take  the  term  `  model  '  in  the 
instrumental  sense.  For  if  the  sage-king  were  to  act  merely  as  a  model  in  the 
instrumental  sense  then  there  would  be  no,  in  Finbarette's  word,  18  iººn"insie 
significance  to  the  people  who  imitate  him.  In  other  words,  the  people  would  copy  or 
imitate  the  sage-king  not  because  the  sage-king's  virtue  was  desired  by  the  people  for 
its  own  sake  and  its  consequence,  but  because  by  imitating  the  sage-king  there  might 
II  I  i.  Fingarctte,  "I  low  The  Analccts  Portrays  The  ideal  of  Efficacious  Authority  ",  Jourlut1  i(7rille.  v 
Plfilosop/  r,  vol,  8,1981,  p.  31, 
"  Ibid. 
142 3.  The  notion  of  authority-as-model 
The  terms'  inner  sage'  and  `  outer  king'  are  never  used  by  Confucius  in  the  Anak'cl.  1, 
nevertheless  the  ideas  prevail  implicitly  in  Confucian  socio-political  thought.  The 
idea  of  the  inner  sage  requires  the  rulers  to  dig  out  human-heartedness  in  themselves, 
i.  e.  to  undergo  the  process  of  self-cultivation;  and  the  idea  of  the  outer  king  is  to 
extend  human-heartedness  towards  others.  It  is  obvious,  for  Confucius,  that  the 
extension  human-heartedness  towards  others  is  not  by  means  of  coercion,  but  by 
means  of  setting  a  model  or  exemplar  people  can  follow  (II,  1;  XII,  17).  Due  to  the 
fact  that  Confucius  never  mentions  the  term  '  model  '  or  '  exemplar  ',  it  would  be 
worthwhile  for  us  to  see  what  it  would  mean  to  Confucius. 
When  we  say  that  someone  is  a  model  or  exemplar,  we  are  meant  to  say  that  the 
person  as  a  model  will  illustrate  what  others  are  to  do  or  be.  When  we  say,  therefore, 
that  someone  is  a  model  student,  we  do  not  encourage  other  students  to  merely 
imitate  his  behaviour,  but  try  their  best  to  share  his  characteristic.  However,  a  model 
aeroplane,  for  instance,  will  never  be  a  real  one  but  an  imitation.  In  addition  to  these 
two  senses  of  model,  there  is  a  third  one.  For  instance,  students  of  art  school  might 
take  a  sculpture  as  a  model,  and  observe  it  and  practice  their  skill  at  sketching.  The 
term  '  model  '  in  this  sense  is  instrumental,  "  that  is,  the  sculpture  is  to  be  copied  and 
imitated  by  the  students  who  want  to  improve  their  skill  at  sketching.  The  model, 
sculpture,  has  instrumental  value.  However,  if  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  Analeci.  s, 
where  Confucius  says  that  "  [a]  gentleman  does  not  behave  as  an  implement  "  (1I,  12), 
then  it  should  be  clear  that  Confucius  will  not  take  the  term  `  model  '  in  the 
instrumental  sense.  For  if  the  sage-king  were  to  act  merely  as  a  model  in  the 
instrumental  sense  then  there  would  be  no,  in  Fingarette's  word,  "  intrinsic 
sign  lcance  to  the  people  who  imitate  him.  In  other  words,  the  people  would  copy  or 
imitate  the  sage-king  not  because  the  sage-king's  virtue  was  desired  by  the  people  for 
its  own  sake  and  its  consequence,  but  because  by  imitating  the  sage-king  there  might 
17  [{.  Fingarette,  "  How  The  Analects  Portrays  The  [deal  of  Efficacious  Authority  ",  Journal  of  ('/ºinese 
Philosoph)-,  vol.  8,1981,  p.  31. 
"  Ibid. 
142 be  a  chance,  let  us  say,  for  them  to  be  promoted  to  the  higher  office.  Moreover,  it 
would  be  odd,  for  Confucius,  to  say  that  the  sage-king,  like  the  model  aeroplane,  is 
not  a  real  king  but  an  imitation  of  the  real  one.  Therefore,  the  sage-king,  like  the 
model  student,  is  the  model  for  people  to  emulate  and  try  to  share  his  characteristic. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  although  the  idea  of  model  as  instrument  is  rejected  by 
Confucius,  yet  the  language  used  in  the  Book  of  Songs  is  by  no  means  without 
ambiguity.  It  is  believed  that  the  Books  of  Songs  is  modified  by  Confucius,  and  in  the 
Books  c  fSongs  the  notion  of  model  as  instrument  does  appear  to  us.  For  example, 
Cut  an  axe-handle?  Cut  an  axe-handle? 
The  pattern  is  not  far  to  seek.  19 
Here  `  pattern  '  is  taken  to  mean  that  the  new  axe-handle  mirrors  the  old  one,  and  the 
new  axe-handle  has  to  pattern  itself  upon  the  old  one.  The  function  of  the  axe-handle, 
as  an  instrument,  is  limited  in  certain  area.  It  is  overt  that  the  language  used  in  the 
Books  of  Songs  seems  to  run  counter  to  that  used  in  the  Analecls.  However,  the 
ambiguity  in  the  language  does  not  suggest,  I  think,  that  Confucius  is  ignorant  of  this 
problem.  It  might  be  supposed  that  the  language  used  in  the  odes  do  not  exactly  bring 
out  what  Confucius  has  in  mind,  and  there  might  be  no  better  vocabulary  which  is 
able  to  convey  what  Confucius  has  in  mind.  Confucius  admires  and  loves  the  ancient 
texts  and  tradition  of  old,  in  doing  so,  he  does  not  want  us  to  merely  imitate  the  good 
of  old,  but  the  imitated  good  is  desired  for  its  own  sake  and  its  consequence.  The 
sage-king  is  a  perfect  human  being,  he  embodies  the  goodness  of  human  nature. 
Therefore,  to  '  imitate  '  the  sage-king  is  to  fulfill  and  realize  human  nature,  it  is  in 
this  sense  that  sage-king  as  a  model  is  in  itself  worth  desiring.  20 
It  is  noticeable  that  the  notion  of  '  modelling  oneself  on  '  could  take  two 
meanings:  `  imitating'  someone  and  `  being  like  '  someone.  To  imitate  someone  with 
good  character  does  not  necessarily  entail  that  those  who  model  themselves  on  the 
virtuous  man  will  possess  the  same  character.  For  they  might  merely  copy  the  virtuous 
man's  behaviour  without  having  the  good  character.  While  to  be  like  the  virtuous  man 
19  A.  Waley,  The  Book  of  Songs  (New  York,  1996),  p.  126. 
20  Fingarette,  op.  cit.  p.  33-5. 
143 might  suggest  that  those  who  model  themselves  on  the  virtuous  man  can  make 
themselves  better  men,  i.  e.  having  the  good  character.  Plato,  in  the  Republic,  seems  to 
think  that  imitating  good  man  makes  us  better  and  he  is  sure  that  imitating  bad  men 
makes  us  bad  (395c-d).  Plato  thus  does  not  seem  to  have  this  distinction  in  his  mind. 
Does  Plato  thinks  that  mere  imitation  can  change  the  character?  I  think  that  Plato 
does.  For  at  444c-d  Plato  says  that  just  acts  produce  just  soul  and  unjust  acts  produce 
unjust  soul,  and  that  justice  is  produced  by  establishing  the  harmony  among  the  three 
elements  in  the  soul.  It  seems  clear  that  for  Plato  by  imitating  the  virtuous  man,  i.  e. 
doing  just  acts,  we  can  be  like  the  virtuous  man  having  the  harmonious  character.  And 
the  similar  idea  is  expressed  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  where  Aristotle  says,  "  we 
become  just  by  doing  just  acts,  temperate  by  doing  temperate  acts,  brave  by  doing 
brave  acts.  -,  2  1  For  moral  virtue,  says  Aristotle,  unlike  intellectual  virtue,  is  acquired  by 
habituating  ourselves  to  do  the  right  acts.  Confucius  here  will  agree  with  both  Plato 
and  Aristotle  that  modelling  oneself  on  the  good  man  can  make  one  better.  However, 
for  Plato,  to  be  genuinely  just  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  doing  the  right  acts  but  of 
having  the  knowledge  of  the  Forms.  This  is  perhaps  a  crucial  difference  between 
Plato  and  Confucius.  For  Plato  to  be  genuinely  just  one  would  have  to  model  oneself 
not  on  a  person  but  on  a  Form.  This  is  the  reason  why  in  the  Republic  only  the 
philosophers  are  genuinely  just  since  they  are  capable  of  seeing  the  Forms. 
It  is  a  common  place,  since  the  time  of  Max  Weber,  that  Confucian  sage-king  is 
vested  by  commentators  with  `  charisma'.  22  As  Weber  says, 
The  kings,  even  in  the  Shih  Ching  (the  Book  of,  5ongs),  no  longer  in  simply 
because  they  are  the  greater  heroes.  And  that  is  decisive  for  the  spirit  of  the 
army.  They  win  because  before  the  Spirit  of  Heaven  they  are  morally  right 
and  because  their  charismatic  virtues  are  superior,  whereas  their  enemies  are 
godless  criminals  who,  by  oppression  and  trespass  upon  the  ancient  customs, 
have  wronged  their  subjects'  weal  and  thus  have  foregone  their  charisma.  23 
21  D.  Ross,  Aristotle:  The  Nico  nacliea  i  Ethics  (Oxford,  1980),  p.  29. 
22  See  D.  C.  Lau,  Confucius:  The  Atialects  (London,  1979),  p.  55.  and  Wm.  T.  De  ßary,  71w  rouble 
with  Colifucianism  (Cambridge,  1996,  p.  1-23. 
￿  M.  Weber,  The  Religion  of  china  (New  York,  1968),  p.  113.  The  parentheses  is  mine. 
144 It  is  interesting  to  see  whether  for  Confucius  the  sage-kings  possess  a  sort  of  charisma 
which  enables  them  to  win  the  heart  of  the  people.  While  first  what  is  charisma? 
Weber  gives  us  a  definition  of  charisma  in  "  The  Theory  of  Social  and  Economic 
Organization  ",  where  he  says, 
The  term  '  charisma  '  will  be  applied  to  a  certain  quality  of  an  individual 
personality  by  virtue  of  which  he  is  set  apart  from  ordinary  men  and  treated 
as  endowed  with  supernatural,  superhuman,  or  at  least  specifically 
exceptional  powers  or  qualities.  These  are  such  as  are  not  accessible  to  the 
ordinary  person,  but  are  regarded  as  of  divine  origin  or  as  exemplary,  and  on 
the  basis  of  them  the  individual  concerned  is  treated  as  a  leader.  24 
It  is  disputable,  I  think,  whether  Weber's  notion  of  charisma  can  be  applied  to 
Confucian  sage-king.  I  shall  argue  against  this  idea  by  discussing  three  points.  Firstly, 
the  Confucian  ideal  authority  is  not  like  the  Weberian  and  the  Christian  idea  of 
charismatic  authority,  though  they  all  share  the  idea  that  people  are  attracted  by  the 
character  of  the  ideal  authority.  In  Confucius'  view,  the  sage-king  is  not  the  one  who 
possess  '  supernatural,  superhuman,  or  at  least  specifically  exceptional  powers  or 
qualities.  '  For  what  the  sage-king  can  achieve  is  ideally  accessible  to  everyone, 
Confucius  says  that  men  are  "  [b]y  nature  close  to  each  other  "  (XVII,  2),  and 
Mencius  says  that  "  [a]ll  men  may  be  Yaous  and  Shuns  "  (VI,  ii,  2).  25  Yaou  and  Shun 
were  sage-kings  in  the  old  time,  but  the  virtue  they  possessed  were  accessible  to 
everyone.  As  long  as  one  is  sincerely  to  undergo  the  process  of  self-cultivation,  and  to 
achieve  the  fulfillment  of  human  nature.  The  sage-king  is  not  one  who  is  isolated 
from  and  stands  above,  like  a  religious  figure,  all  human  beings.  For  "  [b]y  the  sages, 
the  human  relations  are  perfectly  exhibited  "  (IV,  i,  2).  `6  The  consummate  fulfillment 
of  the  sage-king  has  to  be  achieved  in  society.  The  sage-king  can  have  people's 
reverence  and  love  only  because  he  can  extend  human-heartedness  to  the  people,  that 
is,  loving  and  caring  for  them. 
2,  M.  Weber,  The  Theory  of  Social  tend  Eco,  ioinir  Orgrurizaliw,  (New  York,  1964).  p.  353-9. 
2  Legge,  op.  cit.  p.  424. 
26  Ibid.  p.  292. 
145 Secondly,  if  Weber  means  what  he  says  that  "  Confucianism  was  only  interested 
in  affairs  of  this  world  such  as  it  happened  to  be  s27,  then  it  would  be  odd  to  suggest 
that  Confucius'  sage-king  is  a  superhuman.  For  Mencius  in  the  Mencius  describes 
how  the  gentlemen  make  their  effort  to  achieve  and  maintain  the  highest  fulfillment. 
Mencius  says, 
When  Heaven  is  about  to  confer  a  great  responsibility  on  any  man,  it  will 
exercise  his  mind  with  suffering,  subject  his  sinews  and  bones  to  hard  work, 
expose  his  body  to  hunger,  put  him  to  poverty,  place  obstacles  in  the  paths  of 
his  deeds,  so  as  to  stimulate  his  mind,  harden  his  nature,  and  improve 
wherever  he  is  incompetent.  (6ß:  15)2H 
The  sage-king  is  as  normal  as  the  ordinary  people,  what  makes  him  different  is  his 
perseverance  in  acting  in  accordance  with  human-heartedness.  29  1-iuman-heartedness 
is  a  heavy  burden  for  one  to  take  on,  only  with  death  can  he  put  down  his  burden  (VIII, 
7). 
Finally,  Weber  says  that  "  charismatic  authority  repudiates  the  past.  "-'O  Whereas 
on  another  occasion  he  says  that  "  [t]he  whole  of  Confucianism  became  a  relentless 
canonization  of  tradition.  01  Weber  seems  to  contradict  his  own  words,  and  it  would 
be  difficult  to  see  which  view  he  is  going  to  adopt.  If  the  argument  of  authority-as- 
model  above  is  correct,  then  it  is  obvious  that  the  sage-kings  will  mirror  their 
forerunners  and  see  them  as  the  patterns  to  follow.  Confucius'  saying  that  "I  transmit 
but  do  not  create.  Being  fond  of  the  truth,  I  am  an  admirer  of  antiquity  "  (VI[,  1)  does 
illustrate  his  belief  that  the  well-being  of  the  present  and  the  future  will  he  based  upon 
the  splendid  achievement  in  the  past. 
It  is  clear  that  Confucian  sage-king  is  not  a  charismatic  leader,  who  establishes 
his  authority  by  possessing  some  supernatural  power.  For  Confucius,  the  sage-king 
27  Weber.  op.  cit.  P.  155. 
2*  Chan,  op.  cit.  p.  78. 
29  See  the  A»alects  IV,  5. 
30  Weber,  op.  cit.  p.  362. 
11  op.  cit.  p.  164. 
146 establishes  his  authority  by  having  great  reverence  for  tradition,  and  by  being  virtuous 
and  affectionate  to  the  people.  The  idea  of  traditional  authority  and  that  of  moral 
authority  do  not  require  the  leader  to  be  superhuman  or  have  supernatural  powers. 
Thus  unlike  the  notion  of  charismatic  authority,  which  is  incompatible  with  the  idea 
of  the  king  as  model,  the  sage-king  is  the  model  for  emulation.  For  in  Confucius' 
view  everyone  has  the  potentiality  to  be  virtuous.  However,  Plato's  philosopher-king 
is  different  from  Confucian  sage-king  in  the  way  in  which  the  philosopher-king  does 
not  canonize  tradition,  but  sees  it  as  an  obstacle  for  training  the  young  guardians.  The 
philosopher-king,  being  genuinely  just,  is  able  to  see  the  Form  of  the  Good.  Thus  the 
philosopher-kings  establish  their  authority  by  being  rational  and  virtuous.  It  is  this 
emphasis  on  the  knowledge  of  the  Forms  that  marks  the  difference  between 
Confucius  and  Plato.  In  short,  both  Plato's  philosopher-king  and  Confucian  sage-king 
are  not  charismatic  rulers.  Although  both  of  them  would  agree  that  the  ruler  should  be 
virtuous,  in  the  Republic  Plato's  being  in  defiance  of  tradition  and  emphasis  on 
rationality  differ  from  Confucius'  reverence  for  tradition..  32 
One  thing  is  worth  noting  that  Confucian  sage-king,  as  mentioned,  is  a  model  for 
emulation.  However  Platonic  philosopher-king,  it  seems  to  me,  is  not  a  model  for 
emulation.  For  Plato's  theory  of  human  nature  (415a-c)  does  prevent  the  lower  classes 
from  having  any  opportunity  of  being  just  by  emulating  the  philosopher-kings. 
Furthermore  Confucius'  notion  of  the  sage-king  as  model  seems  to  make  a  sharp 
contrast  with  modern  democratic  society.  In  modern  democratic  society  political 
leader  often  tries  to  model  himself  after  the  ordinary  people's  way  of  life  to  show  that 
he  knows  what  people  need.  And  the  leader's  personal  morality  seems  to  make  no 
impact  on  people's  behaviour,  for  they  often  do  not  see  their  leader  as  a  model  for 
emulation.  What  concerns  people  in  the  modern  democratic  society  is  whether  the 
leader  and  the  whole  body  of  officers  have  the  administrative  efficiency.  The 
American  president,  Bill  Clinton's  sex  scandal,  for  instance,  seems  to  be  a  good 
example.  I  am  sure  that  the  Americans  by  and  large  will  not  take  the  president  as  a 
moral  model  for  emulation.  Nevertheless  according  to  the  opinion  poll  president 
32  For  a  discussion  on  the  different  types  of  authority,  see  J.  Hampton,  !  'vlitici/  /'hilh)SO'!  'l'.  Y  (Colorado, 
1997),  ch.  1. 
147 Clinton  still  wins  73  percent  of  the  American  people's  support.  31  This  result  obviously 
runs  counter  to  Confucius'  assertion  that  only  by  being  virtuous  can  the  ruler  win  the 
support  of  people.  What  makes  the  difference  between  Confucius  and  modem 
democratic  society,  I  think,  is  that  for  Confucius  there  is  no  distinction  between 
private  and  public  morality.  A  morally  good  ruler  should  be  virtuous  publicly  and 
privately.  Whereas  in  modern  democratic  society  people  arc  inclined  to  think  that 
there  is  no  continuity  between  private  and  public  morality.  Thus  a  good  president 
being  competent  in  dealing  with  administrative  affairs  may  have  a  licentious  private 
Ii  fe.  " 
Finally,  what  is  the  inner  sage  and  outer  king?  Fung  Yu-Ian  says  precisely  that 
The  Inner  Sage  is  a  person  who  has  established  virtue  in  himself;  the  Outer 
King  is  one  who  has  accomplished  great  deeds  in  the  world.  The  highest 
ideal  for  a  man  is  at  once  to  possess  the  virtue  of  a  Sage  and  the 
accomplishment  of  a  ruler,  and  so  become  what  is  called  a  Sage-King,....  15 
To  put  this  chapter  in  a  nutshell.  Confucius'  ideal  of  inner  sage  and  outer  king 
might  be  a  moral  standard  beyond  our  reach  and  remote  from  the  modem  socio- 
political  thought.  While  what  can  be  appreciate  of  this  ideal  is  that  the  demand  of 
moral  standard,  may  be  not  as  high  as  that  Confucius  would  require,  may  be  the 
remedy  for  the  decline  of  morality  in  politics  in  the  modern  society.  Although  it  might 
he  argued  that  politics  and  morality  have  their  own  spheres  of  autonomy,  yet  the 
minimum  moral  standard  required  in  the  politics  would  be  necessary.  After  all,  no  one 
wants  to  live  in  a  society  full  of  hypocrites. 
33  1  am  indebted  to  Professor  A.  Broadie  for  this  idea. 
For  a  more  detailed  discussion  on'  private  and  public  morality'  see  1'arl  IV,  chapter  11.  Section  2. 
ýý  Fung,  op.  cit.  p.  2, 
148 Chaptcr  9 
Training  and  Education 
It  is  said  in  the  Republic  that  philosophers  who  arc  able  to  see  the  Forms  should  be 
rulers  (473d).  The  philosopher's  ability  to  mentally  see  the  Forms  is  the  result  of 
proper  education.  In  the  Republic  the  educational  system  is  designed  by  Plato  as  two 
stages  (376c-412b,  521  c-534e):  the  first  stage  serves  to  train  all  the  young  guardians, 
and  the  second  stage  serves  to  train  or  educate  the  philosophers.  Education,  for  Plato, 
has  the  power  to  transform  the  society.  As  R.  F.  Stalley  says  that  "  education,  in 
Plato's  eyes,  is  not  just  one  among  many  functions  of  the  state  but  in  some  sense 
embraces  all  the  other  functions.  "'  For  the  ideal  state  Plato  proposed  can  be  realized 
and  the  order  of  the  state  be  maintained  only  when  philosophers  become  kings,  or 
vice  versa.  It  is  through  proper  education  that  philosophers  can  be  produced.  Thus  it  is 
clear  that  without  education  there  would  be  no  philosophers,  and  without 
philosophers  the  social  order  would  be  at  stake.  The  emphasis  on  the  importance  of 
education  also  appears  in  Confucian  thought.  Confucius  thinks  that  the  orderly  society 
can  be  achieved  only  when  everyone  within  the  society  can  act  in  accordance  with 
human"heartedness  and  propriety  (li),  which  requires  each  individual  to  undergo  the 
process  of  self-cultivation.  Self-cultivation  is  primarily  based  on  education. 
In  this  chapter,  I  shall  leave  aside  the  discussion  of  the  differences  or  similarities 
between  Plato's  and  Confucius'  educational  system,  but  concentrate  on  three  topics 
which  will  lead  us  to  see  why  Plato  and  Confucius  have  different  attitudes  towards 
socio-political  problems,  in  spite  of  their  common  emphasis  on  the  order  of  society. 
Firstly,  when  Plato  says  that  the  philosophers  should  return  to  the  cave  after  they  have 
seen  the  Forms,  and  Confucius  says  that  " 
...;  and  if  one  has  more  than  enough  energy 
for  study,  then  one  holds  office  "  (XIX,  13),  both  of  them  seem  to  suggest  the  point 
that  education  can  be  regarded  as  a  means  to  an  end,  i.  e.  the  superior  men  and  the 
philosophers  are  educated  or  trained  to  be  the  rulers  or  ministers.  In  this  part  of  the 
chapter  I  would  like  to  discuss  whether  both  Plato  and  Confucius  are  aware  that  there 
1  R.  F.  Stallcy,  Ani  lniroduclion  to  Plato's  1,  aws  (Indianapolis,  1983).  p.  123. are  differences  between  education  and  training,  and  whether  the  aim  of  education  for 
Plato  and  Confucius  is  to  produce  the  rulers.  Secondly,  the  education  in  the  Republic, 
especially  the  second  stage,  seems  to  be  a  privilege  of  the  minority,  whereas  for 
Confucius  education  is  not  a  privilege  of  the  minority  but  accessible  to  everyone  (XV, 
39).  In  this  part  I  would  like  to  discuss  the  point  that  although  the  difference  between 
Plato  and  Confucius  is  apparent,  yet  the  principle  of  `  treating  unequals  unequally  ' 
seems  to  be  adopted  by  both  of  them  for  different  reasons.  Finally,  both  Plato  and 
Confucius  regard  the  philosophers  and  the  superior  men  as  wise  and  virtuous,  but  the 
fundamental  difference  between  the  two  lies  in  the  point  that  for  the  latter  the  society 
is  the  extension of  the  family,  thus  Confucius  puts  a  lots  of  emphasis  on  family 
education,  that  is,  filial  piety.  A  filial  son  will  be  a  virtuous  minister.  On  the  contrary, 
Plato  in  the  Republic  abolishes  the  family,  and  puts  the  responsibility  for  children's 
education  in  the  hand  of  the  state.  In  the  final  part  of  this  chapter,  I  will  argue  that 
although  in  the  Republic  the  abolition  of  the  family  is  proposed,  yet  in  the  F,  ulhtiphro 
and  the  Laivs,  similar  ideas  to  Confucian  thought  seem  to  be  expressed. 
1.  The  differences  between  training  anti  education 
The  terms  '  training  '  and  '  education  '  are  usually  used  interchangeably  in  our 
everyday  life.  For  instance,  we  might  say  that  a  lawyer  is  '  well  trained  '  or  `  properly 
educated  '.  The  meaning  of  these  terms  thus  is  understood  in  a  broader  view. 
However,  the  distinction  between  education  and  training  has  been  explicitly  drawn 
out  by  R.  S.  Peters  who  proposes  that  there  are  three  criteria  by  virtue  of  which  an 
activity  can  be  judged  whether  it  is  called  '  education  '  or  not.  2  The  three  criteria  are 
as  follows: 
1)  For  an  activity  to  be  called  education  there  must  be  something  worthwhile  for  its 
own  sake  transmitted  to  those  who  are  committed  to  it.  The  study  of  psychology,  let 
us  say,  might  enable  a  student  of  psychology  to  be  a  psychologist,  but  this  does  not 
2  R.  S.  Peters,  Ethics  and  Education  (London,  1979),  pp.  23-45. 
150 make  the  study  of  psychology  count  as  an  educational  activity.  Rather  the  intrinsic 
value  of  the  behavioural  sciences  which  arc  essential  to  the  study  of  psychology 
makes  it  an  educational  activity.  For  they  provide  ways  of  understanding  the 
complexities  of  human  behaviour  which  arc  valuable  in  themselves.  '  Therefore,  under 
this  criterion  the  purpöse  of  studying  psychology  is  to  be  a  psychologist,  but  the  aim 
of  it  is  to  understand  the  complexities  of  human  behaviour.  { 
2)  Education  must  involve  understanding  and  a  cognitive  perspective,  that  is,  an 
educated  man  is  the  one  who  is  not  only  able  to'  know  how',  but  to'  know  why  '.  In 
other  words,  an  educated  man  will  have  understanding  of  the  reason  why  '  of  things. 
Furthermore,  a  well-trained  psychologist  might  know  the  principles  of  psychology 
well  but  he  will  not  be  called  educated.  For  the  psychologist  might  only  exploit  his 
knowledge  of  psychology  to  make  money,  but  is  unable  to  appreciate  that  the  subject 
he  knows  can  be  related  to  other  sciences  which  together  can  form  a  better 
understanding  of  human  beings.  Education  cannot  be  regarded  as  the  acquisition  of  a 
specialized  competence,  it  is  concerned  with  the  whole  man  which  requires  a 
cognitive  perspective. 
3)  The  third  criterion  by  which  an  activity  is  called  education  is  that  those  who  take 
part  in  it  must  show  interest  in  the  activity.  For  it  would  be  possible  for  a  student  of 
psychology  to  complete  his  courses  without  showing  any  interest  in  those  courses. 
Thus  we  might  call  him  a  well-trained  psychologist  but  not  well-  educated. 
In  addition  to  these  three  criteria  we  might  add  the  following: 
4)  Education  is  concerned  with  the  development  of  intellect  and  character.  For  we 
would  not  call  a  man  educated,  if  he  is  ignorant  and  has  lots  of  deficiencies  of 
character.  While  training  is  more  concerned  with  skill  and  cilicicncy. 
5)  Education  should  be  two-way  process,  that  is,  it  should  be  "  creative  interaction  ".  s 
'  K.  C.  Calman,  and  R.  S  Downie,  "  Education  and  Training  in  Medicine  ",  Aledical  I  diwatioi:  22,1988. 
p.  488. 
For  the  difference  between  '  purpose  '  and  '  aim  '  sec  it.  S,  Peters,  Ibid.  p.  28 
s  E.  Dale,  "  Education  or  Training  ",  /'ru,  grurnmed  Learning  cruel  &J,  wcahi(,  na/  7rchnr  h)-  22,1985,  p. 
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what  he  has  received.  Whereas  training  is  rather  one-way  process  because  a  well- 
trained  typist,  for  instance,  just  acts  according  to  what  he  or  she  is  told  without 
reflection  necessarily  involved,  indoctrination. 
6)  The  results  of  education,  unlike  those  of  training  which  are  more  immediate,  may 
not  be  known  for  a  long  time.  6 
I  shall  not  be  concerned  here  with  the  issue  of  whether  the  distinction  between 
training  and  education  is  or  is  not  justifiable.  What  I  shall  proceed  to  do  is  to  see 
whether  these  criteria  mentioned  can  be  applied  to  both  Confucian  and  Platonic 
notion  of  education. 
For  Plato,  real  knowledge,  not  mere  belief,  comes  from  the  understanding  of  the 
unchanging  Forms  which  are  valuable  and  worthwhile  themselves.  They  are  the 
paradigms  of  the  mutable  world.  The  philosophers  who  are  in  contact  with  the  Forms 
are  able  to  '  know  why  ',  that  is  to  say,  they  are  able  to  give  an  account  of  what 
something  is.  Thus  the  philosopher's  understanding  of  the  Forms  will  enable  him  to 
make  proper  decisions  or  judgements.  Furthermore,  The  philosopher  is  the  lover  of 
truth  and  wisdom  (485c),  and  it  is  the  term  '  lover  '  which  clearly  indicates  the  point 
that  he  is  interested  in  and  enthusiastic  about  what  he  is  doing.  And  the  philosopher 
who  receives  proper  education  will  be  self-disciplined,  courageous,  and  just  (485e, 
486a-b),  because  he  possesses  a  balanced  soul,  that  is,  in  his  soul  reason  is  properly  in 
command.  The  process  of  the  philosopher's  education  lasts  a  lifetime,  the  results  of 
the  education  are  not  like  those  of  training  in  making  shoes  and  carpentry  which  can 
be  identified  by  their  skills  and  products.  For,  in  Plato's  view,  a  well-educated 
philosopher  is  a  just  man,  and  justice  cannot  be  properly  identified  merely  in  terms  of 
external  behaviour.  Thus  a  just  man  has  to  be  identified  by  virtue  of  his  "  inward 
self  ",  balanced  soul  (433d).  Justice,  for  Plato,  is  indirectly  concerned  with  the 
external  behaviour.  If  we  are  just,  having  a  balanced  soul,  we  will  tend  to  do  just  acts. 
Although  Plato  does  say  at  444c-d  that  healthy  activities  produce  health  and  so  just 
activities  produce  justice,  he  does  not  mean  that  a  just  man  can  be  identified  by  his 
6  Calman,  and  Downie,  op.  cit.  p.  489. 
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establishing  in  the  mind  a  similar  natural  relation  of  control  and  subordination  among 
its  constituents  "  (444d).  So  a  man  who  is  genuinely  just  has  a  balanced  and 
harmonious  soul.  This  seems  to  be  compatible  with  what  Donald  P.  Ely  says  that  the 
results  of  education  are  less  measurable.  7 
It  is  clear  that  the  criteria  listed  above  can  be  applied  to  the  second  stage  of 
education,  i.  e.  the  education  of  the  philosopher-king.  However,  there  is  still  a  question: 
Is  the  first  stage  of  education  training  or  education?  The  purpose  of  the  first  stage  of 
education  is  to  train  all  the  guardians  to  be  spirited  and  have  true  belief  as  to  what 
should  or  should  not  be  feared  by  undergoing  two  kinds  of  education:  literary  and 
physical  education.  It  is  worth  noting  that  although  the  first  stage  of  education  is  to 
train  the  soldiers,  the  young  guardians,  there  is  no  specific  programme  for  soldierly 
training,  i.  e.  military  technique.  Even  the  physical  education  does  not  merely  serve  to 
strengthen  the  soldiers'  bodies,  but  to  train  the  mind.  Plato  says  that  the  main  aim  of 
both  literary  and  physical  training  is  to  train  the  mind  (410c).  In  other  words,  the  aim 
of  the  first  stage  of  education  is  to  train  the  young  guardians  to  possess  the  balance 
and  harmony  between  spirit  and  reason  in  their  mind  (411e-412a).  However  it  does 
not  mean  that  rationality  is  necessarily  involved  at  this  stage.  For  the  young  guardians 
at  this  stage  are  not  required  to  have  theoretical  understanding  of  the  codes  of  conduct 
laid  down  by  the  educator,  but  required  to  habituate  themselves  to  act  in  according  to 
those  codes.  That  is,  the  young  guardians  can  at  best  have  belief  about  what  is  right 
and  wrong,  and  what  should  and  should  not  be  feared.  To  have  the  capacity  of 
retaining  knowledge  of  what  is  right  and  wrong,  for  Plato,  will  require  the  second 
stage  of  education.  Therefore,  the  first  stage  of  education  tallies  with  criteria  (1),  (3), 
and  (4).  The  first  stage  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  development  of  character  and  so 
is  valuable  in  itself.  The  guardians  also  show  interest  in  this  stage  of  education.  For 
the  first  stage  of  education  is  to  develop  the  young  guardians'  character  and  natural 
capacity,  and  in  the  tripartite  society  only  those  who  can  fully  develop  their  natural 
capacity  can  perform  their  social  functions  well.  To  perform  their  social  functions 
well  is  to  fulfill  their  nature.  If  receiving  proper  education  can  lead  the  young 
7  D.  P.  Ely,  `"  Education  and  Training:  Two  Paths  or  One?  ",  Programmed  Lecirld  19  anti  Kducalioizu! 
7'echirology  22,1985,  p.  76. 
153 guardians  to  fully  develop  their  natural  capacity  and  be  able  to  perform  their  social 
functions  properly.  They  will  surely  show  interest  in  taking  part  in  both  literary  and 
physical  education. 
However,  the  first  stage  of  education  cannot  be  regarded  as  `  education  '  in  the 
strict  sense.  For  it  does  not  accord  with  criteria  (2)  and  (5).  This  stage  does  not 
involve  understanding  and  a  cognitive  perspective,  for  as  mentioned  the  guardians  are 
not  required  to  '  know  why  ',  but  only  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  rules  of  proper 
conduct.  The  guardians  are  not  required  to  reflect  on  what  they  have  received  either. 
For  the  purpose  of  this  stage  of  education  is  to  implant  in  the  guardians'  mind  what  is 
right  and  what  is  wrong.  Therefore,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  first  stage  of  education 
seems  to  be  in  a  state  of  between  training  and  education. 
Although  there  is  no  systematic  discussion  of  education  in  the  Analects, 
Confucius'  emphasis  on  education  prevails  in  it.  For  Confucius,  the  superior  man's 
knowledge  or  wisdom  comes  from  the  study  of  antiquity  (VII,  1;  20).  It  is  said  in  the 
Analects  that  "[o]ne  is  roused  by  the  Songs,  established  by  ritual,  and  perfected  by 
music  "  (VIII,  8).  Antiquity,  like  the  Platonic  Forms,  is  regarded  by  Confucius  as  the 
ideal  pattern  for  the  disorderly  society  of  his  time.  However,  Confucius  does  not 
encourage  people  to  study  without  reflection  on  what  they  study,  in  that  "  [i]f  one 
studies  but  does  not  think,  one  is  caught  in  a  trap.  If  one  thinks  but  does  not  study,  one 
is  in  peril  "  (II,  15).  The  equal  importance  of  learning  and  reflecting  on  what  one  has 
learned  is  overt  in  Confucius'  thought.  Thus  it  would  be  natural  to  hear  Master  Lent; 
say  that  "  [e]very  day  I  examine  my  character  in  three  respects:  am  I  disloyal  in  my 
designs  for  others,  am  I  untrustworthy  in  my  dealings  with  friends,  have  I  failed  to 
practise  what  has  been  passed  on  to  me?  "  (1,4).  Moreover,  an  educated  man  is  the 
one  who  loves  studying  and  never  feels  bored  (VII,  2),  and  it  would  be  a  pleasure  for 
the  well-educated  man  to  learn  something  and  at  times  to  practice  it  (1,1).  It  is  this 
enthusiasm  about  study  which  can  lead  people  to  re-discover  their  human-heartedness, 
Confucius  says, 
If  one  loves  humaneness  but  does  not  love  learning,  the  consequence  of  this 
is  folly;  if  one  loves  understanding  but  does  not  love  learning,  the 
consequence  of  this  is  unorthodoxy;  if  one  loves  good  faith  but  does  not  love 
154 learning,  the  consequence  of  this  is  damaging  behaviour;  if  one  loves 
straightforwardness  but  does  not  love  learning,  the  consequence  of  this  is 
rudeness;  if  one  loves  courage  but  does  not  love  learning,  the  consequence  of 
this  is  rebelliousness;  if  one  loves  strength  but  does  not  love  learning,  the 
consequence  of  this  is  violence.  (XVII,  7) 
An  educated  man  should  be  human-hearted,  wise,  trustworthy,  righteous,  courageous, 
and  firm.  Similarly,  education,  for  Confucius,  is  a  life-long  task,  for  human- 
heartedness  is  heavy  burden  for  one  to  take  on,  only  with  death  can  he  put  down  his 
burden  (VIII,  7). 
It  might  be  argued  that  both  Plato  and  Confucius  propose  that  the  philosopher 
and  the  sage  should  be  rulers.  It  follows  that  education,  like  training,  has  the  short 
term  effect  that  the  efficient  rulers  are  produced  through  proper  education.  It  seems  to 
me,  however,  that  this  problem  can  be  met  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  both  Plato  and 
Confucius  are  well  aware  of  the  differences,  though  under  different  considerations, 
between  training  and  education,  in  that  Plato's  theory  of  knowledge  leads  him  to 
regard  the  knowledge  of  the  skillful  practitioner  as  subordinate  to  the  philosopher's 
knowledge.  In  Plato's  view,  the  knowledge  of  the  skillful  practitioner  is  restricted  in 
one  area,  to  heal  the  sick,  and  the  immoral  practitioner  might  misuse  his  expertise.  s 
Whereas  the  philosopher's  knowledge,  knowledge  of  the  Good,  is  not  restricted  in 
one  area,  which  enables  the  philosopher  to  consider  matters  concerning  the  society  as 
a  whole,  and  it  will  never  be  misused.  Thus  we  see  that  Socratic  '  knowledge  is 
virtue  '  is  endorsed  by  Plato.  Likewise,  in  Confucius'  view,  the  superior  man's 
education  is  not  instrumental  which  will  make  them  competent  in  doing  things  (1I,  12). 
Education,  for  Confucius,  is  to  re-discover  the  human-heartedness  in  man's  nature, 
that  is,  a  humane  man  is  not  only  wise  but  a  virtuous  person  who  whenever  he  acts 
will  act  in  accordance  with  human-heartedness  and  propriety.  And  the  humane  man 
will  be  an  exemplar  for  the  emulation  of  the  masses. 
Secondly,  education,  for  both  Plato  and  Confucius,  is  of  the  whole  man,  since 
both  the  philosopher-king  and  the  sage-king  are  wise  and  virtuous.  But  to  be  rulers 
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155 might  just  be  an  inevitable  result  of  receiving  proper  education  and  not  what 
education  directly  aims  for.  For  in  the  Republic  it  is  said  that  the  philosophers  will  be 
better-off  if  they  do  not  rule  and  concentrate  on  philosophical  contemplation.  While 
they  are  compelled  to  rule  because,  firstly,  if  they  did  not  rule  then  they  would  be 
ruled  by  a  worse  man  (347b-c);  secondly,  since  the  philosophers'  everyday  needs  and 
commodities  are  supplied  by  the  masses,  thus  fairness  requires  them  to  rule  in  return. 
It  can  be  seen  from  both  cases  that  the  philosopher's  ruling  is  not  a  direct  result  of 
their  education.  For  they  take  on  the  task  of  ruling  because  they  do  not  want  to  or  are 
fearful  of  being  ruled  by  the  worse  man,  and  because  they  have  to  pay  the  debt. 
Ruling  can  only  be  seen  as  an  inevitable  result  of  the  education,  that  is,  the 
philosophers'  knowledge  of  the  Forms  will  lead  them  to  see  that  their  ruling  will  do 
good  to  the  society  as  a  whole  and  to  themselves  so  the  philosophers  rule.  The  aim  of 
education  is  to  produce  harmony  in  one's  soul,  that  is,  reason  with  the  help  of  spirit 
rules  over  appetite.  It  is  not  the  aim  of  education  to  produce  rulers  and  one  does  not 
have  to  be  a  ruler  to  complete  one's  education.  9 
Similarly,  Confucius,  I  think,  would  not  think  that  ruling  is  the  direct  result  of 
education.  For  Confucius  says, 
Only  be  dutiful  towards  your  parents  and  friendly  towards  your  brothers,  and 
you  will  be  contributing  to  the  existence  of  government.  These  virtues  surely 
constitute  taking  part  in  government,  so  why  should  only  that  particular 
activity  be  regarded  as  taking  part  in  government.  (II,  21) 
A  humane  man  does  not  necessarily  participate  in  politics,  since,  for  Confucius, 
society  is  the  family  writ  large.  Therefore  what  one  does  in  the  family  will  be  the 
same  as  what  one  does  in  the  society.  Although  it  would  be  argued  that  Confucius' 
appeal  to  the  superior  men  is  to  restore  the  order  of  the  society  thus  it  would  be 
natural  for  them  to  be  in  office,  yet  if  people  can  be  "  filial  when  at  home  and 
respectful  to  elders  when  away  from  home.  They  should  be  earnest  and  trustworthy. 
Although  they  should  love  the  multitude  far  and  away,  they  should  be  intimate  only 
9  For  further  discussion  on  the  issue  whether  the  philosophers  should  rule,  see  Part  IV,  Chapter  11, 
Section  I. 
156 with  the  humane  "  (I,  6),  then  without  the  superior  men  being  in  the  office  the  order 
will  prevail  in  the  society.  For  "  [w]hen  you  come  across  a  superior  person,  think  of 
being  equal  to  him  "  (IV,  17;  VII,  22),  the  superior  man  is  not  necessary  to  be  the  one 
who  holds  the  office.  Equally,  a  sage  is  not  necessary  to  be  a  king,  but  the 
combination  of  these  two  would  be  an  ideal  for  the  government. 
If  my  argument  is  right  then  it  is  clear  that  education,  for  both  Plato  and 
Confucius,  is  not  merely  a  kind  of  preparation  for  the  future  rulers,  but  a  matter  of 
shaping  the  individual's  character.  Therefore,  the  distinction  between  education  and 
training  seems  to  be  recognized  by  both  Plato  and  Confucius.  An  issue  raised  here 
through  my  discussion  is  that  Confucius'  emphasis  on  the  close  connection  between 
the  family  and  society  seems  to  be  absent  in  Plato's  mind.  For  Plato  thinks  that  the 
society  is  the  individual  writ  large.  However  this  issue  I  will  leave  aside  for  a  moment, 
and  I  will  return  to  it  in  the  third  part  of  this  chapter.  Now  I  would  like  to  proceed  to 
discuss  the  notion  of  `  treating  unequals  unequally  '  both  in  Plato's  and  Confucius' 
education. 
2.  The  principle  of  `  treating  unequals  unequally' 
Readers  of  the  Republic  xvill  find  that  throughout  the  book  there  seems  to  be  no 
mention  of  education  for  the  masses  but  only  of  that  for  the  young  guardians  and  the 
philosophers.  However,  it  has  been  suggested  by  scholars1°  that  the  masses  might  be 
able  to  participate  in  the  first  stage  of  the  education  in  that 
It  is  an  obvious  inference  that  some  aspects  of  the  primary  stage  of  education 
outlined  for  the  Guardians  must  apply  to  the  majority  too.  For  if  the  city  is  to 
exhibit  the  virtues  of  moderation,  and  if  the  governed  must  therefore  consent 
to  the  rule  of  the  philosopher-kings,  the  majority  must  share  at  least  the 
moral  upbringing  of  the  Guardians.  It  is  therefore  a  reasonable  surmise  that 
10  R.  Barrow,  Plato  and  Edncalioir,  ch.  IV  (London,  1976),  p.  28;  and  Plato.  Ulililariaaism  and 
Education,  ch.  VII!  (London,  1975),  p.  180. 
157 the  education  in  `  mousikc  '  and  gymnastics  is  common  to  all. 
This  might  be  a  reasonable  inference  but  the  passages  Barrow  refers  to  might  be 
somewhat  ambiguous.  For  what  is  said  at  420d  is  that  the  ideal  state  will  promote  not 
only  the  happiness  of  the  Guardians  but  also  that  of  the  rest  of  classes.  It  would  follow 
that  in  the  ideal  state  education  is  not  only  available  for  the  minority  but  for  the 
majority.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  this  inference  is  legitimate.  At  414d  Socrates 
seems  to  imply  that  all  classes  have  received  an  education.  But  unfortunately  if  we 
take  the  myth  at  415a-d  seriously  then  people  who  are  born  with  bronze  or  iron  in 
their  nature  will  be  placed  in  the  class  of  artisans  and  farmers  whereas  the  educational 
proposals  are  explicitly  aimed  at  the  soldiers  and  rulers,  and  so  their  chance  of 
receiving  the  first  stage  of  education  seems  to  be  denied.  However,  Plato  does 
mention  at  456d  that  the  third  class,  by  implication,  will  receive  professional  or 
technical  training.  Shoemakers  have  to  be  trained  to  make  shoes.  Therefore  Barrow's 
assertion  that  the  third  class  will  participate  in  the  first  stage  of  education  seems  to  be 
wrong.  It  can  be  seen  that  in  the  tripartite  society  people  of  each  class  receive 
education  which  is  suitable  for  them,  my  aim  here  is  to  see  why  the  notion  of 
`  treating  unequals  unequally  '  is  closely  related  to  Plato's  idea  of  education. 
Plato  says  in  the  Republic  IV  that  justice  is  doing  one's  own  job  (433e-434a), 
which  means  that  people  of  each  class  have  to  do  their  own  jobs  for  which  they  are 
naturally  suited,  and  do  not  trespass  on  the  jobs  of  other  classes.  Plato's  treatment  of 
education,  it  seems  to  me,  is  on  a  par  with  the  notion  of  justice  in  that  it  would  be 
unjust  for  the  farmers,  let  us  say,  to  do  the  job  of  the  Guardians,  so  equally  it  would 
be  unjust  to  treat  the  distribution  of  education  without  considering  the  differences 
between  people.  Thus  when  Plato  says  with  irony  that  "  [i]t's  an  agreeable  anarchic 
form  of  society  (democratic  society),  with  plenty  of  variety,  which  treats  all  men  as 
equal,  whether  they  are  equal  or  not  "  (558c),  he  implies  that  it  would  be  unjust  to 
treat  unequals  equally,  so  treating  unequals  unequally  would  be  just  in  that  the 
differences  between  people  should  be  taken  into  account  when  these  differences  are 
relevant  to  the  distribution  of  something,  i.  e.  education,  thus  people  should  be  treated 
11  op.  cir. 
158 differently.  12  The  myth  at  415a-d  does  indicate  the  point  that  for  Plato  the  differences 
between  people  are  dependent  upon  their  different  natures,  it  is  the  natural  differences 
which  lead  Plato  to  concentrate  on  the  design  of  the  higher  education  of  the 
philosophers.  As  mentioned,  without  the  philosophers,  the  social  order  will  not  be 
maintained,  and  only  those  who  are  born  with  gold  in  their  nature  can  be  philosophers. 
Therefore  Plato's  concentration  on  the  philosopher's  education  can  be  appreciated 
since  these  well-educated  philosophers  are  the  cornerstone  of  maintaining  the  social 
order. 
Furthermore,  the  claim  that  the  philosopher  is  the  lover  of  truth  and  wisdom 
seems  to  imply  the  point  that  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  is  a  privilege  of  the 
philosopher,  and  thus  not  desirable  for  all  men.  For,  in  Plato's  view,  to  possess 
knowledge  is  to  see  the  immutable  Forms,  and  it  is  the  philosopher  alone  who  has  a 
balanced  soul  and  thus  can  see  the  Forms.  As  Barrow  points  out, 
[D]espite  the  hints  in  the  writing  that  the  reasoning  faculty  is  the  divine 
element  in  man,  it  is  absolutely  clear  that  he  (Plato)  does  not  see  the  activity 
of  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  as  necessarily  desirable  for  man.  He  does  not 
advocate  it  for  all  men.  He  is  anxious  only  the  some  shall  engage  in  the 
activity  in  order  to  find  the  truth.  " 
lt  is  only  the  minority  group,  the  philosophers,  who  are  able  to  see  the  Forms  and  find 
the  truth. 
Confucius  who  stands  on  the  opposite  side  from  Plato  claims  that  "  [i]n  teaching 
there  should  be  no  distinction  of  classes  "  (XV,  38).  14  Confucius,  unlike  Plato,  thinks 
that  education  should  be  accessible  to  each  individual.  For  if  "  [b]y  nature,  men  are 
nearly  alike  "  (XVII,  2),  15  then  it  would  be  possible  through  proper  education  for 
everyone  in  society  to  be  the  superior  man.  It  can  be  seen  that  the  different  claims  on 
12  Barrow,  op.  cit.  p.  29. 
13  Barrow,  op.  cii.  p.  191. 
14  J.  Legge,  Confucius:  Coº  f  ºcian  Aºra/ects,  The  Great  Learning  and  The  L)o  clri  le  of  the  Mean  (New 
York,  1971),  p.  305. 
15  Legge,  Ibid.  p.  318. 
159 human  nature  --  For  Plato,  people's  social  classes  are  determined  by  their  different 
natures,  while  for  Confucius,  human  nature  is  the  same  --  lead  to  different  views  on 
the  distribution  of  education.  However  in  spite  of  the  difference,  the  notion  of 
`  treating  unequals  unequally  '  can  also  be  applied  to  Confucian  teaching  method.  It  is 
obvious  that  in  the  Anulecis  Confucius  teaches  students  in  accordance  with  their 
habitual  way  of  life.  For  instance, 
Zilu  asked  whether,  if  one  hears  something,  one  practises  it.  The  Master  said: 
Since  your  father  and  elder  brothers  are  still  alive,  how  would  you,  if  you 
heard  something,  put  it  into  practice?  ' 
Ran  You  asked  the  same  question  and  the  Master  said  that  when  one  hears 
something  one  practises  it. 
Gongxi  Hua  said:  '  Zilu  asked  whether,  if  one  hears  something,  one  practises 
it;  and  you,  Master,  said  that  his  father  and  elder  brothers  were  still  alive;  but 
when  Ran  You  asked  the  same  question,  you,  the  Master,  said  that  when  one 
hears  something  one  should  practise  it.  I  am  perplexed  and  venture  to 
question  this.  ' 
The  Master  said:  '  Qui  is  back-ward  and  so  I  urged  him  on,  but  You  is  an 
over-enthusiastic  person  and  so  I  held  him  back.  '  (XI,  20)k) 
Confucius'  answers  to  the  same  question  might  seem  inconsistent  but  what  is  more 
important  is  that  Confucius  as  a  teacher  can  notice  the  different  habitual  ways  of  life 
of  his  students  and  give  them  different  instructions  accordingly.  it  is  in  this  sense,  I 
think,  the  notion  of  '  treating  unequals  unequally  '  can  be  applied  to  Confucian 
education.  In  the  Republic,  the  class  of  the  Guardians  have  the  same  nature  and 
aptitude,  thus  a  fixed  curriculum  might  be  suitable  for  the  aim  of  the  education,  that  is, 
the  fixed  curriculum  could  help  the  philosophers  to  see  the  Forms.  Unlike  Plato, 
Confucius'  students  come  from  different  classes  they  have  different  habitual  ways  of 
life,  in  spite  of  this  they  all  naturally  possess  human-heartedness.  Thus  Confucius  has 
to  treat  his  students  differently  in  accordance  with  their  habitual  way  of  life.  For  to 
16  Qui  is  Ran  You's  another  name,  and  You  is  Zilu's  another  name. 
160 force  people  with  different  habitual  way  of  life  to  accept  the  same  idea  will  be  like 
indoctrination  which  runs  counter  to  Confucian  education  by  enlightenment. 
Confucius  says, 
To  those  who  are  not  eager  to  learn  I  do  not  explain  anything,  and  to  those 
who  are  not  bursting  to  speak  I  do  not  reveal  anything.  If  I  raise  one  angle 
and  they  do  not  come  back  with  the  other  three  angles,  I  will  not  repeat 
myself.  (VII,  8) 
Confucius  requires  his  students  to  reflect  on  what  they  have  been  taught,  and  his 
teaching  method  is  not  to  give  the  students  the  correct  answers  but  to  encourage  them 
to  find  the  answers  themselves. 
Both  Plato  and  Confucius  agree  that  we  should  not  treat  everyone  alike.  But 
Plato  believes  that  there  are  fundamental  differences  between  people  while  Confucius 
sees  differences  as  relatively  superficial  and  capable  of  being  overcome.  So  class 
distinctions  are  essential  for  Plato  but  not  for  Confucius.  The  different  attitudes 
between  Plato  and  Confucius  towards  education  lead  them  to  quite  a  different 
solutions  for  the  disorderly  society.  In  the  Republic  due  to  the  fact  that  the  education 
is  only  accessible  to  the  minority  the  task  of  ruling  and  maintaining  social  order  will 
be  passed  on  to  them.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  A,  ualect.  s  the  education  is  accessible  to 
everyone  thus  as  long  as  one  engages  in  self-cultivation  and  studies  diligently  it  would 
not  be  impossible  for  one  to  be  a  superior  man.  For  ideally  everyone  can  be  the  sage- 
king  (  the  Mencius  IV,  ii,  32;  VI,  ii,  2).  17  Thus  social  order  can  be  achieved. 
3.  Family  education:  filial  piety 
Now  I  would  like  to  turn  my  attention  to  the  issue  left  untouched  at  the  end  of  the  first 
part.  Confucius'  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  the  family  can  be  seen  by  his 
constantly  appeal  to  filial  piety  in  the  Analects.  For  instance,  filial  piety  and  fraternal 
17  J.  Legge,  The  Works  ofAlenci,  is  (New  York,  1970). 
161 duty  are  regarded  as  the  roots  of  human-heartedness  (I,  2),  filial  piety  is  avoiding 
breaking  the  rules  (11,5),  and  filial  piety  and  fraternal  duty  can  be  applied  to  the 
government  (11,21).  Confucius'  view  of  politics  as  the  extension  of  morality  is  clearly 
expressed  in  these  passages.  Thus  one's  family  education  would  be  important  because 
the  harmony  of  the  society  will  depend  upon  that  of  the  family,  and  the  harmony  of 
the  family  will  depend  upon  the  individual's  self-cultivation.  Family  is  valued  as  a 
means  of  maintaining  harmony  of  the  society  as  a  whole.  It  is  said  in  the  Great 
Learning  that  "when  the  personal  life  is  cultivated,  the  family  will  be  regulated;  when 
the  family  is  regulated,  the  state  will  be  in  order.  "18  However,  for  Plato,  the  family 
seems  to  be  an  obstacle  which  will  distract  the  philosophers  from  concentrating  on 
ruling  (416d-417b,  464c-e).  Unlike  Confucius,  in  the  Republic  Plato  does  not  see  any 
intrinsic  value  of  the  family,  so  there  is  no  word  for  filial  piety  and  family  education. 
Despite  Plato's  silence  on  filial  piety  in  the  Republic,  however,  we  can  see  that  in  the 
Laws  Plato  does  mention  that  children  should  respect  their  parents,  if  they  do  not 
respect  their  parents  they  will  be  chastised  with  whipping  and  imprisonment  (932c). 
In  the  Crito  Plato  mentions  that  children  have  to  be  obedient  to  their  fathers  (50c-d), 
but  at  51c  he  regards  being  loyal  to  the  state  as  more  important  than  being  loyal  to  the 
family.  Both  dialogues  seem  to  emphasize  the  point  that  law  and  order  in  the  society 
are  more  important  than  the  harmony  in  the  family,  i.  e.  the  obligations  to  the  state 
come  first;  on  the  contrary,  Confucius,  on  the  other  hand,  thinks  that  the  harmony  of 
the  family  will  affect  the  society  and  makes  it  harmonious. 
However,  one  passage  in  the  Euthyphro  seems  parallel  to  Confucius'  emphasis 
on  the  family  tie.  When  Socrates  heard  that  Euthyphro  was  going  to  prosecute  his 
father  for  manslaughter,  he  said  that 
Then  is  the  man  who  died  at  the  hands  of  your  father  one  of  your  household? 
I  suppose  it's  obvious;  you  wouldn't  have  prosecuted  him  merely  for  the 
sake  of  an  outsider-  not  for  murder.  (4b)19 
In  the  Analects  the  similar  idea  is  expressed: 
18  Wing-tsit  Chan,  A  Source  hook  in  Chinese  Philosophy  (Princeton,  1963),  p.  86-7. 
1911.  Tredennick  and  II.  Tarrant,  "  Euthyphro  ",  Plato:  The  Last  Days  rf  Socrates  (London,  1993),  p.  9. 
162 The  Duke  of  She  told  Master  Kong:  '  In  my  locality  there  is  a  certain 
paragon,  for  when  his  father  stole  a  sheep,  he,  the  son,  bore  witness  against 
him.  '  Master  Kong  said:  `  In  my  locality  those  who  arc  upright  are  different 
from  this.  Fathers  cover  up  for  their  sons  and  sons  cover  up  for  their  fathers. 
Uprightness  is  to  be  found  in  this.  '  (XIII,  18) 
Both  passages  place  the  importance  of  the  family  over  the  state.  Socrates,  like 
Confucius,  is  skeptical  about  whether  one  should  prosecute  one's  father  for 
wrongdoing.  For  Socrates  may  believe  that  non-family  member  is  less  important  than 
family  members,  and  the  life  of  a  slave  is  not  equal  to  that  of  a  free  man.  So  Socrates, 
at  4e,  says  to  Euthyphro  that  "  [a]ren't  you  afraid  in  taking  your  father  to  court  that 
you  too  might  turn  out  to  be  doing  an  unholy  deed?  "20  Socrates  therefore  recognizes 
the  conflict  between  public  justice  and  filial  piety.  However  Socrates  as  usual 
proceeds  to  find  out  the  definition  of  piety  and  leaves  the  issue  of  the  conflict 
between  public  morality  and  private  morality  unsolved.  It  may  he  because  of  such 
conflicts  that  Plato  abolishes  the  family  in  the  Republic.  For  the  philosopher-kings, 
without  family,  will  not  have  to  face  the  same  dilemma  which  troubles  many  people. 
In  a  nutshell,  the  difference  between  Plato  and  Confucius  is  fairly  pointed  out  by 
Greg  Whitlock, 
A  striking  difference  in  the  philosophical  personalities  of  the  two  figures  is 
that  Confucius  spends  a  tremendous  amount  of  effort  thinking  about  the 
family  in  realistic,  concrete  situations.  Plato,  in  contrast,  spends  little  time  on 
the  family,  but  when  he  refers  to  it,  does  so  with  occasionally  draconian 
strokes.  This  shows  itself  in  the  Euthjphro  as  Socrates  ignores  the  two 
important  principles  of  the  dilemma  while  chasing  Euthyphro  around  a  circle 
of  definitions.  21 
20  Ibid.  p.  10. 
21  G.  Whitlock,  "  Concealing  the  Misconduct  of  One's  Own  Father:  Confucius  and  Plato  on  a  Question 
of  Filial  Piety  ", 
. 
hmrnal  of  Chinese  Philosophy  21,1994,  p.  135. 
163 Socrates,  as  mentioned  above,  is  not  unaware  of  the  conflict  between  public  and 
private  morality,  and  seems  to  think,  together  with  Confucius,  that  it  would  be  wrong 
for  one  person  to  prosecute  his  own  father  for  wrongdoing.  Nevertheless,  the 
difference,  mentioned  by  Whitelock,  causes  them  to  have  the  different  views  on  how 
the  rulers  gain  their  authority.  For  Plato  the  philosophers'  knowledge  of  the  Forms  is 
the  source  of  their  authority.  Man,  in  Plato's  view,  is  not  just  mortal  creature,  but 
possesses  an  immortal  element  in  his  soul.  It  is  this  immortal  element  which  is  able  to 
see  the  Forms.  Thus  Plato's  being  in  favour  of  the  philosopher-kings  has  a 
metaphysical  and  epistemological  basis.  Confucius,  on  the  other  hand,  who  never 
talks  of  the  problem  of  human  soul,  adopts  a  this-worldly  doctrine,  since  for 
Confucius  the  sage-king  loves  the  people  just  as  the  father  loves  his  children,  so  the 
authority  of  the  sage-king  will  be  based  on  his  loving  and  caring  for  the  people,  and 
especially  on  his  virtue. 
Both  Plato  and  Confucius  would  agree  on  the  point  that  there  is  a  distinction 
between  training  and  education.  However,  their  different  views  on  human  nature  lead 
them  to  the  different  attitudes  towards  the  distribution  of  education,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  both  of  them  would  prefer  a  hierarchical  society.  As  regards  the  family,  most 
of  the  time  Plato  is  silent  on  the  problem,  especially  in  the  Republic  he  proposes  to 
abolish  the  family.  Although  in  the  Laws,  and  the  Crib  the  family  is  mentioned,  Plato 
is  more  interested  in  maintaining  the  order  of  the  state  by  laws  than  in  the  value  of  the 
family,  and  in  the  I.:  uthyphro  Plato  turns  his  attention  on  the  definition  and  drops  the 
family  and  filial  piety  all  together.  On  the  contrary,  Confucius  equates  the  activities  in 
the  family  with  those  in  the  society,  which  leads  hing  to  pursuit  the  family  value  with 
all  his  effort.  Plato,  unlike  Confucius,  tries  to  build  an  ideal  state  from  without  the 
ideal  state  is  conceptual  rather  than  being  realistic.  Thus  the  analysis  of  the  concept 
leads  him  to  look  for  definitions.  Confucius  is  trying  to  reform  a  disorderly  society 
according  to  the  pattern  of  the  old  time,  thus  restoring  the  social  order  in  accordance 
with  the  ancient  rules  of  propriety  leads  him  to  constantly  look  back  in  the  history. 
164 Part  IV 
Role  Morality Chaptcr  10 
Role  and  Morality 
Plato  says  in  the  Republic  IV  that  in  a  just  state  each  citizen  does  his  or  her  own  job 
(433e-  434a).  To  understand  what  justice  means,  we  need,  in  Plato's  view,  first  to 
know  how  a  state  or  society  comes  into  being.  Society,  says  Socrates,  comes  into 
being  because  people  are  not  self-sufficient,  and  have  varied  needs  which  they  cannot 
supply  themselves.  We  have  a  society  when  we  have  got  enough  people  to  meet  our 
needs  (369b-c).  Socrates  goes  on  to  describe  how  in  this  society  the  economy  consists 
of  mutual  exchanges  among  different  professions.  A  minimum  state  will  consist  of 
four  men,  namely,  a  farmer,  a  builder,  a  weaver,  and  a  shoemaker.  They  are 
competent  and  specialize  in  their  own  work.  Thus  the  farmer  devotes  most  of  his  time 
and  labour  to  food  production  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  all  four,  and  does  not  interfere 
with  the  business  of  others.  This  is  what  Annas  calls  "  the  Principle  of 
Specialization  ".  '  It  means  that  one  man  should  do  one  job,  since  people  have 
different  natural  aptitudes,  which  fit  them  for  different  jobs  (370b).  it  is  this  Principle 
which  is  the  basis  for  the  structure  of  Plato's  just  state.  In  this  chapter  I  propose  to 
discuss  two  issues:  firstly,  I  would  like  to  explore  the  relation  between  Plato's  notion 
of  '  doing  one's  own  job  '  and  the  notion  of  social  role.  And  a  similar  idea  in 
Confucian  ethics  will  be  considered.  Secondly,  I  shall  discuss  the  problem  whether, 
for  Plato  and  Confucius,  morality  is  only  a  matter  of  performing  one's  social  roles  by 
acting  in  accordance  with  laws  or  custom. 
1.  Doing  one's  own  job:  social  roles 
In  describing  the  just  state,  Plato  ollen  says  that  everybody  should  do  their  own  job. 
The  phrase  `  doing  one's  own  job  ',  at  first  sight,  seems  to  suggest  that  in  a  society  the 
individuals  should  lead  the  kind  of  life  or  do  the  kind  of  job  which'  they  have  freely 
1  J.  Annas,  An  lntrodüciion  to  Plato  :  ti  Republic  (Oxford,  1981),  p.  73. chosen.  They  are  not  living  or  doing  a  job  according  to  others'  expectations  and 
desires.  This  viewpoint  suggests  individuality,  since  everybody  has  their  own 
aptitudes,  they  are  different  from  one  another.  So  '  doing  one's  own  job  '  seems  to 
encourage  the  development  of  diversity.  However  this  is  absolutely  not  the  case  for 
Plato.  In  Plato's  view,  '  doing  one's  own  job  '  implies  a  kind  of  conformity  and 
identification  with  a  role  shared  by  others.  2  Differences  of  people's  aptitudes,  for 
Plato,  are  not  differences  that  can  be  used  to  tell  one  person  from  everyone  else. 
The  differences  of  people's  aptitudes  mean  that  there  are  different  types  of  people, 
and  different  types  of  people  are  suited  for  different  kind  of  life.  As  Laszlo  G. 
Versenyi  points  out, 
The  arche  or  genesis  of  the  polis,  the  reason  why  it  comes  into  being  at  all, 
lies  in  human  nature.  It  lies  in  the  facts  that  no  individual  is  self-sufficing 
(autarkes)  but  we  are  all  creatures  of  many  needs,  and  that  no  two 
individuals  are  alike  but  we  have  different  needs,  desires,  talents  and 
abilities.  3 
The  reason  for  the  rise  of  the  society  is,  for  Plato,  that  no  individual  is  self-sufficient. 
However  Versenyi's  claim  that  `  no  two  individuals  are  alike  ',  it  seems  to  me,  cannot 
be  accepted  by  Plato.  For,  as  mentioned,  Plato  in  the  Republic  is  concerned  with 
different  types  of  people,  not  with  the  differences  between  individuals.  People  in  the 
ideal  state  are  classed  by  their  different  natures,  so,  for  example,  a  person  who  was 
born  with  golden  nature  will  be  placed  in  the  class  of  the  Guardians.  Thus  people  in 
this  class  are  alike,  since  they  all  have  the  same  kind  of  nature  which  distinguishes 
them  from  the  other  classes. 
We  have  seen  that  for  Plato  people's  not  being  self-sufficient  is  the  cause  of  the 
society  coming  into  being,  so  each  individual  needs  to  find  a  place  or  role  in  the 
society  and  to  be  cooperative.  It  is  by  cooperation  that  he  or  she  can  fulfill  his  or  her 
needs.  In  the  first  city  the  reason  why  people  cooperate  with  one  another  is  that  it  is  in 
practice  difficult  to  survive  without  society.  Therefore,  people,  in  the  first  city,  have 
2  Annas,  op.  cit.  p.  74. 
L.  G.  Versenyi,  "  Plato  and  His  Liberal  Opponents  ",  Philosophy,  vol.  XLVI,  197  1,  p.  224. 
166 to  be  social  in  order  to  survive.  However,  when  Plato  moves  on  to  talk  of  the  ideal 
state,  he  seems  to  have  quite  a  different  view  on  why  men  have  to  be  social. 
In  the  ideal  state,  the  differences  in  people's  aptitudes  mean  that  each  individual 
understands  that  his  or  her  aptitude  is  different  from  others',  will  be  disposed  to  an 
appropriate  place  or  role  in  the  society,  and  devotes  his  or  her  time  to  perform  his  or 
her  role  well.  The  differences  in  people's  aptitudes  seem  to  be  used  by  Plato  as  a 
means  towards  the  good  of  a  state  as  a  whole.  That  is  to  say  that  a  just  society  can 
come  into  being  only  when  all  the  individuals  within  it  can  find  their  own  natural  or 
proper  roles,  and  finding  of  their  proper  roles  is  not  dependent  upon  their  personal 
inclination,  because  that  would  lead  people  to  care  only  for  their  own  interests  and 
become  selfish,  but  upon  the  inclinations  that  spring  from  the  social  role  for  which 
they  are  fitted  best.  4  Thus,  in  a  just  city  each  individual  should  perform  their  own 
parts  properly.  The  Guardians,  the  Auxiliaries,  and  farmers  and  artisans,  etc.,  all  know 
their  parts  well,  and  perform  them  well.  It  is  this  '  doing  one's  own  job  '  by  which  an 
ideal  state  can  be  achieved.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  doing  one's  own  job  for  which 
one  is  naturally  suited  enables  one  to  fulfill  one's  function  (ergon);  and  to  perform 
one's  function  well  is  to  fulfill  one's  own  nature.  Therefore  the  existence  of  society, 
in  this  sense,  is  not  merely  for  people's  survival,  but  for  their  well-being.  In  other 
words,  society,  as  Aristotle  thinks,  is  an  essential  condition  of  the  good  life.  Men  are 
social  because  without  society  men  cannot  perform  their  natural  functions  properly, 
and  performing  our  natural  functions  well,  for  Plato,  is  not  only  for  the  good  of  the 
society  as  a  whole  but  also  for  that  of  the  individual. 
We  can  find  a  parallel  to  this  in  Confucianism.  In  the  time  of  Confucius,  the 
authority  of  the  House  of  Zhou  dynasty  has  been  drastically  declining,  and  it  was 
superseded  by  nobles  and  ministers.  At  that  time  there  was  a  society  without  order. 
The  disorder  of  society  resulted  from  the  disorder  of  the  social  institutions.  Confucius 
says  in  the  Analc'cts, 
When  the  Way  prevails  in  all  under  Heaven,  the  rites,  music,  and  punitive 
expeditions  emanate  from  the  Son  of  Heaven.  5  When  the  Way  does  not 
4  Annas,  op.  cit.  p.  76. 
5  The  expression  '  the  Son  of  Heaven  '  is  a  respectful  form  of  addressing  the  emperor.  In  ancient  China 
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emanate  from  the  feudal  lords.  If  they  emanate  from  the  feudal  lords,  surely 
it  is  rare  for  them  not  to  be  lost  within  ten  generations;  and  if  they  emanate 
from  their  grandees,  it  is  rare  for  them  not  to  be  lost  within  five  generations. 
If  their  subordinate  officials  have  control  of  state  commands,  it  is  rare  for 
them  not  to  be  lost  within  three  generations.  When  the  Way  prevails  in  all 
under  Heaven,  government  is  not  in  the  hands  of  the  grandees.  When  the 
Way  prevails  in  all  under  Heaven,  ordinary  people  do  not  hold  discussions. 
(XVI,  2) 
Confucius  believes  that  the  degeneration  of  political  and  social  institutions  and  of 
states  starts  from  the  top.  He  thinks  that  the  only  way  to  restore  the  order  of  society  is 
to  arrange  affairs  so  that  the  Emperor  will  continue  to  be  Emperor,  the  nobles  to  be 
nobles,  the  ministers  to  be  ministers,  and  the  common  people  common  people.  6  This 
theory  is  called  '  the  Rectification  of  Names  '.  For  Confucius  the  names  have  to 
match  the  actuality  and  vice  versa.  The  name  is  the  essence  of  a  thing,  such  as,  an 
emperor,  to  which  the  name  is  applied.  Thus,  the  phrase  '  let  the  emperor  be 
emperor  ',  the  first  word  '  emperor  '  is  a  material  actuality,  and  the  second 
`  emperor  '  is  the  name  of  the  emperor,  which  not  only  depicts  the  concept  of  the 
emperor,  but  also  defines  the  duties  and  rights  of  the  emperor.?  Therefore  to  be  a  good 
emperor  is  to  perform  the  role  of  the  emperor  according  to  its  name,  and  to  fulfill  the 
duties  and  obligations  which  have  their  rise  from  the  role.  So  when  Confucius  was 
asked  by  Duke  Jing  of  Qi  of  government,  he  said, 
Let  a  ruler  be  a  ruler,  a  subject  be  a  subject,  a  father  be  a  father,  and  a  son 
be  a  son.  '  Excellence  ',  said  the  Duke.  '  Indeed,  if  a  ruler  be  not  a  ruler,  a 
subject  be  not  a  subject,  a  father  be  not  a  father,  and  a  son  be  not  a  son, 
even  if  there  is  grain,  shall  I  manage  to  eat  it?  '  (XII,  11)8 
people  believed  that  the  authority  of  the  emperor  is  from  the  Heaven. 
6  Yu-Ian  Fung,  A  Nistory  of  C/,  i,  rese  Philosophy,  vol.  1,  (trans.  )  Derk  Bodde  (Princeton,  1983),  p.  59. 
7  Fung,  op.  cit.  p.  60. 
8  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  on  `  the  Rectification  of  Names  '  see  Part  II,  Chapter  2,  Section  3. 
168 We  can  see  here  that  the  cause  of  the  disorder  of  the  society  is  that  the  material 
actuality  and  the  name  do  not  correspond  to  one  another.  Therefore  Confucius  thinks 
that  the  remedy  for  a  disorderly  society  is  to  rectify  the  names.  Through  the  process  of 
the  rectification  of  names  everyone  can  find  their  proper  stations  and  roles,  and 
everyone  performs  only  their  duties  and  obligations  according  to  the  institutions 
which  determine  their  roles.  Confucius  says  that  "  [i]f  one  is  not  in  a  certain  office, 
one  does  not  plan  the  government  involved  in  that  office  "  (XIV,  26),  and  his  disciple 
Master  Zeng  says  that  "a  gentleman  does  not  stray  from  his  station  "  (XIV,  26). 
Therefore,  fulfilling  the  duties  and  obligations  which  arise  from  the  roles  one 
occupies  is  essential  to  the  social  order. 
In  brief,  Confucius,  like  Plato,  believes  that  an  orderly  or  just  society  can  be 
achieved  only  when  people  are  able  to  perform  their  social  roles  properly.  Although 
they  have  different  approaches  -  one  puts  it  in  terms  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  ',  the 
other  in  terms  of  the  Rectification  of  Names  -  what  they  are  aiming  at  is  the  same,  a 
just  or  orderly  society. 
2.  Morality  and  social  roles 
However  can  we  confidently  say  that  a  man  is  morally  good  because  he  performs  his 
social  roles  properly  and  fulfills  his  duties  and  obligations?  This  is  the  issue  I  shall 
discuss  in  this  section.  Before  I  proceed  to  discuss  it,  I  would  like  to  say  something 
about  the  notion  of  society. 
People  often  say  that  human  beings  are  social  animals.  It  is  quite  impossible  for 
a  man  to  live  all  alone,  that  is,  to  isolate  himself  from  a  society  within  which  people 
live  together.  Society  is  an  obscure  term,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  give  a  precise  definition 
of  it.  But  if  we  refer  society  to  a  social  system  then  it  may  be  described  or  defined 
more  precisely.  According  to  the  viewpoint  of  a  social  system,  "  society  is  not  just  the 
aggregate  of  individuals  who  happen  to  occupy  a  geographical  area,  but  is  the 
complex  network  of  institutions  which  gives  structure  to  the  life  of  the  community.  "" 
9  R.  S.  Downie,  "  Social  Roles  and  Moral  Responsibility  ",  Philosophy,  vol.  XXXIX.  1964,  p"  29. 
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possible  for  a  group  of  people  to  live  together.  Thus,  in  a  social  system  we  can  find 
libraries,  universities,  commercial  activities,  trade  unions,  political  parties,  legal 
institutions  and  lots  of  organizations,  which  together  bring  a  society  form  and  order. 
However  a  social  system  will  not  operate  on  its  own,  it  is  each  individual  who  lives  in 
the  society  operating  the  system.  In  other  words,  a  social  system  is  like,  let  us  say,  a 
computer  consisting  of  hardware  and  software,  the  computer  like  the  social  system 
will  not  work  by  its  own  without  an  operator,  a  human  being.  The  difference  is  that 
the  operator  stands  outside  the  computer  whereas  the  social  system  is  operated  by 
those  within  it.  Due  to  the  fact  that  in  a  social  system  every  activity  has  to  be 
determined  by  certain  rules  to  which  the  activity  is  connected,  the  individuals'  actions 
are  to  some  extent  confined  by  those  rules.  They  have  to  act  in  accordance  with  the 
rules  which  determine  their  roles  in  a  social  system.  That  is,  in  order  to  act  in  social 
roles  properly  they  have  to  understand  the  duties  and  rights  defined  by  rules.  Thus 
when  a  man  is  playing  his  role,  say,  a  policeman,  in  the  social  system,  he  is  acting  as  a 
policeman.  His  duties  and  rights  are  closely  connected  with  the  role  of  police.  This,  at 
first  sight,  seems  to  echo  the  ideas  of  Plato  and  Confucius. 
For,  firstly,  both  of  them  regard  human  beings  as  social  animals.  Although  in  the 
Analects  Confucius  does  not  explicitly  mention  it,  we  still  can  find  plenty  of  evidence. 
The  most  obvious  evidence  is  the  word  `  jen  '  (human-heartedness).  The  basic  idea  of 
the  word  `fern  '  in  Chinese,  in  etymological  sense,  consists  of  `  two  '  and  `  man  '.  It 
indicates  one's  relation  with  others  in  society.  Secondly,  both  of  them,  Confucius  and 
Plato,  think  that  in  order  to  achieve  the  good  of  a  society  as  a  whole,  each  individual 
has  to  perform  their  social  roles  properly.  However  can  we  say  that  for  Confucius  and 
Plato,  a  man  is  morally  good  simply  because  he  performs  his  social  roles  well?  Can 
morality  be  explained  simply  in  terms  of  role  performance?  The  problem,  it  seems  to 
me,  can  be  put  in  this  way:  What  is  the  connection  between  being  a  moral  agent  in  a 
society  and  performing  a  role  in  accordance  with  the  rules  which  define  the  duties  and 
rights  of  the  role? 
In  R.  S.  Downie's  article  "  Roles  and  Moral  Agency  ",  10  he  gives  a  clear  account 
10  R.  S.  Downie,  "  Roles  and  Moral  Agency  ",  Analysis,  vol.  29,1969,  pp.  39-  42. 
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first  view,  Mayo  claims  that  the  connection  between  being  a  moral  agent  and 
performing  a  social  role  is  one  of  identity.  In  other  words,  to  be  a  moral  agent  is 
simply  to  fulfill  the  rights  and  duties  of  a  great  numbers  of  roles.  And  a  person's 
moral  responsibility  is  expressed  in  the  morality  of  the  role  itself.  Thus,  in  this 
account,  we  might  say  that  one  person  is  a  good  teacher,  it  does  not  matter  who  the 
teacher  is,  but  what  he  is.  That  is,  a  good  teacher  has  to  give  lessons  on  a  regular 
bases,  and  meet  the  expectations  of  his  students.  In  this  sense,  morality  is  nothing  to 
do  with  the  moral  agent  himself,  but  consists  in  fulfilling  duties  and  obligations,  and 
meeting  people's  expectation.  However,  says  Downie,  there  is  an  obvious  deficiency 
in  this  account.  For  it  cannot  explain  how  a  moral  agent  is  to  choose  which  role  he 
has  to  accept,  nor  can  it  account  for  situations  in  which  two  or  more  roles  may 
conflict.  As  Dorothy  Emmet  points  out,  within  a  society,  "  there  are  constellations  of 
roles,  e.  g.,  in  family  relations  and  in  professional  relations,  and  these  are  not 
necessarily  coherent;  in  fact  their  obligations  can  and  do  conflict.  ""  For  example,  a 
policeman's  duty  is  to  maintain  the  public  security,  but  suppose,  his  father  commits  a 
crime.  On  the  one  hand,  if  he  is  to  be  a  policeman,  it  is  his  duty  to  arrest  his  father 
and  deal  with  according  to  the  law;  on  the  other  hand,  to  be  a  son  he  has  to  be  filial. 
Thus  he  seems  to  be  in  an  awkward  situation.  The  first  assertion  does  not  tell  us  how 
to  make  a  rational  decision  when  one  encounters  superimposed  roles  which  conflict 
with  one  another. 
On  the  second  view,  Mayo  claims  that  moral  agency  is  itself  a  particular  role 
which  is  distinct  from  that  of  professor,  police,  etc..  Without  saying  one  is  for  or 
against  this  assertion,  several  deficiencies  should  be  pointed  out.  Firstly,  it  is  not 
compatible  with  the  first  assertion,  since  in  the  first  assertion  there  is  no  distinction 
between  a  moral  agency  and  particular  roles,  but  in  the  second  assertion  every  moral 
agent  always  has  two  roles,  the  role  of  police,  etc.,  and  that  of  moral  agent.  And  we 
have  mentioned  that  one  may  have  two  or  more  roles  which  conflict  with  each  other. 
So  the  question  arises,  when  the  demands  of  the  moral  roles  and  those  of  the 
particular  roles  conflict  with  each  other,  which  would  be  the  priority?  There  seems  to 
11  D.  Emmet,  Rules,  Roles  and  Relations  (London,  1966),  p.  146. 
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then  it  would  be  chosen  or  rejected.  In  the  sociological  view,  social  roles,  not 
biological  roles,  can  be  chosen  and  rejected.  Whereas  it  would  be  odd  to  say  that  one 
can  choose  to  reject  to  be  moral  agent,  since  no  man  can  choose  not  to  be  moral.  As 
long  as  he  is  living  in  a  society  and  remains  a  rational  member  of  the  society,  he  still 
has  duties  and  obligations  to  fulfill.  In  ordinary  morality,  the  act  of  fulfilling  one's 
duties  can  be  regarded  as  moral  agency.  So  Downie  claims  that  the  second  assertion 
seems  to  be  untenable,  and  that  "  [p]ersons  are  necessarily  moral  agents,  and  can 
accept  or  reject  roles.  "12 
If  we  turn  our  attention  back  to  both  Plato  and  Confucius,  it  seems  to  me  then 
that  both  Plato's  appeal  to  '  doing  one's  own  job  '  and  Confucius'  appeal  to  the 
Rectification  of  Names  cannot  be  fully  explained  by  Mayo's  first  view,  i.  e.  the  idea  of 
the  role  performance  as  that  has  been  understood  by  modern  writers,  such  as  Downie. 
Central  to  their  view  is  that  roles  are  a  matter  of  what  we  do  rather  that  what  we  are. 
But  both  Plato's  and  Confucius'  ideas  cannot  be  fully  explained  only  by  such  an  act- 
centred  theory.  For  an  act-centred  theory  focuses  on  the  notion  of  right  act,  i.  e.  what 
is  the  right  thing  to  do?  Thus  the  right  thing  for  a  police  to  do  is  to  fulfill  his  duty,  e.  g. 
to  keep  society  safe.  In  this  point  of  view,  the  answer  to  '  what  is  the  right  thing  to 
do?  '  would  be  a  list  of  duties  and  obligations.  If  we  go  on  to  ask  what  is  a  good  man, 
then  the  answer  to  it  would  be  that  a  good  man  is  the  one  who  does  what  he  or  she 
ought  to  do,  and  does  it  in  the  right  manner  on  the  right  occasion.  We  identify  a  good 
man  as  a  person  who  is  capable  of  fulfilling  his  or  her  duties,  and  the  morality  can  be 
found  in  their  doing  the  right  thing. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  for  both  Confucius  and  Plato  there  is  no  `  fact  and  value 
distinction,  and  `  is  and  ought  '  distinction.  The  factual  statement  that  I  am  a  student, 
for  Plato  and  Confucius,  implies  evaluative  statements  about  how  a  student  ought  to 
behave.  Thus  for  Plato  to  say  that  someone  is  a  farmer  by  nature  is  to  imply  that  he 
ought  to  perform  the  function  of  a  farmer  and  not  some  other  function.  Similarly  for 
Confucius  to  say  that  someone  is  a  father  is  to  imply  that  he  ought  to  fulfill  the  duties 
and  obligations which  arise  from  the  role,  father.  For  Plato  and  Confucius,  however, 
12  op.  cit.  p.  42. 
172 to  be  a  good  man  is  something  which  is  more  than  fulfilling  his  duties.  In  the 
Republic  IV  Plato  claims  that  for  a  man  to  be  just  he  needs  to  have  a  balanced  soul. 
Plato  is  not  interested  in  people's  external  actions,  but  in  their  inner  mental  states.  It 
is  only  when  the  three  elements  (reason,  appetite,  and  spirit)  of  one  person's  soul  are 
in  a  state  of  balance,  he  can  be  called  a  just  man.  Thus  the  basis  for  a  man  to  be  just 
does  not  merely  depend  upon  how  he  acts,  but  upon  what  kind  of  person  he  wants  to 
be.  Moreover,  in  the  Republic  I  Plato  points  out  the  deficiencies  of  the  idea  that 
justice  is  a  matter  of  a  list  of  duties  and  obligations.  Therefore  at  the  beginning  the 
role-set  morality  may  be  superficially  applied  to  Plato's  `  doing  one's  own  job  ',  but  if 
we  go  further  to  see  what  Plato  is  saying,  then  we  will  find  out  that  the  basis  for  being 
a  just  man  is  not  to  be  concerned  with  the  external  behaviour,  but  with  his  balanced 
inner  state. 
In  the  Analects  lots  of  passages  seem  to  suggest  that  we  can  tell  whether  or  not 
one  person  is  a  good  man  by  his  external  behaviour,  for  example, 
The  master  said:  '  Young  men  should  be  filial  when  at  home  and  respectful 
to  elders  when  away  from  home.  They  should  be  earnest  and  trustworthy. 
Although  they  should  love  the  multitude  far  and  wide,  they  should  be 
intimate  only  with  the  humane.....  '  (1,6) 
Duke  Ding  asked  how  rulers  should  employ  ministers,  and  how  ministers 
should  serve  rulers.  Master  Kong  replied:  '  Rulers  in  employing  ministers 
do  so  in  accordance  with  ritual,  and  ministers  in  serving  rulers  do  so  in 
accordance  with  loyalty.  '  (III,  19) 
Here  we  get  an  impression  that  Confucius'  account  of  morality  seems  to  be  based  on 
people's  behaviour  in  everyday  life.  To  be  a  good  ruler  or  a  good  minister  is  a  matter 
of  performing  their  social  roles.  However,  this  cannot  be  the  case  for  Confucius,  in 
that  there  is  one  passage  in  the  Analects  which  doubts  the  idea  that  morality  can  be 
fully  explained  in  terms  of  role-performance. 
Zixia  asked  about  filial  piety.  The  Master  said:  '  lt  is  the  demeanour  that  is 
difficult.  If  the  young  people  bear  the  brunt  of  their  ciders'  labour  when 
173 there  is  work  to  be  done,  and  if  the  elders  are  provided  with  sustenance 
when  there  is  wine  and  food  available,  then  does  one  consider  that  this 
constitutes  filial  piety?  '  (II,  8) 
The  filial  demeanour,  for  Confucius,  cannot  be  explained  only  in  terms  of  bearing  the 
brunt  of  the  elders'  labour  or  providing  sustenance,  it  must  emanate  from  one's 
inward  character.  That  is  to  say,  one  cannot  be  said  to  have  filial  demeanour  unless 
one  wills  to  behave  in  that  way.  Only  when  a  person  understands  what  it  is  to  be  filial, 
and  is  aware  that  he  is  willing  to  do  it,  can  his  behaviour  be  called  filial.  This  is  what 
I  understand  F.  H.  Bradley's  assertion  that  "  you  can  not  have  the  moral  world  unless 
it  is  willed;  that  to  be  willed  it  must  be  willed  by  persons;  and  that  these  persons  not 
only  have  the  moral  world  as  the  content  of  their  wills,  but  also  must  in  some  way  be 
aware  of  themselves  as  willing  this  content.  i13  In  short,  a  filial  son,  for  Confucius, 
does  filial  acts  willingly  not  only  because  he  has  to  act  in  conformity  with  laws  and 
custom,  but  being  filial  to  his  father  is  the  expression  of  human-heartedness  (1,2). 
Furthermore,  for  both  Plato  and  Confucius  men  are  born  into  a  role  or  roles.  To 
have  a  role,  in  Plato's  view,  is  not  a  matter  of  personal  choice  but  of  nature.  Plato  says 
in  the  Republic  that  we  are  born  with  certain  nature  according  to  which  we  are 
disposed  in  certain  social  class  and  act  in  certain  role  (415a-c).  Similarly,  for 
Confucius,  one  does  not  choose  to  act  or  not  to  act  in  a  certain  role,  but  derives  one's 
roles  either  by  being  born  into  the  family  or  by  inheritance.  Both  Plato  and  Confucius, 
unlike  modern  liberals,  would  disagree  with  Dowwmie's  assertion  that  men  can  choose 
or  reject  roles.  For  if  a  person,  in  Plato's  ideal  state,  could  choose  or  reject  his  role 
then  the  social  order  would  be  in  danger.  It  would  do  great  harm  to  the  state  if  a 
person  who  by  nature  belongs  to  the  third  class  chooses  or  wants  to  do  the  job  of  the 
philosopher-kings  (343b).  Likewise,  for  Confucius,  the  social  order  would  be 
destroyed  if  a  ruler  is  not  a  ruler,  a  subject  is  not  a  subject,  a  father  is  not  a  father,  and 
a  son  is  not  a  son.  '4 
Men  are  born  into  certain  kind  of  roles,  so  we  are  inevitably  subjected  to  moral 
dilemma,  i.  e.  two  roles  are  in  conflict.  The  example  mentioned  above  about  the 
F.  H.  Bradley,  Ethical  Studies  (London,  1876),  p.  160. 
"  See  my  discussion  in  Part  1,  Chapter  3,  Section  3. 
174 conflict  between  a  policeman's  duty  and  a  son's  duty,  when  the  policeman  faces  the 
problem  of  whether  he  has  to  arrest  his  father  who  commits  a  crime.  Which  role 
should  be  the  priority?  Plato  and  Confucius  have  different  answers  to  this  question. 
Plato,  who  sees  the  state  as  prior  to  the  family,  may  think  that  a  citizen's,  qua  citizen, 
duty  is  to  be  loyal  to  the  state  and  be  obedient  to  laws.  Thus  the  policeman,  in  order  to 
maintain  the  social  order,  has  to  arrest  his  father.  Moreover,  it  is  worth  noting  that 
role  conflict  might  be  a  reason  why  Plato  proposes  to  abolish  the  family  in  the 
Republic  since  abolishing  the  family  would  help  to  prevent  conflicts  of  role  from 
happening.  Confucius,  unlike  Plato,  thinks  that  the  family  is  prior  to  the  state.  For 
there  will  never  be  an  orderly  society  if  there  is  no  order  and  harmony  in  the  family.  A 
son's,  qua  son,  duty  is  to  love  his  father,  so  he  has  to  cover  up  his  father's  wrong- 
doing.  It  is  interesting  that  both  Plato  and  Confucius  seem  to  propose  that  there  is  a 
hierarchy  of  roles,  but  they  have  different  views  on  which  role  should  be  primary. 
To  put  this  chapter  in  a  nutshell,  giving  an  account  of  the  fact  that  in  a  just  state 
one  does  one's  own  job,  and  that  in  an  orderly  society  the  actuality  and  the  name  have 
to  match  one  another,  Plato  and  Confucius  start  from  an  act-centred  theory,  morality 
is identified  as  a  kind  of  role  performance.  But  what  they  are  really  concerned  with  is 
not  only  people's  external  behaviour  but  their  inward  character.  For  Plato  the  inner 
balance  of  soul  is  the  basis  for  being  a  just  man;  and  for  Confucius  a  humane  man  is 
one  who  not  only  mechanically  performs  his  social  roles  well  but  is  willing  to 
perform  those  roles  well.  Both  Plato  and  Confucius  would  agree  that  one  could  not 
fulfill  a  role,  let  us  say,  the  wise  ruler,  unless  one  is  a  right  kind  of  person. 
175 Chapter  11 
Role  Conflict 
In  the  developed  society  we  all  play  more  than  one  role.  We  are  often  drawn  into  a 
state  of  loss  when  our  two  different  roles  are  in  conflict.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter 
is  to  see  whether  the  problem  of  role  conflict,  and  the  conflict  between  private  and 
public  morality  arise  for  either  Plato  or  Confucius.  I  shall  argue  that  this  is  not  a 
problem  with  which  Plato  and  Confucius  would  be  concerned  by  discussing  three 
topics:  first,  role  conflicts:  ruling  or  contemplation;  second,  morality  and  law;  and 
finally,  private  and  public  morality. 
1.  Role  conflict:  ruling  or  contemplation 
Why  should  the  philosophers  rule?  The  answer  to  this  question  can  be  found  in  the 
Republic  in  two  passages.  The  first  one  is  in  Book  1,  where  Socrates  says  that  if  the 
philosophers  refuse  to  rule,  then  we  must  "  bring  compulsion  (anagken)  to  bear  and 
punish  them  ";  and  the  worst  penalty  for  their  refusal  is  to  be  piled  by  a  worse  man 
(347b9-c5).  Therefore,  in  order  to  avoid  being  ruled  by  a  worse  man,  the  philosophers 
should  take  the  responsibility  of  ruling.  This  seems  to  imply  that  the  philosophers 
rule  out  of  self-interest,  otherwise  they  will  be  harmed  as  a  result  of  being  ruled  by  the 
one  who  is  worse  than  themselves. 
The  second  one  is  in  Book  VII,  where  Socrates  says  that  from  age  thirty  to  thirty- 
five,  the  philosophers  in  training  are  engaged  in  studying  dialectic  and  in 
philosophical  discussions.  Then  they  must  be  sent  back  to  the  Cave  again,  and  be 
compelled  (anagka.  cleoi)  to  hold  the  military  and  political  offices  for  which  they  are 
suitable  for  fifteen  years.  At  the  age  of  fifty,  those  who  have  undergone  all  the 
relevant  practical  and  intellectual  tests,  are  able  to  see  the  Good  itself.  And  they  will 
spend  most  of  their  time  in  philosophical  discussion  and  contemplation,  but  they  are 
not  allowed  to  do  so  all  the  time,  since  "  when  their  turn  comes  they  will,  ..., 
do  their duty  as  Rulers,  not  for  the  honour  they  get  by  it  but  as  a  matter  of  necessity 
(anagkaion)"  (539d-540b).  Here  the  reason  for  the  philosophers  to  rule  is  that  it  is 
necessary  for  them  to  rule.  One  might  ask  whether  Plato  is  talking  of  two  different 
reasons,  compulsion  and  necessity,  for  the  philosophers  to  rule.  In  Greek,  the 
adjective  anagkaios  and  the  verb  anagka:  o  can  be  taken  to  mean  both  compulsion 
and  necessity.  '  So  in  Greek  there  is  no  verbal  contrast  between  compulsion  and 
necessity.  One  cannot  therefore  assume  that  there  are  two  distinct  reasons  for  the 
philosophers  to  rule  in  the  Republic.  In  an  ideal  state  the  philosophers  receive  better 
education  than  their  fellow  citizens,  and  also  their  everyday  needs  and  commodities 
are  provided  by  other  citizens,  it  is  their  duty  and  obligation  to  rule  the  state. 
Moreover  their  seeing  the  Good  itself  enables  the  philosophers  to  lead  the  state  and 
individual  to  be  in  order  (519a-520a).  Therefore  the  philosophers'  taking  the 
responsibility  of  ruling  in  this  sense  would  be  that  it  is  essential  for  the  well  being  of 
the  state  as  a  whole  that  the  philosophers  rule.  In  short,  the  philosophers  must  be 
compelled  to  rule  because  it  is  necessary  for  them  to  rule  if  the  state  is  to  be  in  order. 
It  appears  from  these  two  passages  that  the  reasons  for  the  philosophers  to  take 
on  ruling  are  two:  self-  or  private  interest  and  state's  or  public  interest.  However,  one 
question  could  be  asked:  Whether  or  not  private  and  public  interest  will  be  in  conflict 
with  one  another?  The  question  raised  by  Glaucon  in  Book  VII  appears  in  a  different 
form  but,  it  seems  to  me,  has  the  same  meaning  as  that  I  propose  here.  Glaucon  says 
at  519d7  that  it  will  not  be  fair  that  we  make  the  philosophers'  lives  worse,  when  it  is 
possible  for  them  to  live  a  better  life.  What  makes  the  philosophers'  lives  worse? 
Their  being  forced  to  rule  would  make  their  lives  worse,  in  that  ruling  is  not  their  own 
interest,  it  is  philosophy  with  which  they  are  primarily  concerned.  Therefore  in  order 
to  perform  their  duty  in  ruling  a  state,  the  philosophers  have  to  sacrifice  their  own 
interest  to  some  extent. 
In  addition,  in  Book  IV  Plato  says  that  it  is  just  to  do  one's  own  job.  It  could  be 
asked  which  one,  studying  philosophy  or  ruling  a  state,  would  be  the  job  for  the 
philosophers,  or  would  both  be.  If  the  answer  to  it  were  one  of  the  two  jobs,  then  the 
problem  would  not  arise.  If  it  is  both,  it  might  be  that  Plato  ought  to  see  a  problem 
1  Liddell  and  Scott,  A»  Intermediate  Greek-l  nglish  Lexicon  (Oxford,  1997),  p.  53. 
177 here.  For  to  be  a  good  philosopher  is  to  do  one's  job  well,  i.  e.  to  study  philosophy  and 
attend  philosophical  discussions  most  of  his  time;  and  to  be  a  ruler  is  to  do  one's  job 
well,  i.  e.  one  has  to  perform  the  role  of  ruler  in  accordance  with  the  laws  and 
institutions  which  give  rise  to  the  role.  However  it  seems  to  me,  on  the  surface,  that 
the  duties  and  obligations  of  these  two  roles  are  difficult  to  reconcile;  if  one  person 
wants  to  do  both  of  them  properly,  one  of  them  must  be  sacrificed  to  some  extent.  For 
it  would  seem  that,  in  Plato's  view,  one  can  only  be  either  a  philosopher  qua 
philosopher  or  a  ruler  qua  ruler.  Also  one  person  doing  two  jobs  in  an  ideal  state  is 
incompatible  with  Plato's  notion  of  justice.  A  moment's  thought,  however,  suggests 
that  Plato  must  see  philosophizing  and  ruling  as  part  of  the  same  job.  For  Plato  may 
think  that  the  essential  task  common  to  both  is  that  of  knowing  the  Good.  To  know 
the  Form  of  the  Good  motivates  the  philosophers  to  bring  the  good  to  the  state  as  a 
whole.  It  is  said  in  the  7  imacus  that  the  Maker  of  our  universe  sees  the  eternal  model, 
so  the  universe  is  beautiful  and  good.  For  the  Maker's  wisdom  enables  Him  to  make 
things  around  Him  good.  Similarly  we  might  say  that  the  philosophers'  wisdom  both 
enables  and  motivates  them  to  make  the  state  good.  ` 
If  this  is  right  the  role  of  the  philosopher  and  the  role  of  the  ruler  would  be 
indistinguishable.  But  it  might  still  be  argued  that  it  is  against  the  philosopher's 
interest  to  rule.  R.  Kraut,  in  his  article  "  Egoism,  Love,  and  Political  Office  in  Plato 
gives  an  account  of  Socrates'  insistence.  He  appeals  to  an  analogy  of  father  and  son 
and  says  that  a  father  loves  his  son,  and  he  will  see  his  son  as  an  extension  of  himself. 
So  when  he  considers  his  interest  he  will  consider  his  son's  interest  as  well.  It  is  not 
because  whatever  benefits  his  son  will  ultimately  affect  him,  but  because  his  son's 
benefit  is  his  benefit.  The  consideration  of  his  son's  benefit  is  described  by  Kraut  as  a 
consideration  of  his  own  '  extended  interest  '.  Whereas  when  one  considers  his  own 
interest,  he  is  considering  his  '  proper  interest  '.  When  the  father  deliberates  he  takes 
into  account  both  his  extended  and  his  proper  interest,  and  weighs  their  relative 
importance,  and  then  acts  in  his  own  interest,  all  things  considered.  The  father's  act 
2  See  the  Timaeus,  29e;  also  J.  Cooper,  "  The  Psychology  of  Justice  in  Plato  ",  America,,  Philvsorhical 
Quarterly,  vol.  14,1977,  pp.  151-57,  esp,  pp.  155-57. 
R.  Kraut,  "  Egoism,  Love,  and  Political  Office  in  Plato  ",  Philosophical  Review,  vol.  LXXX11,1973,  pp. 
333-35. 
179 may  be  contrary  to  his  proper  interest  or  contrary  to  his  extended  interest,  which  will 
depend  on  the  circumstances.  But  one  thing  can  be  sure  is  that  he  never  acts  against 
his  interests,  when  both  his  proper  and  extended  interests  arc  taken  into  account.  In 
short,  the  father  somehow  combines  the  two  to  form  a  single  judgement  of  his  overall 
interest. 
It  is  clear  that  if  we  draw  an  analogy  with  the  relation  of  the  philosophers  to  the 
state,  the  father  will  be  the  philosopher  and  the  son  will  be  the  state.  Therefore  when 
the  philosopher  decides  to  take  the  responsibility  of  ruling  he  is  considering  his 
extended  interest  -  the  interest  of  the  state.  It  may  be  argued  that  the  philosopher 
makes  a  choice  at  the  expense  of  his  own  interest.  But  so  far  as  the  argument  of 
proper  and  extended  interests  goes,  whatever  the  philosopher  decides,  he  decides  on 
the  basis  of  his  interest  --  taking  both  his  proper  and  extended  interests  into 
consideration.  One  issue  which  may  be  considered  here  is  that  Kraut's  notion  of 
proper  and  extended  interest  seems  to  suggest  that  the  philosophers  want  to  rule,  but 
in  the  Republic  Plato  does  not  use  the  language  of  `  want  '  but  of'  compulsion  '.  If 
we  take  '  compulsion  '  as  being  afraid  of  being  ruled  by  the  worse,  then  when  the 
philosophers  decide  to  rule  under  this  consideration  they  are  thinking  of  their  own 
proper  interests.  At  the  same  time,  the  philosophers  might  realize  that  their  being  in 
office  would  be  good  for  the  state  as  a  whole.  However  we  cannot  regard  this  as 
compelling  the  philosophers  to  rule  against  their  will.  For  we  have  to  assume  that  the 
philosophers  see  the  need  to  rule  and  are  therefore  willing  to  rule.  But  they  do  not 
enjoy  it  and  therefore  see  it  as  an  unpleasant  necessity.  The  motivation  for  the 
philosophers  to  rule,  as  mentioned,  is  that  to  love  the  Good  is  to  want  to  make  things 
around  them  good. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  Kraut's  distinction  between  one's  proper  interest  and  one's 
extended  interest  could  be  applied  to  Confucius.  A  sage,  in  Confucius's  view,  need 
not  to  be  a  ruler.  Confucius  in  the  Analects  says  that  being  dutiful  towards  one's 
parents  and  friendly  towards  one's  brothers  constitute  taking  part  in  government  (II, 
21).  Therefore  the  sage  does  not  have  to  choose  between  ruling  and  self-cultivation. 
Moreover,  the  state,  for  Confucius,  is  the  family  writ  large.  So  an  orderly  state 
depends  upon  each  family  within  it  being  orderly.  It  is  said  in  the  Great  Learning  that 
"  [w]hen  the  individual  families  have  become  humane,  then  the  whole  country  will  be 
179 aroused  toward  humanity.  When  the  individual  families  have  become  compliant,  then 
the  whole  country  will  be  aroused  toward  compliance  "  (Ch.  9).  4  In  the  family  the 
interest  of  the  father  would  be  identical  with  that  of  the  family  as  a  whole.  That  is,  the 
father's  proper  interest  is  identical  with  his  extended  interest.  In  other  words,  the 
Confucian  sage  does  not  have  to  face  the  dilemma,  which  troubles  the  commentators 
of  Plato,  because  the  identification  of  the  father's  proper  interest  with  his  extended 
interest,  i.  e.  the  interest  of  the  family  as  a  whole,  and  the  analogy  of  the  family  and 
the  state  make  Confucian  sage  free  from  the  conflict  between  private  and  public 
interest. 
Although  the  sage  is  not  necessarily  a  ruler,  nevertheless  Confucius  in  the 
Analects  advises  the  superior  man  to  take  part  in  politics.  In  the  Analect.  c,  Zixia, 
Confucius'  disciple,  says  that  "  [i]f  one  has  more  than  enough  energy  for  office,  then 
one  studies;  and  if  one  has  more  than  enough  energy  for  study,  then  one  holds  office  " 
(XIX,  13).  In  Chinese  tradition,  scholars  and  civil  servants  are  in  some  way 
interrelated.  For  receiving  proper  education  used  to  be  a  shortcut  for  the  ordinary 
people  to  get  into  office.  It  is  worth  noting  that  Confucius  does  not,  like  Plato,  assert 
overtly  that  it  will  be  very  harmful  if  people  of  the  lower  class  try  to  get  into  the 
military  class  or  even  the  Guardian  class  (434b).  But  Confucius  does  hold  the  view 
that  it  is  harmful  if  unsuitable  people  gain  political  office.  Nor  does  Confucius  assert 
that  it  will  be  unjust  for  one  person  to  do  more  than  one  job  at  the  same  time. 
Moreover  Confucius  admires  the  political  system  in  San  Wong,  that  is,  in  the  reigns 
of  three  rulers,  Yao,  Shun,  and  Yu.  Yao  was  the  first  really  humane  ruler  in  ancient 
China,  he  did  not  hand  his  political  power  to  his  son,  but  to  Shun  who  was  said  to  be  a 
man  of  virtue  and  wisdom.  Shun  followed  the  example  of  Yao,  and  handed  his 
political  power  to  Yu,  who  was  famous  for  his  regulating  rivers  and  watercourses. 
After  Shun's  death,  Yu  became  the  emperor  of  the  first  dynasty  in  China  -  the 
dynasty  of  Hsia.  And  it  was  from  Yu  that  the  empire  became  hereditary.  `  Confucius' 
admiration  for  the  golden  age  in  the  past  implies  that  one's  gaining  political  power 
should  depend  on  one's  ability  and  being  virtuous  rather  than  heredity. 
For  Confucius  an  ideal  ruler  should  be  a  person  who  possesses  virtue  and 
4  Wing-tsit  Chan,  A  Source  Back  in  Chinese  i'hilosophy  (Princeton,  1973),  p.  91. 
5  Yu-lan  Fung,  A  History  of  Chinese  Philosophy,  vol.  1  (Princeton,  1973),  p.  xvi. 
180 wisdom,  and  the  best  way  of  possessing  virtue  and  wisdom  is  to  engage  in  studying. 
So  Confucius  often,  in  the  Analect.  r,  encourages  people  to  engage  themselves  in 
studying.  This  can  be  seen  at  the  outset  of  the  Analecls,  where  Confucius  says  that 
"  [t]o  learn  something  and  at  times  practise  it  -  surely  that  is  a  pleasure?  ... 
(1,1). 
However,  Confucius  does  not,  unlike  Plato,  regard  the  scholar's  being  in  office  as  a 
kind  of  compulsion  or  necessity.  For  there  is  no  difference  between  being  a  good 
father  and  a  good  ruler.  Both  of  them  are  the  exemplars  or  models  for  emulation. 
It  is  noticeable  that  both  Plato  and  Confucius  agree  that  in  existing  states, 
philosophers  or  scholars  are  free  to  choose  whether  they  would  like  to  stay  in  office  or 
not.  In  a  totally  corrupted  state,  Plato  says, 
[T]hey  (The  philosophers)  live  quietly  and  keep  to  themselves,  like  a  man 
who  stands  under  the  shelter  of  a  wall  during  a  driving  storm  of  dust  and  hail; 
they  see  the  rest  of  the  world  full  of  wrongdoing,  and  are  content  to  keep 
themselves  unspotted  from  wickedness  and  wrong  in  this  life,  and  finally 
leave  it  with  cheerful  composure  and  good  hope.  (496d-e) 
And  Confucius  says, 
Be  of  sincere  good  faith  and  love  learning.  Be  steadfast  unto  death  in  pursuit 
of  the  good  principles.  One  does  not  enter  a  state  which  is  in  peril,  nor  reside 
in  one  which  is  rebellious.  When  the  order  prevails  in  the  world,  then  appear 
(you  should  take  a  role  in  (ffrce).  When  it  does  not,  then  hide  (you  should 
resign  front  the  office  and  retire  from  political  life).  (VIII,  13)6 
Confucius,  like  Plato,  seems  to  suggest  that  in  a  corrupted  state,  when  one's  private 
interest  or  moral  view  is  in  conflict  with  public  interest  or  moral  view.  One  should 
primarily  consider  one's  own  interest,  staying  away  from  political  power,  although 
the  country  is  in  need  of  one's  help.  For  a  totally  disorderly  state  is  beyond  help.  This 
may  seem  to  introduce  a  kind  of  egoism.  In  the  Republic  the  same  idea  is  introduced, 
b  italics  are  mine. 
181 as  we  saw  at  496a-d.  However,  for  Plato  and  Confucius,  staying  away  from  the  office 
cannot  be  regarded  as  the  expression  of  egoism,  in  the  disorderly  state  philosophers 
will  have  no  influence  on  evildoers  who  hold  sway.  Conversely,  their  moral  qualities 
might  be  destroyed  by  those  evildoers.  Therefore,  the  philosophers  had  better 
withdraw  from  politics. 
2.  Morality  and  law 
I  have  given  a  brief  introduction  to  the  conflict  between  private  and  public  interest 
both  in  the  Analecis  and  the  Republic.  I  shall  proceed  in  this  section  to  discuss  the 
relation  between  morality  and  law  to  see  whether,  for  Plato  and  Confucius,  moral 
obligation  and  political  or  legal  obligation  are  distinct. 
In  a  role-performance  model,  morality  is  regarded  as  a  matter  of  fulfilling  one's 
duties  and  obligations  according  to  the  laws  and  institutions  which  determine  the 
roles.  The  function  of  the  laws  or  institutions  is  to  sustain  a  society  and  keep  it  in 
order.  The  role-performance  model  thus  seems  to  hold  that  being  a  morally  good 
citizen  requires  one  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  laws  passed  by  the  government. 
However  does  this  mean  that  people  have  moral  obligation  to  obey  the  laws 
irrespective  of  whether  they  are  good  or  bad?  For  it  is  possible  for  a  dictator  to  pass  a 
law,  for  example,  requiring  every  adult  male  to  do  military  service,  on  the  pretense  of 
self-defence,  when  in  fact  the  dictator  wants  to  invade  his  neighbouring  country.  Does 
it  mean  that  one  has  to  obey  the  law  which  is  at  odds  with  one's  moral  conviction? 
Invading  a  neighbouring  country  is  immoral  and  unjust. 
A  positive  law  theorist  may  think  that  legal  and  moral  obligation  are  quite 
distinct.  For  law  can  be  explained  and  accounted  for  without  being  dependent  upon 
any  thesis  about  moral  principles  or  values.  '  Positive  law  theory  thus  claims  that  "  law 
can  be  defined  without  any  reference  to  its  content  "g,  that  is,  law  is  laid  down  by  the 
7  N.  MacCormick,  "  Natural  Law  and  the  Separation  of  Law  and  Morals  ",  Naa/ural  Law  77,  corv: 
Con  iemportyy  Fssays,  (ed.  )  R.  P.  George  (Oxford,  1994),  p.  107. 
A.  Flew  (ed.  ),  A  Dictionary  Of  Philosophy  (London,  1984),  p.  197. 
182 government.  On  this  theory,  legal  obligation  is  simply  a  matter  of  government 
coercion  and  lacks  any  moral  content.  It  thus  remains  an  open  question  whether  or  not 
there  is  a  moral  obligation  to  obey  the  law.  In  other  words,  legal  obligation and  moral 
obligation  are  quite  distinct  concepts. 
However  is  it  true  to  say,  as  the  Positivists  would  claim,  that  there  is  a  clear 
distinction  between  law  and  morality?  Although  it  is  often  argued,  in  a  Positivist  view, 
that  bad  law  is  still  law,  because  its  being  law  depends  purely  on  certain  social 
institutions.  The  Japanese  Emperor,  for  example,  passed  the  law  which  made 
Japanese  invasion  of  China  in  the  World  War  II  lawful.  It  is  no  doubt  a  bad  law  but 
"  [i]ts  being  law  is  an  issue  of  social  fact,  not  one  of  moral  value.  "9 
Nevertheless  it  is  difficult  to  deny  that  there  are  some  connections  between  law 
and  morality.  As  N.  MacConnick  points  out:  first,  laws  are  intelligible  only  by 
reference  to  the  ends  and  values  they  have  to  achieve.  And  those  who  participate  in 
making  or  implementing  the  laws  should  have  these  ends  and  values  in  mind. 
Although  the  laws'  validity  does  not  essentially  depend  upon  these  moral  criteria,  "  it 
does  involve  acknowledging  the  moral  quality  of  the  relevant  ends  and  values,  namely 
justice  and  the  public  good.  "1° 
Second,  one  does  not  obey  a  law  just  because  it  is  a  law,  or  because  the  law 
maker's  sincerity  in  enacting  it.  One  only  obeys  laws  because  they  promote  some  kind 
of  social  order  under  a  rational  basis.  It  is  this  rationality"  which  motivates  one  to 
obey  the  laws.  And  "  [t]he  fundamental  principle  of  moral  thought  is  simply  the 
demand  to  be  rational:....  "12  It  is  in  this  sense  that  law  and  morality  can  be  related 
with  each  other. 
Third,  the  vocabulary  used  in  moral  judgement,  such  as  obligation  and  rights, 
right  and  wong,  and  duty  and  responsibility,  is  common  to  legal  judgement.  For  both 
moral  and  legal  judgement  serve  to  guide  our  behaviour.  To  form  a  moral  or  legal 
judgement  involves  reasoning.  The  function  of  reason,  says  MacCormick,  is  to 
universalize  and  check  particular  objects,  and  weigh  them  in  the  setting  of  an 
9  MacCormick,  op.  cit.  p.  108. 
10  Ibid.  p.  113. 
11  J.  Finnis,  "  Natural  Law  and  Legal  Reasoning  ",  op.  cit.  p.  137. 
12  Ibid. 
183 aspirationally  coherent  way  of  life.  13  In  this  sense  there  is  a  common  trait  between 
moral  and  legal  reasoning,  i.  e.  both  reasoning  are  practical.  14 
The  issue  whether  there  are  different  kind  of  duties,  political  or  legal,  and  moral 
duties,  is  closely  connected  with  conflict  between  natural  law  theory  and  positive  law 
theory.  The  former  claims  that  it  is  by  human  nature  that  men  act  towards  what  is 
good.  15  The  Aristotelian  concept  of  teleology  is  an  example  of  this.  It  might  be  asked 
however  how  men  can  know  what  is  good.  It  is  through  the  use  of  reason  that  men 
can  know  what  is  good.  Therefore,  according  to  natural  law  theory,  for  example, 
stealing  money  from  someone  is  morally  wrong  even  if  there  is  no  positive  law  in 
existence.  For  it  is  against  human  nature  which  inclines  towards  what  is  good. 
Similarly  one  might  argue,  in  the  view  of  natural  law  theory,  that  it  is  wrong  to  obey  a 
bad  law. 
According  to  Confucianism,  human  nature  is  originally  good.  Although  the 
notion  of  the  original  goodness  of  human  nature  is  not  explicitly  mentioned  in  the 
Analects,  it  is  mentioned  by  Confucius'  successor  Mencius,  who  says  in  the  Mencius 
that  in  all  men  there  are  the  feeling  of  commiseration,  the  feeling  of  shame  and 
dislike,  the  feeling  of  respect  and  reverence,  and  the  feeling  of  right  and  wrong.  These 
four  virtues  are  called  human-heartedness,  righteousness,  propriety,  and  wisdom, 
which  are  not  drilled  into  us  from  outside,  but  exist  in  us  at  birth  (6A:  6).  '6  The 
development  of  these  four  virtues  requires  the  individual  to  engage  in  self-cultivation. 
Similarly  in  the  Republic  Plato  appeals  to  human  nature  to  establish  and  maintain 
social  order  in  an  ideal  state  (415a-c).  Plato  also  asserts  that  for  a  man  to  be  just  is  to 
have  a  balanced  soul;  his  reason  is  in  control,  spirit  backs  up  reason's  decision,  and 
desire  is  subdued  to  reason  and  spirit.  Does  this  mean  that  both  Plato  and  Confucius 
are  natural  law  theorists?  To  answer  this  question  we  need  a  more  explicit  account  of 
natural  law.  I  shall  list  four  components  as  follows:  '7 
t;  op.  cit.  P.  119. 
14  Fora  different  view  on  this  issue,  see  Finnis,  Ibid.  p.  141-3. 
's  For  a  view  on  the  relation  between  natural  law  and  human  nature,  see  R.  P.  George,  "  Natural  Law  and 
Human  Nature  ",  Ibid.  pp.  31-41.  Also  Finnis,  Ibid.  p.  135. 
16  Wing-Tsit  Chan,  A  Source  Book  In  Chinese  Philosophy  (Princeton,  1973),  p.  '54. 
17  J.  Boyle,  "  Natural  Law  and  the  Ethics  of  Traditions  ",  op.  cit.  pp.  11-3. 
184 1)  There  are  moral  principles  which  all  mature  human  beings  can  know,  and  the 
naturally  known  principles  are  written  on  the  human  heart. 
2)  Some  specific  moral  norms  follow  from  these  principles  in  such  a  way  that  it  is 
possible  for  people  to  see  their  truth.  Although  people  are  often  ignorant  of  them. 
3)  Now  moral  principles  and  norms  can  be  applied  to  the  more  complex 
circumstances  of  difficult  cases  depends  upon  those  who  are  wise  in  moral 
matters. 
4)  The  characteristic  of  natural  law  is  practical  reasoning.  For  there  are  many 
important  moral  judgements  within  a  person's  life  which  cannot  be  known  on 
the  basis  of  analysis  and  deduction  alone,  and  there  are  very  many  situations  in 
life  in  which  the  morally  correct  course  of  action  cannot  readily  and  confidently 
be  discerned  unless  one's  capacity  for  moral  judgement  is  highly  developed  and 
perfected. 
Let  us  see  whether  both  Plato  and  Confucius  stand  on  the  side  of  natural  law 
theory.  Plato's  claim  that  both  in  the  individual  and  the  state  there  are  four  virtues, 
wisdom,  courage,  sophrosune,  and  justice;  and  Confucius'  claim  that  a  humane  man 
is  wise,  courageous,  and  trustworthy  (IX,  29),  seem  to  match  with  (I)  and  (2).  That  is, 
there  are  some  basic  moral  principles  which  are  written  in  man's  heart.  Plato  clearly 
believes  that  there  are  standards  of  right  and  wrong  which  can  be  known  by  reason. 
But  it  is  not  clear  whether  he  would  accept  that  they  can  be  known  by  all  mature 
human  beings.  It  might  be  argued  that  his  claim  that  in  the  Republic  only  the 
philosophers  can  have  knowledge  of  the  Good,  and  the  lower  class  can  at  best  possess 
belief  of  it,  seems  to  suggest  that  these  four  virtues  are  not  accessible  to  every 
individual.  However  Plato  says  that  we  all  have  some  divine  conception  of  the  Good 
and  strive  for  it  (505d-e),  and  in  the  Laws  Plato  does  think  that  through  proper 
education  "  the  gold  in  us  may  prevail  over  other  substances  "  (645a). 
Although  Plato  does  not  have  the  distinction  between  theoretical  and  practical 
wisdom  in  mind,  he  holds  that  the  philosophers'  knowing  the  Good  motivates  them  to 
make  things  good  around  them.  In  other  words,  for  Plato,  having  theoretical  wisdom 
entails  that  the  philosophers  are  able  to  make  proper  judgements  about  this  world.  So, 
unlike  Aristotle  for  example,  he  pays  very  little  attention  to  the  kinds  of  thinking 
185 involved  in  applying  basic  moral  principles  to  the  particular  circumstances. 
Confucius  pays  much  less  attention  to  the  role  of  reason  than  does  Plato. 
Confucius'  notion  of  human-heartedness  (jen)  implies  that  men  are  social.  A  superior 
man  therefore  is  one  who  is  able  to  have  a  harmonious  social  relations,  which  is  the 
expression  of  practical  wisdom,  (4).  It  is  apparent  that  both  the  philosophers  and  the 
superior  men  are  the  experts  in  moral  matters,  (3).  Therefore  though  their  different 
conceptions  of  human  nature  lead  them  to  understand  it  in  different  ways.  It  seems 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  both  Plato  and  Confucius  are  in  favour  of  natural  law 
theory. 
3.  Private  and  public  morality 
(a)  conflicts  between  government  actions  and  individual  moral  beliefs 
In  an  ideal  state  all  laws  would  be  just  and  all  government  decisions  would  be  correct. 
But,  of  course,  we  do  not  live  in  ideal  states.  Some  laws  are  not  just  and  governments 
do  make  mistakes.  So  two  questions  arise:  1)  Should  we  obey  bad  laws?  2)  Should  we 
take  part  in  a  government  or  serve  a  government  whose  policies  we  believe  to  be 
wrong? 
Firstly,  should  we  obey  bad  laws?  The  positive  law  theorist,  as  mentioned  above, 
would  say  '  Yes  ',  we  have  a  legal  obligation  to  obey  laws.  But  as  we  have  seen 
`  legal  obligation'  in  the  positivist  means  `  coercion'.  The  positivist  can  deny  us  that 
we  have  a  moral  obligation  to  obey  law.  But  the  natural  law  theorist  would  put  the 
same  point  differently.  He  would  argue  that  since  there  are  connections  between  law 
and  morality,  a  morally  bad  law  is  legally  invalid,  i.  e.  it  is  not  a  law  at  all.  It  is  not 
entirely  clear  what  Plato  would  say  here.  In  the  Crity  he  makes  Socrates  argue  for 
obedience,  but  in  the  Republic  he  is  very  scathing  about  existing  government.  Perhaps 
he  would  say  that  we  should  obey  laws  in  so  far  as  they  have  some  tendency  to 
promote  justice  and  in  so  far  as  we  can  do  so  without  actually  being  unjust  ourselves. 
It  is  difficult  to  see  what  Confucius  would  say  about  this  question.  For  in  the 
Analecis  he  is  not  at  all  interested  in  rule  of  law.  Nevertheless  I  assume  that  he  would 
say  that  we  should  not  obey  bad  laws.  For  if  merely  obeying  good  laws  does  not  make 
186 us  have  a  sense  of  shame,  and  a  good  character,  obeying  bad  laws  clearly  cannot 
achieve  this.  Laws  for  Confucius  are  not  essential  to  making  people  morally  good  and 
maintaining  social  order.  He  says  in  the  Analects, 
Lead  the  people  with  governmental  measures  and  regulate  them  by  law  and 
punishment,  and  they  will  avoid  wrongdoing  but  will  have  no  sense  of  honor 
and  shame.  Lead  them  with  virtue  and  regulate  them  by  the  rules  of  propriety 
(Ii),  and  they  will  have  a  sense  of  shame  and,  moreover,  set  themselves  right. 
(Il,  3)18 
An  orderly  society,  in  the  Confucian  view,  might  be  achieved  by  rule  of  law.  However, 
obeying  laws  does  not  make  people  have  a  sense  of  shame,  nor  does  it  make  people 
have  a  good  character.  Thus  Confucius,  like  Plato'9,  thinks  that  law  is  the  second  best 
means  to  run  a  state.  The  best  way  to  govern  a  state  is  to  have  a  virtuous  ruler  as  a 
model  for  emulation,  and  to  regulate  people  by  the  rules  of  proper  conduct. 
Secondly,  in  a  modern  society  there  may  be  problems  when  government  actions 
conflict  with  an  individual  minister's  own  moral  views.  Thus  should  we  take  part  in  a 
government,  or  serve  a  government  whose  policies  we  believe  to  be  wrong?  This 
question  can  be  tackled  in  two  ways.  20  The  first  one  would  be:  How  far  a  politician 
would  allow  his  own  moral  view  to  affect  the  fulfillment  of  his  social  role?  R.  S. 
Downie  suggests  two  views  on  this  question:  one  is  `  resign-if-you-disagree  ',  and  the 
other  view  is  '  ignore-your-own-attitude  '.  The  latter  implies  that  a  public  servant 
should  not  have  his  own  policy,  since  if  the  public  servant  only  enacts  the  policies 
with  which  he  agrees,  then  the  operation  of  the  government  would  he  thwarted. 
However,  there  are  several  disadvantages  in  holding  the  resign-if-you-disagree  view. 
Firstly,  frequent  resignation  will  lead  to  political  unstability.  Secondly,  the 
consequences  of  resignation  might  go  beyond  those  of  policies  for  which  the  person 
resigned.  Thirdly,  resignation  may  lead  to  the  fact  that  the  role  or  the  policy  may  be 
'R  Chan,  op.  Of.  p.  22 
19  The  Siatesmaºr,  297e4.5.  For  Plato  the  ideal  ruler  is  the  best  means  to  run  a  state. 
20  R.  S.  Downie,  Go'ernnem  Arline  and  Morality,  ch.  IV  (London,  1964),  pp"  101-13.  Also  in 
Downie's  book,  Rules  and  Values,  ch.  6  (London,  1971),  pp.  138-45. 
187 carried  out  by  the  person  who  is  worse  than  the  person  who  resigned. 
The  problem  of  conflict  between  government  actions  and  minister's  own  moral 
views  in  modern  liberal  societies  does  not  arise  for  either  Plato  or  Confucius.  For  as 
mentioned  in  the  ideal  state  there  is  no  distinction  between  private  and  public 
morality.  Nevertheless  something  like  it  does  arise  when  they  consider  existing 
corrupt  societies.  The  first  view  seems  to  be  endorsed  by  Confucius  in  the  Analects, 
where  he  says  that  when  the  order  prevails  in  the  world,  then  you  should  take  a  role  in 
office.  When  it  does  not,  then  you  should  resign  from  the  office  and  retire  from 
political  life  (VIII,  13).  For  if  a  gentleman  remains  in  office  in  a  disorderly  society, 
his  own  moral  integrity  would  be  devastated  by  wickedness.  Therefore  he  should 
resign  from  his  office,  and  only  pays  attention  to  his  own  moral  character  without 
thought  of  others.  Similarly,  for  Plato  if  the  philosophers  live  in  a  disorderly  society 
not  in  an  ideal  one,  they  should  be  far  away  from  politics.  Conversely  it  is  clear  that 
the  ignore-your-own-attitude  view  would  not  be  accepted  by  Confucius,  neither  will  it 
be  accepted  by  Plato.  Since  in  the  ideal  state  the  people  in  office  are  the  philosophers. 
They  are  the  only  ones  who  can  have  an  insight  into  the  Good  itself,  and  know  what  is 
good  for  the  state  as  a  whole  and  for  individuals.  Against  this  one  might  point  out  that 
in  Republic  I  Plato  suggests  that  the  just  men  should  rule  for  fear  of  being  ruled  by 
worse  men.  Thus  it  would  seem  that,  provided  the  society  is  not  utterly  corrupt,  Plato 
should  concede  that  the  philosopher  should  play  some  part  in  politics.  There  would  be 
a  parallel  here  with  the  arguments  about  the  disadvantages  of  resignation. 
(b)  self-regarding  and  other-regarding  conduct 
Thinkers  in  the  liberal  tradition  have  been  much  concerned  with  question  of  public 
and  private  morality.  The  question:  Whether  a  person's  being  fit  for  a  public  office  or 
not  should  depend  on  his  private  moral  life?  can  be  treated  in  two  ways.  Firstly, 
public  office  and  private  morals  are  separated.  For  what  a  politician  does  after  his 
office  hour  would  be  his  business,  so  long  as  his  choice  of  doing  things  would  not  put 
the  national  security  in  danger.  J.  S.  Mill  claims  that  there  is  a  distinction  between 
self-regarding  and  other-regarding  conduct.  Thus  our  actions  are  not  accountable  to 
188 society  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  others.  2'  The  American 
president  Clinton's  sexual  scandal  might  be  a  good  example.  The  president's  sexual 
activities  are  his  personal  matters  which  are  no  one's  business  but  his.  So  far  as  he 
can  perform  the  duties  and  obligations  of  the  president,  it  does  not  matter  whether  in 
private  he  is  zealous  in  having  sex.  However,  his  using  the  presidential  power  to 
obstruct  the  judicial  justice  or  committing  perjury  in  order  to  cover  up  the  so-called 
Zippergate  scandal  may  lead  the  president  to  be  impeached.  For  his  abuse  of  the 
presidential  power  and  perjury  are  not  matters  of  self-regarding  conduct,  but  of  other- 
regarding  conduct.  They  do  harm  to  the  judicial  system  and  are  unlawful. 
Second,  there  is  a  continuity  between  the  public  office  and  private  morals.  But 
this  view  will  stand  only  when  it  is  considered  in  a  restricted  sense,  i.  e.  if  a  politician 
never  tips  the  waiter,  his  failure  of  doing  so  will  not  affect  his  political  life,  although 
people  will  call  him  mean.  If  a  politician  however  commits  an  adultery,  it  might 
affect  his  political  career.  For  example,  the  woman  with  whom  he  has  an  adultery 
might  exploit  him  to  get  the  documents  of  national  security,  if  so,  then  the  politician's 
adultery  will  put  the  country  in  danger.  Moreover  it  might  be  argued  that  the 
politician  is  a  public  example,  his  behaviour  of  adultery  will  set  a  bad  example  for  the 
society. 
This  is  again  a  problem  in  modern  liberal  societies,  I  think  nevertheless  that  both 
Plato  and  Confucius  would  take  the  continuity  view,  since  for  them  to  be  a  ruler  does 
not  only  mean  that  one  person  can  fulfill  the  role  of  the  ruler,  but  also  that  he  has  the 
kind  of  character  of  being  ruler.  When  Confucius  was  asked  by  Ji  Kang  Zi 
[H]ow  the  people  might  be  induced  to  be  respectful  and  loyal  so  that  they 
might  be  properly  encouraged.  The  Master  says:  If  you  oversee  them  with 
dignity,  they  will  be  respectful.  If  you  are  dutiful  towards  your  parents  and 
kind  to  your  children,  then  they  will  be  loyal.  If  you  promote  the  good  and 
instruct  the  incompetent,  then  they  will  be  encouraged.  (II,  20) 
Thus,  a  good  ruler  not  only  performs  his  role  properly,  but  also  possesses  the  kind  of 
21  J.  Riley,  Aii!  /:  On  Liberty  (London,  1998),  chs.  5  and  6. 
189 character  which  enables  him  to  lead  the  public  and  to  be  an  good  example  of  the 
society.  The  same  idea  appears  in  the  Republic:  before  taking  on  the  task  of  ruling  the 
philosophers  would  receive  a  long-term  education,  which  consists  of  physical, 
intellectual,  and  moral  education.  When  they  pass  all  tests,  then  they  will  not  only  be 
competent  but  also  have  a  good  character  for  ruling.  In  other  words,  the  philosophers 
would  be  not  only  socially  but  psychologically  just. 
To  put  this  chapter  in  a  nut  shell.  The  problems  of  role  conflict  which  confront 
modern  liberal  philosophers  do  not  arise  for  both  Plato  and  Confucius.  Firstly,  both 
Plato  and  Confucius  think  that  the  interest  of  an  individual  is  identical  with  that  of  the 
state  as  a  whole.  What  is  good  for  the  state  is  good  for  the  individual.  Thus  the 
philosophers  do  not  worry  about  which  one  they  have  to  choose,  ruling  or 
contemplation.  Secondly,  as  natural  law  theorists,  they  do  not  distinguish  law  from 
morality.  All  legal  and  political  obligations  have  to  be  explained  on  the  basis  of 
morality.  However,  Confucius  and  Plato  do  not  see  law  as  the  best  means  to  govern  a 
state.  Thirdly,  the  conflict  between  public  and  private  morality  is  a  problem  for 
modern  liberal  societies,  not  for  Plato  and  Confucius.  For  Plato  rejects  the  distinction 
between  self-regarding  and  other-regarding  conduct,  partly  because  he  sees  it  as  the 
main  purpose  of  the  state  to  promote  virtue  and  partly  because  lie  has  an  agent  centred 
view  of  virtue.  What  matters  for  him  is  not  primarily  the  sort  of  acts  one  does  but  the 
sort  of  person  one  is.  Confucius  rejects  the  distinction  between  self-regarding  and 
other-regarding  conduct,  partly  because  the  superior  manhood  can  only  be  achieved 
within  society,  and  partly  because  any  sensible  account  of  moral  agency  should 
involve  both  agent-centred  and  act-centred  view  of  morality.  One's  inner  character  is 
revealed  as  much  (or  more)  by  one's  private  actions  as  by  one's  public  ones. 
190 Chapter  12 
Roles  and  Communitarianism 
Human  beings  are  like  actors,  says  P.  Morea,  in  that  "  [f]rom  womb  to  tomb  we  are 
influenced  by  our  fellow  actors  and  we  act  the  way  they  expect  us  to.  "'  Society,  in  the 
language  of  the  theatre,  can  be  said  to  provide  the  script  for  all  the  dramatis  personae. 
Each  individual  actor  has  to  fulfill  the  role  to  which  he  is  assigned.  As  long  as  the 
individual  actors  play  their  roles  in  the  light  of  the  provided  script,  the  play  of  society 
can  be  on  track  as  planned.  In  this  chapter  I  propose  to  discuss  three  topics:  firstly,  I 
would  like  to  discuss  the  relation  between  roles  and  social  control  to  see  how  by 
acting  in  one's  role  social  order  can  he  maintained,  secondly,  i  shall  discuss  the 
sociological  view  of  a  role  to  show  how  for  the  sociologists  we  acquire  our  role  or 
roles;  and  finally,  the  issue  of  the  similarities  between  the  role-performance  analysis 
of  society  and  communitarianism  will  be  considered. 
1.  Roles  and  social  control 
We  are  all  familiar  with  the  analogy  between  the  individual  citizens  in  a  society  and 
actors  in  a  play.  Morea's  statement,  however,  may  overstate  the  case,  since  actors  in  a 
play  have  no  choices  at  all  about  what  they  do  or  say,  but  have  to  follow  their  scripts. 
But  people  in  a  society  may  still  have  a  considerable  number  of  choices.  They  have 
more  freedom  to  choose  what  they  want  to  do.  Only  when  they  make  their  choices,  i.  e. 
they  consent  to  take  up  a  role,  do  they  have  to  fulfill  the  duties  or  obligations  which 
arise  from  the  role. 
Social  stability  can  be  achieved  by  social  control.  2  lt  would  be  hard  to  imagine 
that  a  society  can  harmoniously  exist  without  social  control.  In  our  everyday 
1  P.  Morea,  Personality:  An  I»trotlruclio,  r  to  11w  llwories  of  Psvcholo  '  (London,  1990),  p.  117. 
2  P.  Berger,  hn'itationt  to  Sociology  (London,  1963),  pp.  83-94. experience,  even  in  a  video  rental  shop,  for  example,  we  can  find  a  mechanism  of 
control,  if  the  shop  is  to  be  run  properly. 
There  are  three  different  ways  in  which  social  control  can  be  observed,  1)  The 
first  and  the  oldest  method  of  social  control  is  physical  violence.  This  can  be  seen  in 
most  modern  democratic  societies  in  which  policemen  are  armed.  Although  in  some 
societies  policemen  are  not  armed,  such  as  Britain,  yet  the  last  step  in  dealing  with 
someone  who  evades  tax,  for  example,  might  be  that  policemen  show  up  at  the  door 
with  a  warrant  and  take  him  to  the  court.  The  action  of  taking  someone  into  custody 
may  be  seen  as  a  kind  of  physical  violence,  which  is  one  of  the  methods  of  social 
control.  Moreover,  capital  punishment  in  some  societies  is  regarded  as  a  method  of 
preventing  people  from  committing  crimes.  For  the  authorities  in  those  societies 
believe  that  the  abolition  of  capital  punishment  will  lead  to  the  increasing  of  criminal 
rate  and  cause  social  instability. 
However  this  does  not  mean  that  the  constant  use  of  force  in  society  is  practical 
and  effective.  The  use  of  force  has  to  be  on  behalf  of  the  majority  of  the  people.  It  has 
to  be  accepted  and  understood  by  people  that  it  is  good  for  them  and  for  society  as  a 
whole  that  force  is  employed.  Take  an  example,  there  have  been  armed  forces 
patrolling  in  London  since  the  IRA  started  bombing.  But  people  would  feel  strange  or 
somewhat  terrified  by  patrolling  armed  forces  in  the  street  if  the  bombing  had  never 
happened.  The  existence  of  armed  forces  in  the  street  is  accepted  by  people  since  they 
realize  that  it  will  bring  social  order  back  and  their  lives  can  be  secured.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  the  role  of  force  in  social  control  can  be  introduced. 
2)  The  second  method  of  social  control  has  three  elements:  a)  morality,  b) 
custom,  and  c)  manners.  (a)  In  a  morality  which  emphasizes  role-performance,  to  be  a 
morally  good  bank  clerk  is  to  perform  the  role  of  bank  clerk  properly.  If  one  who  is  a 
bank  clerk  fails  to  play  his  role  properly,  e.  g.  by  embezzling  public  funds,  he  is 
immoral.  As  a  result  of  his  being  immoral  he  may  lose  his  job  and  even  be  put  into 
jail.  (b)  Custom  is  also  a  powerful  factor  in  social  controllability.  A  few  years  ago,  for 
example,  it  would  be  impossible  to  imagine  that  gay  people  dared  to  stand  up  to 
people's  curious  eyes  and  to  claim  their  rights.  For  their  behaviour  went  against  social 
custom  and  their  claim  of  gay  people's  rights  might  have  caused  them  to  lose  their 
jobs  or  made  it  difficult  for  them  to  find  other  ones.  (c)  Bad  manners  will  lead  one  to 
192 be  unpopular  within  a  group.  One  might  even  be  dismissed  in  a  company  because  of 
one's  bad  manners  towards  one's  superior. 
It  can  be  seen  that  all  these  three  elements  require  people  to  be  conformists.  In 
other  words,  (a)  the  individuals'  behaviour  has  to  be  in  conformity  with  moral  rules 
which  give  rise  to  the  duties  and  obligations  of  roles.  (b)  The  individuals'  behaviour 
has  to  conform  to  the  custom  in  their  society,  which  is  accepted  and  practiced  by  most 
people.  (c)  The  individuals'  manners  have  to  conform  to  what  most  people  think  that 
is  a  good  manners,  since  they  live  in  a  web  of  social  relation. 
It  might  be  worth  questioning  here,  in  spite  of  the  similarity  between  these  three 
elements,  whether  morality,  custom,  and  manners  are  identical  with  each  other  or  not. 
It  is  obvious  that  custom  is  different  from  morality  in  that  moral  rules  would  not  vary 
from  society  to  society.  But  custom  is  regional,  two  different  societies  might  have 
different  customs.  Therefore  the  requirements  of  morality  and  custom  would  be 
different.  That  is,  morality  requires  people  to  act  morally  in  all  circumstances, 
whereas  people  might  behave  differently  according  to  different  social  customs. 
Furthermore,  if  good  manners  is  to  mean  etiquette,  then  it  might  be  different  from 
morality.  For,  in  this  sense,  to  have  a  good  manners  is  merely  to  follow  the  formal 
rules  of  proper  social  behaviour.  What  is  the  difference  between  custom  and  manners? 
Custom  is  "  [a]  form  of  repeated  rational  action,  in  which  past  performance  provides 
the  reason  for  present  practice,  .... 
";  To  act  in  accordance  with  custom  is  to  perform 
an  action  which  is  practised  by  most  people  in  society.  The  distinction  between 
custom  and  manners  is  not  always  clear.  We  often  say  that  it  is  customary  to  tip  the 
waiter  or  waitress  in  a  restaurant.  However,  how  we  carry  out  the  action  tipping  the 
waiter  would  be  a  matter  of  manners.  We  might  tip  the  waiter  in  a  very  rude  or  polite 
way.  Manners  is  more  specific  about  how  we  behave  towards  others.  While  custom 
tells  us  what  kind  of  behaviour  is  commonly  or  customarily  performed  by  people. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  for  Plato  and  Confucius,  morality  is  something  different 
from  or  more  than  acting  in  accordance  with  rules  of  proper  conduct.  To  be  genuinely 
moral,  for  Plato,  is  something  to  do  with  agent's  inner  mental  state,  i.  e.  reason  is 
properly  in  control.  For  Confucius  following  the  rules  of  social  conduct  cannot  be 
1  R.  Scruton,  A  Dictionary  of  Political  Thought  (London,  1982),  p.  110. 
193 regarded  as  morality,  since  it  lacks  a  kind  of  feeling  for  people.  Both  Plato  and 
Confucius  would  agree  that  morality  is  a  matter  of  what  kind  of  person  you  are,  i.  e. 
having  a  good  character,  not  merely  of  what  kind  of  act  you  perform.  For  Plato 
without  a  good  character  reason  might  be  subject  to  the  control  of  desires,  which 
makes  it  be  unable  to  deliberate  properly.  The  philosophers  having  a  harmonious  soul 
are  able  to  make  a  proper  judgement  all  things  considered.  Although  Confucius  does 
not  have  a  notion  of  reason  in  the  Analects,  he  claims  that  the  superior  man,  who 
possesses  a  well  cultivated  character,  is  humane,  brave,  and  wise  (IX,  29). 
3)  The  third  method  of  social  control  is  the  human  group;  that  is,  one's  family  or 
personal  friends  can  also  constitute  a  control  system.  It  is  in  the  family  or  in  the  circle 
of  friends  that  one  has  the  most  important  and  basic  social  ties.  And  it  could  be  a 
disaster  if  one  person  is  expelled  from  his  family  or  the  circle  of  his  friends,  since  one 
would  possibly  be  out  of  society  and  become  a  worthless  nobody.  Thus  in  order  to 
keep  oneself  in  this  social  tie,  one's  behaviour  has  to  conform  to  others'  expectations, 
and  play  one's  social  roles  properly.  It  is  worth  noting  that  Plato,  of  course,  in  the 
Republic  seeks  to  abolish  the  traditional  family  but  to  turn  the  state  into  a  single 
family  to  replace  it.  4  Confucius  on  the  other  hand  sees  the  family  as  the  foundation  of 
social  stability. 
In  sum,  no  matter  which  method  of  social  control  we  refer  to,  we  can  find  a 
common  basis  among  them,  that  is,  they  all  require  people  to  play  their  roles  properly 
in  society.  It  is  playing  social  roles  properly  that  people  can  prevent  themselves  from 
being  punished  or  expelled  from  families  or  groups. 
2.  The  sociological  conception  of  a  role 
From  role-performance  to  social  control:  we  can  see  that  we  are  in  society  and  play 
roles  in  the  social  system.  In  what  follows,  I  shall  proceed  to  discuss  the  sociological 
conception  of  a  role,  and  individual  identity. 
4  Plato  says  at  414e  that  the  Guardians  must  regard  their  fellow  citizens  as  "  brothers  born  of  the  same 
mother  earth.  " 
194 We  all  play  some  roles  in  society  so  we  all  arouse  some  expectations  in  others', 
and  also  expect  something  from  others.  As  Berger  points  out, 
[Social]  institutions  pattern  our  actions  and  even  shape  our  expectations. 
They  reward  us  to  the  extent  that  we  stay  within  our  assigned  performances, 
If  we  step  out  of  these  assignments,  society  has  at  its  disposal  an  almost 
infinite  variety  of  controlling  and  coercing  agencies.  ` 
This  seems  to  suggest  that  society  is  like  a  prison,  "  [t]here  is  no  '  outside  'I  can 
climb  over  the  wall  and  escape  to  ".  6  For  if  I  climb  outside  the  wall,  then  I  will  be 
punished  because  of  my  breaking  the  sanctions  of  society. 
In  the  view  of  sociologists,  such  as  Berger  and  Mead,  individual  identity  is 
socially  given,  socially  maintained  and  socially  transformed.?  That  is  to  say,  other 
people's  view  or  expectations  of  us  would  he  the  basis  of  our  self,  and  our  self  is 
transformed  in  accordance  with  the  different  roles  we  occupy.  In  the  former  case  a 
university  lecturer's  identity,  for  example,  does  not  only  depend  on  the  fact  that  he 
plays  the  role  of  university  lecturer  well,  i.  e.  he  always  gives  lessons  on  regular  basis, 
but  also  on  his  students.  For  if  his  students  do  not  respect  him,  they  talk  through 
lectures,  and  stop  attending  lectures,  then  the  identity  of  the  university  lecturer  will  be 
jeopardized.  In  the  latter  case  a  recently  promoted  manager,  for  example,  might  feel 
uncomfortable  when  his  colleagues  call  him  `  manager  ',  whereas  as  time  lapses  he 
will  get  used  to  his  new  role  and  new  title.  Thus  personal  identity  goes  with  our 
different  social  roles  and  other  people's  view  of  us,  and  Rawls'  assertion  that  there  is 
real  self  behind  social  roles  we  occupy  is  rejected  by  this  kind  of  social  behaviourism. 
For  the  "  unobservable  '  real  self  beneath  '  would  not  be  scientific,  and  sounds  a 
shade  mystical.  "' 
The  process  of  finding  our  self  is  so-called  socialization,  and  there  is  a  good 
s  Berger,  op.  cit.  p.  108. 
6  Morea,  op.  cit.  p.  116. 
T  Berger,  op.  cit.  p.  116. 
1  MMorea,  op.  cit.  p.  122. 
195 account  of  it  given  by  Mead,  9  who  asserts  that  human  self  emerges  in  three  stages. 
First,  there  is  a  preparatory  stage,  in  which  the  infant  meaninglessly  imitates  others.  In 
this  stage  there  is  no  understanding  involved  in  imitation.  Second,  there  is  a  play  stage, 
where  a  child  goes  on  doing  what  others  do,  but  with  a  gleam  of  understanding.  At 
this  stage,  by  playing  others'  parts,  such  as  mother,  father,  brother,  sister,  the  child  has 
many  `  selfs  ',  and  each  of  them  has  its  own  behaviour.  It  shows  that  at  this  stage  the 
child  has  no  grasp  of  his  or  her  own  identity.  Third,  there  is  a  game  stage,  in  which  as 
the  child  has  contact  with  more  and  more  people,  he  or  she  realizes  "  what  different 
people  expect  of  a  particular  child  has  many  features  in  common.  "  "  So  the  child 
moves  from  many  selfs,  each  appropriate  for  one  particular  significant  others,  to  a 
single  core  self  which  meets  the  expectations  of  a  composite  generalized  other.  "t0 
In  this  interpretation,  personal  identity  is  neither  something  behind  our  social 
roles,  nor  something  given  by  others.  Personal  identity  has  to  go  with  social 
recognition.  Each  individual  learns  to  play  his  or  her  own  roles  properly  by  virtue  of 
imitating  or  playing  others'  roles  at  his  or  her  early  stage.  It  is  through  playing  the 
roles  of  others  that  a  child  discovers  the  significance  of  roles  which  are  assigned  to 
him  or  her.  Children's  learning  to  play  their  own  roles  takes  place  in  interaction  with 
other  human  beings,  such  as  their  parents  and  siblings.  In  other  words,  a  child's 
learning  to  play  his  or  her  own  roles  occurs  in  society.  Only  when  the  child  can  grasp 
the  general  concept  of  society,  is  he  or  she  able  to  form  the  concept  of  himself  or 
herself:  Thus  [s]elf'  and  `  society  ',  in  the  child's  experience,  are  two  sides  of  the 
same  coin.  "" 
The  assertion  of'  the  two  sides  of  the  same  coin  '  seems  to  go  hand  in  hand  with 
Confucian  philosophy.  A  person  can  understand  his  or  her  self  only  when  he  or  she  is 
in  the  society.  A  person  outside  society  is  unimaginable  for  Confucius.  For,  in 
Confucius'  view,  we  are  born  into  a  family  in  which  we  acquire  our  basic  social  roles, 
son  or  daughter,  brother  or  sister.  Our  personal  identity  would  be  largely  determined 
by  the  roles  we  play  both  in  the  family  and  the  society.  Although  Plato  in  the  Republic 
proposes  to  abolish  the  family,  he  would  agree  that  our  individual  identity  is 
9  Morca,  op.  cit.  pp.  120-121. 
10  op.  cit.  p.  121. 
11  Berger,  op.  cit.  p.  11  T. 
196 intimately  linked  with  our  social  roles.  One  man,  for  Plato,  does  one  job  for  which  he 
is  naturally  suited  (370b).  Who  we  are  and  what  we  do  in  the  state  are  decided  by  our 
nature. 
However,  Plato's  account  of  immortality  of  soul,  in  Book  X  of  the  Republic  and 
the  Phaedu,  seems  to  suggest  that  we  are  not  primarily  social,  and  we  are  independent 
of  any  society.  For  if  it  makes  sense  to  speak  of  the  same  individual  as  having  many 
lives  then  his  identity  cannot  be  constituted  by  any  particular  society.  Nevertheless, 
Plato  thinks  that  the  society  where  we  were  born  into  has  a  great  influence  upon  our 
characters.  Plato's  account  of  the  corrupted  societies  in  Book  VIII  and  IX  shows  that 
in  a  corrupted  society  one  might  have  a  corrupted  character.  And  in  a  corrupted 
society  one's  identity  would  not  be  one's  true  identity.  For  one's  true  nature  or 
function  is  distorted  by  the  corrupted  society.  So  our  true  identity  would  be  the 
identity  we  have  in  an  ideal  state.  For,  in  Plato's  view,  each  one  has  to  do  one  job  for 
which  he  or  she  is  naturally  suited.  It  suggests  that  one's  identity  is  determined  by 
one's  natural  function  in  the  ideal  society.  Thus  only  in  the  ideal  state  can  one  have  a 
true  recognition  of  who  one  is. 
3.  The  liberal  and  communitarian  conception  of  a  role 
The  role-performance  theorists'  emphasis  on  the  attachments  to  society  seems  to  go 
against  Gauthier's  assertion,  when  he  writes  that  the  individual  "  is  not  bound  by 
fixed  social  roles,  either  in  her  activities  or  in  her  feelings.  Although  social  affective 
relationships  are  essential  to  the  liberal  individual,  there  are  no  essential  social 
relationships.  "12  However,  the  coin  munitarians,  such  as  Sandel  and  MacIntyre,  assert 
that  one  cannot  be  properly  understood  unless  we  refer  to  one's  social,  cultural  and 
historical  context.  The  individuals  are  bound  up  with  the  sanction  of  social  roles  and 
they  are  members  of  society  bound  by  moral  tics.  1;  Thus  it  would  be  difficult  to 
12  D.  Gauthier,  "  The  Liberal  Individual  ",  ("oýmmnirilarianism  and  huliridualism,  (ed.  )  Shlomo  Avineri 
and  Avner  de-Shalit  (Oxford,  1995),  p.  155. 
M.  Sandel,  "  The  Procedural  Republic  and  The  Unencumbered  Self  ",  Ibid.  p.  19.  S.  Mullhall  and  A. 
Swift,  "  Maclntyre:  The  Morality  Atler  Virtue  ",  in  Liberals  and  Communiraria'1.  v  (Oxtbrd,  1994),  pp. 
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mentioned,  he  would  be  a  worthless  nobody,  or  a  person  "  without  character,  without 
moral  depth  ".  14  In  objecting  to  Rawls'  account  of  `  the  veil  of  ignorance  '  Sandel 
says, 
As  a  self-interpreting  being,  I  am  able  to  reflect  on  my  history  and  in  this 
sense  to  distance  myself  from  it,  but  the  distance  is  always  precarious  and 
provisional,  the  point  of  reflection  never  finally  secured  outside  the  history 
itself.  " 
The  existence  of  society  is  antecedent  to  us  and  we  survive  and  flourish  within  it. 
Society  existed  before  we  were  born  and  will  continue  to  exist  after  we  are  dead. 
Thus  society  is  a  historical  entity,  one's  identity  can  only  be  found  in  a  social, 
historical  and  cultural  context.  Beyond  these  one's  identity  will  not  be  secured.  Here 
we  find  a  similarity  between  role-performance  and  communitarianism,  i.  e.  the 
emphasis  on  social  attachment. 
In  addition  to  this  view  on  how  our  selves  are  constituted,  i.  e.  one's  identity  is 
dependent  upon  the  society  where  one  lives,  there  is  a  second  view.  In  Rawls'  account 
of  `  the  veil  of  ignorance  '  we  are  told  that  the  individuals  can  be  identified  only  by 
virtue  of  their  capacity  of  choice.  The  individuals'  social,  historical  and  cultural 
context  are  out  of  consideration  here.  For,  in  Rawls'  view,  these  factors  would  impede 
people  from  choosing  rationally  principles  of  justice  which  define  the  basic  structure 
of  the  society.  Thereby  social  justice  can  never  be  achieved.  Individualists  claim  that 
one's  self  is  unencumbered.  One  is  not  bound  up  with  social  roles,  and  not  necessarily 
to  be  understood  in  a  social,  and  traditional  context.  One's  identity  is  constituted  by 
one's  capacity  to  choose. 
Both  Confucius  and  Plato  would  think  that  the  good  of  the  society  as  a  whole  is 
prior  to  the  individual  right.  However  for  the  individualists,  the  situation  should  be 
reversed.  J.  Rawls  says, 
70-100. 
"  op.  cit.  p.  23. 
15  Ibid.  p.  24. 
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that  we  would  acknowledge  to  govern  the  background  conditions  under 
which  these  aims  are  to  be  formed  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are  to  be 
pursued.  For  the  self  is  prior  to  the  ends  which  are  affirmed  by  it;  even  a 
dominant  end  must  be  chosen  from  among  numerous  possibilities.  There  is 
no  way  to  get  beyond  deliberative  rationality.  We  should  therefore  reverse 
the  relation  between  the  right  and  the  good  proposed  by  teleological 
doctrines  and  view  the  right  as  prior.  16 
Thus  in  Rawls'  view  one's  identity  is  not  bound  up  with  aims  and  interests.  Rather 
freedom  requires  that  we  be  able  to  choose  our  aims  and  interests. 
The  relationship  between  freedom  of  choice  and  society  is  brought  out  by 
Taylor,  who  objects  to  the  idea  of  atomism  that  to  be  a  proper  human  is  to  have 
freedom  to  choose  one's  own  mode  of  life.  Taylor  says  that  "  freedom  and  individual 
diversity  can  only  flourish  in  a  society  where  there  is  a  general  recognition  of  their 
worth.  ""  That  is,  one's  freedom  of  choice  is  conditioned  by  the  society  in  which  one 
lives.  In  a  monogamous  society,  for  example,  one  can  only  marry  a  woman  or  a  man 
as  one's  wife  or  husband.  One's  choosing  to  be  polygamous  would  be  unacceptable  to 
the  society.  Furthermore,  for  example,  once  one  decides  to  marry  a  woman  whom  one 
has  dated  for  a  long  time,  one's  choice  of  getting  married  leads  one  to  take  the  role  of 
husband  or  the  role  of  father  in  the  future.  What  a  man's  wife  expects  of  him  is  to 
support  the  family  by  working  hard.  Thus  one's  individual  identity  as  a  husband  can 
only  be  recognized  within  a  society  where  a  husband's  duty  or  obligation  is  to  take 
care  of  the  family  by  working  hard.  Since 
the  free  individual  can  only  maintain  his  identity  within  a  society/culture  of  a 
certain  kind,  he  has  to  be  concerned  about  the  shape  of  this  society/culture  as 
a  whole.  He  cannot,  ..., 
be  concerned  purely  with  his  individual  choices  and 
the  associations  formed  from  such  choices  to  the  neglect  of  the  matrix  in 
16  J.  Rawls,  Al  ivory  of  Justice  (Oxford,  1973),  p.  560. 
17  C.  Taylor,  "  Atomism  ".  op.  cit.  p.  47. 
199 which  such  choices  can  be  open  or  closed,  rich  or  meager.  (8 
We  can  never  maintain  individual  identity  on  our  own,  it  is  always  dependent  upon 
conversation  with  others,  i.  e.  the  expectation  of  other  people,  or  upon  the  common 
understanding  which  is  the  cause  of  the  practices  of  our  society.  Having  a  role  in  a 
social  system  always  entails  expectations  of  others.  Thus  our  discovery  of  ourselves 
inevitably  depends  upon  the  views  of  others. 
At  the  outset  of  this  chapter  I  mentioned  that  the  stability  of  society  is  partly 
dependent  upon  each  individual's  performing  his  or  her  role  properly,  and  partly  upon 
social  control.  It  implies  that  each  individual  has  to  play  his  or  her  role  well  not  only 
because  it  is  good  for  each  individual,  i.  e.  they  can  keep  their  positions  in  the  society, 
but  also  it  is  good  for  a  society  as  a  whole,  i.  e.  it  promotes  stability  and  prosperity. 
Now  that  each  individual's  identity  has  to  be  found  in  society  and  in  interaction  with 
other  people,  it  would  be  natural,  it  seems  to  me,  to  assert  that  only  when  the  good  of 
society  as  a  whole  is  secured  can  the  individual  pursue  his  or  her  own  good.  Therefore 
when  there  is  a  conflict  between  what  is  good  for  the  individual  and  what  is  good  for 
the  society  as  a  whole,  one  has  to  give  priority  to  the  good  of  the  society  as  a  whole. 
For  without  the  good  of  the  society,  social  order,  being  secured  the  pursuit  of  the 
individual  good  is  meaningless. 
However,  the  individualists  would  deny  that  there  is  common  good,  they  assert 
instead  that  each  individual  has  his  or  her  own  conception  of  good,  and  he  or  she  is 
free  to  pursue  his  or  her  own  good.  This  view  is  disputed  by  the  communitarians,  such 
as  Maclntyre,  who  insists  on  the  need  for 
[...  the  notion  of  desert  is  at  home  only  in  the  context  of]  a  community  whose 
primary  bond  is  a  shared  understanding  both  of  the  good  for  man  and  of  the 
good  of  that  community  and  where  individuals  identify  their  primary 
interests  with  reference  to  those  goods.  19 
The  shared  understanding  both  of  the  good  for  the  individual  and  of  the  good  of 
IR  Taylor,  op.  cit.  p.  47. 
19  A.  Macintyre,  "  Justice  as  a  Virtue:  Changing  Conceptions  ",  Ibid.  p.  58. 
200 society  implies  the  constraints  on  freedom.  For  the  conception  of  duties  seems  to 
construct  the  value  of  a  common  good  that  consists  in  a  certain  sort  of  ideal  social  life, 
a  network  of  relationships,  which  can  be  defined  in  terms  of  social  roles.  2°  In  a 
society  it  would  be  our  duty  to  achieve  the  common  good.  Duties  and  obligations 
always  entail  some  sort  of  limitations.  To  play  a  role  is  to  fulfill  the  duties  which  are 
prescribed  by  the  role,  and  to  fulfill  the  duties  is  to  come  up  to  other  people's 
expectations.  Therefore  the  linkage  between  role-performance  and  the  common  good 
becomes  clear. 
The  similarities  between  the  role-performance  analysis  of  society  and 
communitarianism,  in  my  point  of  view,  can  be  presented  in  three  aspects:  1)  the 
individual  is  attached  to  society;  2)  the  individual's  identity  is  constituted  by  society; 
and  3)  the  pursuit  of  individual  good  may  be  restricted  to  some  extent  for  the  sake  of 
the  common  good.  Both  the  role-performance  analysis  of  society  and 
communitarianism  emphasize  that  an  individual  can  only  be  understood  in  his  social, 
cultural,  and  historical  background.  Human  beings  are  social,  each  one  is  understood 
as  'a  repertoire  of  roles  ',  with  which  one's  self  is  identified.  In  fulfilling  one's  roles 
one  fulfills  the  duties  and  obligations  of  those  roles,  and  meets  others'  expectations. 
One's  identity  is  thus  found  in  interaction  with  other  people,  and  this  interaction  can 
only  happen  in  society.  Both  the  role-performance  analysis  of  society  and 
communitarianism  would  agree  that  individual  autonomy  would  be  better  achieved 
within  society  rather  outside  society,  in  that  an  individual  outside  society  would  be 
difficult  to  be  understood,  and  his  or  her  live  would  be  morally  meaningless. 
In  conclusion.  In  order  to  maintain  social  order,  people  in  the  society  have  to 
perform  their  role  or  roles  properly.  However  when  the  social  order  is  in  danger,  the 
introduction  of  social  control  could  keep  people  in  their  proper  stations  and  bring  the 
order  back.  Thus  the  notion  of  social  control  helps  us  to  see  why  doing  one's  own  job 
is  essential  to  the  stability  of  the  society.  The  similarities  between  role-performance 
analysis  of  society  and  communitarianism  show  that  the  meaning  of  our  existence  can 
only  be  found  in  the  society.  For  what  role  we  play  in  the  society  constitutes  the 
understanding  of  our  own  self.  Detaching  from  the  society  would  be  impossible  for  us 
20  P.  Singer,  A  Companion  to  Ethics  (Oxford,  1994),  p.  445. 
201 to  define  our  own  identity.  Both  Plato  and  Confucius  would  be  hostile  to  the  liberal 
view.  Confucius,  as  we  saw  in  chapter  3,  would  have  much  in  common  with  the 
communitarians.  But,  in  spite  of  superficial  similarities,  Plato's  position  is 
fundamentally  different  because  he  believes  that  roles  depend  on  our  nature.  2 
21  See  appendix. 
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Roles  and  Act-Centred  Theory 
It  seems  to  be  a  commonplace  that  ethical  theories  can  be  distinguished,  in  a  broad 
way,  into  two  types:  act-centred  and  agent-centred.  Some  scholars,  such  as  N.  J.  li. 
Dent,  might  disagree  with  this  distinction,  since  they  hold  the  view  that  this 
distinction  is  `  far  too  facile  '  to  give  a  full  account  of  morality.  '  Nevertheless,  in  this 
chapter  I  shall  still  make  use  of  the  distinction  in  order  to  explore  the  relationship 
between  the  act-centred  theory  and  role  morality.  Meanwhile  I  shall  refer  to  Plato's 
Republic  and  Confucius'  Analec[.  c  to  help  me  to  give  an  account  of  it. 
1.  Role  obligation  and  act-centred  theory 
Act-centred  theory  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  right  action  or  conduct.  Its  central 
notions  are  about  obligation,  duty,  `  morally  ought  '  and  '  ought  not  ',  and  right  and 
wrong.  It  follows  that  the  proper  answer  to  the  question  '  What  is  the  right  thing  to 
do?  ',  in  an  act-centred  view,  will  be  that  one  should  conform  oneself  to  those  duties 
and  obligations.  That  is  to  say,  a  good  man  is  the  one  who  is  able  to  fulfill  his  duties 
and  obligations,  and  perform  the  proper  actions  on  all  occasions.  Therefore  we  can 
identify  a  good  man  as  one  who  is  capable  of  and  willing  to  do  his  duty,  and  his  virtue 
64  lies  in  conscientiousness  about  doing  the  right  thing.  ,2 
Another  picture  which  is  different  from  the  act-centred  theory  is  agent-centred 
theory.  It  is  principally  concerned  with  the  good  person  or  good  agent.  The  central 
notions  of  agent-centred  theory  are  of  virtue,  and  goodness.  So  the  question  will  not 
he  the  same  as  the  one  which  is  proposed  by  act-centred  theory,  but  will  be  '  What 
kind  of  person  should  I  he?  '  And  the  proper  answer  to  the  question  will  not  refer  to 
N.  J.  H.  Dent,  "  Virtue  and  Action  ",  Philosophical  Quarterly,  vol.  25,1975,  pp.  331-2. 
2  J.  Annas,  An  Introduction  to  Platos  Republic  (Oxford,  1981),  p.  157. agent's  external  actions,  but  rather  to  his  or  her  internal  state,  that  is,  his  or  her 
character.  On  this  view  a  person  is identified  by  people  as  just,  not  because  he  or  she 
does  the  right  action  at  the  right  moment,  on  the  right  occasion,  but  because  he  or  she 
possesses  the  very  character  which  is  relevant  to  justice.  The  just  actions  he  or  she 
does  are  only  the  expressions  of  the  very  character  she  or  he  possesses.  Consequently, 
we  can  clearly  see  that  act-centred  theory  is  directly  connected  with  action,  agent- 
centred  theory,  however,  is  not.  As  J.  Laird  points  out  that  "  agent-ethics  includes 
potentiality;  act-ethics,  directly  at  least,  does  not.  Apart  from  that,  agent-ethics  is  not 
restrict  to  willed  action,  but  act-centred  is  so  restricted.  0  The  agent-ethics  is  not 
restricted  to  willed  action  only,  because  some  involuntary  actions  can  reveal  one's 
character  as  much  as  voluntary  ones.  Furthermore,  the  '  potentiality  ',  in  my 
understanding,  means  that  when  we  talk  of  character  we  are  talking  of  potentiality  or 
tendency.  That  is,  a  person  who  possesses  the  character  of  temperance  has  the 
potentiality  to  behave  moderately  and  temperately.  It  is  by  his  character  that  he  will 
behave  this  or  that  way. 
I  hope  that  this  brief  account  of  the  distinction  between  act-centred  and  agent- 
centred  theory  will  be  helpful  in  bringing  out  the  main  topic  of  this  chapter.  The 
concept  of  role  morality  presupposes  that  a  social  system  will  not  operate  on  its  own. 
Its  operations  are  the  products  of  individuals  acting  in  social  roles.  The  individuals 
are  not  to  act  as  independent  agents,  rather  they  are  acting  in  social  roles,  i.  e.  they  are 
in  a  social  web.  Social  roles  entail  duties  and  obligations  prescribed  or  determined  by 
the  institutions  which  give  rise  to  the  social  roles.  4  So  a  good  person  will  be  the  one 
who  is  capable  of  fulfilling  the  duties  or  obligations  of  his  or  her  social  roles.  Thus 
role  morality  gives  a  central  place  to  role  obligation,  for  role  obligation  is  described 
by  M.  0.  Hardimon  as  "a  moral  requirement,  which  attaches  to  an  institutional  role, 
whose  content  is  fixed  by  the  function  of  the  role,  and  whose  normative  force  flows 
from  the  role.  "5  From  this  it  follows  that  to  be  in  a  role  or  to  play  a  role  well  is  to 
fulfill  the  obligations  of  that  role.  Therefore  a  good  husband  is  one  who  plays  his  role 
as  a  husband  well,  e.  g.  supports  his  family,  is  loyal  to  his  wife,  etc..  The  same  account 
3  J.  Laird,  "  Act-ethics  and  Agent-ethics  ",  Mind,  vol.  LV,  1946,  p.  114. 
4  R.  S.  Downie,  "  Social  Roles  and  Moral  Responsibility  ",  Philosophy,  vol.  XXXIX,  1964,  p.  29. 
3  M.  O.  Hardimon,  "  Role  Obligation  ",  The  Journal  of  Philosophy-,  vol.  XCL,  1994,  p.  334. 
204 can  be  found  in  the  act-centred  theory  -  that  being  a  good  husband  is  to  fulfill  the 
duties  of  being  a  husband. 
Two  points  are  noticeable:  first,  role  obligations  arc  obligations  which  fall  on  us 
as  a  consequence  of  our  place  in  society.  In  other  words,  to  be  a  student  I  have  to 
fulfill  the  obligations  prescribed  by  the  role.  However  one  might  argue  that  there 
might  be  duties  and  obligations  which  apply  to  all  men  irrespective  of  their  place  in 
society.  In  the  view  of  natural  law  theorists,  for  example,  we  are  required  to  be  honest 
irrespective  of  our  place  in  society.  But  a  footballer,  for  example,  might  have  to  make 
some  false  movements  to  cheat  his  opponents  in  order  to  score  a  goal.  The  natural  law 
theorists  might  argue  that  the  footballer  is  immoral  because  he  is  not  honest,  i.  e. 
scoring  a  goal  by  cheating  his  opponents.  Whereas  the  role  moralists  would  argue  that 
the  footballer  is  morally  good  because  he  fulfills  the  obligations  prescribed  by  the  role 
he  occupies.  Thus  whether  one  has  to  be  honest,  in  the  view  of  role  morality,  will 
depend  upon  occasion.  That  is,  what  role  one  occupies  at  the  moment. 
Second,  according  to  my  argument,  role  morality  can  be  regarded  as  act-centred 
theory.  However  does  it  mean  that  there  is  no  distinction  between  role  morality  and 
act-centred  theory?  If  there  is  then  what  would  be  the  distinction.  Or  put  the  question 
in  this  way:  Is  it  justifiable  to  say  that  act-centred  theory  is  role  morality?  The  answer 
to  this,  I  think,  is  controversial.  For,  as  mentioned,  role  morality  gives  a  central  place 
to  roles.  By  acting  in  a  role,  let  us  say,  a  fish  monger,  I  have  obligations  to  fulfill,  and 
in  the  meantime  can  claim  my  right  as  a  fish  monger.  That  is,  I  have  right  to  receive 
money  from  my  customers  as  long  as  I  give  them  the  kind  of  fish  they  want. 
Therefore  role  morality  is  concerned  with  obligations  and  roles,  rights  and 
responsibilities.  However  it  seems  to  me  that  act-centred  morality  does  not 
necessarily  give  a  central  place  to  roles.  I  am  alone  in  a  desert  island,  for  example, 
and  there  is  an  abandoned  mansion.  In  order  to  keep  myself  warm  in  the  cold  weather 
I  enter  into  the  mansion  and  occupy  it.  Here  I  do  not  act  in  any  role,  so  my  action's, 
occupying  the  mansion,  being  right  or  wrong  does  not  depend  upon  whether  I  fulfill 
the  obligation  prescribed  by  my  role.  The  moral  judgement  of  my  action  might 
depend  upon  what  is  the  reason  for  me  to  occupy  the  mansion.  My  reason  to  occupy  it 
is  to  survive.  In  other  words,  my  moral  belief  tells  me  that  to  die  in  vain  is  shameful, 
205 thus  to  survive  I  have  to  occupy  the  mansion.  6  It  is  clear,  according  to  this  view,  that 
my  action's  being  right  or  wrong  depends  upon  my  moral  belief  which  enables  me  to 
make  a  judgement  on  how  to  act.  And  this,  it  seems  to  me,  marks  the  difference 
between  role  morality  and  act-centred  morality. 
Role  obligations  are  often  divided  into  two  kinds:  contractual  and  non- 
contractual.  7  Contractual  role  obligations,  taken  literally,  require  persons  who  are  in 
those  roles  to  sign  on  for  the  roles.  That  is,  a  person  who  signs  on  as  a  teacher  has  to 
fulfill  the  duties  or  obligations  of  the  role  as  a  teacher,  which  are  prescribed  in  the 
contract.  The  contractual  roles  are  often  chosen  by  people  who  would  like  to  be  in 
those  roles.  Non-contractual  roles,  on  the  other  hand,  are  not  matters  of  people's 
choices.  They  are  acquired  by  birth.  We  are  our  (biological)  parents'  son  or  daughter, 
we  do  not  choose  to  be  their  son  or  daughter  but  in  our  capacities  as  son  or  daughter 
we  have  to  show  filial  obedience  to  our  parents.  Role  obligations of  this  sort  are  not 
contractual,  i.  e.  we  do  not  sign  on  as  someone's  son  or  daughter.  We  are  born  to  be 
our  parents'  son  or  daughter.  It  might  be  argued  that  there  are  non-contractual  roles 
which  do  not  depend  upon  birth.  If  I  move  to  a  new  house,  for  example,  I  acquire  the 
role  of  neighbour  to  those  who  live  near  me.  At  first  sight  this  argument  seems  to  be 
plausible.  However  the  role  of  neighbour  I  acquire  can  also  be  seen  as  a  kind  of 
contractual  role.  For  there  is  usually  a  tacit  con/rae!  8  within  a  community,  which 
decides  what  is  the  right  and  responsibility  of  each  member  of  it.  Once  I  move  into 
the  community  I  tacitly  agree  that  I  have  to  be  kind  to  and  help  my  neighbours  when 
they  need. 
The  other  kind  of  non-contractual  obligation  is  citizenship.  We  are  born  to  be 
citizen  of  this  or  that  state,  and  we  have  to  do  our  duties  as  a  citizen  of  the  state  to 
which  we  belong.  The  citizenship  we  have  is  not  acquired  from  the  contract  on  which 
we  signed.  Of  course  it  might  be  argued  that  citizenship  could  be  contractual.  For 
immigrants  can  have  their  citizenship  by  signing  on  as  citizens  of  the  country  into 
which  they  immigrate.  Nevertheless  most  people  have  their  citizenship  by  birth. 
The  precise  content  of  non-contractual  role  obligation  and  how  it  comes  to  exist 
6  M.  Smith,  "  Realism  ",  A  Comfxution  to  Ethics,  (ed.  )  P.  Singer  (Oxford,  1993),  pp.  399-410. 
Hardimon,  op.  cit.  P.  337. 
"  Voluntary  acceptance  may  be  tacit  ",  see  Elardimon,  Ibid.  p.  357. 
206 may  be  unclear.  Some  people  might  be  inclined  to  say  that  we  just  know  we  have 
such  obligations  (presumably  by  some  kind  of  intuition).  Others  might  argue  that  they 
are  determined  by  the  multitude  of  informal  customs  which  we  take  for  granted.  Due 
to  the  fact  that  non-contractual  role  obligations  are  less  clear  than  contractual  ones,  it 
might  be  suggested  that  those  problematic  role  obligations  should  be  abandoned. 
However,  the  cost  of  abandoning  those  non-contractual  role  obligations  might  be 
huge,  9  since,  firstly,  our  self-conception  might  be  radically  changed.  It  would  be  odd 
for  us  to  regard  ourselves  as  family  members  but  without  being  under  any  obligation 
to  the  family.  "  [T]he  idea  of  noncontractual  role  obligation  is  an  essential  element  of 
conceiving  of  oneself  as  a  family  member  and  citizen.  "10  Secondly,  being  a  family 
member  involves  acting  in  conformity  with  the  role  we  occupy.  If  non-contractual 
role  obligation  were  to  be  abandoned,  there  would  be  a  radical  transformation  of  how 
we  live  our  lives.  For  a  large  part  of  what  is  meant  by  "  son  '  is  that  one  has  certain 
duties.  A  society  which  did  not  recognize  these  duties  could  not  have  our  concept  of  a 
son.  Our  attachment  to  family  is  so  central  to  our  self-identification,  thus  our  moral 
lives  are  not  only  characterized  by  our  institutional  roles  but  also  by  our  non- 
contractual  roles.  Both  contractual  and  non-contractual  role  obligations  are 
widespread  in  our  moral  life. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  for  modern  liberal  thought  whether  people  have 
contractual  and  non-contractual  roles  depend  upon  the  acceptance  of  those  who 
occupy  that  role.  For  example  the  obligations  of  a  shoemaker  do  not  apply  to  me 
unless  I  reflectively  ucceptl1  that  role.  My  accepting  the  role  as  a  shoemaker  depends 
upon  '  whether  I  judge  subjectively  that  it  is  desirable,  or  preferable.  The  main 
determinant  in  one's  having  a  role  is  one's  ability  to  choose.  This  ability  to  choose,  I 
think,  marks  the  difference  between  modern  liberals  and  Plato,  which  I  shall  discuss 
in  the  next  section. 
9  flardimon,  op.  cit.  p.  346. 
10  Ibid. 
Hardimon,  Ibid.  p.  347-51. 
207 2.  The  differences  between  Plato  and  Confucius 
on  family  and  role  obligation 
In  the  Republic  IV,  Plato  claims  that  in  an  ideal  state  justice  is  doing  one's  own  job 
(433e).  Thus  Plato's  account  of  justice  in  the  state  can  be  properly  interpreted  in 
terms  of  role  obligation  and  act-centred  theory.  For  doing  one's  own  job  requires 
people  of  the  three  classes  to  stick  to  their  own  business,  and  not  to  trespass  or 
interfere  with  others'  business.  That  is,  being  a  good  shoemaker,  for  example,  is  to 
play  his  role  as  a  shoemaker  well.  To  provide  enough  shoes  for  the  needs  of  people. 
For  Plato,  doing  one's  own  job  implies  a  sort  of  conformity  and  identification  with  the 
roles.  12  The  shoemaker  is  acting  in  accordance  with  an  obligation  which  takes  its  rise 
in  the  role  of  shoemaker.  The  reason  for  the  shoemaker  to  fulfill  his  obligations  is  not 
that  he  thinks  that  the  role  of  shoemaker  is  reflectively  acceptable,  but  that  he  knows 
or  realizes  that  his  aptitude  is  suitable  for  being  a  shoemaker  (370b).  It  is  noticeable 
that  when  Plato  starts  talking  about  the  primitive  society  around  369,  he  clearly  has  an 
act-centred  view  of  roles.  Plato  says  that  the  farmer's  obligation  is  to  provide  enough 
food  for  all  the  people  and  devote  enough  time  to  food  production  (369e).  But  as  soon 
as  Plato  starts  talking  of  aptitudes  or  nature  (phusi.  r)  he  begins  to  move  away  from  this 
position.  He  seems  to  say  that  our  duties  depend  upon  our  aptitudes,  i.  e.  the  kind  of 
person  we  are.  In  an  ideal  state  roles  and  aptitudes  may  coincide. 
Therefore,  the  claim  that  `  the  role  of  shoemaker  is  reflectively  acceptable  ' 
cannot  be  accepted  by  Plato.  For  in  the  ideal  state  each  individual  cannot  choose  his 
or  her  role  according  to  his  or  her  interest,  but  each  individual's  social  role  is 
dependent  upon  his  or  her  nature  or  aptitude.  Moreover,  not  only  does  a  shoemaker 
play  his  role,  but  also  lie  identifies  himself  with  the  role.  He  is  more  than  the 
occupant  of  the  role  of  shoemaker,  he  is  engulfed  in  the  role.  A  shoemaker's  life  is 
valuable  because  his  social  role  is  dependent  upon  his  personal  aptitude  which  fits 
him  for  being  a  shoemaker,  and  his  life  style  will  be  largely  determined  by  his  social 
role.  In  Plato's  view,  a  society  is  a  cooperative  association,  people's  different 
aptitudes  will  dispose  them  to  their  natural  places  within  the  society.  To  fulfill  one's 
12  Annas,  op.  cit.  p.  74. 
208 obligations  prescribed  by  one's  social  role  is  to  perform  one's  function  (ergot:  )  well, 
and  to  perform  one's  function  well  is  to  achieve  the  fulfillment  of  one's  nature.  For, 
in  Plato's  view,  one  has  to  do  one  job  for  which  one  is  naturally  suited. 
In  Book  III  of  the  Republic  Plato  tells  us  a  story  of  how  people  of  the  three 
classes  can  be  identified.  It  is  by  one's  nature  that  one  is  determined  to  be  in  a 
particular  class.  The  nature  of  the  Guardians  is  gold,  that  of  the  Auxiliaries  is  silver, 
and  that  of  farmers  and  artisans  is  iron  and  bronze  (415a-c).  This  passage  together 
with  370b  seem  to  suggest  that  there  are  no  contractual  roles  existing  in  Plato's  ideal 
state.  For  people's  jobs  are  determined  by  their  own  aptitudes  or  natures,  and  to  be 
gold,  or  silver,  or  iron  and  bronze  is  decided  by  birth.  Therefore  one  person  is  born  to 
be  a  shoemaker,  the  other  is  born  to  be  an  Auxiliary,  since  their  social  roles, 
according  to  Plato,  have  to  be  determined  by  their  aptitudes  and  natures.  It  is  worth 
noting  that  in  non-contractual  societies  one's  role  may  be  determined  by  some  other 
ways:  1)  by  government  decree:  for  example,  one  lives  in  a  monarchical  society,  one's 
role  may  be  determined  by  the  king;  2)  by  religious  doctrine:  according  to  Tibetan 
Buddhism,  for  example,  Dalai  Lama  is  determined  by  one's  being  the  incarnation  or 
manifestation  of  buddhahood;  and  3)  by  heredity:  in  a  feudal  society  one's  role  may 
be  determined  by  one's  inheriting  one's  family  business.  All  these  three  kinds  of 
society  and  Plato's  ideal  state  are  in  contrast  with  liberal  societies  of  which 
contractual  roles  are  characteristic. 
Furthermore,  Plato's  abolishing  the  family  (415d-417b,  457b-d)  seems  to  suggest 
the  same  idea  that  there  is  no  contractual  roles  existing  in  the  upper  class  in  the  ideal 
state,  since  the  starting  point  of  a  family  is  the  marriage  between  a  couple,  thus  the 
role  of  husband  and  that  of  wife  will  be  derived  from  signing  a  contract,  or  certificate 
of  marriage.  The  non-existence  of  the  contractual  role  in  the  Republic  arises  from  the 
fact  that,  in  Plato's  view,  we  have  natural  aptitudes  and  by  performing  the  appropriate 
roles  we  bring  about  the  good.  For  a  shoemaker  therefore  perfonning  his  role  properly 
is,  on  the  one  hand,  to  fulfill  the  activity  of  making  shoes  which  is  suitable  to  his 
aptitude;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  do  good  to  the  society  as  a  whole.  In  short,  in 
Plato's  ideal  state  contractual  role  obligations,  it  seems  to  me,  do  not  have  any 
existence,  and  there  is  no  difference  between  individual's  fulfillment  of  the  duties  of 
his  or  her  social  role,  and  the  achievement  of  the  good  of  the  society  as  a  whole. 
209 The  cardinal  passage  about  role  obligation  in  Confucius'  Analects  is,  as  i  take  it, 
in  Book  XII,  11,  where  Confucius  is  questioned  by  Duke  Jing  of  Qi  of  government, 
Confucius  replies, 
Let  a  ruler  be  a  ruler,  a  subject  a  subject,  a  father  a  father,  and  a  son  a  son. 
Excellent!  said  the  Duke.  Indeed,  if  a  ruler  be  not  a  ruler,  a  subject  be  not  a 
subject,  a  father  be  not  a  father,  and  a  son  be  not  a  son,  even  if  there  is  grain, 
shall  I  manage  to  eat? 
An  orderly  society  can  only  be  achieved  when  each  individual  fulfills  their  role 
obligations.  Moreover,  it  is  quite  clear  that  in  a  society,  according  to  Confucius,  each 
individual  is  not  only  performing  his  or  her  own  social  roles,  but  they  will  regard 
themselves  as  the  roles  they  play.  For  people  are  living  in  a  role  net,  when  their  roles 
change,  others'  roles  will  change  as  well.  That  is,  their  personal  identity  will  alter 
when  their  roles  change.  For  example,  one  person  will  be  a  father  and  a  son  at 
different  moment,  when  he  is  acting  in  a  role  as  a  father  he  is  relating  himself  to  a 
person  who  is  his  son.  Equally,  when  he  is  acting  in  a  role  as  a  son,  he  is  relating 
himself  to  a  person  who  is  his  father.  In  Western  contemporary  moral  philosophy  it 
might  be  possible  to  consider  the  concept  of  the  self  in  isolation.  "  [F]or  the  early 
Confucians  ",  however,  "  there  can  be  no  me  in  isolation,  to  be  considered  abstractly: 
I  am  the  totality  of  roles  I  live  in  relation  to  specific  others.  ""  This  is  the  reason  why 
scholars  are  inclined  to  hold  the  view  that  in  the  Analects  individuals  are  role- 
bearing.  14 
The  role  obligation  and  act-centred  theory  in  Confucius'  Analecis  has  political 
implications  as  is  clear  in  passages  such  as  "  [i]f  one  is  not  in  a  certain  office,  one 
does  not  plan  the  governance  involved  in  that  office  "  (VIII,  14;  XIV,  26),  and  Master 
Zeng  says  that  "a  gentleman  does  not  stray  from  his  station  "  (XIV,  26).  Also  there 
are  many  passages  concerned  with  our  everyday  behaviour  towards  others,  such  as 
how  are  we  related  to  others,  and  what  is  the  right  deed  when  we  are  related  to  such 
13  H.  Jr.  Rosemont,  "  Rights-bearing  Individuals  and  Role-bearing  Persons  ",  Rules,  Rituals,  Lind 
Responsibility:  Essays  Dedicated  to  Herbert  Fingarette,  (ed.  )  M.  I3ockover  (Illinois,  1991),  p.  90- 
14  Whether  this  view  is  correct  or  not,  see  my  discussion  in  Part  V,  Chapter  15. 
210 and  such  a  person.  Some  passages  I  shall  quote  as  follows, 
The  Master  said:  '  Young  men  should  be  filial  when  at  home  and  respectful 
to  elders  when  away  from  home.  They  should  be  earnest  and  trustworthy. 
Although  they  should  love  the  multitude  far  and  wide,  they  should  be 
intimate  only  with  the  humane.  If  they  have  any  energy  to  spare  after  so 
doing,  they  should  use  it  to  study  "  culture  ".  '  (I,  6) 
Zixia  said:  '  If  he  appreciates  men  of  quality,  if  he  makes  light  of  sexual 
attraction,  if  in  serving  his  father  and  mother  he  is  capable  of  using  his 
strength  to  the  utmost,  if  in  serving  his  lord  he  is  capable  of  offering  up  his 
life,  if  in  his  dealings  with  friends  he  is  trustworthy  in  what  he  says,  I  would 
certainly  call  him  learned  even  if  it  is  said  that  he  has  never  studied.  '  (1,7) 
Someone  said  to  Master  Kong:  '  Why  do  you  not  take  part  in  government?  ' 
The  Master  said:  '  The  Rook  (!  f  Documents  mentions  filial  piety,  doesn't  it? 
"  Only  be  dutiful  towards  your  parents  and  friendly  towards  your  brothers, 
and  you  will  be  contributing  to  the  existence  of  government.  "  These  virtues 
surely  constitute  taking  part  in  government,  so  why  should  only  that 
particular  activity  be  regarded  as  taking  part  in  government.  '  (ti,  21) 
There  are  still  many  other  passages  which  are  concerned  with  right  deed  and 
with  the  fulfillment  of  role  obligations  in  the  Analects.  What  is  interesting  in  the 
quoted  passage,  Book  11,21,  is  that  Confucius  seems  to  assume  that  the  family  is  the 
smallest  political  or  social  unity  in  a  society.  And  the  principle  of  governing  a  state,  in 
Confucius'  view,  is  no  different  from  that  of  managing  a  family.  They  all  have  to  '  do 
their  own  jobs  ',  and  they  all  have  to  fulfill  their  duties  which  are  prescribed  by  their 
roles.  It  should  be  noticed  here  that  the  lack  of  a  difference  between  governing  a  state 
and  managing  a  family  in  Confucius'  thought  is  quite  different  from  the  picture  we 
had  above  in  Plato's  Republic.  For  the  latter  claims  that  the  family  will  be  an 
obstruction  for  the  Guardians  to  rule  the  state  so  it  would  be  better  to  abolish  the 
family.  Plato's  proposal  to  abolish  the  family  in  the  Republic  forms  a  clear  contrast 
with  Confucius'  emphasis  on  the  family  in  the  Analecis.  However,  in  the  Laws,  Plato, 
in  contrast  to  the  Republic,  emphasizes  the  part  of  the  family.  He  claims  that  a  state 
211 comes  from  the  aggregation  of  families  (680a-681c),  so  from  922b  to  932e  Plato  sets 
out  to  establish  family  law.  The  shifting  attitude  towards  the  value  of  the  family  might 
be  unclear,  but  what  appears  from  the  different  treatments  of  the  family  in  the 
Republic  and  in  the  Analects  is,  it  seems  to  me,  that  Plato's  ideal  state  is  an  imaginary 
one,  he  is  trying  to  reconstruct  a  new  state.  Thus  the  method  of  his  reconstruction 
would  be  radical.  On  the  contrary,  Confucius  is  not  trying  to  reconstruct  a  new  state 
but  to  reform  the  state  in  which  he  lives.  That  is,  in  the  Great  Learning  it  is  said  that 
to  bring  order  to  the  state  one  has  to  engage  in  self-cultivation  and  regulate  one's 
family.  Thus  reform  for  Confucius  could  be  a  gradual  process,  and  the  method  of 
Confucius'  reform  would  not  be  so  radical  as  Plato's  one. 
I  have  mentioned  that  in  the  Republic  Plato  seems  to  regard  every  role  as  non- 
contractual,  since  we  enter  in  our  roles  by  birth  or  by  nature.  What  would  be  the 
picture  in  the  Analects?  It  is  evident  that  in  Confucius'  account  of  right  actions  he 
refers  to  non-contractual  roles,  such  as  father  and  son,  most  of  time.  That  is,  he 
emphasizes  filial  conduct.  However  this  is  not  exhaustive.  Confucius  throughout  the 
Analects  never  mentions  that  we  are  bom,  or  by  nature,  to  be  in  such  and  such  social 
class  or  social  role.  Instead  he  says  that  when  we  are  in  such  and  such  social  role  we 
have  to  act  in  such  and  such  way  in  which  we  can  fulfill  the  duties  of  that  role.  Thus 
when  Confucius  is  asked  by  Duke  Ding  how  a  ruler  should  employ  ministers,  and 
how  ministers  should  serve  a  ruler,  Confucius  replies, 
Rulers  in  employing  ministers  do  so  in  accordance  with  ritual,  and  ministers 
in  serving  rulers  do  so  in  accordance  with  loyalty.  (1II,  19) 
It  might  be  true,  at  Confucius'  time,  the  role  of  ruler  was  derived  by  birth,  in  that  the 
rulership  was  hereditary.  But  it  is  arguable  whether  ministers  were  also  hereditary. 
For  the  old  social  order,  at  Confucius'  time,  collapsed.  Whether  one  can  be  a  minister 
does  not  merely  depend  upon  one's  social  class,  but  also  upon  his  talent  and  ability. 
However  this  does  not  mean  that  one  can  choose  to  be  a  minister.  For  one  can  only  be 
a  minister  under  the  ruler's  command.  Therefore  although  the  role  of  minister  is  not 
hereditary,  it  does  not  mean  that  it  is  contractual. 
Furthermore  a  passage  in  Book  VIII  of  the  Anakcts  seems  to  indicate  that 
212 ministers  can  refuse  the  ruler's  command  when  the  state  is  in  peril. 
The  Master  said:  '  Be  of  sincere  good  faith  and  love  learning.  Be  steadfast 
unto  death  in  pursuit  of  the  good  Way.  One  does  not  enter  a  state  which  is in 
peril,  nor  reside  in  one  which  is  rebellious.  When  the  Way  prevails  in  the 
world,  then  be  seen.  When  it  does  not,  then  hide.  When  the  Way  prevails  in 
your  own  state,  to  be  made  poor  and  obscure  by  it  is  a  disgrace;  but  when  the 
Way  does  not  prevail  in  your  own  state,  to  be  made  rich  and  honourable  by  it 
is  a  disgrace.  '  (VIII,  13) 
This  passage  seems  to  superficially  imply  that  ministers  have  their  own  choice  to 
decide  whether  they  would  like  to  stay  in  office  or  not.  And  it  is  this  choice  which 
shows  that  there  are  contractual  roles  existing  in  Confucius'  state.  However  this  view, 
in  my  opinion,  is  wrong.  For,  according  to  Confucius,  whether  one  wants  to  stay  in 
office  or  not  does  not  depend  upon  his  ability  to  choose,  but  upon  his  belief  in  and 
understanding  of  ritual  (li)  and  custom.  It  is  ritual  and  custom  which  determine 
whether  one  should  stay  in  the  office  or  not  when  the  state  is  in  peril.  That  is  the 
reason  why  Confucius  urges  people  to  study  the  antiquity  which  is  the  guidance  for 
people's  behaviour  (III,  14;  VII,  1). 
It  is  interesting  to  see  that  although  in  Confucius'  state, 
like  Plato's  ideal  state, 
there  is  no  non-contractual  role,  Confucius,  unlike  Plato,  does  allow  ministers  to 
resign  from  their  offices.  However  their  resignation  is  not  the  result  of  their  choice 
but  of  following  the  rule  of  proper  conduct  (ii).  For  it  would  be  shameful  for  one  to 
stay  in  office  in  a  corrupted  regime. 
Both  Plato  and  Confucius  emphasize  role  obligation  when  they  build  up  their 
own  ideal  states.  Also  they  are  concerned  with  the  problem  `  what  is  the  right  thing  to 
do?  '.  When  an  agent  acts  in  a  role,  what  is  right  thing  for  him  or  her  to  do  is  to  act  in 
accordance  with  the  rules  which  are  derived  from  the  role,  and,  moreover,  to  fulfill 
the  duties  which  arise  from  the  role.  By  comparing  and  analyzing  these  two 
philosophers'  thought,  I  think  that  there  is  a  common  trait  between  role  obligation  and 
act-centred  theory.  Both  of  them  are  concerned  with  actions,  behaviour,  and  with 
duties  and  obligations.  Now  that  Plato  and  Confucius  pick  up  the  same  method  to 
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understanding  of  it,  as  mentioned,  is  that  firstly,  their  ideal  states  are  based  on 
different  foundations;  secondly,  Plato  draws  our  attention  to  human  nature,  but 
Confucius  does  not.  In  spite  of  these  differences,  what  both  Plato  and  Confucius 
intend  to  do,  in  my  opinion,  is  to  find  a  way  in  which  we  can  improve  our  moral  life. 
However,  I  shall  argue  in  the  next  two  chapters  that  unlike  the  modern  contract 
theorists  both  Plato  and  Confucius  see  morality  as  depending  upon'  who  you  arc'.  So 
with  them  there  is  a  kind  of  agent-centred  aspect  to  their  account  of  roles. 
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From  Act-Centre  to  Agent-Centre Chapter  14 
Plato  and  Common  Morality 
It  is  commonly  believed  that  Plato,  in  Book  I  of  the  Republic,  considers  inadequate 
accounts  of  justice  in  terms  of  doing  certain  kind  of  actions,  while  later  in  the 
Republic  he  moves  away  from  the  account  of  justice  as  doing  certain  kind  of  actions, 
and  instead  claims  that  justice  is  a  state  of  human  soul.  That  is,  a  just  man  is  one  who 
has  a  harmonious  and  balanced  soul.  It  is  said  that  "  the  whole  progress  of  Book  2 
through  4  has  been  an  attempt  to  build  up  a  notion  of  the  just  agent.  ""  The  purpose  of 
this  chapter  is  to  argue  that  it  might  be  right,  on  the  surface,  that  Plato  in  Book  I 
concentrates  on  showing  his  interlocutors  the  inadequacies  of  talking  of  justice  as  a 
list  of  duties  or  obligations,  or  interest,  or  profit.  But,  under  the  surface,  Plato  sets  up 
an  outline  for  his  discussion  of  justice  in  the  rest  of  the  Republic.  Thus,  Book  I  and 
the  rest  of  Books  are  not  inconsistent.  In  short,  I  propose  to  argue  that  Plato  right  from 
the  outset  of  the  Republic  tries  to  build  up  an  agent-centred  morality.  Plato  therefore 
does  not  commit  the  fallacy  which  commentators  think  he  does.  2 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  confine  my  discussion  mainly  in  Book  I  to  uncover  its  real 
purpose.  I  would  like  to  argue  that  Plato  does  not  commit  a  fallacy  of  irrelevance,  as 
Sachs  thinks  he  does,  3  by  virtue  of  discussing  three  topics:  firstly,  i  would  like  to 
examine  Cephalus'  and  Polemarchus'  accounts  of  justice  in  Book  I;  secondly,  the 
relationship  between  the  just  act  and  the  just  soul  will  be  explored;  and  finally,  I  shall 
proceed  to  look  for  some  clues  to  prove  that  Plato  in  the  Republic  is  not  interested  in 
the  ordinary  conception  of  justice  but  only  in  the  Platonic  sense  of  justice. 
11  Annas,  An  Introduction  tu  Plato's  Republic  (Oxford,  1981),  p.  158. 
2  D.  Sachs,  "A  Fallacy  in  Plato's  Republic  ".  The  Philosophical  Rc'rieir,  vol.  LXXII,  1963,  pp.  141.58. 
sI  think  that  Sachs'  question  is  related  to  Annas'  claim  that  Plato  attempts  to  build  up  an  agent-centred 
morality  from  Book  2  to  4.  For  to  prove  that  Plato  tries  to  establish  an  agent-centred  morality  right  from 
the  beginning  of  the  Republic  is  to  prove  that  Sachs  is  wrong  to  claim  that  there  is  a  fallacy  of  irrclevance 
in  the  Republic. 1.  Cephalus'  and  Polemarchus'  accounts  of  justice 
Socrates  and  Glaucon  are  attending  the  festival  at  the  Piraeus,  and  are  jokingly  forced 
to  visit  the  house  of  Cephalus  and  his  sons  Polemarchus,  Lysias  and  Euthydemus. 
Socrates  is  blamed  by  Cephalus  for  not  coming  frequently  to  his  house  to  have 
conversation  with  him.  Socrates  says  to  Cephalus  that  he  enjoys  talking  to  old  men 
and  asks  Cephalus  whether  old  age  is  a  kind  of  burden  for  him.  Cephalus  quotes 
Sophocles'  saying  that  "I  am  glad  to  have 
...  escaped  from  a  fierce  and  frenzied 
master  ",  i.  e.  sexual  desire,  and  goes  on  saying, 
[i]n  old  age  you  become  quite  free  of  feelings  of  this  sort  and  they  leave  in 
peace;  and  when  your  desires  lose  their  intensity  and  relax,  you  get  what 
Sophocles  was  talking  about,  a  release  from  a  lot  of  mad  masters.  In  all  this, 
and  in  the  lack  of  respect  their  families  show  them,  there  is  only  one  thing  to 
blame;  and  that  is  not  their  old  age,  Socrates,  but  their  character.  For  if  men 
are  sensible  and  good  tempered,  old  age  is  easy  enough  to  bear:  if  not,  youth 
as  well  as  age  is  a  burden.  (329c-d) 
It  is  apparent,  from  the  term  italicized,  that  the  claim  which  Plato  puts  into 
Cephalus'  mouth  is  whether  one  can  have  a  tranquil  life  will  be  dependent  upon  one's 
character  (Tropus)  not  upon  what  one  does.  Unfortunately,  Cephalus,  who  regards 
philosophy  as  something  not  very  serious  (328d)  and  has  no  philosophical  reflection 
on  the  nature  of  character,  thinks  that  a  tranquil  life  is  the  combination  of  good- 
temper  and  fortune.  For  with  the  aid  of  fortune,  Cephalus  thinks  that  he  can  avoid 
both  unintentional  cheating  or  lying  and  the  fear  of  some  sacrifice  to  God  unmade  or 
some  debt  unpaid  before  he  dies  (331b).  And  the  dialogue  from  331c  onwards  is  to 
show  that  whether  a  man  is just  or  not  cannot  be  identified  only  in  terms  of  his 
external  behaviour.  For  the  action  of  returning  what  one  borrows  under  certain 
circumstances  might  be  regarded  as  immoral.  In  the  case  of  returning  the  knife  to  its 
owner  who  has  gone  mad,  no  matter  what  Cephalus  does,  return  the  knife  to  its  owner 
or  not,  he  is  in  a  position  of  being  immoral.  For  if  Cephalus  returns  the  knife  to  his 
friend  gone  mad,  he  might  use  the  knife  to  kill  himself;  and  if  Cepiialus  does  not 
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So  it  seems  to  lead  to  the  kind  of  situation  B.  Williams  describes  in  his  article  "  Moral 
Luck  ",  4  that  these  are  circumstances  in  which  no  matter  what  you  choose  you  will 
feel  regretful.  It  is,  I  think,  the  reason  why  Plato  would  like  to  leave  act-centred 
morality  aside  from  the  outset  of  the  Republic  and  concentrates  on  agent-centred 
morality.  And  the  discussion  of  justice  as  external  behaviour  in  accordance  with  rules 
or  precepts  is  part  of  Socrates"  strategy  which  will  prepare  the  way  for  his  account 
of  justice  as  psychic  harmony. 
Two  points  deserve  our  attention  in  Socrates'  conversation  with  Cephalus:  firstly, 
although  Cephalus  is  unable  to  articulate  the  relation  between  having  a  good 
temperament  and  leading  a  tranquil  life,  and  the  nature  of  character,  yet  his  reference 
to  character  implies  that  whether  a  person,  old  or  young,  can  have  a  tranquil  life  will 
be  dependent  upon  his  character  besides  his  fortune.  A  temperate  man  will  not  be 
greedy  but  be  satisfied  with  what  he  has  in  hand.  Cephalus  is,  tinder  Plato's  pen,  a 
temperate,  but  unintellectual,  man  not  only  because  he  does  not  grudge  his  old  age 
but  also  because  as  a  money  maker  he  is  not  "  over-fond  of  money  "  (330c).  Secondly, 
Cephalus  is  a  businessman  and  resident  alien  who  has  no  citizenship  in  Athens.  It 
would  be  reasonable  that,  as  a  resident  alien,  Cephalus'  account  of  justice  should 
emphasize  not  the  relation  between  polls  and  citizen,  but  rather  the  relation  between 
individuals.  Moreover,  Cephalus,  as  a  successful  businessman  (330b),  might  have  to 
travel  from  one  polls  to  another  in  order  to  get  his  business  done.  Rules  or  laws  vary 
from  one  poli.  c  to  another.  Thus  Plato's  characterization  of  Cephalus  in  Book  1,1  think, 
serves  to  illustrate  the  point  that  justice  cannot  be  defined  as  sticking  to  a  set  of  rules, 
since  rules  would  be  different  from  place  to  place.  It  is  only  when  a  person  possesses 
the  right  character  that  he  is  able  to  adapt  his  acts  to  different  circumstances. 
However,  at  this  stage,  what  is  the  content  of  man's  character  is  still  unknown  to  us. 
What  we  can  know  so  far  is  that  Plato  points  out  that  ordinary  people,  such  as 
Cephalus,  are  insensitive  towards  the  notion  of  character  which  plays  an  important 
role  in  the  account  of  justice. 
Polemarchus,  from  331d,  takes  over  the  conversation  and  quotes  the  saying  of 
B.  Williams,  "  Moral  Luck  ",  Ihc.  Arislolelian  Society  (suppl.  ),  1976,  pp.  115-35, 
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claim  that  justice  is  telling  the  truth  and  returning  what  one  has  borrowed.  Socrates 
doubts  whether  Simonides  is  saying  that  it  is  just  to  return  the  knife  to  its  owner  even 
though  he  is  mad  (332a).  Polemarchus  denies  that  that  is  what  Simonides  says,  and 
makes  it  clear  by  saying  that  what  Simonides  meant  to  say  is  that  "  one  friend  owes  it 
as  a  due  to  another  to  do  him  good,  not  harm  "  (332a),  and  what  is  due  to  our  enemies 
is  harm  (332b).  So  he  draws  a  conclusion  that  "  it  is  right  to  give  everyone  what  is 
appropriate  to  him  "  (332c). 
Socrates'  objection  to  Polemarchus'  claim  starts  first  by  asking  what  is  the  due 
and  appropriate  thing  which  the  medical  skill  supplies?  and  to  whom?  Polemarchus 
replies  that  it  supplies  the  body  with  remedies  and  food  (332c).  Similarly,  cookery  is 
the  skill  of  supplying  "  the  flavour  to  our  food  "  (332dl).  Then  what  does  justice 
supply  and  to  whom?  Polemarchus  replies,  "  it  must  be  the  skill  that  enables  us  to 
help  and  injure  one's  friends  and  enemies  "  (332d4-5).  Secondly,  Socrates  points  out 
that  there  seems  to  be  no  sphere  of  activity  for  justice,  since  the  best  person  to  help 
you  when  you  are  ill  is  a  doctor,  and  the  best  person  to  help  you  when  you  face  the 
risks  of  a  sea  voyage  is  a  navigator.  But  what  about  a  just  man?  Polemarchus  says  that 
we  can  find  a  just  man  displaying  an  expertise  of  his  own  in  times  of  war.  That  is,  in 
war  the  just  man  will  help  his  friends  and  harm  his  enemies.  Socrates  goes  on  asking, 
but  a  healthy  body  makes  no  use  of  a  doctor,  so  in  peacetime  there  is  no  use  of  justice. 
Polemarchus  modifies  his  claim  and  says  that  the  just  man  is  useful  in  business  (333a). 
Our  money  and  goods  can  be  deposited  with  him,  since  the  just  man's  honesty  can  be 
trusted.  But  according  to  this  view,  justice  is  useless  when  you  want  to  use  money  or 
goods,  in  that  someone  else  will  be  good  at  using  them  (333b-d).  Polemarchus  cannot 
help  admitting  the  conclusion  that  justice  can't  be  a  very  serious  thing  (333e). 
The  notion  of  rechne  is  prominent  in  this  passage,  and  also  plays  a  main  part  in 
Socrates'  conversation  with  Thrasymachus  (341c"346e).  The  Greek  word  techn,  is 
translated  into  English  as  '  skill  craft  '  or  `  art  '.  The  lee/me  is  an  organized  body 
of  knowledge  of  the  ways  to  achieve  a  certain  end.  Skills  or  Iechnui  can  be  divided 
into  two  sorts,  some  skills  are  practical,  such  as  cookery,  others  are  not,  such  as 
218 mental  arithmetic.  5  All  practical  rechne  have  their  defined  domains  to  which  they 
apply.  A  doctor's  skill  is  to  heal  illness,  a  cobbler's  skill  is  to  make  shoes.  While 
justice  seems  to  have  no  specific  domain  at  which  it  aims,  it  does  not  exist  as  a  means 
to  an  end,  but,  for  Plato,  as  a  state  of  human  soul. 
Although  some  commentators6  think  that  Polemarchus  does  not  have  to  accept 
the  analogy  of  rechne,  yet  the  introduction  of  the  notion  of  tcc/ºnc  has  two  purposes: 
firstly,  justice  is  not  like  a  skill,  such  as  medicine.  For,  as  mentioned,  there  is  a  field 
with  which  medicine  is  concerned,  namely  healing  the  sick.  While  justice  as  non- 
instrumental  has  no  field  of  concern.  Plato  does  not  think  that  justice  is  a  matter  of 
acting  in  conformity  with  certain  kind  of  rules.  For  one  might  perform  some  kind  of 
act  in  a  way  in  which  the  rules  demand  in  order  to  avoid  punishment.  Justice,  for 
Plato,  is  not  concerned  with  the  fact  that  acting  in  accordance  with  rules  will  bring 
desirable  consequences,  i.  e.  reputation,  fame,  etc..  Justice  does  not  serve  as  a  kind  of 
means  to  obtain  some  desirable  ends.  Justice,  in  Plato's  view,  is  concerned  with  one's 
soul.  A  just  man  has  a  balanced  soul.  Justice  is  desirable  for  its  own  sake.  Thus  it 
would  be  inadequate  to  define  justice  in  terms  of  its  field,  that  is,  it  would  be 
improper  to  define  justice  in  terms  of  external  behaviour.  Moreover  the  inadequacy  of 
defining  justice  in  terms  of  its  field  is  brought  out  at  333e-334a,  where  Socrates 
claims  that  a  skillful  doctor  is  able  to  heal  the  sick  as  well  as  to  produce  disease 
undetected.  So  the  just  man  who  is  good  at  keeping  money  will  also  be  good  at 
stealing  it.  It  leads  to  absurdity  in  that  even  common  sense  enables  one  to  know  that  it 
is  unjust  to  steal  others'  money,  and  it  would  be  impossible,  according  to  Plato,  for  a 
just  man  to  act  unjustly. 
Secondly,  justice  is  like  a  skill,  since  there  is  a  more  profound  meaning 
underlying  the  skill  analogy.  A  skillful  navigator  is  the  one  who  is  able  to  take 
passengers  from  A  to  B  safely.  It  should  be  noticed  here  that  the  goal  or  aim  of  the 
navigator  and  that  of  the  passengers  are  different.  For  the  goal  of  the  former  is  to 
carry  out  a  safe  passage,  but  the  goal  of  the  latter  is  to  move  from  A  to  B.  The  safe 
passage  to  the  latter  is  external  and  instrumental,  because  whether  the  passage  is  safe 
Annas,  oh.  cit.  p.  25. 
6  Annas,  Ibid.  p.  24.  R.  C.  Cross  and  A.  D.  Woozlcy,  Pluto  :r  Republic:  A  Philosophical  ('ummeislar)' 
(London,  1994),  p.  12. 
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might  feel  that  it  is  not  a  safe  passage,  but  passenger  Y  who  has  not  had  seasickness 
might  feel  the  opposite.  Whereas  the  safe  passage  to  the  former,  the  navigator,  is 
internal.  That  is,  the  activities  of  the  navigator  are  good  not  because  they  are  capable 
of  moving  passengers  from  A  to  B,  but  because  they  are  successful  as  navigation;  they 
are  successful  as  navigation  because  they  are  good  for  producing  safe  passage.  Thus 
the  relation  between  the  product  of  a  skill,  safe  passage,  and  the  goodness  of  the 
activities,  navigation,  constituting  it  is  internal.?  Similarly,  if  justice  is  a  human 
quality  then  it  would  be  improper  to  define  justice  in  such  a  way  that  actions  in 
accordance  with  rules  or  precepts  are  counted  as  just  irrespective  of  what  kind  of 
person  performed  them.  For  the  goodness  of  just  acts  must  come  from  the  good  of 
justice  which  the  just  man  perceives.  It  would  follow  that  whether  an  act  is  just  or  not 
would  not  be  dependent  upon  the  fact  that  it  is  advantageous  to  one's  friend  or 
disadvantageous  to  one's  enemy,  but  upon  the  good  justice  aims  at.  Therefore  the 
relation  between  the  goodness  of  just  acts  and  the  good  justice  aims  at  would  be 
internal.  8  This  is  the  reason  why  Plato  prepares  his  readers  right  from  the  beginning  of 
the  Republic  to  talk  of  justice  not  in  terms  of  what  kind  of  act  one  performs  but  of 
what  kind  of  person  one  is.  For  problems  about  what  the  specific  aims  of  justice  are 
and  why  they  are  good  in  themselves  cannot  be  explained  simply  in  the  way  in  which 
ordinary  people  will  regard,  for  example,  shoemaking  or  food  producing  as  good 
because  people's  needs  can  be  satisfied.  If  we  talk  of  justice  in  this  way  then  justice 
will  be  instrumental  and  this  is  not  what  Plato  wants. 
At  334b  Polemarchus  reiterates  his  claim  that  justice  is  helping  your  friends  and 
harming  your  enemies.  While  Socrates  presses  Polemarchus  by  asking  the  question: 
I  low  do  you  tell  who  your  friend  is  and  who  your  enemy  is?  Don't  men  sometimes 
make  mistakes?  So  it  might  be  possible  that  when  one  makes  a  mistake  in  telling  who 
one's  friend  or  enemy  is,  one  will  possibly  help  one's  enemy  and  harm  one's  friend 
(334c).  This  passage  indicates  something  which  relates  to  the  development,  later  in 
the  dialogue,  of  Plato's  view  on  the  notion  of  knowledge  in  connection  with  goodness. 
For  Plato  a  just  person  must  possess  knowledge  by  virtue  of  which  he  is  able  to  give 
T  K.  Lycos,  Plato  uºr  Justice  and  flower:  Reading  Book  I  of  Pluto  :r  Republic  (Albany,  19$7),  p.  91. 
'  Ibid.  p.  92. 
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understanding  and  the  ability  to  give  an  explanation  of  what  something  is.  It  is 
impossible  for  a  just  man  to  do  right  thing  but  be  unable  to  give  an  account  of  what  he 
does  and  why.  Thus  it  would  be  impossible,  according  to  Plato,  for  a  just  man  to  tell 
who  his  friend  is  and  who  his  enemy  is  without  being  able  to  give  an  account  of  why. 
It  can  be  seen,  from  Plato's  conversation  with  Cephalus  and  Polemarchus,  that 
Plato  carefully  constructs  his  argument  at  the  beginning  of  the  Republic  in  order  to 
lead  his  readers  into  a  less  known  territory,  i.  e.  justice  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  acting 
in  accordance  with  rules,  but  a  matter  of  inner  harmony.  Although  at  this  stage  what 
is  the  content  of  one's  inner  harmony  is  not  known,  yet  the  direction  of  Plato's 
argument,  it  seems  to  me,  is  clear.  The  just  man,  who  has  good  character,  does  not  see 
acting  justly  as  instrumental,  but  sees  acting  justly  as  internally  connected  to  what  he 
perceives  to  be  just. 
The  question  whether  Plato  in  Book  I  is  really  interested  in  the  ordinary 
conception  of  justice  will  be  discussed  in  the  final  section  of  this  chapter.  What  I  shall 
proceed  to  do  next  is  to,  if  merely  acting  in  conformity  with  rules  and  precepts  cannot 
be  regarded  as  real  or  genuine  justice,  enquire  how  the  Platonically  just  man  will  act. 
Or,  to  put  the  question  in  another  way:  Does  the  Platonic  conception  of  justice  entail 
the  ordinary  conception  of  justice?  Will  the  Platonically  just  man  act  in  accordance 
with  the  ordinary  conception  of  justice? 
2.  The  relation  between  the  just  act  and  just  soul 
Towards  the  end  of  Book  IV  it  is  said,  as  mentioned  at  the  outset  of  this  chapter,  that 
the  real  concern  of  justice  is  not  with  external  acts,  but  with  the  inner  harmony  of  soul. 
And  in  the  same  passage  a  few  lines  down  we  are  told  by  Socrates  that  a  man  who 
possesses  a  harmonious  soul  is  ready  for  action  of  any  kind, 
[W]hether  it  concerns  his  personal  or  financial  welfare,  whether  it  is  political 
Annas,  op.  cit.  pp.  30-1. 
221 or  private;  and  he  will  reckon  and  call  any  of  these  actions  just  and 
honourable  if  it  contributes  to  and  helps  to  maintain  this  disposition  of  mind, 
and  will  call  the  knowledge  which  controls  such  action  wisdom.  (443c) 
This  passage  seems  to  indicate  that  Platonic  justice  has  implications  for  just  actions. 
As  Weingartner1°  points  out,  reason  is  a  sort  of  rational  desire,  and  the  only  way  in 
which  a  desire  can  be  defined  is  in  terms  of  its  object.  Thus,  the  object  of  the  rational 
desire,  reason,  is  the  real  truth,  that  is,  the  knowledge  of  the  Good.  }le  goes  on  to  say, 
What  is  true  is  what  is  right.  Plato  did  not  go  in  for  making  distinctions 
between  fact  and  value.  The  ultimate  object  of  reason  is  the  Good  (504d- 
509c).  And  the  Good  is  not  so  called  because  it  is  valuable,  in  contrast  with 
the  t'orms  and  the  world  of  sense  and  practice.  Rather,  the  Good  is  given  this 
name  because  it  is  the  ultimate  object  of  rational  desire,  whereas  all  more 
proximate  objects  of  rational  desire  are  good  to  the  degree  that  they  manifest 
that  principle.  Thus  the  forms,  too,  are  good  and  so  are  things  and  states  of 
affairs  to  the  degree  to  which  they  participate  in  form. 
Due  to  the  fact  that  the  object  of  reason  is  the  Good,  the  Platonically  just  man  will 
always  aim  at  what  is  true  and  what  is  true  is  right.  Therefore,  he  will  never  embezzle, 
commit  sacrilege  or  theft,  or  betray  his  friends  or  his  country  (443a).  Weinbartner 
thinks  that  the  "  leap  "11  from  self-regarding  justice  to  other-regarding  justice  in  the 
Republic  can  be  bridged  by  appeal  to  Plato's  knowledge  of  the  Good  and  theory  of  the 
Forms.  And  this  view  is  endorsed  by  Demos,  who  gives  a  similar  analysis'  3  to 
Weingartner's  and  says  conclusively, 
10  R.  It.  Weingartner,  "  Vulgar  Justice  and  Platonic  Justice  ",  11hilusophy  and  1'hertumenologicu/ 
Research,  vol.  XXV,  1965,  p.  250. 
11  Ibid. 
12  R.  Demos,  "A  Fallacy  in  Plato's  Republic?  ",  The  Philosophical  Review,  vol.  LXXIII,  1964,  p.  396- 
97. 
13  for  Demos'  analysis  see  /bid.  p.  397-98. 
222 The  concern  for  my  self-fulfillment  is  analyzable  into  a  concern  that 
everyone  should  attain  psychical  fulfillment;  that  I  am  inwardly  just  means 
that  I  want  everyone  to  have  his  due.  14 
However,  although  this  approach  seems  to  be  able  to  bridge  the  gap  between 
Platonic  and  ordinary  justice,  yet  both  Weinpartner  and  Demos  still  have  to  answer 
the  question  arising  from  their  approaches.  That  is,  even  though  the  Platonically  just 
man  will  act  in  accordance  not  only  with  his  own  good  but  also  with  the  good  of 
others,  there  is  still  a  gap  between  acting  rationally  and  the  ordinary  conception  of 
justice.  For,  as  Annas  points  out, 
It  is  true  that  the  rule  of  reason  will  involve  recognition  of,  and  action  in 
accordance  with,  the  good  of  others  as  well  as  that  of  oneself,  and  that  the 
examples  cited  by  Plato  are  all  examples  of  what  we  might  call  duty  to 
others;  but  this  is  far  from  showing  that  the  rule  of  reason  will  require  one  to 
do  and  refrain  from  doing  precisely  the  acts  of  common  morality  which  Plato 
presents  as  a  touchstone.  '  5 
The  passage  at  485d-e,  where  Socrates  describes  the  qualities  of  character  required  in 
the  philosopher,  could  be  taken  as  a  solution  for  this  problem.  Socrates  says  that  "  if  a 
man's  desires  set  strongly  in  one  direction,  they  are  correspondingly  less  strong  in 
other  directions  ".  The  Platonically  just  man,  '6  according  to  this  passage,  will  act  in 
accordance  with  the  good  of  all,  and  will  not  act  otherwise.  For  the  Platonically  just 
man's  rational  desire,  reason,  flows  towards  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  and 
physical  pleasure  will  pass  him  by.  Thus,  "  no  philosopher  entrusted  with  gold  ",  says 
Kraut,  "  would  unjustly  seek  to  embezzle  it,  since  no  philosopher  is  interested  in 
14  vl.  ).  cit.  p.  398. 
15  J.  Annas,  "  Plato  and  Common  Morality  ",  Classical  Philosophy:  Collected  I'cr/xrs  (New  York  & 
London,  1995),  vol.  3,  (ed.  )  T.  Irwin,  p.  185. 
16  In  the  Republic,  only  the  philosophers  can  be  regarded  as  genuinely  just.  So  here  my  use  or,  the 
philosopher  '  and  '  the  Platonically  just  man  '  is  interchangeable, 
223 increasing  his  wealth.  "  17  This  is  a'  hydraulic  account  '  of  justice.  All  injustice  results 
from  the  fact  that  too  much  desire  is  directed  into  channels  other  than  philosophy. 
However  Kraut's  claim,  it  seems  to  me,  cannot  answer  the  question:  Why  the 
philosophers  can  tell  lies?  Telling  lies,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  justice,  is  unjust,  but 
in  the  Republic  Plato  allows  the  philosophers  to  tell  lies  for  the  good  of  the  state  as  a 
whole  (389b-c).  This  seems  to  suggest  that  the  Platonically  just  man  will  not  always 
act  according  to  the  ordinary  sense  of  justice.  The  Platonically  just  man  does  not  stick 
to  rules,  he  is  expedient  or  flexible  so  that  he  is  able  to  make  a  proper  judgement 
about  how  to  act  in  different  circumstances.  The  reason  thus  for  the  Platonically  just 
man  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  sense  of  justice  is  not  so  straightforward  as 
we  at  first  think  it  is. 
It  can  be  seen  that  the  approaches  adopted  by  scholars,  namely,  Wcingartner, 
Demos  and  Kraut,  to  prove  that  the  Platonic  conception  of  justice  entails  the  ordinary 
conception  of  justice  are  in  one  way  or  the  other  inadequate.  Let  us  proceed  to  see 
whether  the  ordinary  conception  of  justice  will  entail  the  Platonic  conception  of 
justice. 
It  is  obvious  that  in  Book  I  Plato  gives  his  readers  a  hint  that  genuine  justice 
cannot  be  defined  merely  in  teens  of  acting  in  accordance  with  rules  and  precepts. 
Whereas  in  Book  IV  the  analogy  of  health  and  justice  seems  to  indicate  that  healthy 
activities  produce  health,  and  similarly,  just  actions  will  produce  a  just  soul  (444c). 
However  the  sentence  `just  actions  will  produce  a  just  soul  '  raises  two  issues.  "  One 
is  moral  psychology,  and  the  other  is  moral  judgement.  The  issue  regarding  moral 
psychology  is  expressed  in  Aristotle's  Nicoinacheun  Ethics  where  Aristotle  says, 
This,  then,  is  the  case  with  the  virtues  also;  by  doing  the  acts  that  we  do  in 
our  transactions  with  other  men  we  become  just  or  unjust,  and  by  doing  the 
acts  that  we  do  in  the  presence  of  danger,  and  by  being  habituated  to  feel  fear 
or  confidence,  we  become  brave  or  cowardly.  The  same  is  true  of  appetites 
and  feelings  of  anger;  some  men  become  temperate  and  good-tempered, 
others  self-indulgent  and  irascible,  by  behaving  in  one  way  or  the  other  in  the 
1'  R.  Kraut,  "Reason  and  Justice  in  Plato's  Republic  ",  Ibid.  p.  206. 
to  Annas,  op.  cit.  p.  192. 
224 appropriate  circumstances.  Thus,  in  one  word,  states  of  character  arise  out  of 
like  activities.  (l  103a33"b25)'9 
It  may  be  true,  according  to  Dent,  20  that  a  man  is  called  just  because  he  has  the 
disposition  to  perform  just  acts.  For  a  just  man,  for  the  sake  of  the  good,  does  those 
acts  required  to  ensure  that  each  man  has  his  due.  Thus,  to  talk  ofjusticc  is  to  talk  of 
moral  justification,  that  is,  whether  this  or  that  act  is  in  accordance  with  society's 
moral  consensus.  But  it  would  be  odd  to  say  that  one  is  temperate  because  one  is  able 
to  act  temperately.  For,  in  Dent's  view,  to  be  just  is  different  from  being  temperate. 
The  former  requires  one  to  act  in  conformity  with  rules  irrespective  of  one's  character, 
but  the  latter  is  primarily  concerned  with  one's  character.  In  short,  justice  is 
concerned  with  moral  justification,  but  temperance  is  concerned  with  moral 
psychology.  However,  it  might  not  be  the  case  for  Plato.  Plato  does  not  think  that 
justice  is  merely  a  matter  of  acting  with  moral  justification.  Justice,  like  temperance, 
is  concerned  with  one's  character.  Although  the  claim  that  just  acts  will  produce  a 
Platonically  just  soul  may  be  right,  yet  a  Platonically  just  man  cannot  he  fully 
recognized  merely  through  his  external  behaviour.  For  what  actions  are  ordinarily  just 
is  decided  by  society's  moral  consensus,  and,  as  mentioned  above,  the  Platonically 
just  man  does  not  always  act  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  sense  of  justice. 
It  is  obvious,  from  the  discussion  above,  that  the  relationship  between  the 
Platonic  conception  of  justice  and  the  ordinary  conception  of  justice  seems  to  be 
fragile.  If  the  gap  between  these  two  conceptions  of  justice  cannot  be  satisfactorily 
bridged,  then  how  can  Plato  reply  to  the  claim  made  by  Thrasymachus  and  Glaucon 
that  being  unjust  will  be  better  oil  than  being  just.  In  what  follows  I  shall  proceed  to 
argue  the  point  that  throughout  the  Republic  including  Book  I  Plato  pays  no  attention 
to  the  ordinary  conception  of  justice.  That  is,  Plato  in  the  Republic  only  concentrates 
on  the  discussion  of  agent-centred  morality  and  takes  act-centred  morality  as  a  kind  of 
2  test  to  the  former.  t  So  there  is  no  fallacy  of  irrelevance  involved  in  Plato's  Republic. 
"  D.  Ross,  Aristotle:  71uß  Nicomachernr  Ethics  (Oxford,  1980),  p.  29. 
20  Dent  suggests  that  Aristotle's  language  fails  to  make  this  clear,  see  "  Virtues  and  Actions  ",  7k' 
Philosophical  Quarterly,  vol.  25,1975,  pp.  324-25. 
21  For  the  distinction  between  act-centred  morality  and  agent-centred  morality  see  J.  Laird,  "  Act-Ethics 
225 3.  From  act-centred  theory  to  agent-centred  theory? 
The  idea  that  to  be  just  is  to  be  wise  or  knowledgeable  is  also  illustrated  in  Socrates' 
conversation  with  Thrasymachus.  At  349b-d  Socrates  claims  that  "  [t]he  just  man 
does  not  compete  with  his  like,  but  only  his  unlike,  while  the  unjust  man  competes 
with  both  like  and  unlike.  "  From  349e  to  350c  Socrates  is  trying  to  show  why 
Thrasymachus  is  wrong  to  think  that  the  unjust  man  is  good  and  sensible  and  the  just 
man  is  the  opposite.  The  summary  of  the  argument  is  as  follows: 
1)  Being  musical  involves  intelligence.  (349e) 
2)  Intelligence  is  good,  lack  of  it  bad. 
3)  A  musician  who  is  tuning  a  lyre  tries  to  do  better  than  an  unmusical 
layman. 
4)  But  he  does  not  try  to  compete  with  another  musician. 
5)  The  man  who  has  no  knowledge  will  try  to  compete  both  with  the  man 
who  has  and  with  the  man  who  has  not.  (350a) 
6)  The  man  with  professional  skill  is  wise.  (350b) 
7)  The  wise  man  is  good. 
So,  8)  The  good  man,  who  has  knowledge,  will  not  try  to  compete  with  his 
like,  but  only  with  his  opposite. 
While,  9)  The  bad  and  ignorant  man  will  try  to  compete  with  both  his  like 
and  his  opposite. 
10)  The  unjust  man  tries  to  compete  with  everyone  while  the  just  man  only 
competes  with  those  unlike  him. 
So,  11)  The  just  man  is  wise  and  good  and  the  unjust  man  bad  and  ignorant. 
(350c) 
Commentators22  have  paid  attention  to  the  way  in  which  Socrates  trades  on  the 
ambiguity  of  language  in  this  passage,  whereas  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  a  preliminary 
and  Agent-Ethics  ",  Mind,  vol.  LV,  1946,  pp.  113-32. 
22  For  example,  Annas,  op.  ci[.  pp.  51-52. 
226 to  the  latter  part  of  Book  V  (427a-480a).  For  the  aim  of  the  latter  part  of  Book  V  is  to 
find  out  the  definition  of  the  philosopher  by  virtue  of  pointing  out  the  differences 
among  knowledge,  opinion,  and  ignorance.  And  by  comparing  the  current  passage 
and  the  passage  referred  to  in  Book  V  it  is  clear  that  from  the  start  of  the  Republic 
Plato  has  already  made  up  his  mind  that  his  philosopher  will  be  a  trinity  of  wisdom, 
justice  and  self-discipline.  For  what  Socrates  purports  to  show  in  this  passage  (349e- 
350e)  is  that  goodness  is  not  essentially  competitive,  and  that  the  just  man  is  the  wise 
man,  and  the  just  and  wise  man  will  never  be  over-ambitious  and  acquisitive.  What 
the  just  man  wants  or  does  will  never  be  over  the  limit.  Similarly,  a  skillful  sculptor 
always  aims  at  producing  a  perfect  sculpture  with  right  proportion,  and  not  more. 
Therefore,  the  just  man's  knowledge  will  enable  him  to  know  what  is  required  and 
within  the  boundary.  2. 
Thrasymachus  claims  that  injustice  is  a  source  of  strength  (35la-b).  From  351b 
to  352d  Socrates  sets  out  to  object  to  Thrasymachus'  claim  and  says  that  since  justice 
is  wisdom  the  just  state  is  stronger  than  the  unjust  one.  He  demonstrates  this  with  the 
following  argument:  For  a  state  to  be  strong  each  member  of  it  has  to  be  coordinated 
with  one  another  and  does  no  wrong  to  one  another.  Thus  if  they  treat  each  other 
justly  there  will  be  a  unity  within  the  state,  if,  on  the  contrary,  they  treat  each  other 
unjustly  there  will  be  hatred  and  dissension  within  the  state.  Socrates  goes  on  saying 
conclusively, 
Injustice,  then,  seems  to  have  the  following  results,  whether  it  occurs  in  a 
state  or  family  or  army  or  in  anything  else:  it  renders  it  incapable  of  any 
common  action  because  of  factions  and  quarrels,  and  sets  it  at  variance  with 
itself  and  with  its  opponents  and  with  whatever  is  just. 
And  it  will  produce  its  natural  effects  also  in  the  individual.  It  renders  him 
incapable  of  action  because  of  internal  conflicts  and  division  of  purpose,  and 
sets  him  at  variance  with  himself  and  with  all  who  are  just.  (351e-352a) 
These  two  passages  seem  to  indicate  that  the  character  of  a  person  or  state  will  be 
23  Lycos,  op.  cii.  p.  120-25. 
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among  knowledge,  opinion,  and  ignorance.  And  by  comparing  the  current  passage 
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350e)  is  that  goodness  is  not  essentially  competitive,  and  that  the  just  man  is  the  wise 
man,  and  the  just  and  wise  man  will  never  be  over-ambitious  and  acquisitive.  What 
the  just  man  wants  or  does  will  never  be  over  the  limit.  Similarly,  a  skillful  sculptor 
always  aims  at  producing  a  perfect  sculpture  with  right  proportion,  and  not  more. 
Therefore,  the  just  man's  knowledge  will  enable  him  to  know  what  is  required  and 
within  the  boundary.  `' 
Thrasymachus  claims  that  injustice  is  a  source  of  strength  (351  a-b).  From  351  b 
to  352d  Socrates  sets  out  to  object  to  Thrasymachus'  claim  and  says  that  since  justice 
is  wisdom  the  just  state  is  stronger  than  the  unjust  one.  He  demonstrates  this  with  the 
following  argument:  For  a  state  to  be  strong  each  member  of  it  has  to  be  coordinated 
with  one  another  and  does  no  wrong  to  one  another.  Thus  if  they  treat  each  other 
justly  there  will  be  a  unity  within  the  state;  if,  on  the  contrary,  they  treat  each  other 
unjustly  there  will  be  hatred  and  dissension  within  the  state.  Socrates  goes  on  saying 
conclusively, 
Injustice,  then,  seems  to  have  the  following  results,  whether  it  occurs  in  a 
state  or  family  or  army  or  in  anything  else:  it  renders  it  incapable  of  any 
common  action  because  of  factions  and  quarrels,  and  sets  it  at  variance  with 
itself  and  with  its  opponents  and  with  whatever  is  just. 
And  it  will  produce  its  natural  effects  also  in  the  individual.  It  renders  him 
incapable  of  action  because  of  internal  conflicts  and  division  of  purpose,  and 
sets  him  at  variance  with  himself  and  with  all  who  arc  just.  (351  e-352a) 
These  two  passages  seem  to  indicate  that  the  character  of  a  person  or  state  will  be 
23  Lycos,  op.  cit.  p.  120-25. 
227 dependent  upon  whether  the  elements  within  them  arc  in  a  state  of  harmony  or  a  state 
of  conflict.  This  is  the  main  theme  which  Plato  tackles  in  Book  IV,  where  he  claims 
that  in  a  just  state  each  member  of  which  does  his  or  her  own  job  for  which  he  or  she 
is  most  suited  (433a).  And  in  a  just  soul  each  part  does  its  own  job,  that  is,  reason  is  in 
command  and  spirit  and  appetite  are  obedient  to  reason's  command  (441c).  Plato,  in 
Book  1,  does  not  give  his  readers  any  more  information  than  that  there  is  a  conflict  or 
harmony  in  human  soul.  Nevertheless  H.  W.  B.  Joseph  points  out, 
This  is  the  first  emergence  in  the  Republic  of  the  notion  that  there  is  a 
constitution  in  the  soul  of  any  man  comparable  to  what  may  exist  in  any 
community  of  men,  so  that  justice  and  injustice  are  the  same  in  a  man  and  in 
a  community,  and  according  to  the  degree  in  which  either  prevails  in  them 
different  and  corresponding  types  of  man  and  of  community  arise.  24 
It  is  obvious  that  Plato  thinks  that  to  talk  of  a  just  man  and  a  just  state  one  has  to  refer 
to  their  inner  constitutions.  Although  at  this  stage  he  puts  little  into  Socrates'  mouth 
about  the  nature  of  just  man  or  just  soul,  yet  the  close  relation  between  Book  I  and  the 
rest  of  the  Republic  is  certain. 
Towards  the  end  of  Book  1,  Socrates  shows  why  the  just  man  is  happier  than  the 
unjust  man  by  appeal  to  the  notion  of  function  (ergon).  The  function  of  a  thing,  says 
Socrates,  is  that  which  only  it  can  do  and  does  the  best  (352e,  353a).  So  the  function 
of  eyes  is  to  see  and  that  of  ears  hear.  Socrates  goes  on  to  say  that  everything  which 
has  a  function  has  its  own  particular  excellence  (353b).  Due  to  the  fact  that  the  eyes 
have  a  function,  there  is  an  excellence  of  the  eyes.  And  it  would  be  impossible  for  the 
eyes  to  perform  their  function  well  if  they  lack  their  excellence.  Socrates  continues 
his  argument  by  saying  that  the  function  of  human  mind  is  to  deliberate,  control  and 
pay  attention,  which  is  life  (353d).  The  excellence  of  the  mind  will  enable  it  to 
perform  its  function  well,  and  justice  is  the  particular  excellence  of  the  mind  (353e). 
Socrates  therefore  concludes  that  the  just  man  and  the  just  mind  will  have  a  good  life, 
and  the  man  who  has  a  good  life  will  be  happy. 
24  W.  I  I.  B.  Joseph,  l:  ýsayc  iii  Ancient  aýtcl  Mock'ru  Philosophy,  ch.  II  (Oxford.  1935).  p.  38. 
228 Although  Annas  points  out  that  there  is  no  argument  to  prove  the  claim  that 
23  justice  is  the  excellence  of  the  mind,  yet,  I  think,  it  does  not  affect  my  argument 
here.  The  passage  at  353b-e  suggests  that  virtue  is  a  quality  which  enables  one  to  live 
well.  It  does  not  consist  in  the  acts  which  constitute  living  well,  if  we  follow  this  line 
of  thought  then  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  see  why  Plato  is  from  the  outset  of  the 
Republic  interested  in  agent-centred  morality.  For  in  talking  of  the  just  soul  Plato  is 
talking  of  what  sort  of  person  one  is  not  about  what  sort  of  act  one  should  perform.  A 
similar  point  can  be  inferred  from  the  passage  where  Thrasymachus  takes  over  the 
discussion  at  336c,  he  asks  Socrates  to  give  a  definition  of  what  justice  is. 
Thrasymachus  says, 
Give  us  an  answer  yourself,  and  tell  us  what  you  think  justice  is.  And  (Ion  'I 
tell  me  that  its  duty,  or  expecliencv,  or  advantage,  or  profit,  or  interest.  I 
won't  put  up  with  nonsense  of  this  sort;  give  me  a  clear  and  precise 
definition.  (336c-d) 
What  Plato  puts  into  Thrasymachus'  mouth  is  clear,  justice  cannot  be  defined  in 
terms  of  duty,  expediency,  advantage,  profit,  and  interest.  What  else  can  be  taken  to 
be  the  definiens  of  justice,  all  I  can  think  of  or  all  Plato  wants  to  say  is  character.  It 
might  be  argued  that  Socrates  in  the  next  few  speeches  suggests  that  he  might  give 
one  of  the  forbidden  definitions  if  it  happens  to  be  right  (337a-c).  However  what 
Socrates  does  here,  I  think,  is  to  elicit  the  definition  of  justice  from  Thrasymachus  to 
show  that  talking  of  justice  in  terms  of  duty,  interest,  and  advantage  is  nonsensical. 
Socrates'  discussion  with  Thrasymachus  on  justice  in  terms  of  interest  and  profit  is  to 
tell  his  readers  what  he  is  actually  interested  in  is  agent-centred  morality.  As  Schiller 
fairly  points  out, 
[N]o  fallacy  has  been  committed  because  it  was  not  Plato's  intention  to 
answer  the  problem  posed  by  Sachs  and  Adkins.  These  critics  clearly  believe 
that  Plato's  proofs  in  the  Republic  are  designed  to  show  that  vulgarly  just 
23  However,  Desmond  Lee  seems  to  think  that  the  premise  of  saying  `justice  is  the  peculiar  excellence  of 
the  mind  '  can  be  found  at  350c.  See  D.  Lee,  Plato:  Republic  (London,  1987),  note  2,  p.  100. 
229 men  are  happy.  If  Plato  is  not  particularly  interested  in  this  problem,  we  are 
being  rather  unfair  to  derogate  his  work  as  one  based  on  a  fallacy.  26 
Although  Schiller  expresses  his  discomfort  with  this  reply  to  Sachs'  problem  later  on 
in  his  article,  yet  if  my  discussion  is  right,  this  discomfort  should  disappear.  For  the 
passages  referred  to  in  Book  I  of  the  Republic  do  show  that  Plato  is  not  interested  in 
the  relationship  between  the  ordinary  conception  of  justice  and  the  Platonic 
conception  of  justice,  but  in  the  latter  solely.  It  follows  that  in  Plato's  view  justice 
cannot  be  defined  in  terms  of  "  the  nonperformance  of  acts  of  certain  kinds  "27  either, 
i.  e.  the  just  man  will  not  commit  adultery,  embezzle,  and  betray  his  friends,  etc..  For 
both  the  ordinary  sense  of  justice  and  the  vulgar  sense  of  justice  are  concerned  with 
acts,  and  the  inadequacies  of  talking  justice  in  terms  of  external  behaviour  are  fully 
exposed  in  Book  1.  Thus  from  the  beginning  of  the  Republic  Plato  draws  his  readers' 
attention  to  that  justice  is  not  a  matter  of  acting  rightly,  but  of  having  a  balanced  soul. 
Plato's  appeal  to  agent-centred  morality  has  three  important  corollaries:  28  firstly, 
we  must  have  some  independent  way  of  saying  what  the  just  man  is  Iike.  For  example, 
if  we  say  that  the  just  man  is  one  who  is  able  to  act  justly,  there  is  still  a  question  for 
us  to  answer,  that  is,  what  the  just  man  is  like.  Plato  is  fully  aware  of  this,  so  he 
appeals  to  the  agent-centred  morality  in  that  for  Plato  just  acts  can  be  identified  only 
when  the  just  man  can  be  identified  first.  That  is,  the  just  man  will  come  first  and 
through  the  just  man  we  will  know  what  types  of  acts  are  just.  Secondly,  it  follows 
from  the  first  corollary  that  without  knowing  what  the  just  man  is like  there  is  no  way 
for  us  to  identify  what  sorts  of  acts  as  just.  Thus,  it  would  be  inappropriate,  according 
to  Plato,  to  draw  a  list  of  rules  or  precepts  with  which  every  member  of  the  society 
has  to  act  in  accordance.  The  only  guarantee  one  can  get  for  acting  justly  is  to  have  a 
harmonious  and  balanced  soul  because  it  would  be  impossible  to  make  an  exhaustive 
list  of  rules  and  precepts  which  people  can  follow.  Thirdly,  it  would  be  clear  why 
Plato  says  in  the  Stalesmun  that  the  law  is  the  second-best  way  of  governing  the  state 
26  J.  Schiller,  "  Just  Men  and  Just  Acts  in  Plato's  Republic  ",  Journal  of  the  Ilistory  of  Philosqpby,  vol 
VI,  1968,  p.  3. 
27  Sachs,  vp.  cit.  p.  143. 
28  Annas,  '*  Plato  and  Common  Morality  ",  op.  cit.  pp.  191-93. 
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Confucius  and  Behavioural  Morality 
Confucius  is  asked  in  the  Analects  by  his  disciple,  Yan  Hui,  about  human-heartedness 
(jen).  The  Master  says  that  to  subdue  oneself  and  return  to  ritual  (li)  is  to  practise 
human-heartedness  (XII,  1).  The  Confucian  notion  of  `  to  subdue  oneself  'cannot  be 
merely  understood  as  the  suppression  of  one's  bodily  desires.  Rather  it  is  closely 
related  with  the  concept  of  self-cultivation  if  we  put  the  notion  of  `  to  subdue 
oneself  '  in  the  moral  context.  The  notion  of'  return  to  ritual  '  does  not  imply  that 
one  should  submissively  act  in  accordance  with  rules  of  proper  conduct,  but  that  by 
acting  in  accordance  with  rules  or  laws  one  expresses  one's  well-cultivated  nature  or 
character,  i.  e.  human-heartedness. 
In  this  chapter,  I  would  like  to  argue  that  although  throughout  the  Analects 
Confucius  seems  to  give  his  readers  an  impression  that  he  is  concerned  with  act- 
centred  morality,  i.  e.  how  to  act  properly  in  a  given  situation,  yet  the  inner  dimension, 
that  is,  agent-centred  morality,  underlying  proper  acts  or  conduct  is  immanent  in 
Confucianism.  In  the  first  section,  I  shall  explore  the  notion  of'  to  subdue  oneself'  to 
see  the  agent-centred  view  of  morality  in  Confucian  ethics.  And  in  the  second  section 
I  would  like  to  discuss  the  notion  of  `  return  to  ritual  '  to  sec  the  relation  between 
ritual  and  human-heartedness  and  why  moral  actions,  for  Confucius,  cannot  be  merely 
acting  in  accordance  with  rules  or  laws.  Finally,  the  union  of  agent-centred  and  act- 
centred  morality  in  Confucian  ethics  will  be  discussed. 
1.  The  notion  of  `  to  subdue  oneself' 
To  understand  the  Confucian  notion  of  `  to  subdue  oneself  '  as  something  distinct 
from  the  suppression  of  one's  bodily  desires,  I  would  like  first  to  draw  attention  to  the 
Mencius.  Mencius  is  asked  by  Kung-tu  Tzu:  "'t'hough  equally  human,  why  are  some 
men  greater  than  others?  "  Mencius  replies, He  who  is  guided  by  the  interests  of  the  parts  of  his  person  that  arc  greater 
importance  is  a  great  man;  he  who  is  guided  by  the  interests  of  the  parts  of 
his  person  that  are  of  smaller  importance  is  a  small  man.  (Kung-tu  Tzu 
pursues:  )  Though  equally  human,  why  are  some  men  guided  one  way  and 
others  guided  another  way?  (Mencius  replies:  )  The  organs  of  hearing  and 
sight  are  unable  to  think  and  can  be  misled  by  external  things.  When  one 
thing  acts  on  another,  all  it  does  is  to  attract  it.  The  organ  of  the  heart  can 
think.  But  it  will  find  the  answer  only  if  it  does  think;  otherwise,  it  will  not 
find  the  answer.  This  is  what  Heaven  has  given  me.  If  one  makes  one's  stand 
on  what  is  of  greater  importance  in  the  first  instance,  what  is  of  smaller 
importance  cannot  displace  it.  In  this  way,  one  cannot  but  be  a  great  man.  " 
(VI,  A,  15)' 
This  passage  shows  that  for  Mencius  there  is  a  distinction  between  mind  and 
body,  and  both  perception  and  feeling  can  distract  the  mind.  The  Mencian  emphasis 
on  the  function  of  human  mind,  thinking,  seems  to  be  parallel  to  Plato's  emphasis  on 
reason  in  the  Republic.  Plato  says  that  reason  should  rule  in  the  soul  since  it  has  "  the 
wisdom  and  foresight  to  act  for  the  whole  "  (441e),  and  that  "a  mind  with  a  grace  and 
sense  of  proportion  that  will  naturally  and  easily  lead  it  on  to  see  the  form  of  each 
reality  "  (486d).  The  second  quotation  implies  that  the  mind  must  avoid  distractions 
in  order  to  contemplate  the  Forms.  The  mind,  for  Plato,  concentrates  on  the  world  of 
the  Forms.  However  for  the  Confucians  the  mind  must  avoid  distractions  in  order  to 
concentrate  on  affairs  of  this  world.  That  is,  the  mind  without  distraction  can  perform 
its  function  properly  which  enables  one  to  express  one's  feeling  and  enjoy  pleasures 
to  a  proper  extent.  The  problem  of  how  to  express  one's  feeling  towards  others 
depends  upon  one's  acting  in  conformity  with  ritual.  In  a  society  the  interaction 
among  the  members  of  it  should  be  regulated  by  rules  of  proper  conduct.  Thus  to  act 
rightly  one  must  understand  those  rules,  which  is  the  job  of  the  mind. 
It  is  said  in  the  Analcct.  r  that 
1  C.  D.  Lau,  Meticius  (London,  1970),  p.  168. 
233 In  the  practice  of  the  rites  harmony  is  regarded  as  the  most  valuable  thing, 
and  in  the  ways  of  the  ancient  kings  this  is  regarded  as  the  most  beautiful 
thing.  It  is  adopted  in  all  matters,  both  small  and  great.  But  sometimes  it 
does  not  work.  If  you  behave  harmoniously  because  you  understand  harmony, 
but  do  not  regulate  your  conduct  with  ritual,  surely  that  cannot  be  made  to 
work.  (1,12) 
Having  harmonious  social  relations  with  others  is  a  precious  thing,  but  it  is  not  worthy 
of  pursuing  such  harmony  if  one  does  not  do  so  in  accordance  with  ritual.  '  To  act  in 
conformity  with  ritual  requires  one  to  understand  ritual.  Only  when  one  knows  ritual 
is  one  able  to  take  one's  stand  (XVI,  13).  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  Confucians  think 
that  acting  in  accordance  with  ritual  is  helpful  in  shaping  one's  character.  For  one's 
love  towards  people  is  a  kind  of  raw  feeling.  It  needs  ritual  to  shape  and  regulate  it  so 
that  one  can  express  one's  love  towards  others  properly.  A  similar  idea  can  be  found 
in  the  Republic,  where  Plato  claims  that  doing  just  acts  produces  justice  in  the  soul 
(444c-d).  Both  Plato  and  Confucius  would  agree  that  one's  external  behaviour  has  an 
impact  on  one's  character.  However,  the  difference  between  Plato  and  Confucius  on 
this  matter  is  that  for  the  former,  even  though  people  of  the  lower  classes,  whose 
natures  are  silver,  and  iron,  do  just  acts,  it  does  not  mean  that  they  possess  inner 
harmony  in  their  souls.  For  only  the  philosophers,  whose  nature  is  gold,  can  be  said  to 
possess  harmonious  soul.  On  the  contrary,  the  Confucian  claim  that  by  nature  men  are 
close  to  one  another  (XVII,  2),  allows  a  road  sweeper,  for  example,  to  have  a  good 
character  by  doing  the  right  acts. 
Furthermore,  both  ritual  and  music  are  concerned  with  harmony.  Plato  in  Book  3 
of  the  Ilepuhlic  claims  that  different  types  of  music  are  associated  with  different  types 
of  character.  Thus  to  educate  the  young  guardians  the  Educator  has  to  choose  those 
kinds  of  music  which  can  produce  harmony  and  self-control  in  the  young  guardians' 
soul.  Confucius,  like  Plato,  thinks  that  music  can  perfect  one's  character.  lie  says  that 
"  [o]ne  is  roused  by  the  Songs,  established  by  ritual,  and  perfected  by  music  "  (Vill, 
2  Here  I  disagree  with  R.  Dawson's  claim  that  "  the  purpose  of  ritual  (Ii)  is  to  bring  about  harmony 
between  man  and  nature,  .... 
",  Confucius:  The  Aiialects  (Oxford,  1993),  note  1.12,  p.  84.  For  ritual  in 
this  passage  is  understood  as  the  measure  of  the  interaction  between  man  and  man. 
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In  the  Platonic  tripartite  soul  the  relation  among  the  three  elements,  i.  e.  reason, 
spirit,  and  appetite,  is  that  appetites  have  to  be  under  the  control  of  reason  with  the 
aid  of  spirit  (442a-b).  The  expression  `  under  the  control  of  reason  '  does  not  imply 
the  suppression  of  appetitive  desires.  Neither  Plato  nor  Mencius  see  the  necessity  of 
suppressing  our  feelings  or  physical  desires.  Plato  in  the  Republic  says, 
Then  if  the  mind  as  a  whole  will  follow  the  lead  of  its  philosophic  element, 
without  internal  division,  each  element  will  be  just  and  in  all  other  respects 
perform  its  own  function,  and  in  addition  will  enjoy  its  own  particular 
pleasures,  which  are  the  best  and  truest  available  to  it.  (586e-587a) 
Plato  in  this  passage  claims  that  bodily  desires  are  not  necessarily  to  be  suppressed. 
They  should  be  guided  by  reason  in  the  right  direction.  Although  Mencius,  unlike 
Plato,  does  not  see  that  the  soul  is  composed  of  three  parts,  he  holds  that  our  desires 
and  feelings  have  to  be  fulfilled  to  a  proper  extent.  Mencius  says, 
When  I  say  that  all  men  have  a  mind  which  cannot  bear  to  see  the  Vqlji  rings 
of  others,  my  meaning  may  be  illustrated  thus:  -  even  now-a-days,  if  men 
suddenly  see  a  child  about  to  fall  into  a  well,  they  will  without  exception 
experience  a  feeling  of  alarm  and  distress.  They  will  feel  so,  not  as  a  ground 
on  which  they  may  gain  the  favour  of  the  child's  parents,  nor  as  a  ground  on 
which  they  may  seek  the  praise  of  their  neighbours  and  friends,  nor  from  a 
dislike  to  the  reputation  of  having  been  unmoved  by  such  a  thing.  From  this 
case  we  may  perceive  that  the  feeling  of  commiseration  is  essential  to  man, 
that  the  feeling  of  shame  and  dislike  is  essential  to  man,  that  the  feeling  of 
modesty  and  complaisance  is  essential  to  man,  and  that  the  feeling  of 
approving  and  disapproving  is  essential  to  man.  The  feeling  of 
commiseration  is  the  principle  of  benevolence.  The  feeling  of  shame  and 
dislike  is  the  principle  of  righteousness.  The  feeling  of  modesty  and 
complaisance  is  the  principle  of  propriety.  The  feeling  of  approving  and 
disapproving  is  the  principle  of  knowledge.  Men  have  these  four  principles 
235 just  as  they  have  their  four  limbs.  When  men,  having  these  four  principles, 
yet  say  of  themselves  that  they  cannot  develop  them,  they  play  the  thief  with 
themselves,  and  he  who  says  of  his  prince  that  he  cannot  develop  them  plays 
the  thief  with  his  prince.  Since  all  men  have  these  four  principles  in 
themselves,  let  them  know  to  give  them  all  their  development  and 
completion,  and  the  issue  will  be  like  that  of  fire  which  has  begun  to  burn,  or 
that  of  spring  which  has  begun  to  find  vent.  Let  them  have  their  complete 
development,  and  they  will  suffice  to  love  and  protect  all  within  the  four 
seas.  Let  them  be  denied  that  development,  and  they  will  not  suffice  for  a 
man  to  serve  his  parents  with.  (11,  i,  6)3 
This  lengthy  quotation  indicates  that  feeling  and  thinking,  for  Mencius,  always 
go  hand  in  hand  in  our  moral  life  without  one  suppressing  the  other.  And  the  Chinese 
character  (,,  (lisin)  is  translated  in  the  first  quotation  as  heart,  and  in  the  second 
quotation  as  mind.  As  Liu,  Shu-hsien  points  out,  "  [i]n  the  Chinese  tradition  the  mind 
and  the  heart  have  never  been  sharply  distinguished  from  each  other.  Hence  the 
conflict  between  cognitivism  and  emotivism  has  never  become  a  serious  issue  for  the 
Chinese  philosophers.  "'  Furthermore,  human  desires,  in  the  Confucian  view,  should 
not  be  suppressed  but  be  fulfilled  to  a  proper  extent.  As  Confucius  says  that  "  [r]iches 
and  honours  --  these  are  what  men  desire,  but  if  this  is  not  achieved  in  accordance 
with  the  appropriate  principles,  one  does  not  cling  to  them  "  (IV,  5),  and  that  "  riches 
and  Honours  acquired  by  unrighteous  means  are  to  me  like  the  floating  clouds  "  (VII, 
16).  Every  human  being  has  desires  which  should  not  be  suppressed  recklessly  but  be 
fulfilled  to  a  proper  extent. 
The  notion  of  righteousness  here  is  essential  to  Confucian  ethics.  For 
righteousness  in  Chinese  is  "  (yi)  which  means  ti  (yi),  suitabic,  congruent, 
proper.  5  They  are  different  characters  with  the  same  tont.  The  Confucian  claim, 
3  J.  Legge,  The  Works  ojMenciu.  s  (New  York,  1970),  pp.  202-4. 
Shu-hsien  Liu,  "A  Philosophical  Analysis  of  the  Confucian  Appi  oach  to  Ethics  ",  1'hIIO.  SOrhr  Ei  and 
West,  vol.  XXII  (4),  1972,  p.  420. 
3  P.  A.  Boodberg,  "  The  Semasiology  of  Some  Primary  Confucian  Concepts  ",  1'hi/  a.  voophy'  lsus!  Ill/  If  ýýsl, 
vol.  It  (4),  1953,  p.  331. 
236 "  [l]et  a  ruler  be  a  ruler,  a  subject  be  a  subject,  a  father  be  a  father,  and  a  son  be  a 
son  "  (XII,  11),  is  normally  understood  as  a  prescriptive  norm  of  how  one  should  act 
in  different  social  roles.  However  in  certain  situations  one's  different  social  roles 
might  be  in  conflict  with  one  another.  The  Duke  She  told  Master  Kong: 
In  my  locality  there  is  a  certain  paragon,  for  when  his  father  stole  a  sheep,  he, 
the  son,  bore  witness  against  him.  Master  Kong  said:  In  my  locality  those 
who  are  upright  are  different  from  this.  Fathers  cover  up  for  their  sons  and 
sons  cover  up  for  their  fathers.  Uprightness  is  to  be  found  in  this.  (XII1,18) 
This  is  a  typical  example  of  role  conflict  in  our  everyday  life.  Confucius  here  suggests 
that  one's  judgement  about  how  to  act  in  this  situation  should  not  blindly  follow  rules 
or  laws.  For  in  so  doing,  that  is,  if  the  son  bears  witness  against  his  own  father  who 
steals  a  sheep,  he  violates  or  turns  a  blind  eye  to  his  own  nature,  human-heartedness. 
Filial  piety  is  one  of  two  roots  of  human-heartedness  (1,2).  Thus,  the  problem  of  how 
the  son  has  to  act  in  this  situation,  according  to  Confucius,  is  the  problem  whether  he 
is  able  to  take  three  factors  into  account:  1)  his  role  as  the  son,  2)  the  current  situation 
(his  father  has  stolen  a  sheep),  and  3)  the  purpose  of  his,  the  son's,  action.  According 
to  the  Great  Learning,  as  a  son  he  has  to  abide  in  filial  piety,  6  so  when  there  is  a 
conflict  between  familial  responsibility  and  social  responsibility  Confucius  holds  that 
the  former  should  have  priority  over  the  latter  in  one's  decision  making.  For  to  cover 
up  one's  father's  wrong  doing  is  to  practise  filial  piety  and  to  practise  filial  piety  is  to 
undergo  the  process  of  self-cultivation,  rediscovering  human-heartedness  in  one's  self. 
Thus  acting  in  accordance  with  rules  of  proper  conduct  should  be  based  upon  the 
principle  of  righteousness,  and  acting  according  to  righteousness  is  to  act  humanely. 
Throughout  the  argument  above  the  notion  of  self  cultivation  is  prominent.  For, 
in  the  Confucian  view,  undergoing  the  process  of  self-cultivation  one  can  bring  out 
6  It  is  said  in  the  Great  Learning  that"....  The  Book  of  Odes  says,  '  flow  profound  was  King  Wcnl  I  low 
he  maintained  his  brilliant  virtue  without  interruption  and  regarded  with  reverence  that  which  he  abided 
(chip).  '  As  a  ruler,  he  abided  in  humanity.  As  a  minister,  he  abided  in  reverence.  As  a  son,  he  abided  in 
filial  piety.  As  a  father,  he  abided  in  deep  love.  And  in  dealing  with  the  people  of  the  country,  he  abided  in 
faithfulness.  "  See  Wing-tsit  Chan,  A  Source  Book  of  Chinese  !  'hilosopk  v  (Princeton,  1973),  p.  88. 
237 the  full  development  of  one's  character  and  possess  virtues,  such  as  wisdom, 
righteousness,  and  propriety.  These  virtues  are  internally  linked  to  human- 
heartedness.  7  This  is  the  reason  why  Confucius  says  that  "  [tjhosc  who  arc  humane 
rest  content  with  humaneness  and  those  who  are  wise  derive  advantage  from 
humaneness  "  (IV,  2).  Psychologically  speaking,  every  human  being  has  the 
potentiality  to  embody  human-heartedness.  But  in  order  to  embody  human- 
heartedness  one  does  not  have  to  seek  human-heartedness  from  without.  Mencius 
says, 
Humanity,  righteousness,  propriety,  and  wisdom  are  not  drilled  into  us  from 
outside.  We  originally  have  them  with  us.  Only  we  do  not  think  [to  rind 
them].  Therefore  it  is  said,  `  Seek  you  will  find  it,  neglect  and  you  will  lose  it. 
(6A:  6)s 
Therefore,  `  to  subdue  oneself'  cannot  be  understood  as  one  clement  suppressing  the 
other  element  in  the  mind,  but  as  self-cultivation.  That  is  to  say  that  to  be  a  humane 
man  is  to  bring  his  four  principles  or  beginnings  into  fully  development.  For  "  [e]ach 
of  these,  when  fully  cultivated,  guarantees  correct  moral  behavior.  "9 
Human-heartedness  as  a  unifying  concept,  like  the  Platonic  notion  of  the  Good, 
is  not  comprehended  by  Confucius  purely  intellectually.  For  Confucius  tries  to 
embody  human-heartedness  in  the  social  context,  that  is,  hunian"heartcdness,  by  its 
etymological  sense  (two  +  men)  requires  concrete  manifestations.  It  leads  us  to  the 
second  section  `  return  to  ritual  '. 
2.  The  notion  of  `  return  to  ritual' 
7  Wei-ming  Tu,  Cenlralily  a»d  commonality:  All  IssaY0,,  Con/urian  &'ligiou.  wreo  (Albany,  1989),  p. 
57. 
a  Chan,  ol).  cit.  p.  54. 
9  Hansen  Chad,  "  Freedom  and  Moral  Responsibility  in  Confucian  Ethics  ",  1'hNvsoplsy  East  (W  t/  West. 
vol.  XXII  (2),  1972,  p.  175. 
238 Ritual  in  Chinese  is  I  which  is  composed  of  two  parts:  i(:  (deity),  and  }  (ritual 
vessel).  It  is  clear  that  ritual  in  its  original  meaning  referred  to  rules  of  proper  conduct 
in  religious  ceremonies.  However  Confucius  extended  the  range  of  ritual  from  this 
original  meaning  to  both  good  manner  and  an  ideal  of  social  order.  1°  Ritual,  according 
to  Cua,  can  be  interpreted  both  in  a  particular  sense  and  a  general  sense.  1  I  shall 
proceed  to  discuss  first  the  particular  sense  of  ritual. 
Ritual  in  the  particular  sense  may  be  regarded  as  a  set  of  rules  which  govern 
human  behaviour  in  different  social  contexts.  It  is  said  in  the  Book  of  IZitrul/  that 
Do  not  roll  rice  into  a  ball,  do  not  leave  rice  on  the  table,  do  not  let  your 
soup  run  out  of  your  mouth.  Do  not  smack  your  lips,  do  not  leave  a  bone  dry, 
do  not  turn  over  the  fish,  do  not  throw  bones  to  the  dog,  and  do  not  persist  in 
trying  to  get  a  particular  piece  of  meat.  Do  not  turn  rice  about  to  let  it  cool 
off,  and  do  not  take  porridge  with  chop  sticks.....  12 
Ritual  in  this  passage  consists  in  the  detailed  regulation  of  manners  of  behaviour  on 
the  table.  Although  the  prescriptive  aspect  of  ritual  is  important,  Confucius  is 
primarily  concerned  with  the  relations  between  ritual  and  the  other  virtues  as  a  whole. 
The  following  two  points  can  be  made.  Firstly,  Confucius  is  opposed  to  formalism. 
The  Confucian  notion  of  ritual  cannot  be  understood  merely  as  a  set  of  prescriptive 
rules  of  conduct  or  etiquette.  If  someone  by  a  fluke13  acted  kindly  towards  others  in 
accordance  with  rules  or  laws,  he  would  not  be  a  just  man.  It  is  in  this  sense  that 
Confucius  says  that  "  [i]f  someone  is  not  humane  in  spite  of  being  a  man,  what  has  he 
to  do  with  ritual?  "  (III,  3)  Secondly,  it  follows  that  ritual  is  the  external  expression  of 
one's  interior  life.  '4  Human-heartedness  (je,:  ),  for  Confucius,  means  to  love  people. 
But  how  to  express  one's  love  to  others  in  a  proper  way  depends  upon  ritual.  That  is, 
10  Yutang  Lin,  The  Wisdom  (!  f  Confucius  (London,  1958),  p.  25. 
A.  S.  Cua,  "  Reflections  on  the  Structure  of  Confucian  Ethics  ",  i'hilrsophy  tim  l  11  'em,  vol.  XXI, 
1971,  p.  132. 
12  Lin,  op.  cit.  p.  49. 
1'  Cua,  op.  cit.  p.  133. 
14  Cua,  /hid.  p.  132. 
239 ritual  is  "  an  external  criterion  of  the  morality  of  jen  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a  criterion 
that  governs  the  concrete  expression  of  jen.  "1s  This  leads  us  to  the  general  sense  of 
ritual. 
We  are  told  in  the  Analects  that  ritual  plays  an  important  role  in  the  cultivation 
of  moral  character.  For  instances, 
One  is  roused  by  the  Songs,  established  by  ritual,  and  perfected  by  music. 
(VIII,  8) 
If  you  do  not  study  the  rites,  you  will  have  no  way  of  taking  your  stand.  (XVI, 
13) 
If  one  does  not  understand  the  rites,  one  has  no  means  of  taking  one's  stand. 
(XX,  3) 
What  is  established  here  is  one's  character,  and  what  is  studied  should  be  internalized 
in  one's  self.  For  one's  being  courteous,  cautious,  brave,  etc.  cannot  be  regarded  as 
meritorious  without  ritual,  Confucius  says, 
If  one  is  courteous  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  dissipates  one's  energies; 
if  one  is  cautious  but  does  %kithout  ritual,  then  one  becomes  timid;  if  one  is 
bold  but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  reckless;  if  one  is  forthright 
but  does  without  ritual,  then  one  becomes  rude.  (VIII,  2) 
Courtesy,  caution,  boldness,  and  forthrightness  are  regarded  as  merits  of  human 
character  only  when  they  are  expressed  in  company  with  ritual.  Even  the  practice  of 
filial  piety  has  to  be  in  accordance  with  ritual  and  to  "  [a]void  breaking  the  rules  "  (11, 
5).  The  reason  to  avoid  breaking  the  rules  is  not  that  in  order  to  avoid  punishment  one 
has  to  submissively  obey  the  rules,  but  that  one  obeys  the  rules  with  reverence  (11,7). 
As  mentioned  above,  to  be  a  superior  man  is  not  a  matter  of  fluke  or  coincidence.  For 
the  practice  of  ritual  requires  an  inner  dimension,  human-heartedness,  and  the  outer 
expression  of  human-heartedness  requires  ritual  performance.  '('  As  Cua  points  out, 
ºs  op.  cit. 
16  Cua,  Ibid  p.  133,  and  Wei-ming  Tu,  "  Li  as  a  Process  of  I  [umanization  ",  Philosophy  l:  a.  vt  aful  West, 
240 The  Confucian  view  may  be  stated  thus:  without  Ii  or  rules  of  propriety 
human  actions  would  degenerate  into  mere  movements  ---  mere  occurrences 
without  normative  significance.  The  normative  significance  of  ritual  actions 
ultimately  lies  in  jen.  But  mere  jen-feelings  and  dispositions  arc  by 
themselves  incapable  of  concrete  fulfillment  when  they  are  expressed  in 
inappropriate  contexts.  Thus  if  jeer  is  to  be  properly  regarded  as  an  internal 
criterion  for  the  moral  relevance  of  feelings,  Ii  expresses  the  outward  or 
external  criterion  for  the  relevance  of  the  expressions  of  these  feelings.  " 
It  should  be  noted  that  it  is  the  notion  of  ritual  that  marks  the  difference  between 
Confucian  altruism'8  and  Mo  Tzu's  (468-376  B.  C.  )  doctrine  of  Universal  Love.  Mo 
Tzu  holds  that  the  major  calamities  come  from  people's  failure  to  love  one  another.  19 
In  answer  to  Fan  Chi's  question  about  human-heartedness,  Confucius  says  that  "  Eilt  is 
to  love  others  "  (XI[,  22).  The  Confucian  claims  that  '  to  love  others  '  and  all  within 
the  Four  Seas  being  the  superior  man's  brothers  (XII,  5)  do  not  have  the  same 
meaning  as  Mo  Tzu's  Universal  Love.  For,  in  the  Confucian  view,  the  raw  feelings  of 
love  or  affection  should  be  restrained  to  some  extent  in  accordance  with  ritual.  Thus 
what  Confucius  proposes  here  is  the  principle  of  difJerentiuwion  of  love.  The  roots  of 
human-heartedness  are  based  upon  filial  piety  and  fraternal  duty  (1,2).  It  would  be 
impossible,  in  the  Confucian  view,  for  one  who  is  not  able  to  practise  filial  piety  and 
fraternal  duty  properly  at  home  to  be  able  to  love  others.  For  social  contexts  of  actions 
are  the  extension  of  the  familial  contexts  of  actions.  And  the  harmonious  familial 
relations  are  the  first  step  of  the  manifestations  of  well-cultivated  inner  self 
It  is  noticeable  that  benevolence  or  universal  love  cannot  be  sufficient  for  a 
social  morality  because  social  life  has  to  be  structured  by  rules.  A  society  without 
rules  would  be  an  impoverished  society.  For  we  need  rules  in  the  society  to  be  the 
guidance  for  our  interaction  with  others.  Rules  as  the  guidance  to  our  interaction  with 
vol.  XX11(2),  1972,  p.  188. 
"Ibid.  p.  133-34. 
IS  For  an  account  of  historical  development  of  Confucian  altruism,  sec  !  i.  H.  l3ubs,  "  The  Development 
of  Altruism  in  Confucianism  ",  Philosophy  East  acid  West,  vol.  1  (1),  1951,  pp.  48-55. 
19  Yu-lan  Fung,  A  History  of  Chiiiece  I'ltilosophy  (Princeton,  1983),  p.  95. 
241 people  enable  us  to  predict  how  people  would  act  in  a  given  situation.  The  more 
complex  a  set  of  social  rule  is  the  easier  for  us  to  know  how  to  interact  with  people. 
Confucius'  appeal  to  the  rules  of  proper  conduct  is  to  show  that  ritual  plays  an 
important  part  in  holding  both  society  and  people  together.  Thus  the  absence  of  ritual 
in  the  Republic  is  an  interesting  phenomenon.  Plato  in  the  Republic  thinks  that  the 
ideal  state  could  dispense  with  law,  because  the  basic  element  for  the  ideal  state  to 
come  into  being  and  the  social  order  to  be  maintained  is  the  philosopher-kings.  And 
the  philosopher-kings'  interaction  with  people  seems  to  be  limited.  They  do  not  have 
family  life,  private  property,  etc..  These  are  distractions  to  the  philosopher-kings' 
ruling  the  state.  However  in  the  Laws  Plato  sets  up  a  complex  code  of  laws  to  be  the 
guidance  to  the  interaction  between  man  and  man,  and  between  man  and  the  state. 
The  role  of  ritual  as  the  criterion  for  expressing  one's  love  or  affection  towards 
others  is  illustrated  in  the  Great  Learning,  where  we  are  told  that 
The  ancients  who  wished  to  manifest  their  clear  character  to  the  world 
would  first  bring  order  to  their  states.  Those  who  wished  to  bring  order  to 
their  states  would  first  regulate  their  families.  Those  who  wished  to  regulate 
their  families  would  first  cultivate  their  personal  lives....;  when  personal  life 
is  cultivated,  the  family  will  be  regulated;  when  the  family  is  regulated,  the 
state  will  be  in  order;  and  when  the  state  is  in  order,  there  will  be  peace 
throughout  the  world.  20 
The  idea  of  this  passage  is  that  the  fulfillment  of  peace  in  the  world  depends  upon  1) 
the  well-cultivated  individual,  2)  the  regulated  family,  and  3)  the  orderly  state.  One 
can  only  manifest  one's  character  through  external  behaviour  which  is  guided  by  rules 
or  laws.  A  well-regulated  family  requires  each  of  its  member  to  act  in  accordance 
with  ritual,  i.  e.  let  a  father  be  a  father,  and  let  a  son  be  a  son.  Likewise  an  orderly  state 
can  be  achieved  only  when  the  ruler  acts  as  a  ruler,  and  the  ministers  act  as  ministers. 
The  appeal  to  regard  others  as  one's  brothers  in  the  Anulects  also  appears  in 
Plato's  Republic.  Plato  says  in  Book  III  that  the  Guardians  should  regard  their  fellow- 
20  Chan,  op.  cit.  pp.  86-7. 
242 citizens  as  brothers  because  they  were  born  from  the  same  mother  earth  (414e).  It 
seems  to  me  that  the  fraternal  love  (philia)  appealed  here  by  Plato  seems  to  be  more 
similar  to  Mo  Tzu's  Universal  Love  than  to  Confucian  differentiation  of  love.  Both 
Platonic  fraternal  love  and  Mo  Tzu's  Universal  Love  are  utilitarian  in  nature.  For  both 
of  them  think  that  the  kind  of  love  they  recommend  will  do  great  benefit  to  the 
society  as  a  whole.  However,  the  Confucian  differentiation  of  love  is  more  similar  to 
Francis  Hutcheson's  universal  benevolence.  Hutcheson  says  in  "  An  Inquiry 
Concerning  the  Original  of  Our  Ideas  of  Virtue  or  Moral  Good  "  that 
The  universal  benevolence  toward  all  men,  we  may  compare  to  that 
principle  of  gravitation,  which  perhaps  extends  to  all  bodies  in  the  universe,. 
but  increases  as  the  distance  is  diminished,  and  is  strongest  when  bodies 
come  to  touch  each  other.  21 
Confucius  will  agree  with  Hutcheson's  claim  in  that  for  Confucius  one's  love  towards 
people  cannot  be  without  differentiation.  If  human-heartedness  is  universalistic 
principle  then  ritual  is  the  principle  of  purticularism.  2`  If  to  love  others  is  what 
human-heartedness  demands  then  loving  others  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
differentiation  will  be  the  practice  of  ritual.  "  In  other  words,  a  Confucianist  always 
carries  out  his  moral  self-cultivation  in  the  social  context.  "';  Confucian  self- 
cultivation  does  not  make  one  refrain  from  active  participation  in  society.  For  by 
human-heartedness  itself  one  has,  of  course,  to  love  others,  while  the  realization  of 
this  love  should  be  in  accordance  with  different  situations  at  different  times.  This  is 
the  expression  of  expediency  or  righteousness  on  which  acting  in  conformity  with 
ritual  is  based.  Rules  of  proper  conduct  are  important  not  only  because  they  enable  us 
to  predict  others'  actions  and  coordinate  our  behaviour  with  them  but  because  actions 
have  meanings.  The  meaning  or'  love  one's  parents  '  is  different  from  that  of  `  love 
one's  friends  '. 
21  R.  S.  Downie,  Francis  Hutchceson:  Philosoph  ic"al  Writings  (London.  1994),  p.  101. 
22  Wei-ruing  Tu,  "  The  Creative  Tension  Between  Jen  and  Li  ",  Philosophy  Fast  trod  West,  vol.  XVIII, 
1968,  p.  36. 
23  Tu,  lhid 
243 So  far,  the  saying  that  '  to  subdue  oneself  and  return  to  ritual  '  is  to  practise 
human-heartedness  has  been  discussed.  It  is  clear  that  according  to  Confucius,  one's 
personal  authenticity  and  sociality  should  always  go  together  with  each  other.  In  other 
words,  the  reason  for  one  to  act  morally  can  only  be  found  in  the  union  of  one's 
character  and  the  outer  expressions  of  one's  character,  actions.  In  what  follows  I  shall 
proceed  to  argue  that  in  Confucian  ethics  the  dichotomy  of  agent-centred  and  act- 
centred  ethics  does  not  exist. 
3.  The  union  of  act-centred  and  agent-centred  theory 
As  we  have  seen,  it  is  commonly  claimed  that  ethical  theories  can  be  divided  into  two 
aspects:  agent-centred  and  act-centred  theory.  The  former  is  concerned  with  the 
question:  What  kind  of  person  should  one  be?  The  latter  is  concerned  with  the 
question:  How  one  ought  to  act?  However  in  Confucian  ethics  neither  of  these  two 
theories  alone  can  give  a  complete  account  of  morality.  For,  in  the  Confucian  view,  a 
moral  agent's  self-cultivation  cannot  be  isolated  from  society.  To  be  social  is  to 
achieve  self-realization.  A  moral  agent,  in  Cua's  word,  must  aim  not  only  at  the 
cultivation  of  right  feelings,  but  also  at  the  right  expressions  of  these  feelings  in 
proper  context.  24  The  emphasis  on  seeking  human-heartedness  within,  self-cultivation, 
leads  Confucian  ethics  to  an  agent-centred  theory,  whereas  the  emphasis  on  ritual 
leads  Confucian  ethics  to  an  act-centred  theory.  The  ideal  of  the  superior  man  is  the 
embodiment  of  the  combination  or  union  of  human-heartedness  and  ritual.  Confucius 
says, 
He  (The  gentleman)  puts  his  sayings  into  action  before  adopting  them  as 
guidelines.  (II,  13) 
Only  one  who  is  humane  is  able  to  like  other  people  and  able  to  dislike  other 
people.  (IV,  3) 
The  gentleman  never  shuns  humanness.  (IV,  5) 
24  op,  cit.  P.  134, 
244 The  ways  of  the  gentleman  are  three  ...:  the  humane  do  not  worry;  the  wise 
are  not  perplexed;  and  the  courageous  do  not  feel  fear.  (XIV,  28) 
Righteousness  the  gentleman  regards  as  the  essential  stuff  and  the  rites  are 
his  means  of  putting  it  into  effect.  (XV,  18) 
The  idea  of  these  passages  is  that  acting  in  conformity  with  rules  of  proper  conduct 
requires  an  inner  dimension  for  its  foundation,  i.  e.  human-heartedness.  Otherwise, 
ritual  will  only  be  the  mechanism  of  regulating  people's  behaviour.  As  Mencius  says 
that  "  [a]it  the  ten  thousand  things  are  there  in  me.  There  is  no  greater  joy  for  me  than 
to  find,  on  self-examination,  that  I  am  true  to  myself.  Try  your  best  to  treat  others  as 
you  would  wish  to  be  treated  yourself,  and  you  will  find  that  this  is  the  shortest  way  to 
benevolence  "  (VII,  A,  4)"25  To  be  true  to  one's  human-heartedness  is  to  have  a 
harmonious  social  relation  with  others.  Thus,  the  significance  of  the  superior  man  as  a 
paradigmatic  individual  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  actualization  of  human-heartedness 
cannot  be  understood  only  as  purely  intellectual  or  theoretical,  for,  according  to 
Confucius,  moral  behaviour  is  a  union  of  internal  and  external  criteria  in  the  concrete 
situations  of  the  life  of  the  moral  agent.  26 
The  question  whether  Confucius  is  aware  of  the  modern  dichotomy  of  moral 
theories  can  easily  be  answered.  Confucius,  I  think,  is  not  aware  of  this  dichotomy  in 
that  the  interdependence  and  intimate  relationship  between  human-heartedness  and 
ritual  lead  Confucius  to  think  that  a  complete  account  of  morality  should  contain  both 
agent-centred  and  act-centred  theories. 
When  Confucius  says  in  the  Doctrine  of  the  Mean, 
In  the  way  of  the  superior  man  there  are  four  things,  to  not  one  of  which 
have  I  as  yet  attained.  --  To  serve  my  father,  as  I  would  require  my  son  to 
serve  me:  to  this  I  have  not  attained;  to  serve  my  prince,  as  I  would  require 
my  minister  to  serve  me:  to  this  I  have  not  attained;  to  serve  my  elder  brother, 
as  I  would  require  my  younger  brother  to  serve  me:  to  this  I  have  not  attained; 
to  set  the  example  in  behaving  to  a  friend,  as  I  would  require  him  to  behave 
23  Lau,  op..  cit.  p.  183. 
26  Cua,  op.  cit.  p.  138. 
245 to  me:  to  this  I  have  not  attained.  (Chapter  XIII)27 
What  Confucius  says  does  not  only  mean  that  one  has  to  fulfill  the  duties  which  arise 
from  one's  social  roles,  but  also  means  that  one's  duty-fulfilling  acts  are  the 
manifestations  of  one's  nature.  Thus  Confucius  says  that  "  [w]hen  one  cultivates  to 
the  utmost  the  principles  of  his  nature,  and  exercises  them  on  the  principle  of 
reciprocity,  he  is  not  far  from  the  path  "  (Ch.  XIII).  28  Moral  action  has  to  be 
complemented  by  moral  attitude,  and  moral  attitude  has  to  be  carried  out  by  moral 
action.  For  Confucius  the  account  of  the  moral  action  can  never  be  completely 
appreciated  without  both. 
Confucius  says  that  "  [a]t  fifteen  I  set  my  heart  on  learning,  at  thirty  I  was 
established,  at  forty  I  had  not  perplexities,  at  fifty  I  understood  the  decrees  of  Heaven, 
at  sixty  my  ear  was  in  accord,  and  at  seventy  I  followed  what  my  heart  desired  but  did 
not  transgress  what  was  right  "  (II,  4).  In  spite  of  the  suspicion  of  the  authenticity  of 
this  chapter,  29  it  nevertheless  shows  that  for  Confucius  the  process  of  self-cultivation 
is  a  lifelong  task.  One's  moral  actions  can  only  stem  from  one's  proper  cultivated 
nature,  and  one's  proper  cultivated  nature  can  only  be  recognized  or  actualized 
through  one's  action.  A  humane  man,  as  Confucius,  will  always  subdue  himself  and 
return  to  ritual. 
To  sum  up.  The  distinction  between  agent-centred  and  act-centred  theories 
presupposes  a  distinction  in  psychology  between  the  '  inner  '  and  the  '  outer  '.  If  my 
argument  is  right,  Confucius  does  not  make  such  distinction.  A  just  or  humane  man 
cannot  be  recognized  only  by  the  former  without  the  latter,  or  vice  versa.  For,  in 
Confucius'  view,  to  be  just  is  to  carry  out  the  duties  which  arise  from  our  social  roles. 
A  just  action  can  never  be  meritorious  unless  it  is  underlined  by  right  character;  and  a 
right  character  cannot  be  revealed  unless  the  moral  agent  acts  justly.  In  Confucian 
ethics  the  distinction  between  agent-centred  and  act-centred  theories  loses  importance 
to  the  extent  that  who  we  are  is  defined  by  our  social  roles. 
27  J.  Legge,  Confucius  (New  York,  1971),  p.  394. 
2  Ibid. 
29  Dawson,  op.  cit.  p.  85. 
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This  thesis  began  with  a  discussion  of  how,  for  Plato  and  Confucius,  an  orderly 
society  can  be  achieved.  Both  Plato  and  Confucius  hold  that  only  when  each  person  is 
doing  his  or  her  own  job  can  an  orderly  society  be  achieved.  However,  this  does  not 
mean  that  they  use  the  notion  of'  doing  one's  own  job  '  in  the  same  way.  The  notion 
of'  doing  one's  own  job',  for  Plato,  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  inner  harmony  of 
the  state  and  the  soul.  That  is,  Plato  has  a`  psychological  or  agent-centred  account  ' 
of'  doing  one's  own  job  '.  For  by  using  this  notion  Plato  is  able  to  illustrate  how  the 
three  elements  in  the  soul  can  be  harmonious  with  one  another.  Thus  the  notion  of 
`  doing  one's  own  job  ',  in  Plato's  view,  does  not  have  the  import  of  how  an 
individual  should  behave  towards  others. 
Moreover,  Plato's  view  of  justice  in  the  state  mirrors  his  account  of  justice  in  the 
soul,  and  thus  treats  individuals  as  parts  or  a  whole  rather  than  an  agent.  For  Plato  the 
individual  is  just  when  each  part  of  his  or  her  soul  does  its  own  work.  Plato  does  not 
suggest  that  justice  for  the  individual  consists  in  doing  his  or  her  own  job  (though,  no 
doubt,  he  would  say  that  the  just  man  and  woman  do  in  fact  do  his  or  her  own  job  in 
the  state).  Thus  Plato  has  an  agent-centred  rather  than  act-centred  view.  The  notion  of 
`  doing  one's  own  job  '  in  the  state  therefore  does  not  have  the  meaning  of  how  a  state 
should  interact  with  other  states,  but  of  how  the  three  classes  can  be  harmonious  with 
one  another.  In  other  words,  Plato  is  concerned  with  the  internal  harmony  of  the  state. 
It  might  appear  that  for  Plato  in  the  ideal  state  the  relation  between  the 
individuals  and  the  state  is  understood  in  an  organic  sense.  In  other  words,  the  relation 
between  the  individuals  and  the  state  is  like,  for  example,  the  relation  between  my 
hand  and  my  body.  Once  my  hand  is  detached  from  my  body  it  cannot  perform  its 
function  properly,  that  is,  it  is  not  a  hand  at  all.  It  would  be  true,  for  Plato,  that  only  in 
the  ideal  state  can  each  individual  fulfill  their  needs  and  perform  their  functions  well. 
However,  Plato  does  not  say  that  those  who  cannot  perform  their  natural  functions 
well  are  non-human.  Plato  instead  says  that  if  one  is  incapable  of  performing  one's 
function,  "  life  is  not  worth  while  "  (406e-407a).  It  is  not  clear  what  Plato  has  in  mind when  he  says,  '  life  is  not  worth  while  '.  But  it  might  be  interpreted  in  two  ways:  first, 
it  could  mean,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  state,  that  if  one  is  unable  to  perform  one's 
function,  one  does  no  good  but  harm  to  the  state  as  a  whole.  So  the  state  should  get 
rid  of  such  individual.  For  the  stability  and  balance  of  the  state  would  be  in  jeopardy. 
Second,  it  could  mean,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual,  that  if  one  cannot 
perform  one's  function  well,  one  cannot  fulfill  one's  nature.  Without  fulfilling  one's 
nature,  one  would  have  an  unhappy  life  which  is  not  worth  living.  I  think,  Plato  would 
take  the  second  view.  That  is,  not  being  able  to  fulfill  one's  function  does  not  make 
one  non-human,  but  unhappy.  The  relation  between  the  state  and  the  individuals  in 
the  ideal  state  is  in  a  sense  of  unification.  That  is,  in  a  unified  state  the  citizens  share  a 
common  education,  bring  up  their  children  in  common,  and  have  a  common 
responsibility  (466c).  The  citizens  share  the  same  feeling  and  strive  towards  the  same 
goal,  the  happiness  of  the  state  as  a  whole  (420b). 
In  Plato's  account  of  the  rise  of  society  (369b-370b),  he  does  not  see  the  relation 
between  the  individuals  and  the  state  as  organic.  For  men  can  survive  outside  society 
in  a  rather  miserable  way,  but  they  are  not  sub-human  or  non-human.  What  Plato  says, 
I  think,  is  that  men  can  perform  their  natural  functions  well  only  in  the  society,  and  to 
perform  their  functions  well  is  to  fulfill  their  natures.  It  follows  that  to  fulfill  their 
natures  is  to  be  happy.  Men  however  outside  society  cannot  perform  their  natural 
functions  well,  thus  they  would  be  unhappy.  Thus  the  advantage  of  adopting  the 
second  interpretation,  mentioned  above,  is  that  it  avoids  the  inconsistency  between 
the  account  of  the  origin  of  the  city  which  implies  a  quasi-contractual  view,  and  an 
organic  view.  For  Plato  an  ideal  state  is  not  organic  but  unified. 
For  Confucius,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  an  essential  element  in  the  virtue  of  the 
individual  to  do  one's  own  job.  The  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  seems  to  fit  in 
with  Confucius'  notion  of  Rectification  of  Names.  For  the  notion  of  Rectification  of 
Names  requires  one  to  understand  that  a  role  is  not  merely  the  name  of  a  social 
position,  but  a  role  entails  duties  and  obligations  which  the  occupant  of  the  role  has  to 
fulfill.  Only  when  one  carries  out  the  duties  or  obligations  of  the  role  of  father,  does 
one  deserve  the  name  of  father.  However,  to  fulfill  the  duties  or  obligations  of  one's 
role,  in  Confucius'  view,  needs  an  inner  dimension,  i.  e.  human-heartedness.  For  one's 
acting  in  accordance  with  rules  or  custom  cannot  be  understood  in  a  mechanical  sense. 
248 One's  moral  behaviour  is  the  expression  of  one's  well-cultivated  character,  human- 
heartedness.  Thus  Confucius  proposes  a'  combinational  account  '  of  the  notion  of 
'  doing  one's  own  job  '.  That  is,  act  and  character  are  so  closely  interwoven  that  it  is 
difficult  to  classify  Confucius'  theory  as  act-centred  or  agent-centred. 
Confucius  in  the  Analect  s  says  that  human-heartedness  means  "  to  love  others  " 
(XII,  22).  However  Confucius  does  not  propose  the  notion  of  Universal  Love.  One's 
affection  towards  others,  in  Confucius'  view,  should  be  restrained  to  some  extent  in 
conformity  with  rules  of  proper  conduct,  ritual.  Therefore  what  Confucius  proposes 
here  is  the  principle  of  differentiation  of  love.  If  human"heartedncss  is  the  motive  for 
one's  action,  to  love  people,  then  ritual  regulates  the  expression  of  one's  love  towards 
others  in  an  appropriate  way.  Although,  for  Confucius,  a  superior  man  possesses 
human-heartedness,  the  superior  man's  love  towards  his  friends,  according  to  ritual, 
cannot  be  the  same  as  his  love  towards  to  his  parents.  The  well-cultivated  character 
has  to  be  complemented  with  the  code  of  proper  conduct,  Thus  the  dichotomy  of  act. 
and  agent-centred  morality  is  irrelevant  in  Confucian  ethics.  For  moral  conduct,  for 
Confucius,  cannot  be  understood  in  either  theory,  but  both. 
The  modem  liberals,  unlike  Plato  and  Confucius  who  emphasize  the  importance 
of  the  agent's  character,  hold  that  a  role  is  a  matter  of  what  one  cloes,  not  of  what  one 
is.  Thus  the  liberals  have  an  '  act-centred  account'  of  the  notion  of'  doing  one's  own 
job  '.  In  other  words,  a  morally  good  man  is  one  who  acts  in  accordance  with  rules 
and  laws,  regardless  of  what  kind  of  person  he  is.  Moreover,  the  liberals  hold  that 
one's  having  a  role  depends  upon  one's  freedom  of  choice.  One  acquires  a  role  as  a 
result  of  one's  choice.  The  contrast  between  the  liberal  thought  and  Plato  and 
Confucius  is  obvious.  For,  in  Plato's  view,  one's  social  role  depends  upon  one's 
nature  or  aptitude,  while  for  Confucius,  one's  social  role  depends  upon  one's  birth, 
inheritance,  and  consanguinity. 
The  central  claim  of  this  thesis  is  that  the  different  ways  in  which  the  liberal, 
Plato  and  Confucius  answer  the  question  '  How  does  one  acquire  one's  role?  '  rest  on 
their  very  different  views  of  human  nature.  The  differences  in  their  conception  of  a 
social  role  lead,  in  their  turn,  to  important  differences  on  other  issues  especially,  1) 
the  division  of  labour,  2)  the  understanding  of  the  self,  and  3)  education. 
1)  Plato  says  that  each  man  should  do  one  job  for  which  he  is  naturally  suited 
249 (370b).  One's  position  in  the  society  is  determined  by  one's  nature,  and  thus  the 
division  of  labour  for  Plato  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  theory  of  human  nature, 
Confucius,  unlike  Plato,  does  not  think  that  men  have  different  natures,  but  that  by 
nature  men  are  close  to  each  other  (XVII,  2).  However  all  men  being  equal  by  nature 
does  not  lead  Confucius  to  agree  with  liberals'  view  that  one's  role  is  determined  by 
one's  choice.  For,  in  Confucian  society,  one's  social  position  is  determined  by  one's 
family  and  the  extension  of  one's  social  relations  with  others.  Furthermore,  the 
liberals  assert  that  besides  one's  biological  roles,  most  of  one's  roles  are  contractual. 
That  is,  by  accepting  a  role  one  agrees  to  fulfill  the  duties  or  obligations  prescribed  by 
the  role.  However,  in  a  non-contractual  society,  one's  role  might  be  determined  by  the 
following  ways:  a)  human  nature,  b)  government  decree,  c)  religious  doctrine,  and  d) 
inheritance.  Thus  it  is  clear  that  in  Confucian  society,  a  non-contractual  society,  one's 
role  might  be  determined  by  inheritance  and  government  decree.  For  in  spite  of  one's 
hereditary  roles  one  might  be  summoned  by  the  Emperor  to  be  a  minister.  Plato's  just 
state  is  not  contractual  either,  since  the  principle  of  specification  is  built  upon  the 
theory  of  human  nature.  Thus,  as  mentioned  above,  we  all  have  different  natures 
which  fit  us  for  different  jobs. 
2)  The  liberals  hold  that  people  should  have  freedom  to  choose  what  roles  they 
want,  and  have  the  capacity  of  living  different  kind  of  lives.  That  is,  people  should 
have  freedom  to  develop  their  natural  diversity.  What  is  essential  to  one's  self,  in 
liberal  thought,  is  the  capacity  to  choose.  Plato's  assertion  that  justice  is  concerned 
with  one's  inner  harmony  (443c)  implies  that  our  true  self  is  our  reasoning  power. 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  the  human  soul,  in  Plato's  view,  has  its  own  autonomy.  That 
is,  it  is  self-governed  and  capable  of  resolving  the  possible  conflicts  within  it.  But  it 
might  be  argued  whether  Plato  has  a  concept  of  autonomy,  for  it  is  clear  that  Plato 
does  not  see  the  notion  of  autonomy  (self-government)  as  consisting  in  freedom  of 
choice.  For  him  one's  capacity  for  rational  choice  depends  upon  one's  understanding 
of  the  Good,  not  upon  one's  preference.  Only  when  reason  is  in  command  in  one's 
soul  is  one  able  to  understand  the  Good,  and  only  when  one  desires  what  is  Good  is 
one  genuinely  autonomous.  Confucius  would  also  disagree  with  the  liberals  but, 
unlike  Plato,  he  holds  that  one's  self  can  only  be  understood  in  social  context.  In  other 
words,  one's  relations  with  others  can  reveal  what  one's  true  self  is.  Confucius  says 
250 that  filial  piety  and  fraternal  duties  are  the  roots  of  Human-heartcdncss  (1,2). 
The  liberals  think  that  each  individual  has  the  right  to  form  his  or  her  own 
conception  of  good,  and  there  is  no  one  objectively  right  conception  of  good  life. 
However  Plato  and  Confucius  do  not  see  it  in  this  way.  For  both  Plato  and  Confucius 
think  that  there  is  one  objectively  good  life  towards  which  each  individual  strives,  and 
the  good  of  the  individual  is  identical  with  the  good  of  the  state  as  a  whole.  Plato, 
unlike  Confucius  whose  notion  of  the  Good  (the  Way)  is  this-worldly,  also  thinks  that 
there  is  a  transcendent  good,  the  Form  of  the  Good.  The  good  of  the  state  is  an 
imitation  of  it.  The  theory  of  Form  is  alien  to  Confucian  ethics,  because  the  highest 
good,  the  Way,  in  Confucius'  view,  is  the  order  of  the  society.  This  notion  of  the  Way 
is  of  paramount  importance  in  his  thought.  For  example  he  says,  "  [i]f  one  has  heard 
the  Way  in  the  morning,  it  is  all  right  to  die  in  the  evening  "  (IV,  8). 
3)  The  liberals'  emphasis  on  freedom  of  choice  implies  that  the  individual  can 
choose  what  kind  of  education  or  training  to  give  their  children.  It  may  be  the  fact  that 
one's  daughter  is  interested  in  music  which  makes  one  decide  to  send  her  to  music 
school.  However,  in  Plato's  Republic,  what  kind  of  education  one  can  receive  mainly 
depends  upon  one's  nature.  Thus  the  first  stage  of  education  is  for  training  the  young 
guardians,  the  second  stage  of  education  is  for  educating  the  philosophers,  and  people 
of  the  third  class  receive  technical  or  professional  training  (456d).  Confucius  says  that 
"  [i]n  education  there  should  be  no  class  distinction  "  (XV,  38).  '  What  this  passage 
suggests,  at  first  sight,  is  similar  to  the  liberal  thought  that  each  individual  can  choose 
what  kind  of  education  or  training  he  or  she  would  like  to  receive.  However, 
Confucius  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  idea  that  education  should  be  accessible  to 
everyone,  not  with  one's  capacity  to  choose. 
The  liberals,  Plato,  and  Confucius  have  different  views  on  <hat  kind  of 
education  one  should  receive.  Would  they  agree  on  the  issue:  What  is  the  aim  of 
education?  Or  put  it  in  this  way:  What  kind  of  individual  is  education  intended  to 
produce?  The  aim  of  education,  for  the  liberals,  is  to  encourage  children  to  develop  in 
whatever  way  they  choose.  To  educate  children  to  have  the  capacity  to  choose  is 
important  in  modern  society.  For  in  our  life  we  often  stand  at  the  crossroads,  for 
1  Chan,  Wing-tsit,  A  Source  Book  in  c/zii  se  Philoscýp  /y  (Princeton,  1973).  p.  44. 
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education  widens  our  interests  and  in  turn  we  are  capable  of  choosing  a  way  of  life 
which  is  compatible  with  our  interests.  However,  education  for  Plato  serves  to 
educate  each  individual  to  be  able  to  perform  their  natural  functions  well.  For  the 
different  kinds  of  education  mentioned  above  aim  at  different  classes  people.  If 
people  receive  proper  education  or  training  they  will  do  their  own  jobs,  and  not  be 
meddlesome.  For  Confucius,  education  is  essentially  a  training  in  understanding 
tradition.  That  is,  by  receiving  education  one  can  acquire  a  proper  understanding  of 
ritual,  which  enables  one  to  act  in  a  proper  way.  In  other  words,  the  aim  of  education, 
for  Confucius,  is  to  train  or  educate  people  to  express  their  feeling  (human- 
heartedness)  towards  others  in  conformity  with  ritual. 
In  brief,  -  the  aim  of  education,  for  the  liberals,  is  to  train  people  to  choose  what 
interests  them.  For  the  liberals  think  that  our  roles  are  undetermined,  so  the  more 
education  one  receives  the  more  possible  ways  of  life  one  can  choose.  For  Plato, 
people's  roles  are  determined  by  their  different  natures,  education  is  to  train  the  three 
classes  to  fit  for  their  roles,  and  to  enable  them  to  act  effectively  with  their  roles.  For 
Confucius,  people's  roles  are  determined  by  birth,  thus  the  basic  personal  relations 
are  familial  ones,  i.  e.  father  and  son,  brother  and  sister,  etc..  Ritual,  the  rule  of  proper 
conduct,  is  the  guideline  for  the  interactions  between  the  family  members,  education 
is  thus  to  train  people  to  conform  to  ritual. 
The  differences  among  Plato,  Confucius  and  the  modern  liberals  also  cast  some 
light  on  moral  problems,  such  as  homosexuality  and  euthanasia,  in  modern  societies. 
Homosexuality,  for  the  liberal,  is  not  a  matter  of  public  morality.  It  is  a  matter  of 
individual  sexual  preference.  One's  being  homosexual  depends  upon  one's  sexual 
preference,  which  is  nothing  to  do  with  being  moral  or  immoral.  For  the  liberal  any 
pattern  of  sexuality  can  he  equally  valid.  However,  for  Confucius,  there  is  a  continuity 
between  public  and  private  morality,  one's  being  a  homosexual  not  only  does  harn  to 
the  reputation  of  one's  family,  but  also  damage  the  last  of  the  family  line.  For  the 
continuity  of  generation  of  the  family  is  important  to  Chinese.  The  Chinese  old  saying, 
the  most  unfilial  thing  to  do  is  not  to  have  male  offspring,  shows  how  much  harm 
homosexuality  brings  to  the  family. 
In  ancient  Athens,  the  head  (kyrios)  of  the  household  (oiku.  c)  can  have  a  man  as 
252 his  concubine.  And  in  Aristophanes'  play,  the  Frogs,  when  Dionysos  says  to  his 
brother  Herakles:  "I  am  in  love  with  someone  ",  Herakles  asks:  "  with  man  or 
woman?  ".  2  These  two  examples  shows  that  the  practice  of  homosexual  behaviour  in 
ancient  Athens  is  not  uncommon.  No  surprisingly,  Plato  does  not  sec  homosexuality 
doing  harm  to  the  family.  For,  in  the  Republic,  he  proposes  to  abolish  the  family.  And 
Plato  thinks  that  homosexual  love  has  its  value  if  it  can  lead  to  love  the  Form.  That  is, 
if  it  is  diverted  in  the  right  way,  having  sexual  satisfaction  in  a  moderate  way,  it  has 
educational  value  (the  Republic  403a-c,  and  the  Symposium  210a"212a).  Plato  claims 
in  the  Symposium  that  the  desire  of  a  young  man  has  to  be  aroused.  Although  the 
young  man  may  mistakenly  take  it  at  first  as  physical,  yet  through  proper  guidance  the 
same  desire  can  help  him  ascend  from  the  beautiful  things  of  this  world  to  the 
recognition  of  the  true  Beauty. 
So  far  as  euthanasia  is  concerned,  Plato  says  that  " 
....  a  life  in  which  one  must 
give  all  one's  attention  to  one's  ailments  and  none  to  one's  proper  job  simply  is  not 
worth  living.....  "  (406d).  The  point  of  this  passage  is  that  in  the  orderly  state  one 
person  does  one  job  for  which  he  or  she  is  naturally  suited.  Thus  to  do  one's  job  well 
is  to  fulfill  one's  nature.  If  one  cannot  pay  all  attention  to  one's  job  because  of  some 
chronic  disease,  one  is  unable  to  perform  one's  function  well.  Without  being  able  to 
perform  one's  function  well  one's  nature  cannot  be  fulfilled.  Without  being  able  to 
fulfill  one's  nature  one  does  not  have  a  happy  life.  A  life  like  this  is  not  worth  living. 
This  passage,  I  think,  might  suggest  that  Plato  is  in  favour  of  the  practice  of 
euthanasia.  For  one's  suffering  from  a  long  term  disease  prevents  one  from  playing 
his  role  properly,  which  might  in  turn  cause  instability  in  the  state.  The  reason  for 
Plato  to  be  in  favour  of  euthanasia  might  be  different  from  modern  moralists.  For 
Plato,  an  ideal  state  can  be  achieved  and  maintained  only  when  each  one  does  his  or 
her  own  job.  Thus  Plato's  main  concern  is  the  stability  of  the  state.  Moreover,  a 
person  who  cannot  perform  his  function  well,  i.  e.  he  is  unable  to  fulfill  his  nature,  is 
not  happy.  An  unhappy  life  is  not  worth  living.  However  modern  moralists  who 
approve  of  euthanasia  might  think  that  it  can  relieve  the  burden  of  the  patient's  family 
and  the  society,  or  that  people  have  right  to  choose  when  to  die.. 
2  Barrett,  D.  (trans.  ),  Aristophanres:  The  Wasps,  The  Poet  and  the  {fyvmein,  11w  Frogs  (London,  1964),  p. 
158. 
253 Confucius,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  approve  of  the  idea  of  euthanasia,  it  can 
be  seen  in  the  Hsiao  Ching  (the  Book  of  Piliatily),  where  Confucius  says,  " 
.... 
Seeing 
that  our  body,  with  hair  and  skin,  is derived  from  our  parents,  we  should  not  allow  it 
to  be  injured  in  any  way.  This  is  the  beginning  of  filiality.....  s3  The  basis  of  Chinese 
society  is  the  family.  In  the  family  one's  every  decision  on  whether  one  wants  to  live 
should  be  made  with  the  consideration  of  the  family  as  a  whole.  For  the  family  bond 
lays  the  emphasis  on  the  interrelationship  between  family  members,  not  on  the 
individual's  autonomy.  Thus  suicide,  for  example,  is  commonly  seen  in  Chinese 
society  as  an  unfilial  behaviour. 
In  brief,  the  examples  of  homosexuality  and  euthanasia  show  that  for  Plato  the 
individual's  primary  obligation  is  to  the  state.  In  the  case  of  homosexuality,  to 
practise  it  in  a  moderate  way  can  lead  one  to  love  the  Form,  and  to  love  the  Form  of 
the  Good  will  motivate  one  to  make  things  around  one  good;  and  in  the  case  of 
euthanasia,  a  sick  person,  who  cannot  perform  his  or  her  function  well,  does  no  good 
to  the  state  as  a  whole.  Thus  Plato's  primary  concern  is  the  state.  For  people  for  Plato 
are  defined  by  their  natural  functions,  and  they  would  be  no  value  to  themselves  and 
to  the  state  when  they  cease  to  perform  their  functions  well.  For  Confucius,  one's 
primary  obligation  is  to  one's  family.  For  the  practice  of  homosexuality  and  of 
euthanasia  do  great  harm  or  bring  shame  to  the  family.  Thus  whatever  one  does  one 
has  to  take  one's  family  into  account.  People's  roles,  in  Confucius'  view,  arc  not 
functionally  defined.  Rather  people  acquire  their  roles  by  birth,  that  is,  people  are  tied 
up  with  their  families.  Whatever  they  decide  to  do  they  have  to  take  the  family  as  a 
whole  into  account.  For  the  liberals,  the  practice  of  homosexuality  and  of  euthanasia 
are  matters  of  one's  personal  choice.  One's  right  to  choose  cannot  be  infringed  by  any 
means.  Thus  social  order  seems  to  be  secondary  in  value. 
The  contrast  between  Plato's  abolition  of  the  family  in  the  Republic  and 
Confucius'  emphasis  on  the  role  of  the  family  in  the  Analects  is  an  interesting  one. 
For  it  leads  Plato  and  Confucius  to  have  different  thoughts  on  how  a  corrupted  society 
can  become  an  orderly  one.  Plato's  theory  of  human  nature  leads  him  to  hold  that 
radical  change  is  necessary.  A  corrupted  society  can  be  corrected  only  when 
3  Makra,  M.  L.  (trans.  ),  The  H.  siao  Ching  (New  York,  1961),  ch.  I,  p.  3. 
254 philosopher  becomes  king  or  the  current  king  becomes  philosopher  (473d),  and  with 
the  aid  of  the  Auxiliaries  (441e).  For  without  the  aid  or  support  of  the  Auxiliaries  the 
philosopher  might  be  overpowered  by  the  mob  (588d-589b).  Thus  it  might  be 
suggested  that  the  first  step  towards  an  orderly  society  is  to  use  force.  With  the  aid  of 
the  Auxiliaries  the  philosopher  can  carry  out  his  plan  of  achieving  a  just  and  orderly 
society.  Plato's  ideal  state  is  an  imaginary  one,  he  requires  a  radical  transformation  of 
society.  In  other  words,  Plato  tries  to  reconstruct  a  new  state. 
Confucius  does  not  see  military  force  as  a  means  by  which  the  ruler  can  bring 
order  to  a  corrupted  society.  The  emphasis  on  the  family  leads  Confucius  to  hold  that 
a  society  can  be  ordered  when  the  family  is  regulated.  Without  having  order  in  the 
family  there  will  never  be  order  in  the  society.  For  family  is  the  bedrock  of  society.  If 
the  relation  between  father  and  son  can  be  restored  in  accordance  with  ritual,  then  the 
relation  between  ruler  and  minister  can  be  restored,  and  if  the  relation  between 
siblings  can  be  restored,  then  friendship  between  friends  can  be  restored.  Confucius 
deeply  believes  that  to  display  the  virtues  of  filial  piety  and  fraternal  love  is  to  play 
one's  proper  part  in  government  (11,21).  Therefore,  the  order  in  the  family  is  a  crucial 
factor,  for  Confucius,  of  bringing  order  to  the  society.  Confucius  does  not  want  to 
reconstruct  a  new  society,  but  to  reform  the  society  in  which  he  lives.  In  the  Greet 
Learning  it  is  said  that  to  bring  order  to  the  state  one  has  to  engage  in  self-cultivation 
and  regulate  one's  family.  Thus  reform  for  Confucius  would  be  a  gradual  process. 
By  contrast,  the  liberals  do  not  to  put  much  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  the 
family.  For  people  are  seen  as  individuals  rather  than  as  members  of  a  family.  The 
emphasis  on  the  freedom  of  choice  in  modem  societies  might  be  one  of  the  reasons 
for  having  high  rate  of  divorce.  For  the  over-emphasis  on  freedom  of  choice  makes 
people  think  that  I  can  do  whatever  I  feel  like  because  I  am  entitled  to  choose,  and 
makes  marriage  casual.  If  Confucius  is  right  on  emphasizing  the  family  value  then 
marriage  should  be  treated  seriously.  After  all,  marriage  is  the  bedrock  of  family. 
A  final  thought.  No  one,  of  course,  wants  to  live  in  Plato's  imaginary  world, 
although  it  is  perfect  and  ideal.  And  no  one  wants  to  go  back  to  live  in  Confucius' 
feudal  society,  although  it  is  humane.  Since  Plato  and  Confucius  lived  in  the  remote 
past,  what  can  we  learn  from  Plato  and  Confucius?  Two  points  might  be  suggested: 
first,  in  modern  societies  people  have  freedom  to  choose  what  they  want  to  do. 
255 However,  the  over-emphasis  on  freedom  of  choice  might  sometimes  cause  chaos  or 
disorder  in  the  society.  Although  Plato's  ideal  state  requiring  the  people  to  be 
obedient  to  the  ruler,  and  Confucius'  humane  society  requiring  people  to  be  in 
conformity  with  ritual  do  not  fit  in  with  modern  democratic  society.  Nevertheless, 
their  appeal  to  the  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  to  bring  order  to  the  society  may 
be  a  cure  for  the  problem  of  social  disorder  in  modem  societies.  We  ollen  say:  'I  am 
entitled  to  do  such  and  such  ',  or'  It  is  my  right  to  do  such  and  such  '.  However,  I  am 
personally  inclined  to  think  that  right  and  duty  or  obligation  go  hand  in  hand  with 
each  other.  Only  when  one  fulfills  his  duty  or  obligation,  let  us  say,  paying  the  income 
tax,  is  one  entitled  to  enjoy  the  benefits  provided  by  the  government.  For  every  right 
defines  an  obligation.  It  is  apparent  that  both  Plato  and  Confucius  do  not  have  the 
notion  of  right  in  their  ethics.  Nevertheless,  the  notion  of  `  doing  one's  own  job  '  can 
be  a  reminder  for  us.  Before  you  claim  your  rights  you  have  to  think:  Have  you 
fulfilled  your  duties  or  obligations?  After  all,  the  social  order  has  to  be  built  upon  the 
balance  between  give  and  take. 
Second,  we  live  in  a  more  complex  world  than  Plato  and  Confucius  did.  In 
modern  societies  we  have  more  complex  rules  and  laws  by  which  our  certain 
activities  are  determined,  and  to  which  they  are  connected.  We  are  habituated  or 
educated  to  think,  a  good  citizen  is  one  who  is  law-abiding.  That  is,  acting  in 
conformity  with  rules  and  laws  is  moral.  However,  is  it  true  to  say  that  morality  is 
merely  concerned  with  what  one  does,  not  with  what  kind  of  person  one  is?  Most  of 
people  in  USA,  for  example,  think  that  it  does  not  matter  what  kind  of  person  he  is,  as 
long  as  the  president  can  fulfill  his  duties  and  obligations,  and  bring  prosperity  to  the 
country.  He  is  a  good  president.  Both  Plato  and  Confucius  would  think  that  the  role  of 
president  can  be  well  played  only  when  one  is  the  right  person  for  the  role.  A  good 
president,  for  Confucius  and  Plato,  is  not  only  able  to  fulfill  his  duties  and  obligations, 
but  also  has  a  right  or  well-cultivated  character.  The  emphasis  on  character  may  be  an 
antidote  for  hypocrisy.  We  often  see  a  politician  praising  the  family  value  in  public, 
but  not  being  able  to  practise  it  in  private.  Plato  and  Confucius  would  say,  having  a 
good  character  you  not  only  know  that  being  law-abiding  is  good  or  moral,  but  also 
are  willing  to  obey  the  laws.  What  you  are  (inner)  and  what  you  do  (outer)  should  be 
consistent. 
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A  comprehensive  table  to  Chapter  III: 
Plato  Confucius  Individualism  Communitarianism 
Society  and  The  individual  Society  is  prior  The  individual  Society  is  prior  to 
the  individual  is  prior  to  to  the  is  prior  to  the  individual 
society*  individual  society 
Personal  the  balanced  social  relation  unencumbered  is  understood  in 
identity  soul  (reason  is  self(frcedom  social,  cultural,  and 
properly  in  ofchoice)  historical  context 
control) 
The  individual  The  individual  The  individual  The  individual  The  common  good 
good  &  The  good  is  good  is  good  is  prior  to  is  prior  to  the 
common  good  coincident  coincident  with  the  common  individual  good. 
with  the  the  common  good. 
common  good.  good. 
Social  role  determined  by  determined  by  acquired  by  choices  we  can 
human  nature  the  family  and  freedom  of  make  are 
consanguinity  choice  conditioned  by 
society 
Tradition  should  be  should  be  should  be  is  necessary  for 
examined  (in  conformed  to  rationally  and  personal  identity 
the  Republic)  and  respected  critically  (tradition  has  value 
examined  in  itself) 
(tradition  has 
no  particular 
value  in  itself) 
Ruler  virtuous  and  virtuous  and  democratic  democratic  election 
wise  man  (the  wise  man  (sage  election  (seeing  (seeing  election  as 
philosopher-  king)  election  as  producing  a  result 
king)*  producing  a  which  satisfies  what 
result  which  is  best  for  the 
satisfies  the  society) 
maximum 
number  of 
o  Ic) *  In  talking  of  the  ideal  state,  Plato  seems  to  think  that  the  state  is  prior  to  the 
individual.  It  is  noteworthy  that  although  Plato  asserts  in  the  I&'/'uh/ic"  that  justice  in 
the  state  is  that  each  one  does  one  job  for  which  he/she  is  by  nature  suited,  yet  he  does 
not  mean  that  one's  nature  is  defined  by  one's  role  in  the  state.  That  is,  one's  nature  is 
not  dependent  upon  society. 
*  Although  both  Plato  and  Confucius  claim  that  the  virtuous  and  wise  man  should  be 
the  ruler  in  the  ideal  state,  yet  they  put  different  emphases  on  the  notion  of  the  ideal 
ruler.  The  former  emphasizes  the  philosopher's  power  of  reason,  and  the  latter  the 
sage  king's  respect  for  tradition. 
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